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Ecology is a new fusion point for all sciences… The emergence of ecology has placed the economic 
biologist in a peculiar dilemma: with one hand he points out the accumulated findings of his search for 
utility, or lack of utility, in this or that species; with the other he lifts the veil from a biota so complex, so 
conditioned by interwoven co-operations and competitions, that no man can say where utility begins or 
ends.  
 
Aldo Leopold (1939; p. 114) 
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Abstract 
 
 
A principal purpose of this thesis is to present an economic evaluation of ecosystems. The 
concept of ecosystem health is adopted to ascertain the status of ecosystems. Ecosystem health is 
considered in part an economic concept and defined as a function of utility through the 
ecosystem services that satisfy various needs, subject to preserving the integrity of the adaptive 
cycle. In order to quantify the utility supplied by ecosystem services the novel utility index 
Ecosystem Outcome Protection Year (ECOPY) is developed. By forming this index, an 
evaluation can be performed using cost utility analysis, which avoids monetizing these benefits.  
 
An attempt is made to ascertain an appropriate approach for ecosystem management. It is 
reasoned that expert intuition can determine some kind of macro-regularities in ecosystems 
despite their complex dynamics. Hence, these inferences could be used for ecosystem 
management. Adaptive co-management is introduced as a means to bring about the 
collaboration of experts as resource co-managers. The concept of informed intuition is 
developed to bring about a systematic approach to learning and evaluation where the mental 
models of experts are transcribed using fuzzy cognitive mapping.  
 
However, it is argued that ecosystems as complex adaptive systems are non-ergodic and full of 
surprises. Accordingly, abduction, the logic of creative conjecture is systematically developed, 
for the purposes of maintaining mental model flexibility. This systematic application of 
abduction with an informed intuition forms the proposed abductive process of research, which 
is grounded in Shacklean potential surprise, a non-probabilistic function. To demonstrate this 
novel research process, a post-classical economic evaluation of Te Waihora lake ecosystem is 
undertaken, which employs the ECOPY index and potential surprise method. This empirical 
case study reveals various cost-effective management actions for improving lake health, which 
went beyond the intuitions of resource co-managers. This indicated the potential of the 
approach, which is considered a significant contribution for the methodological development of 
ecosystem management.  
Keywords: abduction, adaptive co-management, complex adaptive systems, cost utility analysis. 
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Acts of creation are ordinarily reserved for gods and poets, but humbler folk may circumvent this 
restriction if they know how. To plant a pine, for example, one need be neither god nor poet; one need 
only own a good shovel. By virtue of this curious loophole in the rules, any clodhopper may say: Let there 
be a tree - and there will be one. 
 
If his back be strong and his shovel sharp, there may eventually be ten thousand. And in the seventh year 
he may lean upon his shovel, and look upon his trees, and find them good. 
 
God passed on his handiwork as early as the seventh day, but I notice He has since been rather 
noncommittal about its merits. I gather either that He spoke too soon, or that trees stand more looking 
upon than do fig leaves and firmaments. 
 
Aldo Leopold (1949; p. 81) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 1
Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
The problems that exist in the world today 
cannot be solved by the level of thinking that created them 
 
Albert Einstein 
 
The management of threatened species is urgently needed, given the impact of human economic 
activity resulting in the irreversible loss of biodiversity and the homogenization of our 
ecosystems. The effects of biodiversity loss can have catastrophic consequences to the 
environment and socio-economic systems alike. The specific causal factors for biodiversity loss, 
while all relating to human economic activity, are said to be many and diverse. Nonetheless, 
habitat fragmentation, land conversion, species exploitation, exotic species introduction and the 
agricultural practice of monocultures are considered significant factors (Perrings et al., 1995; 
Memmott et al., 2006). However, whatever the factors, the fact remains that biodiversity loss has 
been dramatic. So dramatic, that over the last 300 years, the extinction rates of species have 
increased up to 1000 times over ‘natural’ background rates (Lawton & May, 1994). Hence, these 
extinction rates indicate a stark reality that human-induced biodiversity loss is a critical 
environmental problem.  
 
Despite the loss of biodiversity, there is the inevitable economic realization that when we spend 
scarce (public) funds for species management, we should try to get value-for-money. After all, 
there are far more threatened species which require our managerial input than there are fiscal 
resources available (Cullen et al., 2001). Yet, despite agreement in wanting to achieve value-for-
money, it is difficult to agree on what we should invest in. Disagreement is understandable, as 
we and our preferences are not monolithic. Yet, we need to make judgements as to which 
management actions, as an investment, should be allocated our funds. Thus, in order to achieve 
value-for-money, we need a means to evaluate attributes relevant to the management of species, 
or environmental resources in general, by definitive economic expressions. Only then will 
resource managers be able to evaluate environmental projects allowing for the ‘rational’ choice 
of management actions for achieving sustainable pathways.   
 
 2
The need to evaluate environmental projects in an economic manner is obvious. Texts in 
environmental economics stipulate that the most comprehensive method for economic 
evaluation is cost benefit analysis. Specifically, cost benefit analysis assesses management 
actions by collapsing aggregated benefits and costs into a monetary metric. This monetary 
metric can either be represented as a benefit-cost ratio or the net difference between benefits and 
costs as net benefits (Hanley & Spash, 1993). Accordingly, actions that are economically 
justifiable are those with a positive net benefit. However, as with all management actions, the 
consequential net benefits from the action are spread throughout future time periods. For 
actions to be comparable, they need to be discounted back to the present period by a discount 
rate. The discount rate exhibits the (social) rate of time preference. A positive discount rate 
assumes that human agents have a preference for returns sooner not later. Once discounted, the 
future net benefits for a designated payoff period can then be summed, providing a comparable 
net present value for each management action proposed (Equation 1.1).  
 
=
+
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Equation 1.1: The net present value (NPV) of a management action is determined by summing 
net benefits (NB) over the designated payoff period (T) and discounting net benefits by a 
specified discount rate (r). 
 
Over time, cost benefit analysis has undergone several advancements. In its present form, cost 
benefit analysis accounts for social welfare considerations, where human agents, as consumers, 
are assumed to be sovereign. Value is then revealed through the preferences of human agents, 
which by way of market exchange determine prices. Hence, the social welfare for an 
environmental project could be determined as the estimated sum of discounted net benefits of 
all affected human agents. With social welfare calculated, cost benefit analysis can theoretically 
lead to the efficient allocation of resources, as scarce funds can be used to produce the greatest 
social good, where consumer surplus is maximized (Arrow et al., 1996).  
 
Despite this argument for efficient resource allocation, it is well-known that the use of cost 
benefit analysis for the economic evaluation of environmental projects is a difficult undertaking 
for at least two reasons. First, some argue that species have intangible values or existence values 
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in themselves, which are unlikely to be captured by the anthropocentric pricing mechanism of 
the marketplace (Pearce & Turner, 1990). Secondly, even if prices are relevant, there is the 
difficulty that there is often no properly defined market which can adequately capture the value 
of many environmental resources (Proops, 2000; Balmford et al., 2002).  
 
The presence of market externalities when evaluating environmental projects, as a result of 
missing markets, can lead to the misallocation of resources (Swanson, 1995). The absence of 
markets for many environmental resources is a reflection that these resources are public goods, 
which are not readily exchanged in the ‘private’ marketplace. Significantly, this difficulty of 
ascertaining a price is more problematic when establishing a benefits function, rather than a 
costs function (Hoehn et al., 2003). Hence, given the presence of externalities, if cost benefit 
analysis was readily used in evaluating environmental projects, such as species management, 
there arises the likelihood that many of the benefits supplied would be undervalued. This 
undervaluation may result in economic inefficiencies and cause environmental projects to be 
discriminated against in favour of competing societal projects (Pearce & Moran, 1994).  
 
In order to address these problems, environmental economists have developed various non-
market valuation methods designed to overcome pricing difficulties in the absence of actual 
markets. Some non-market valuation methods estimate indirectly the willingness-to-pay of 
human agents for the environmental resource by revealed preferences, as occurs with the travel 
cost method. However, these methods generally can only account for values that derive their 
value from the actual use of the environmental resource (i.e. use values). Another approach is 
the contingent valuation method, which it is said can determine total economic value of an 
environmental resource, in that it can reveal ‘prices’ for both use values and the less tangible 
non-use values (Equation 1.2). These non-use values not only include existence values, but also 
option values and quasi-option values. Option values and quasi-option values, respectively, are 
values which reflect the willingness-to-pay for the environmental resource to be available in the 
future and the willingness-to-pay to avoid use of the environmental resource in the present, 
given the possibility of improved efficiencies that have yet to occur (Jakobsson & Dragun, 1996).  
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Equation 1.2: The total economic value (TEV) of a resource is calculated by the summation of 
use values (UV), option values (OV), quasi-option values (QV) and existence values (EV).  
 
In order to determine total economic value, the contingent valuation method estimates prices by 
stated preferences. Accordingly, surveys are conducted to elicit monetary values from a large 
sample population of affected human agents by way of hypothetical market scenarios, so that 
their willingness-to-pay for benefits supplied can be calculated. Hence, the contingent valuation 
method constructs a virtual market where no actual market exists (Carson, 1998). The validity of 
contingent valuation is, however, contested. Some economists claim that virtual markets must 
give rise to virtual prices, not real prices (Bateman et al., 2002).  
 
Choice modelling is one method considered able to avoid the potential biases of putting a direct 
monetary value on a contingency (Hanley et al., 1998). In choice modelling, comparisons are 
made between ‘scenarios’ distinguished by a given set of attributes, which can then allow 
monetary values of these attributes to be inferred. However, choice modelling, like contingent 
valuation, still entails the painstaking effort of gathering large amounts of information from a 
large sample population, which makes for both costly and impractical valuation (Gowdy, 1997). 
After all, the economy of research matters.  
 
Given these difficulties in using cost benefit analysis, resource managers may choose not to 
value benefits altogether. Instead, they may resort to the use of cost analysis, where 
management actions are evaluated by least cost. Worse still, resource managers may resign 
themselves to management governed in an unsystematic manner with little transparency of 
expenditure (Prato, 1999). This lack of accountability may generate doubt amongst society over 
the cost-effectiveness of expenditure for environmental projects. This may in turn result in 
environmental projects being discriminated against in favour of other more transparent projects 
within the portfolio of assets that society holds.  
 
Discrimination against environmental projects may have catastrophic consequences. This is 
because a fundamental shift has occurred, where today human agents have taken up a 
 5
significant amount of the responsibility for the continuance of many species (Vitousek et al., 
1997). Hence, disinvestment in species may result in further biodiversity loss (Figure 1.1) 
(Swanson, 1995). But we also need to keep in mind that while disinvestment in environmental 
resources may be brought about by lack of economic analysis and missing markets, it may also 
occur for rational reasons. One should be aware that fiscal “resources spent on [species 
management] are resources not spent on kid’s health” (Shogren, 1998; p. 567).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1.1: The discriminatory consequences when an inadequate approach is used for the 
evaluation of environmental projects (adapted from Stephens et al., 2002). 
 
1.1 Cost Effectiveness Analysis & Cost Utility Analysis 
In spite of the problems with cost benefit analysis, economists argue that it should not be 
discarded unless better methods are available (Gafni, 2006). Fortunately, while not well-known, 
there are alternative methods that may be practical and useful. The most distinguishable feature 
of these alternative methods is that they are able to formulate an outcome (or output) function, 
without the specific need for the comprehensive valuation of benefits using monetary 
measurement. Thus, in evaluating environmental resources by these alternative methods, the 
status of an environmental resource can be determined by the outcome of a non-monetary 
environmental unit. Cost effectiveness can then be determined by evaluating the measured 
outcome against a monetary-based cost function, quantified by accounting for the estimated cost 
of implementing the proposed management actions (Proops, 2000).  
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Despite the usefulness of these alternative methods, recognition of the need to determine an 
environmental outcome and subsequently assess it in an economic manner has been ignored by 
most of the research community, let alone by resource managers (Polasky et al., 2001). 
Nevertheless, there are some notable exceptions. One such study is that of Montgomery et al. 
(1994), who analysed opportunity costs of various management actions for the threatened 
species, the northern spotted owl, using cost effectiveness analysis. Specifically, in this work, the 
survival probability of the threatened species was used as the environmental units of outcome. 
The resultant findings demonstrated that the marginal costs of species management increase 
markedly as the survival probability of the species approaches 100 per cent. Despite cost 
effectiveness analysis appearing useful, it is not able to compare an array of environmental 
projects. This is because the environmental units selected, that is, the measure of effect, will limit 
the evaluation to those environmental resources where this measure is directly applicable. 
Moreover, the status of any environmental resource is likely to be better determined by 
accounting for more than a single measure of effect.   
 
The work of Metrick and Weitzman (1998) was the first to come to terms with the need for a 
method that encompasses multiple attributes. Their cost-effectiveness ranking approach used 
the parable of Noah’s Ark as an analogy to prioritize species for further management. The 
specific attributes considered were: the cost of improving survival probability of the species; its 
change in survival probability with the implementation of the proposed management action; the 
direct utility of the species; and the genetic distinctiveness of the species (Equation 1.3).  
 ∆
= +  
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Equation 1.3: The cost-effectiveness ranking approach (Metrick & Weitzman, 1998). 
Here Ri is the rank index of species i; 
Di is the genetic distinctiveness of species i; 
Ui is the direct utility of species i; 
∆pi is the improvement of survival probability of species i; and 
Ci is the cost to improve the survival probability of species i. 
 
The resultant formulation of these attributes provides a ranking of the species evaluated, which 
Metrick and Weitzman (1998) describe as a measure of the species expected marginal 
distinctiveness and utility per dollar spent. Despite its promise, there are a number of limitations 
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with this approach. The most significant of these is there is little evidence to suggest that the 
selected attributes are comprehensive, let alone that they can be either easily quantified or 
aggregated (Weitzman, 1998; Hughey et al., 2003).  
 
Cullen et al. (1999; 2001) made a necessary contribution to the economic evaluation of 
environmental projects, when they observed that the difficulties of putting a monetary 
measurement on benefits with environmental projects are similar in kind to human health 
investments. Accordingly, these authors employed cost utility analysis for evaluating 
environmental projects, a method devised by health economists to overcome pricing difficulties 
(Broome, 1993). Cost utility analysis is attractive because it, unlike cost effectiveness analysis, 
provides a definitive means of evaluating either an array of environmental projects or a 
multiplicity of attributes about an environmental project. Cost utility analysis achieves this as it 
can transform the outcome function of potentially multiple attributes in part by expert 
judgements into a utility index (Richardson, 1994; Banzhaf & Boyd, 2005). The human health 
utility index, Quality Adjusted Life Years (QALY), is one such index that is well-known in health 
economics.  
 
While differences between cost effectiveness analysis and cost utility analysis are apparent 
through the use of multiple attributes and expert judgement, some economists prefer not to 
make such distinctions (e.g. Gold et al., 1996). An example of this confusion can be found in the 
work of Macmillan et al. (1998). These authors argued that they were using cost effectiveness 
analysis when investigating the cost-effectiveness of public expenditure on Scottish woodland 
restoration. However, by eliciting expert judgements to standardize multiple attributes before 
aggregating these weighted attributes into a utility index, an economic evaluation by cost utility 
analysis was clearly performed. The work of MacMillan et al. (1998) is nevertheless helpful, as 
amongst other things it demonstrates that cost utility analysis is synonymous with multi-criteria 
analysis.  
 
Multi-criteria analysis is an overarching term depicting the set of methods capable of weighting 
and aggregating a multiplicity of attributes together (Munda et al., 1994). However, the 
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construction of a utility index by multi-criteria analysis has been argued by some economists to 
be inappropriate. This is because a utility index does not measure value per se, as it does not 
account for the willingness-to-pay of human agents (e.g. Mooney & Olsen, 1991). Value can be 
distinguished from utility, as value reflects preferences revealed through the determination of 
prices in a ‘market’. Utility, while intimately related to value, reflects a kind of measure of the 
degree of ‘usefulness’ of a resource as felt in the mind of a human agent (Straton, 2006). The 
criticism comes from neoclassical economists because unlike value, utility is not considered to be 
comparable across human agents in neoclassical economic theory as an expression of public 
choice. However, despite this problem, it turns out that utility indices can provide an adequate 
representation of value. In short, utility reflects preferences; where the more preferentially 
weighted an outcome is the more value associated with it (Broome, 1991; Richardson, 1994).  
 
By devising a utility index, cost utility analysis can both incorporate multiple attributes into its 
measurement, and provide an expression of value. Moreover, this capacity of accounting for an 
expression of value is significant, as a deficiency with cost effectiveness analysis is that in using 
an environmental unit alone, it neglects the preferences of human agents. This problem is found 
conversely with cost benefit analysis. This is because in focusing solely on the preferences of 
human agents through their willingness-to-pay, cost benefit analysis incorporates only an 
anthropocentric schema of value through price. Price by itself fails to reveal information about 
the actual ‘status’ of an environmental resource or the environmental context in which value 
was generated (Gowdy, 1997; Straton, 2006; Winkler, 2006). A genuine account of value requires 
both an ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ aspect. That is, ‘valuation’ should include environmental 
status and the preferences of human agents (Georgescu-Roegen, 1968; 1975). Unlike the 
anthropocentrism of cost benefit analysis, and the strict biocentrism of cost effectiveness 
analysis, only cost utility analysis appears capable potentially of capturing both environmental 
and economic accounts.  
 
Given this capability to capture both environmental and economic accounts, it could be 
conceived that cost utility analysis has the greatest scope amongst the methods examined. 
However, neoclassical economists still argue that cost benefit analysis has the greatest scope. 
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This is because the use of a monetary metric allows cost benefit analysis to compare investments 
across the portfolio of all societal projects. For this reason, while cost utility analysis is 
potentially capable of determining economic efficiencies, these are efficiencies of production. 
Only cost benefit analysis can determine allocative efficiencies (Drummond et al., 1997).  
 
The inability of cost utility analysis to determine allocative efficiencies need not however be seen 
as a deficiency. The task of cost utility analysis is to determine cost-effective management 
actions for the funds available. It does not attempt any re-determination of allocated funds. 
Therefore, the use of cost utility analysis is appropriate as long as environmental projects remain 
socially valued. Moreover in practice, it is unlikely that cost benefit analysis could be used for 
the purposes of achieving allocative efficiency across a number of societal projects. This is 
because in doing so it must assume substitutability across all forms of capital. This assumption 
of substitutability has been criticized. Some economists argue that capital from environmental 
resources, as natural capital, should not be substituted with other anthropogenic forms of 
capital. This is because some level of natural capital must always be maintained, in order to 
sustain our existence (Dasgupta & Mäler, 2000; Saez & Requena, 2007).  
 
1.2 Social Welfarism & Expert Judgement 
Along with the allocation questions of cost utility analysis, it is the shift away from social 
welfare theory towards expert judgements for the construction of a utility index that some 
neoclassical economists have considered the most unacceptable aspect of cost utility analysis 
(Brent, 2003). After all, Arrow et al. (1996) point out that the economic evaluation of 
environmental projects should account for the social welfare considerations as defined by the 
value functions of all affected human agents. The determination of the greatest social good 
cannot, it is argued, be determined by the undemocratic and biased values of a ‘qualified’ few. 
Hence, a critical issue with the use of cost utility analysis is seeking out the appropriate 
preferences to use.  
 
This issue can be partially overcome, if one considers utility as defined by Pareto (1897). In this 
interpretation, utility is distinguished from ophelimity, where utility refers to cardinal 
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preferences that are socially needed and can be directly comparable across human agents. 
Ophelimity, on the other hand, refers to ordinal preferences that are individually wanted and 
are not comparable across human agents (Cooter & Rappoport, 1984). To further illustrate the 
contrast between these utility forms, Pareto (1897) suggested that bad-tasting medicine has 
utility for sick people, but not ophelimity. This difference is important as needs and the 
preferences they encompass are then a ‘common’ characteristic amongst all human agents 
(Kamenetzky, 1992). Therefore, it may not be necessary when examining utility to determine the 
preferences of all affected human agents. And indeed, a recent study suggests preferences 
elicited by experts appear to be a reasonable approximation of the preferences of all affected 
human agents. This suggests expert judgements can be used as a cost-effective method for 
determining social welfare considerations (Colombo et al., 2009). 
 
This interpretation of utility by Pareto is supported in recent findings in social psychology and 
behavioural economics. Empirical evidence indicates that the preferences of human agents are 
not strictly independent and stable, as assumed in cost benefit analysis. Preferences, rather, are 
found to be endogenous and dependent on their institutional or social psychological context 
(Costanza, 2006; Gowdy, 2007; Hodgson, 2010). Human agents are not independent; they are 
social beings, in that they can interact with one another within a socio-economic system 
allowing the exchange of information and tradeable commodities as ‘socio-economic (goods 
and) services’ (Hodgson, 1988). Thus, human agents are now conceived to operate at two 
different, but integrated, levels of cognition (Ainslie & Haslam, 1992). At one level there is the 
neoclassical consumer, who has individual wants (which may be short-term). On another level, 
however, there is a citizen, who is potentially far-sighted and who can consider the needs of 
others and society, more generally (Hamilton, 2008). It is the cognitive level of the citizen that 
one can consider societal needs and utility, which should be used for the economic evaluation of 
environmental projects. In fact, it is highly questionable whether the individualistic (and short-
term) preferences of the consumer are appropriate for the economic evaluation of environmental 
projects, when these resources are public goods and involve the long-term issues of 
sustainability (Sagoff, 1994; 1998; Hodgson, 2010). Significantly, sustainability is defined here as 
the capacity to preserve the integrity of a system over the long-term (Costanza et al., 2001).  
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In light of these criticisms of social welfare theory, it becomes more apparent that cost utility 
analysis, using the knowledge and preferences of a qualified few is a legitimate means for 
determining matters of public choice. After all, many of the affected human agents will neither 
possess sufficient understanding of the environmental problems faced nor an adequate grasp of 
the economic methods used (Alvarez-Farizo & Hanley, 2006; Barkmann et al., 2008). Given their 
limited competence in making up their own minds on matters of the environment, affected 
human agents would naturally gather advice or ‘outsource’ their knowledge and preferences to 
those agents they judge to be experts (Earl & Potts, 2004). Hence, in recognition that human 
agents use the knowledge and preferences of experts, it appears reasonable to use the judgement 
of experts firsthand for economic evaluation.  
 
From what has been said, it is important that the methods of economic evaluation examined are 
not seen as an increased level of analytical sophistication, where cost benefit analysis is the 
‘normative standard’ (Richardson, 1994). Instead these methods should be placed into two 
distinct methodological positions. While neoclassical economic theory underpins cost benefit 
analysis, it is defined that cost utility analysis is underpinned by an alternative methodological 
approach termed here ‘post-classical economics’ (Table 1.1). A post-classical economics is 
methodologically different to neoclassical economic theory, not least because it recognizes both 
objective and subjective aspects to ‘value’ and the significance of expertise. This use of the term 
post-classical economics is somewhat different from, but not in contradiction with, that used 
previously by Lavoie (1992), who described post-classical economics as a non-unified set of 
‘alternative’ economic theories (e.g. institutional economics and evolutionary economics) that are 
theoretically distinct to neoclassical economics.  
 
Method Cost function Outcome function Economic approach  
Cost analysis Monetary-based No unit ---  
Cost benefit analysis Monetary-based Monetary-based Neoclassical  
Cost effectiveness analysis Monetary-based Environmental units  --- 
Cost utility analysis Monetary-based Utility index Post-classical  
Table 1.1: A summary of the various methods of economic evaluation examined. 
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1.3 Ecosystem Health & the ECOPY 
Cost utility analysis, it is argued, is a suitable method for the economic evaluation of 
environmental projects. It is a low cost method for determining the cost-effectiveness of 
environmental projects, which is essential for agencies tasked with ‘demonstrating’ the cost-
effectiveness of their management actions implemented. Previously, Cullen et al. (1999) applied 
cost utility analysis for species management. In doing so, a utility index, named Conservation 
Output Protection Years (COPY), was devised. The COPY index measures the change in species 
status according to a threatened species rating after the implementation of a suitable 
management action. In later work, Cullen et al. (2001) included a priority setting function to 
reflect preferential weights towards investigated species, as not all species should be considered 
of equal utility (Equation 1.4). 
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Equation 1.4: The COPY payoff with priority setting function (Cullen et al., 2001). 
Here Stm is the status of species i with management; and 
Stm/o is the status of species i without management. 
CHARi is the charisma of the species i; 
DISi is the distinctiveness of the species i; and 
Ci is the cost of the management action for the species i.  
 
The COPY index as defined by Cullen et al. (1999; 2001) can be criticized for its one 
dimensionality. This is because it is limited, as it was originally defined, to the evaluation of 
single species projects only. In recognizing its potential one dimensionality, Cullen et al. (2002) 
extended the COPY index beyond single species so as to evaluate environmental projects 
involving multiple species. However, despite this increased scope, it still remains too restrictive, 
as species management may be ecologically counter-productive, if the management of one 
species is at odds with managing other threatened species (Folke et al., 1996; Simberloff, 1997).  
 
With ever more species threatened with extinction, there is a compelling line of reasoning that 
management should be redirected away from species and towards ecosystems. This shift 
towards ecosystem management is reasoned threefold. First, as indicated above, there are 
negative ecological implications when managing species in isolation and not as an integrated 
‘agent’ of an ecosystem, where many species interact with each other. In fact, including species 
 13
interactions may reverse the rank order of priorities amongst species (Baumgärtner, 2004). 
Secondly, the random loss of species may not be critical at the margin, and costs involved in 
species management in representative ecosystems may well exceed their benefits (Van Kooten & 
Bulte, 2000). Finally, ecosystem management incorporates much larger spatial scales and longer 
temporal scales that increase scope and take advantage of associated economies of scale 
(Simberloff, 1997). Indeed, a primary reason for the conception of ecosystem management was 
the need to focus on long-term issues for the sustainability of ecosystems (Janssen, 2002a). 
Hence, when compared with ecosystem management, the bitwise efforts of species management 
may lead to numerous economic inefficiencies, while also being unlikely to mitigate the present 
loss of biodiversity (Likens, 1992; Apitz et al., 2006).  
 
Ecosystem management as a guiding paradigm, however, may not be a simple undertaking. 
This is because assessing the status of various species is comparatively a much easier task than 
determining the status of an ecosystem (Tracy & Brussard, 1994). Despite this, ecosystem health 
is one concept that some researchers claim is able to capture the status of ecosystems (e.g. 
Rapport, 1989). Ecosystem health is crafted mainly to determine how ‘fit’ an ecosystem is 
relative to its potential performance (Costanza, 1992). Ecosystem health draws upon human 
health as an analogy and integrates this within the context of ecosystem science (Rapport, 1989). 
In fact, the concept actually encompasses human health explicitly. This is because a healthy 
ecosystem provides some of the necessary factors of production ‘needed’ for continued human 
health (Folke, 1999). Indeed, “the assumption of interactions between human and ecosystem 
health is a given; it is both intuitive and significant” (Di Giulio & Monosson, 1996; p. 9).  
Consequently, at the root of ecosystem health is the realization of an interactive co-dependency 
between ecosystems and socio-economic systems. A stark example of this co-dependency is an 
area known as the ‘Dust Bowl’ in the prairie lands of the United States. This area once flourished 
with biodiversity. However, as the intensity of agricultural practices increased, the soil structure 
destabilized so that erosion occurred resulting in the mass loss of productive topsoil. The 
subsequent ecological degradation resulted in substantial biodiversity loss and the economic 
collapse of agricultural practices. Today, the area is left barren (Kahn, 1995). Hence, one can 
surmise that the conditions necessary to sustain the capacity of ecosystems are now dependent 
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on human agents, and yet human agents are (and always have been) dependent on ecosystems 
for their own health and development (Costanza, 1996).  
 
Given that ecosystem health is an extension of human health, it would seem that a utility index 
by which ecosystem health could be measured is an extension of the QALY and COPY indices. 
In order to ascertain the status of ecosystems, a newly coined index, the ECOPY is proposed and 
developed in this thesis. ECOPY stands for ‘Ecosystem Outcome Protection Years’. In devising 
the ECOPY index, a principal purpose of this thesis is made known: to develop and practically 
undertake an economic evaluation of an ecosystem using cost utility analysis for the 
determination of cost-effective management actions for ecosystem management. 
 
However, despite its popularity and promising start, ecosystem health remains a somewhat 
vague concept. In contrast, while human health has a wide body of reference data on the 
‘characteristic’ human agent (Schaeffer et al., 1988), advocates of ecosystem health have reached 
less agreement on a suitable benchmark (Rapport et al., 1998). However, difficulty in defining 
ecosystem health in precise language is to be expected as terms become defined. For example, 
some do not accept the union of ‘ecosystem’ with ‘health’. Instead, they argue that the term 
health is only relevant to organisms, let alone species, but certainly not to ecosystems (Suter, 
1993; Wicklum & Davies, 1995). To that end, O’Laughlin et al. (1994; p. 64) state that “the terms 
health … and ecosystem … defy precise definition – they tend to mean whatever people want 
them to mean.”  
 
These difficulties in defining the root of the concept of ecosystem health have unfortunately 
stalled its endorsement (Gaudet et al., 1997; Rapport et al., 1998; Lancaster, 2000). Accordingly, 
ecosystem health as a concept has been marginalized, as it is portrayed more as a broad societal 
aspiration, which is useful in general conservation than a credible measure of environmental 
status. This marginalization has seen health research efforts shift away from ecosystem health 
and towards the more ‘tangible’ and defined fields of the toxicology, pathology and 
epidemiology of organisms and species (Wilcox & Kueffer, 2008). The challenge remains to a 
large degree as to how to extend the status of health beyond organisms and species, and 
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towards ecosystems. This challenge still needs to be met for ecosystem health to be reinitiated as 
a means to evaluate the status of ecosystems. There is a need to define an operational definition 
that can be accepted by the scientific community. Hence, an objective function of ecosystem 
health should be grounded in ecosystem science (Belaoussoff & Kevan, 1998; 2003). 
 
1.4 Overview & Way Ahead 
It is apparent that there is a need to integrate economic and ecological phenomena. However, as 
some economists have recognized (e.g. Georgescu-Rogen, 1971; Patterson, 2002), previous 
attempts to integrate ecological theory with neoclassical economic theory, have resulted in 
ecological theory being contradicted. Yet, we know that the health of humans and socio-
economic systems and the health of ecosystems are dependent on each other. Hence, it appears 
necessary that economics be methodologically consistent and compatible with ecological theory 
for the sustainable management of ecosystems. After all, “if economics is to have much of a 
future then economists will have to adopt scientific foundations that are appropriate to the 
systems that they deal with” (Foster, 2005; p. 875).  
 
A deep-seated exploration is therefore commenced in this thesis. It is a search to discover a logic 
that establishes an ecological rationality, where economic theory for the management of 
ecosystems is coherent with our conceptualization of ecosystems established from ecological 
theory. An ecological rationality is essential, because as the cyberneticist Bateson recognizes, our 
“own survival depends on understanding that not only are we coupled to our own 
conceptualization of ecosystems and ecological order, but also to embodiments of our own ways 
of thinking about them and acting on them” (Harries-Jones, 1995; p. 8). This ecological 
rationality would establish the basis of a methodology suitable for a post-classical economics, 
which can deal adequately with ecosystem health. Such an exploration is challenging, but is 
potentially profitable. After all, we as human agents are not different or separate from nature, 
looking at it from the ‘outside’ (Costanza et al., 2007a). That is, we are not detached from some 
external reality which is ‘out there’, which is different from ourselves. On the contrary, ever 
since the works of Darwin (1859; 1871), we have known that we are a part of nature itself. 
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The undertaking described above, determines the structure of each of the following chapters. 
First, the challenge to conceptualize ecosystems and their health into an objective function 
grounded in ecological theory is tackled in Chapter 2. In this chapter, ecological theory is 
progressively reviewed and critiqued, so that the ‘evolution’ of the ecosystem health concept is 
depicted. From this, it is shown that ecosystems are conceptualized as complex adaptive 
systems. With ecosystems conceptualized, a novel definition of ecosystem health is conceived.  
 
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, a synthesis is constructed between economic theory and ecosystem 
management. This relationship is fundamental, as there are two aspects needed to carry out 
ecosystem management; ‘knowledge’ about ecosystem behaviour and a ‘choice’ about the 
management action to be implemented. That is, “in the practical policy world, ecosystem 
management is based on understanding how [ecosystems] work, how humans can alter them, 
the values we wish to protect and the costs of [management action]” (Costanza & Farber, 2002; 
p. 369). But, what makes these aspects difficult is the presence of uncertainty. Specifically, in 
Chapter 3, neoclassical economic theory and the approaches of ecosystem management that are 
methodologically consistent with it are reviewed and critiqued. In Chapter 4, a post-classical 
economics is discussed, where a suitable novel methodology is developed around the socially 
representative judgement of a group of experts. However, this approach it is argued in Chapter 5 
has not gone far enough. An alternative logic needs also to be embraced. In doing so, it is argued 
that an ecological rationality can be formed, as knowledge is rational relative to the specific 
ecosystem managed, as a complex adaptive system. In turn, a complete and novel methodology 
is proposed, which is argued to be consistent with ecological theory and ecosystem health. That 
is, a complex adaptive systems approach is established. This is important as “the essential 
qualities of any complex adaptive system can really only be effectively captured by another 
complex adaptive system” (Bradbury, 2002; p. 63). Accordingly, by the end of Chapter 5, this 
thesis would have gone through the same evolution of concepts as depicted in Chapter 2.  
 
In Chapter 6 an original empirical case study is performed, which examines the ‘degraded’ lake 
ecosystem, Lake Ellesmere, also known by the local indigenous Māori as Te Waihora. In 
particular, this chapter reveals practically how the knowledge of ecosystem behaviour of the 
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lake can be gained through applying the proposed novel methodology. In Chapter 7, a practical 
application of an economic evaluation of this lake ecosystem is performed using knowledge 
derived from the proposed novel methodology and cost utility analysis through the 
employment of the ECOPY index. From this economic evaluation, cost-effective management 
actions are found for improving the ecosystem health of the lake.  
 
The concluding chapter, Chapter 8, provides a summary of the findings, which leads to a 
discussion on the relationship between methodology, ecological rationality and biodiversity 
loss. Finally, the research limitations and opportunities for future research are indicated.    
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Chapter 2: The Science & Definition 
of Ecosystem Health 
 
Look abroad through nature’s range 
Nature’s mighty Law is change… 
 
Robert Burns 
 
2.0 Introduction  
Any means for measuring ecosystem health is an attempt to capture the status of ecosystems. 
However, to date it still remains a somewhat vague concept (O’Laughlin et al., 1994; Lancaster, 
2000). Hence, the task of this chapter is to identify what a healthy ecosystem is. Such a definition 
of ecosystem health requires that an objective function of ecosystems is carefully enunciated. 
This objective function, as previously acknowledged, should be grounded in ecosystem science. 
Hence, in this chapter, ecological theory is progressively reviewed and critiqued in order to 
decipher a suitable objective function of ecosystem health. However, this chapter provides not 
only a critical review of ecological theory; it offers a novel definition of ecosystem health. This 
definition will be used to define the ECOPY index (i.e. Ecosystem Outcome Protection Years) 
introduced in Chapter 1, and this will be applied later for the economic evaluation of an 
ecosystem (Chapter 7).  
 
In the beginning sections of this chapter, ecosystems and their science are conceptualized from 
two different perspectives within the discipline of ecology, those of population ecology and 
systems ecology. The different perspectives of an ecosystem found in population ecology and 
systems ecology are highlighted by how they respectively define the scope of the system 
boundary between the ecosystem and its surrounding environment (Figure 2.1) (O’Neill et al., 
1986; Allen & Hoekstra, 1992).  
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Figure 2.1: A representation of an ecosystem and its system boundary 
within its surrounding environment. 
 
An ecosystem, as conceptualized by population ecologists, envisages that the system boundary 
can be defined by the assemblage of its many interacting populations of species as an ecological 
community (Levin & Pacala, 2003). A population is the set of organisms belonging to a single 
species. The interactions between species are commonly, though not exclusively, confined to 
studies of predator-prey relationships. Where only predator-prey relationships between species 
are considered, an ecosystem can be conceived as a food web (Allen & Hoekstra, 1992).  
 
Systems ecologists, on the other hand, envisage that the system boundary of an ecosystem 
extends beyond biota to include the interactions of species with abiotic components as well 
other species. For this reason, systems ecologists view ecosystems as energetic systems, as 
energy is viewed as a common measure between biotic and abiotic components of an ecosystem 
(Depew & Weber, 1996). Accordingly, species are often grouped into tropho-species, which 
represent species that share the similar predator and prey species. Hence, system ecologists view 
interactions between (tropho-)species and abiotic components in the form of a series of energy 
transformations, that when modelled resemble an agglomerated food web, or food chain. 
 
Nevertheless, as will be established in the first part of this chapter, neither of these 
conceptualizations of an ecosystem are adequate for depicting an objective function of 
ecosystem health. Both population ecology and systems ecology provide only partial theoretical 
understandings of ecosystem science. Progress, however, can be made when these perspectives 
are synthesized. They, then, make way for a theoretical understanding of ecosystems conceived 
Surrounding 
environment 
System boundary 
Ecosystem 
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as thermodynamic networks. This synthesis does not contradict population or systems ecology. 
Instead it allows various ecological theories, including information theory, organization theory, 
resilience theory, complexity theory, network theory and hierarchy theory to be brought to bear 
on the subject and to subsequently be integrated. In doing so, another synthesis is achieved in 
the second part of this chapter, where ecosystems are conceptualized as complex adaptive 
systems with a scale-free network topology.  
 
It is the conceptualization of ecosystems as complex adaptive systems that will bind this chapter 
together, and the thesis as a whole. That is to say, given that ecosystems are found to be complex 
adaptive systems, a suitable methodology to evaluate and manage them, in keeping with an 
ecological rationality, must be capable of appropriately incorporating complex and adaptive 
phenomena. Significantly, in conceptualizing ecosystems as complex adaptive systems, it will be 
established by the end of this chapter that strictly ‘objective’ accounts of ecosystem health are 
inappropriate. Ecosystem health is in part a subjective conception.  
 
2.1 Succession & Stability 
Many ecosystems, despite their richness, exhibit some well-defined patterns of behaviour. One 
such pattern of behaviour is succession. A well-known example of succession is the transition of 
an abandoned field to a forest (Solé & Bascompte, 2006). Thus, succession depicts ecosystems 
that can grow and develop in a directional manner from an immature phase (i.e. abandoned 
field) towards a mature climax phase (i.e. forest) (Clements, 1936; Odum, 1969).   
 
The immature phase is dominated by small, fast-growing generalist species referred to as r-
strategists. The reason r-strategist species dominate the immature phase is because their high 
growth rate allows them opportunistically to use emergent favourable conditions. As growth in 
biomass continues, the ecosystem develops towards the climax phase. This phase is dominated 
by K-strategist species that are large, slow-growing specialist species, who maintain their 
population close to their carrying capacity. Hence, the carrying capacity represents the 
population abundance of a species that can be maintained for the resources available. The 
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specialization of K-strategist species at the climax phase generally increases the diversity in these 
systems, while ensuring increased efficiency in the use of resources (Figure 2.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2: A representation of succession in an ecosystem. Box 1 indicates the r-phase or 
immature phase, where r-strategist species predominate, while boxes 2a and 2b indicate 
intermediate succession phases of mixed species apparent with growth, which develops 
towards box 3, the K-phase or mature climax phase, where K-strategist species predominate.   
 
At some point in time, a disturbance to the ecosystem will occur. Succession theory, as it is 
classically modelled assumes that a disturbance will only take an ecosystem back to a previous 
phase. Ecosystem development through succession will result in the convergence onto the 
‘same’ mature climax phase thereafter (Oechel et al., 1994). Thus, ecosystems as they have been 
classically modelled are systems with a global equilibrium found at the mature climax phase, 
which is stable and self-perpetuating.  
 
Of additional importance, the evolutionary theory of natural selection explains the presence and 
specialized nature of K-strategist species. This is because species will attempt to adapt and 
maximize their survival and reproduction or their fitness functions for the prevailing ecological 
conditions. The fitness function of a species is said to be maximized by the process of natural 
selection by way of an adaptive walk. This evolutionary mechanism of exploration is governed 
by ‘random’ mutations that bring about variation and the subsequent selection of useful 
adaptations through ‘sifting’ from an enormous set of variants and trying some of them and 
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generally keeping those that ‘work’ (Dawkins, 1976). This ‘blind’ mechanism leads to the 
accumulation of favourable adaptations over time, which acts to produce the most adapted set 
of species for the prevailing ecological conditions.  
 
Succession, as it is classically modelled, maintains that the mature climax phase is a stable and 
self-perpetuating equilibrium that is resistant to change. If so, then, ecosystem health could be 
defined by the stability of various ecological variables (e.g. population abundance of species 
assuming carrying capacity near the climax phase). Specifically, stability is defined as the 
capacity of an ecological variable after a disturbance to return to its respective equilibrium value 
(Costanza, 1992). Equilibrium values, in accordance with succession as it is classically modelled, 
are conditions found at the mature climax phase. But, before it is possible to use stability as a 
measure of ecosystem health, we are left with the question of explaining the global stability of 
the mature climax phase. It was the ecologist Elton (1958), who first began an enduring dispute 
in population ecology, when he argued the existence of the diversity-stability hypothesis. The 
basis of the hypothesis was the observation that the high diversity of species found in climax 
communities, such as tropical rain forests, can explain the stability of these systems.  
 
The diversity-stability hypothesis initially had some support based in mathematical accounts of 
information theory. By applying information theory to food webs, it can be demonstrated that 
the addition of a single species can in turn multiply the number of possible interactions within a 
food web. This exponential increase in interactions decreases the characteristic path length (i.e. 
the average path length or connective distance between any two species chosen at random) of 
the system (Shannon & Weaver, 1949). Accordingly, it was reasoned that as the density of 
interactions increase there is an increased likelihood that the overabundance of one species will 
not affect the stability in population abundance of other species because there would be a 
greater ‘choice’ available in predator-prey relationships (MacArthur, 1955). Hence, with greater 
choice available in diverse climax communities, the population abundance of species in the food 
web is hypothesized to be maintained at its stable equilibrium.  
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Despite these arguments for the diversity-stability hypothesis developed sometimes being taken 
to be a theorem, they are not necessarily valid (May, 1973). Information theory does not provide 
a “formal proof of the increase in stability of a community as the number of links in its food web 
increases” (Hutchinson, 1959; p. 103). And indeed, the validity of the diversity-stability 
hypothesis came under scrutiny by the ecologist May (1973; 1976). In his studies, species 
assemblages were modelled as non-linear dynamic systems, so as to account for the interactions 
of species in food webs. The results indicated that there was no positive relationship between 
the attributes stability and diversity. In fact, “too rich a [food] web … leads to instability” (May, 
1973; p. 122). The instability generated was reasoned to occur because as the number of species 
increases there is an increased likelihood that an additional species will bifurcate the population 
dynamics of another species away from a steady state to a less stable attractor. For example, the 
population dynamics of a species may qualitatively change into a periodic attractor, where its 
dynamics once settled down, do not return to a fixed value, but rather oscillate around a 
repetitive pattern. Alternatively, the population dynamics may also cascade in a continual 
bifurcation into a sea of chaos. The extraordinary dynamics of chaos indicate that the species 
population will never settle down, despite that chaotic dynamics have an attractor that bounds 
where the dynamics can and cannot go. Hence, chaos despite its deterministic origins is highly 
irregular and has the appearance of randomness. Accordingly, when chaotic dynamics are at 
play even minor differences in initial conditions between two identical models will result in 
major differences. Thus, chaotic dynamics exhibit ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ 
(Gleick, 1987). This is the critical insight of chaos theory (Figure 2.3).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.3: The dynamic behaviour of a hypothetical population abundance of a species over 
time exhibiting (a) steady state dynamics; (b) periodic dynamics; or (c) chaotic dynamics.  
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The experimental ecologist McNaughton (1977) escalated the controversy when he presented 
empirical results that showed support for the diversity-stability hypothesis. Specifically, African 
buffalo were removed from two grassland ecosystems. This resulted in biomass loss in the less 
diverse ecosystem, while the productivity of the more diverse ecosystem remained stable. 
However, despite the difficulty in isolating empirically the effects of diversity on stability (Ives 
et al., 2000), Tilman (1996) undertook an extensive empirical study to gain insights into this 
relationship. This researcher found that increases in species diversity decreases the stability of 
the population dynamics of individual species, but increases the stability of productivity as 
indicated by biomass values in the ecological community. This finding supports both empirical 
and mathematical findings. Hence, the controversy over the diversity-stability hypothesis 
appears ‘somewhat’ resolved. Diversity can both positively and negatively impact stability.  
 
Despite this finding, the presence of non-linear dynamics in ecosystems illuminated a greater 
issue. That is, non-linear dynamics indicate that multiple system states could exist with 
ecosystems (Figure 2.4) (Holling, 1973; May, 1977). If so, succession leading to the convergence 
onto the same mature ecological community regardless of its initial conditions would be 
incorrect. Rather, with non-linear dynamics, initial conditions are not ‘forgotten’, as different 
initial conditions may lead to ecosystems developing on different succession pathways after a 
disturbance (Pahl-Wostl, 1995).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.4: A representation of a non-linear function in discrete time. The function depicts 
three equilibria marked as x1, x2 and x3. Note that x1 and x2 represent stable equilibria, which 
could be system states in an ecosystem, while x3 is unstable and cannot be a system state 
(adapted from Ludwig et al., 1997).  
45o 
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While difficult to prove unreservedly, there is now an array of evidence that infers that 
ecosystems do exhibit a multiplicity of system states (Table 2.1) (Scheffer & Carpenter, 2003). 
Given the presence of multiple system states, ecosystem health cannot be portrayed by the 
stability properties of ecological variables near or at equilibrium, as ecosystems do not have a 
single unique equilibrium. Ecosystems are not globally stable. They are only ever locally stable. 
Hence, ecosystems are path dependent and historical systems, where differences in initial 
conditions will define the succession pathway of the present system state (Solé & Bascompte, 
2006). Accordingly, ecosystem health should not be defined by the stability of various ecological 
variables returning to equilibrium conditions after a disturbance. Instead, ecosystem health it 
appears should be defined by the vulnerability of the present system state from transitioning 
into an alternative system state (Ferriera & Towns, 2001; Ludwig et al., 2001).  
 
Type of 
ecosystem 
Alternative  
system state 1 
Alternative 
system state 2 
Citations 
Aquatic 
ecosystems 
Clear water dominant Turbid water dominant Carpenter, 2001; 2003 
Benthic vegetation 
dominant 
Blue-green algae 
dominant 
Scheffer et al., 2001 
Macrophyte dominant Blue-green algae 
dominant 
Gunderson, 2001 
Floating plant abundant Floating plant depleted Scheffer et al., 2003 
Game fish abundant Game fish absent Post et al., 2002 
Hard coral dominant Fleshy algae dominant Nyström et al., 2000 
Kelp forests dominant Urchin dominant Simenstad et al., 1987; 
Estes & Duggins, 1995 
Seagrass beds dominant Algae and muddy water 
dominant 
Gunderson, 2001 
Fish stock abundant Fish stock depleted Steele, 1998 
Terrestrial 
ecosystems 
Grass dominant Tree dominant Walker et al.,1981; 1997; 
Perrings & Walker, 1995 
Grass & savannah 
dominant 
Woody vegetation 
dominant 
Sinclair et al., 2007 
Forest pest outbreak No pest outbreak Holling, 1986 
Pine trees dominant Hardwood trees 
dominant 
Peterson, 2002 
Birch-spruce succession Pine dominant Danell et al., 2003 
Grass dominant Moss dominant Zimov et al., 1995 
Table 2.1: Some empirical examples of a range of ecosystems demonstrating the presence of 
multiple system states (adapted from Folke et al., 2002a). 
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2.1.1 Thermodynamics & Exergy  
Unlike population ecologists, who have focused much of their attention on issues of stability of 
populations, systems ecologists have tended to investigate succession, through asserting that 
ecosystems are energetic systems. Ecosystems as energetic systems are recognized to be subject 
to the laws of thermodynamics. The first law of thermodynamics states that the total amount of 
energy always remains unchanged as energy neither can be created nor destroyed, only 
transformed (Jørgensen, 1997). The crucial second law states that available energy, termed 
exergy, is always dissipated and converted into unavailable energy (e.g. respiration & evapo-
transpiration) termed entropy, when it is used to do work for ecosystem growth and 
maintenance. The reason for this is that energy, when used to do work is transformed from 
being ordered to being progressively more disordered. Disordered energy, as entropy, becomes 
very difficult to extract work from. Thus, the first and second laws recognize that while the 
quantity of energy is always conserved, the quality of energy as defined by its thermodynamic 
order is not.  
 
The second law, then, leads to the conclusion of decay and degradation resulting in complete 
disorder. This state where entropy is maximized is referred to as thermodynamic equilibrium. It 
is at this stable thermodynamic equilibrium that ecosystems are genuinely ‘dead’, once again 
highlighting why stability would not be a useful definition of ecosystem health (Costanza, 1992). 
Nevertheless, this outcome of thermodynamic equilibrium appears to be in contradiction to 
perceived development of ecosystems. Ecosystems, as recognized through succession, appear to 
develop and grow by accumulating biomass (or exergy). By growing and developing, 
ecosystems move away from conditions of thermodynamic equilibrium and towards far-from-
equilibrium conditions (Kay & Regier, 2000).  
 
There is then an apparent paradox; ecosystem development despite the second law. This 
problem of ecosystem development was resolved by the physicist Schrödinger (1944) who 
recognized that only in isolated systems do the effects of the second law result in 
thermodynamic equilibrium. But, all ecosystems are non-isolated systems as their boundaries 
are permeable in that they allow species migration, water and material movement, and a 
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continuous stream of exergy, as solar radiation. The imported exergy into the ecosystem can be 
transformed into biomass and the resultant entropy produced can then be exported back into 
the surrounding environment. In using this environmental gradient, an ecosystem can stay 
away from thermodynamic equilibrium and maintain itself far-from-equilibrium, and as long as 
the ecosystem produces entropy at a rate sufficient enough to compensate for its own 
development, there is no violation of the second law (Kay, 1991; Schneider & Kay, 1994).   
 
Noting the second law of thermodynamics, the thermodynamicist Prigogine (1980) stated that 
ecosystems are dissipative systems, in that they dissipate exergy and produce entropy in order 
to maintain their thermodynamic order. In fact, for an ecosystem to generate multiple system 
states, we need more than a differentiation between linear and non-linear dynamics. We also 
need a differentiation between those systems far-from-equilibrium and those systems near 
thermodynamic equilibrium (Figure 2.5) (Jørgensen, 1997). As Nicolis and Prigogine (1989; p. 59) 
put it “without the maintenance of an appropriate distance from equilibrium, non-linearity 
cannot by itself give rise to multiple [system states].” This is because only once an ecosystem is 
acting as a dissipative system at far-from-equilibrium conditions, can it reveal its interactions as 
non-linear “potentialities hidden in [its dynamics], potentialities that remain dormant at or near 
[thermodynamic] equilibrium” (Nicolis & Prigogine, 1989; p. 60).  
 
.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.5: A ball-and-cup diagram illustrating the non-linear dynamics and far-from-
equilibrium conditions of an ecosystem. The cups represent state space, while the ball 
represents the present system state and development of the ecosystem. Note y1 represents 
thermodynamic equilibrium, while x1 and x2 represent system states of the ecosystem.  
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Despite that ecosystem development does not violate the second law, there remains little 
indication as to which of the possible pathways an ecosystem may take to realize this end. In 
determining what pathway is selected, an energetic objective function of ecosystem 
development can be delineated. In defining such a function, relevant energetic measures can be 
used to gauge quantitatively ecosystem development along its succession pathway. The systems 
ecologist Jørgensen (1997) argues that the degree of development can depict ecosystem health.  
 
One energetic objective function that explains far-from-equilibrium behaviour is the proposition 
that ecosystems will have a propensity to select those pathways that maximize exergy dissipated 
or entropy produced at the fastest possible rate (Swenson, 1996; Kay & Regier, 2000). That is, 
ecosystems select those pathways that are more efficient at destructing exergy gradients than 
their surrounding environment. Ecosystems with greater capacity for destructing exergy 
gradients are those with more biomass, because biotic size reflects the exergy amount the 
ecosystem can obtain. Hence, while accumulating biomass in ecosystems requires that more 
exergy dissipation is needed for ecosystem maintenance, it also allows these ecosystems to 
dissipate more incoming exergy. Accumulated biomass or the productivity of an ecosystem, 
then, can be used to express ecosystem development (Carpenter et al., 1999a). 
 
Jørgensen (1997) has proposed exergy storage or the amount of incoming exergy invested into 
ecosystem development, as an alternative expression. This refers to how if an ecosystem receives 
a throughflow of incoming exergy, it will attempt to use this energy to increase its own stored 
exergy. Translating survival and growth into stored exergy, Jørgensen (1997) argued that it 
becomes possible to stipulate an energetic objective function, whereby an ecosystem will have 
the propensity to select the path that maximizes exergy stored. This is the path that has the 
greatest displacement from thermodynamic equilibrium. Hence, stored exergy corresponds to 
the exergy amount needed for returning (or destroying) the ecosystem back to its 
thermodynamic equilibrium. Thus, the greater the stored exergy accumulated in an ecosystem, 
the greater its development and in turn its health (Jørgensen & Svirezhev, 2004).  
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Despite efforts to differentiate exergy storage from exergy dissipation, it would appear that 
there is little difference. However, Jørgensen (1997; 2000) maintains that while these energetic 
objective functions are the same during immature succession phases, this is not so when 
ecosystems reach maturity. Most of the exergy captured in mature ecosystems goes into the 
maintenance of ecological functioning (e.g. nutrient cycling) and not into growth. Growth of 
biomass discontinues when one of the essential resources for production becomes scarce. 
Consequently, when the maximum rate of exergy capture has been reached due to resource 
scarcity, mature ecosystems cannot increase the amount of exergy that is dissipated either. 
However, although exergy dissipation cannot increase, exergy storage can. This is because 
stored exergy also accounts for evolutionary adaptations (e.g. specialization of species) 
represented as forms of thermodynamic information. These evolutionary adaptations increase 
stored exergy, yet are not considered in biomass values (Figure 2.6) (Jørgensen, 2000).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.6: A comparative representation of biomass and exergy storage for measuring 
ecosystem development (adapted from Jørgensen, 2000). 
Here z1 represents the maximum rate of exergy captured; and  
z2 represents evolutionary adaptations. 
 
2.1.2 Organization & Ecological Resilience 
Jørgensen (1997; 2000) attempted to extend stored exergy beyond considerations of functioning, 
by postulating that stored exergy could also reflect organizational structure of an ecosystem. 
This is important, as ecosystem health should account for structure as well as functioning. 
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Specifically, Jørgensen (1997) reasoned that stored exergy accounts for structure, because exergy 
is the inverse of thermodynamic disorder. Hence, stored exergy would appear to combine 
ecosystem functioning and its structure into a single quantitative measure.  
 
Stored exergy, unfortunately, is not only difficult to determine (Müller, 1997), but it also only 
determines the thermodynamic order found within species. It does not account for system 
structure. Hence, the proposition that stored exergy measures structure is misleading (Nielsen, 
2000). Systems ecologists using energetic objective functions and measures do not account for 
the many species interactions that are sometimes acknowledged by population ecologists. These 
interactions not only include predator-prey relationships, but also mutual and competitive 
relationships amongst species. Accordingly, an energetic understanding can only stipulate the 
necessary conditions for ecosystem existence, its functioning and the direction of growth 
towards far-from-equilibrium conditions (Csanyi, 1989; Bakshi, 2002). It cannot explain 
ecosystem behaviour, as this is driven by its structure. However, despite this limitation, 
energetic measures alone are still used for assessing ecosystem health (e.g. Xu et al., 2005).  
 
In order to account for structure, there needs to be a shift away from maximizing energetic 
quantities alone. In addition, a non-energetic account must also be considered (Bateson, 1972; 
1979). This non-energetic account is information, which should not be confused with 
thermodynamic information. This is because information reflects various interactions between 
species (e.g. competitive & mutualistic), not the information found within a species.  
 
The importance of information is undeniable, as according to Bateson (1972; 1979), while energy 
is important for ecosystem development, the organization of information may well be more 
critical for its health. This is because although ecosystems do become degraded when exergy 
budgets are depleted, degradation usually first occurs with the loss of structure. For example, 
compare a live animal with that of a recently dead animal. The biomasses of both animals are 
the same, yet they differ in that the live animal unlike the dead animal does not possess a flow of 
information to activate its configuration of metabolic and neuronal processes (Tiezzi, 2006).  
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In acknowledging the significance of information, an ecosystem resembles a communication 
channel where information is signalled between species (Margalef, 1995). This interpretation 
does not require a major re-understanding of an ecosystem, as population ecologists have 
already accepted information theory in their theorizing. Ecosystems as communicative channels 
can in turn be viewed as networks (Brown, 1994). That is, “ecosystems are the meeting grounds 
on which species interact, [they are therefore] integrated networks” (Levin & Pacala, 2003; p. 63). 
Accordingly, the networked structure of an ecosystem is just a collection of species represented 
as nodes in a network, and various interactions between species and the abiotic components of 
the ecosystem represented as connections between nodes (Figure 2.7). 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.7: An ecosystem as a network, made up of species and their interactions with other 
species and abiotic components. 
 
With ecosystems depicted as networks, it appears possible to unify population ecology and 
systems ecology. This is conceived by incorporating thermodynamics into the analysis, whereby 
ecosystems can be conceptualized as thermodynamic networks (Nielsen & Ulanowicz, 2000). In 
doing so, both the structure and functioning of an ecosystem can be accounted for.  
 
One promising measure that accounts for an ecosystem as a thermodynamic network is 
Ulanowicz’s (1986; 1997) ascendancy index. By capturing both system structure and ecological 
functioning, the ascendancy index can determine whether an ecosystem has developed along its 
succession pathway. But, this ascendancy index did not go far enough. There is also the need to 
account for the vulnerability of the system state transitioning into an alternative system state.  
 
In order to model vulnerability, the concept of ecological resilience was enunciated by Holling 
(1973). Specifically, ecological resilience is the antonym of vulnerability to state transitions 
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(Carpenter et al., 2001). It reflects the magnitude of a disturbance that a particular system state 
can withstand without making a system state transition (Holling et al., 1995; Ludwig et al., 1997). 
Thus, while ecological resilience is associated to stability, Holling (1986; 1996) warns not to 
mistake ecological resilience for engineering resilience. Engineering resilience, in constrast to 
ecological resilience, is a stability measure that accounts for the equilibration rate of an 
ecological variable to settle down ‘close’ to an equilibrium value after a disturbance (Pimm, 
1984; 1991). Hence, it is ecological resilience rather than engineering resilience, which is 
appropriate for determining ecosystem health. For this reason, whenever the expression 
resilience is used from here on, it refers to ecological resilience.  
 
In recognizing the importance of resilience and ecosystem development, Costanza (1992; p. 7) 
proposed a definition of ecosystem health. That is, an ecosystem could be considered healthy “if 
it is stable and therefore sustainable; that is, if it is able to maintain its metabolic vigour, its 
internal organization, structure and autonomy and is resilient to perturbations and stresses over 
a time and space frame relevant to the system.” Hence, in using this definition, Costanza (1992) 
developed a multiplicative index of ecosystem health, which integrates organization, stored 
exergy, and resilience together (Equation 2.1). This ecosystem health index remains a benchmark 
and has been applied in a recent empirical case study (e.g. Suo et al., 2008).  
 
EHIi = Oi × Xi × Ri 
Equation 2.1: The ecosystem health index (adapted from Costanza, 1992). 
Here EHIi is the ecosystem health index for the system state i; 
Oi is the organization of system state i; 
Xi is the stored exergy (or work potential) in system state i; and 
Ri is the resilience of system state i.  
 
2.2 Self-Organization & Complexity 
When ecosystems, as thermodynamic networks, move away from thermodynamic equilibrium a 
critical distance far-from-equilibrium is reached. At this critical distance the processes of self-
organization spontaneously occur. This forms the organizational structure of an ecosystem from 
lower-to-higher forms of organization. The spontaneity of self-organizing processes is 
significant as, while the maintenance of thermodynamic order requires that an ecosystem is non-
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isolated, this is not the case with informational order. Self-organization can occur in a 
completely isolated system. The communication and transfer of information gets a decisive 
advantage over thermodynamics, because organization is for ‘free’ (Kauffman, 1993).  
 
When self-organizing processes develop, ‘emergent’ properties of macroscopic global behaviour 
form from the microscopic local interactions of ‘agents’ (e.g. populations of species) of the 
system modelled. Hence, emergent phenomena occur at the macro-level, not at the micro-level. 
Nevertheless, this macroscopic global behaviour that emerges feeds back on microscopic local 
interactions. Thus, the dynamics of the self-organizing process is a function of a circular 
causality, between local interactions that bring emergence (i.e. upward causality) and negative 
and positive feedback (i.e. downward causality) (Figure 2.8). The underlying characteristic of 
negative feedback is an homogenizing effect, as it dampens change and stabilizes the system. 
Conversely, positive feedback amplifies change and destabilizes the system through increased 
system heterogeneity (Maruyama, 1978).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.8: A representation of the self-organizing processes where local interactions of 
species allow the emergence of macroscopic global behaviour (adapted from Langton, 1992).   
 
The emergence of macroscopic global behaviour from microscopic local interactions in networks 
has been demonstrated in simulated cellular automata, which are computational spatial 
networks. Importantly, when modelling ecosystems, it is necessary that the spatial organization 
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of these systems is accounted for given their networked structure (Solé & Bascompte, 2006). 
Specifically, in cellular automata each node in the simulated system ‘looks’ to its neighbouring 
nodes to gauge what (binary) state they are in, and in using this information each node applies a 
few simple rules to determine its own appropriate state.  
 
It was Langton (1992) who in making numerous simulations of cellular automata was able to 
demonstrate the possible patterns at the macroscopic level. In particular, not only were point, 
periodic and chaotic macro-states revealed, but an additional macro-state perceptively emerged 
at ‘the edge of chaos’ (Kauffman, 1993). The emergence of this macro-state, known as 
complexity, was observed between the perceptively regular (i.e. periodic macro-state) and the 
perceptively random (i.e. chaotic macro-state). Thus, complex macroscopic global behaviour 
need only emerge from simple microscopic local interactions (Wolfram, 2002; Lansing, 2003). 
This is the critical insight of complexity theory.  
 
From the simulated output of cellular automata an understanding of spatial networks can be 
established. In periodic macro-states, information about the initial conditions is only partially 
retained in the final system configuration, as information is always retained only in localized 
regions. Information is never communicated throughout the whole system. Therefore, while 
periodic macro-states can have several final configurations, all configurations consist only of 
simple repetitive patterns. Thus, with periodic macro-states the system always settles down, so 
that there is no ‘random’ activity left in the system. In chaotic macro-states, information about 
the initial conditions is communicated throughout the whole system, which results in the system 
demonstrating continuous random activity, as the system ‘will’ never settle down. The inability 
to settle down explains its ‘sensitive dependence on initial conditions’ (Gleick, 1987). In complex 
macro-states, information about the initial conditions can also potentially lead to system-wide 
communication and continuous activity that ‘may’ never settle down. However, in complex 
macro-states, unlike chaotic macro-states, there is a kind of ‘control’ over the signalling and 
transmission of information across the system. This control is established through a distinctive 
characteristic of complex macro-states, that of the occurrence of localized structures or clusters 
that interact with each other in potentially unique ways. Thus, system-wide communication 
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only occurs if one of its localized structures is affected, which allows the system to interact along 
some ‘random’ pathway to other clusters (Figure 2.9) (Wolfram, 2002).  
 
 
    
 
Figure 2.9: Depictions of simulated spatial output from cellular automata demonstrating 
point, periodic, chaotic and complex macro-states, respectively (Wolfram, 2002). In the 
chaotic macro-state there is a perceived randomness, despite the prevalence of triangular 
structures. In the complex macro-state there is a complicated structure, where clusters 
interact with each other along ‘random’ pathways.  
 
Previously, it has been recognized that ecosystems have multiple system states. Hence, it is 
understood that ecosystems are not governed by a point macro-state. The other three macro-
states that can produce multiple system states (i.e. periodic, complex and chaotic) can similarly 
be evaluated as to their plausibility. Ecosystems cannot be governed by a periodic macro-state, 
because while this system is sufficiently stable to allow for systematic work for the purposes of 
growth and development, it is not able to transmit information across the whole system. The 
capacity to communicate information system-wide appears critical to increase the likelihood of 
adapting and fine-tuning the pathway selected. Hence, ecosystems are either chaotic or complex, 
as these macro-states allow for system-wide communication. However, chaotic macro-states 
despite their ability to communicate information, have limited structure in order to do 
systematic work. Moreover, in chaotic macro-states system-wide communication can ‘swamp’ 
the system leading to endless structural changes. It is with complex macro-states that systematic 
work can be undertaken, as this state has sufficient structural integrity. Yet, its structure can 
change to appropriate states when need be according to system-wide communication (Foster, 
2006). This hypothesis appears supported empirically, as evidence indicates that complex 
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macro-states, hereafter referred to as complex systems, are widespread in ecology (Perry, 1994; 
Solé & Bascompte, 2006).  
 
2.2.1 Small-World Networks & Scale-Free Networks  
It has been argued that ecosystems are thermodynamic networks that through processes of self-
organization in conditions which are far-from-equilibrium form emergent non-random, but 
complex dynamics. There are two network architectures or topologies that could underpin 
ecosystems as complex systems. A complex system either lies somewhere between a random 
and an ordered network, referred to as a small-world network (Watts & Strogatz, 1998), or 
alternatively, a complex system resembles a scale-free network, in which it has small-world 
characteristics, but there is also a hierarchy of nodal connectivity (Barabási, 2003).  
 
To demonstrate the network topology of a small-world network, we can devise a simple means 
of transforming an ordered network, which has a long characteristic path length, into a random 
network, which has a short characteristic path length, by a random process of nodal 
reconnection (Watts & Strogatz, 1998). Several significant outcomes are found through this 
process that indicates the advantages of a complex system (Figure 2.10). Certainly, if we 
reconnect one node to another node, all determined completely at random, we observe three 
findings. First, nearly all the effects of the re-connection process occur in the initial re-
connections of the network. Secondly, there is an abrupt change from an ordered to a random 
network as the reconnection process progresses. Finally, while the characteristic path length 
decreases dramatically as the reconnection process commences, there still remains a high degree 
of clustering, as found with an ordered network. It is this network topology that is clustered, yet 
has a short characteristic path length through having a few ‘random’ connections, which is the 
complex system of a small-world network (Watts & Strogatz, 1998).  
 
Small-world networks bring the advantages of an ordered network and a random network 
together. Hence, unlike an ordered network, a small-world network promotes efficient 
information transmission across the network because the random connections allow information 
to transfer easily across the network, without it having to pass through each node along the 
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way. Unlike a random network, a small-world network has a high degree of clustering. The 
advantage of clustering is that even if a few nodes are removed, the other nodes will remain 
closely connected allowing information to continue to pass through the network (Ball, 2004).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.10: The random nodal re-connection process from an ordered to a random network 
(adapted from Watts & Strogatz, 1998). 
 
Despite that small-world networks accurately depict the advantages of complex systems; they 
assume that a network is homogeneous with only a single characteristic ‘scale’ where networks 
have an average distributed connectivity across all nodes. This is because small-world networks 
do not account for growth, which is an essential aspect to modelling ecosystems. However, the 
physicists Barabási and Albert (1999) found from empirical studies of networks that grow, that 
there is a non-random bias or ‘preference’, as a new node in the network, will ‘choose’ to 
connect to a node in the network that has a high fitness-connectivity product. A fitness-
connectivity product is determined by the number of nodal connections and the fitness of the 
particular node studied. That is, network growth and formation generate a scale-free network as 
the processes of self-organization are governed by non-random preference. Accordingly, while 
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the assertion that complex systems are found at the edge of chaos is illuminating, it is 
recognized that complex dynamics need only be explained by two real phenomena, growth and 
preference or what Barabási (2003) describes as ‘preferential attachment’.  
 
When a network grows, most nodes in the network have only a few connections. However, a 
few nodes, known as hubs, will make many connections (Figure 2.11). Accordingly, the 
connectivity of complex systems is scale-free, as connectivity appears to follow a non-normal 
power law distribution (Barabási, 2003). Therefore, the absence of a pinnacle in a power law 
distribution implies that there is no characteristic node. Rather, there is a hierarchy of nodal 
connectivity, from a few well-connected hubs that form clusters around them, to many nodes 
that only have a few connections. This skewed distribution of nodal connectivity emerges from 
only the local interactions of agents, and yet it is this resultant scale-free network topology that 
keeps the characteristic path length of the system small. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.11: (a) The representation of a normal distribution found with a small-world 
network, where there can be found a characteristic node for the system. (b) The 
representation of a power law distribution found with a scale-free network, where there is no 
scale as there is no characteristic node for the system (adapted from Barabási, 2003).   
 
2.2.2 Driver Species & Modularity  
For ecosystems to be represented as scale-free networks there would have to be a few species 
that represent hubs, as they are well-connected disproportionately with other species. 
Importantly, well-connected species in ecosystems have been referred to as keystone species or 
driver species (Walker, 1992; Power et al., 1996). An example of a driver species is army ants 
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found in tropical rain forests, as this species is connected with many other vertebrate and 
invertebrate species (Boswell et al., 1998). Species that are not well-connected in an ecosystem 
are passenger species. Hence, for scale-free networks to be the underlying network topology of 
ecosystems, the question that needs to be asked is how prevalent are driver species? According 
to the ecologists Solé and Bascompte (2006), driver species are present in all well-defined 
ecosystems. Hence, it is reasonable to presume that ecosystems demonstrate some kind of scale-
free network topology (Ikegami, 2005). But, a question remains, given the multiplicity of system 
states of ecosystems, as to the relationship between scale-free networks and their resilience to 
disturbances.  
 
Network research has demonstrated that scale-free networks are resilient even when one to 20 
nodes are randomly disabled, as the characteristic path length remains barely changed. It 
appears that scale-free networks do not ‘shatter’. Rather these networks appear to slowly reduce 
when nodes are removed (or disabled) from the network at random (Barabási, 2003). It is 
apparent that scale-free networks are resilient to random attack, highlighting why this network 
architecture may have been evolutionarily selected. The source of this resilience in a scale-free 
network is the existence of hubs or highly connected nodes. However, while scale-free networks 
are resilient against random attacks, they are far less resilient when under a planned attack. This 
is because the removal of hubs in the network, given their high connectivity, would affect the 
organizational structure of the entire network. Hence, ecosystem vulnerability at a single point 
in time can be estimated by the vulnerability of its driver species. One can surmise that what 
makes scale-free networks resilient is unfortunately also what makes these networks vulnerable 
to change (Barabási, 2003).  
 
This effect of being vulnerable to change under a planned attack has been found in real 
ecosystems, as observed with sea otters, as driver species, in kelp forest dominant systems. 
Here, sea otters prey on sea urchins. This predation of sea urchins in turn controls kelp grazing, 
which sustains the kelp forest. However, where disturbance has been caused by exploitation 
through the huinting of sea otters, the subsequent loss of sea otters has resulted in the system 
being vulnerable to catastrophic change. And indeed, with the increase in the sea urchin 
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population, the kelp forests collapsed through over-grazing. This led to a transition into a sea 
urchin dominated system state (Estes & Duggins, 1995; Allison & Hobbs, 2004).  
 
An important finding from information theory (Section 2.1), is that where the number of nodes 
grows in a network, then the number of connections is likely to grow exponentially (Shannon & 
Weaver, 1949). However, this exponential growth in nodal connectivity can result in over-
connectedness, which can cause catastrophic change in ecosystems (Kauffman, 1995; Solé & 
Bascompte, 2006). This potential for collapse is caused by the exponentially increasing likelihood 
of a change in one part of the network catastrophically altering other parts of the network with 
linear increases in network growth. This understanding has been depicted by the threshold 
value known as ‘self-organized criticality’ (Bak et al., 1989; Bak, 1996). It is at this critical 
threshold value that a single additional node may make its behaviour highly vulnerable to 
catastrophic change through overwhelming positive feedback, where the network becomes 
highly unstable and chaotic, and results in a system state transition.   
 
Given the problems of over-connectedness with network growth, there are two forces that 
oppose each other: increased economies of scale through the increased capacity to capture and 
communicate information through the system, and increased diseconomies of scale through 
over-connectedness constraining the system and making it more vulnerable to change 
(Beinhocker, 2006). Despite this tension, Kauffman (1995) recognized that it can be somewhat 
alleviated with a hierarchical networked structure. This is because a hierarchical network would 
break up network connectivity through generating many modules or a nested set of non-isolated 
partially decomposable sub-systems. Significantly, this modularity has been found in 
ecosystems (Bascompte et al., 2003). Thus, by breaking up the ecosystem into sub-systems, the 
ecosystem can grow, and yet be less vulnerable to change from over-connectedness. This 
modularity ensures that a failure in one sub-system will not necessarily cascade into other sub-
systems (Simon, 1974).  
 
The importance of modularity in ecosystems does not contradict the assertion that ecosystems 
demonstrate a scale-free network topology. This is because the hierarchy of nodal connectivity 
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in scale-free networks generates clustering or a modular structure. Hence, in scale-free networks 
it is observed that densely connected modules combine in a hierarchical manner with large, but 
less densely connected modules. It is then, the densely connected hubs within each module that 
act as means of co-ordinating information between other modules of the system (Barabási, 2003).  
 
While the hierarchical modularity will somewhat alleviate global or system-wide catastrophes 
from occurring, it would still appear vulnerable to localized failures given the high density of 
connections within sub-systems. However, Jordano et al. (2003) made an extensive study of 53 
food webs, where they found that most ecosystems had connectivity distributions whose model 
fit was not an exact power law distribution. Rather, a truncated power law distribution was the 
most common distribution. These authors concluded that while ecosystems self-organize 
according to the non-random preferences of species towards favourable conditions, there are 
some constraints to where connections can be made. The consequence of this is that sub-systems 
in ecosystems are more resilient than would otherwise be expected (Solé & Bascompte, 2006).  
 
2.2.3 Adaptive Capacity & Functional Redundancy 
The modularity of ecosystems allows sub-systems to fluctuate somewhat independently from 
other parts of the ecosystem. With partially independent sub-systems, an ecosystem can 
undertake multiple ecological functions simultaneously, as each sub-system can be responsible 
for a function necessary to maintain the productivity of the ecosystem. Accordingly, modularity 
in a network partially explains the need for biodiversity in an ecosystem, as it is biodiversity 
that allows for multiple ecological functions to co-exist (Folke et al., 2002a; Kinzig et al., 2002). 
This reasoning supports previous empirical findings (Tilman, 1996; Section 2.1), where 
biodiversity was found to increase the stability of productivity in ecosystems. However, the 
need for multiple ecological functions alone does not fully explain the biodiversity found in 
many ecosystems. Empirical evidence suggests that the productivity of an ecosystem 
asymptotes at approximately 20 species (Kinzig et al., 2002). Hence, the species richness found in 
many ecosystems is presumably for an additional purpose.  
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Population ecologists, however, have also long postulated that biodiversity may allow the 
maintenance of the system to adapt to change, as reflected in its adaptability (Folke et al., 2002a). 
In order to understand the adaptability of an ecosystem, the concept of adaptive capacity has 
been conceived (Adger, 2000). Effectively, adaptive capacity accounts for the capacity of the 
system to adapt if and when a change in ecological conditions occurs through a novel 
disturbance (e.g. species migration or species invasion). A system with high adaptive capacity is 
one which can maintain its functioning, despite the effect of a disturbance. This is achieved by 
the system being able to make structural changes by disorganizing and then reorganizing itself 
through self-organizing processes. Hence, the capacity to adapt to change is about breaking old 
connections and then subsequently forming new connections. If this process of re-organization 
is successfully achieved, the system can accommodate the change from the disturbance, while 
still maintaining its functionality (Foster, 2005; Levin, 2003; 2005).  
 
It is reasoned that biodiversity may bring about adaptive capacity because a diverse range of 
species within each sub-system ensures that functioning can be maintained if and when 
ecological conditions change. To see this, each species within a particular sub-system is likely to 
respond differently to change, depending on which ecological conditions favour them. 
Accordingly, while driver species ensure the resilience and functioning for a sub-system under 
prevailing ecological conditions, the argument for biodiversity maintains that passenger species 
may be the preferred species to connect to if and when ecological conditions change. From the 
perspective of scale-free networks, species within the sub-system would disconnect from the 
present driver species and presumably choose to re-connect to that species where the changed 
ecological conditions would favour them, as they would have a high degree of fitness. Hence, 
during this process of re-organization, a passenger species in the sub-system might become the 
driver species. This conclusion explains the empirical findings of instability in the population 
abundance of species with increasing diversity, even though the productivity of the ecosystem 
can be maintained (Tilman, 1996; Section 2.1). Hence, biodiversity is needed in sub-systems to 
allow them to adapt to change. This phenomenon is known as functional redundancy (Naeem et 
al., 1994; Walker, 1997; Elmqvist et al., 2003). An example of this phenomenon are plankton 
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species with a high tolerance to lake waters with a low pH, as these (passenger) species are able 
to maintain the grazing of phytoplankton during these acidic conditions (Frost et al., 1995). 
 
The recognition of the importance of biodiversity in the ecosystem to maintain its capacity to 
adapt to change highlights that a species that may be necessary for functioning at one point in 
time may not be critical at another point in time. Functioning is not necessarily lost if a driver 
species migrates or becomes extinct, because functioning can continue where a passenger 
species is available to fulfil the function required. A state transition from a disturbance may only 
occur where a necessary function cannot be produced, as the ecological conditions do not favour 
any species in the sub-system. Hence, ecosystem health, it is argied, should not be indicated by 
the presence of driver species alone.  
 
In light of the importance of functional redundancy, biodiversity could be conceived as an 
insurance mechanism. That is, biodiversity may act to insure the system “against the loss or 
poor performance of selected species” (Naemm & Li, 1997; p. 507). Hence, a genuinely 
productive ecosystem is one that contains an abundance of species both in many sub-systems 
and within sub-systems. This is because multiple functions can be produced and maintained if 
and when ecological conditions change. It is for this reason that biodiversity might be 
considered an appropriate objective function of ecosystem health. If so, this would have much 
appeal because health could be determined by a diversity index (Belaoussoff & Kevan, 2003).  
 
The process of re-organization towards species that are preferred when ecological conditions 
favour them indicates that species may have the capacity to adapt their behaviour. The capacity 
of many species to adapt their behaviour might be explained through their ability to readily 
process incoming stimulus and information (Nielsen, 2007). Despite this conclusion, many 
population ecologists do not acknowledge the potential of species to process information. This is 
in spite of their modelling of ecosystems using information theory (Nielsen, 2000). In 
acknowledging the information processing of species allowing to them to adapt their behaviour 
when ecological conditions change, an ecosystem can be best conceptualized as a complex 
adaptive system (Levin, 2003; 2005). In order, to adapt their behaviours, it is reasonable to 
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surmise that some species develop adaptive rules for action that can change, so that they can 
take advantage of the resilient, yet adaptable character of ecosystems, as complex adaptive 
systems (Holling et al., 2008).  
 
It is sometimes promoted by neo-Darwinian evolutionary theorists that the species that will 
survive are those that maximize their fitness to prevailing ecological conditions, according to the 
maxim, ‘the survival of the fittest’. However, as has become evident, species become extinct 
from being ill-fitted to changing ecological conditions (Ansell-Pearson, 1999). Survival is not 
given to those species that are most well-adapted. Rather, survival is given to those species 
(including human agents) that have the capacity to adapt to change (Mayhew, 2006).  
 
Accordingly, there is a tension between adaptation and adaptability of species to ecological 
conditions. There is a movement through succession towards species with greater adaptation to 
prevailing ecological conditions for the efficient use of resources and to degrade effectively 
incoming exergy gradients. On the other hand, there is a realization that those species that 
survive are those able to adapt to changing ecological conditions. Hence, while adaptation 
provides for the efficient use of resource, it is a strategy that is vulnerable if ecological 
conditions were to change. Conversely, while adaptability provides a wide ecological niche, it is 
a strategy that does not use the prevailing ecological conditions efficiently. Importantly, it is 
most unlikely that ecological conditions will either remain continuously stable or unstable. In 
fact, from the understanding of complex adaptive systems, it is found that ecosystems are 
conservative and resilient, but also adaptable and vulnerable to change (Holling et al., 2008). 
Accordingly, the strategies of adaptation and adaptability on their own are not necessarily 
sustainable. A sustainable strategy is found as a dynamic balance or smudge ‘somewhere’ 
between adaptation (i.e. efficiency) and adaptability (i.e. flexibility) (Janssen, 2002b; Ulanowicz, 
2002).  
 
In understanding this tension between adaptation and adaptability, it is evident that 
maximizing adaptability through a focus on biodiversity is not necessarily efficient. This is 
because this system would have too much redundancy. Moreover, if adaptation was maximized, 
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while being a healthy system for the present ecological conditions, it would become highly 
constrained. This is because, despite the system state having maximized its adaptation, it would 
have difficulty adapting if and when ecological conditions change given its rigid configuration 
(Figure 2.12). Hence, there is a need when considering the health of ecosystems to incorporate 
both adaptability and adaptation together in a dynamic manner.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.12: A representation depicting a constrained system state. 
 
2.2.4 Holling’s Adaptive Cycle & Panarchy 
From the perspective established of the various structural and functional characteristics of an 
ecosystem, Holling’s (1986) metaphor of the adaptive cycle appears to be a major contribution 
that in its richness goes well beyond succession theory. This is because the adaptive cycle 
captures ecosystems having the capacity to grow and adapt along a succession pathway, while 
also having the capacity to re-organize and adapt to change. Hence, the adaptive cycle not only 
explicitly recognizes ecosystems as thermodynamic networks and complex adaptive systems, 
but, it is argued here, it also depicts the evolution of the ecosystem and the necessary tension 
between adaptation and adaptability.  
 
Before anything further is said, it should not be envisaged that there is only a single adaptive 
cycle that represents ecosystem behaviour. Rather, the term panarchy has been used to refer to 
the nested set of sub-systems that make up an ecosystem. Hence, panarchy illustrates that 
ecosystems have a hierarchy of adaptive cycles that occur at differing spatio-temporal scales 
(Holling & Gunderson, 2002).  
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The adaptive cycle illustrates ecosystem development through a process of network formation 
and reformation, by a sequence of four differentiable phases (Holling, 1986; 2001). The first two 
phases of the adaptive cycle are akin to the succession pathway from r-strategist species to K-
strategist species, and represent growth, development and adaptation. Briefly, the first phase, 
referred to as the exploitation or r-phase begins with the ‘ecosystem’ exploiting those functions 
that are responsible for the early and immediate colonization of systems during which r-
strategist species capture resources that are readily accessible. The second phase, described as 
the conservation or K-phase, occurs when the slow accumulation of resources builds 
increasingly organized ecological structures, whereby K-strategist species predominate. 
Available energy depicting stored exergy increases during the long periods of the slow dynamic 
sequence from the exploitation to the conservation phase (or the r-to-K forward stage), while at 
the same time the system state becomes more organized with existing species. Nevertheless, 
there is a point where organization becomes over-connected, rigid and vulnerable to change.  
 
At this point, the highly organized accumulation of resources becomes very brittle, where 
system collapse of accumulated ecological capital (i.e. stored exergy and connectedness) may be 
inevitable. The actual change from the K-phase to the third phase, the release or the Ω-phase 
will most likely be triggered exogenously by a disturbance. The resulting system collapse of 
accumulated ecological capital releases the resources accumulated and the associated tight 
organization is also lost. However, despite the loss in biomass and organization, during this 
phase novel re-assortments and experimentation may occur. Hence, the Ω-phase is sometimes 
referred to as ‘creative destruction’ after the economist Schumpeter (1954; 1964). Finally, the 
process of change resultant from the Ω-phase creates opportunity for the fourth phase, the re-
organization phase (or α-phase), where released structure and functioning are re-assorted into 
‘fresh’ combinations for the next r-phase. In contrast, to the r-to-K forward phase transition, the 
Ω-to-α back phase transition contains considerable disorganization reflecting the capacity of the 
system to adapt to change. Importantly, if the ecosystem retains a sufficient number of its 
previous components necessary for functionality, it may re-organize towards the same system 
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configuration. However, if the α-phase does not retain some of its necessary components, the 
system may transition into an alternative system state depicted in Figure 2.13 as x.  
 
The adaptive cycle, as illustrated in Figure 2.13, behaves as if two objective functions are 
indivisibly linked in sequence, whereby the r-to-K forward phase transition of network 
formation (i.e. growth and succession) emphasizes production and accumulation, and so 
adaptation; while the Ω-to-α back phase transition of network reformation emphasizes 
experimentation and re-assortment, and so adaptability (Holling & Gunderson, 2002). In 
emphasizing both adaptation and adaptability, the adaptive cycle accounts for the dynamic 
balance or tension between adaptation and adaptability, which is necessary for maintaining the 
health of ecosystems as complex adaptive systems.  
 
Figure 2.13: The adaptive cycle illustrating the four phases of ecosystem development. The 
lengths of the arrows indicate the rate of network formation and reformation (adapted from 
Holling & Gunderson, 2002).  
 
Ecosystem health should not be portrayed as any particular maximization of phase space (i.e. r, 
K, Ω, α) or ecological capital per se (i.e. organization, work potential, or resilience). Rather, the 
adaptive cycle indicates that in order to maintain the tension in the ecosystem between 
adaptation and adaptability, it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the adaptive cycle ad 
infinitum or as a continuous process (Hearnshaw et al., 2005). Thus, ecosystem health is reasoned 
here to be established by preserving the integrity of the adaptive cycle in the long-term. That is, 
to maintain the tension between adaptation and adaptability it is necessary to let the ecological 
processes of an ecosystem ‘continue’. A genuinely resilient ecosystem is one which maintains a 
particular system state over the long-term. Interruption of this continuance by attempting to 
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maintain an ecosystem within a particular phase for the purposes of retaining accumulated 
ecological capital is likely to result in catastrophe (Smith et al., 1993; Holling et al., 1995). 
 
2.2.5 Natural Integrity & Ecosystem Restoration 
From what has now been understood, it is evident that when defining ecosystem health we 
must avoid over stressing the importance of some notions that underpin its discussion, like: 
stability, biomass, stored exergy, adaptation, resilience, and biodiversity are inherently good 
(Callicott, 1995; 1999). In addition to overstating these notions as to what is inherently good, it 
has been concluded that there is no ecologically better phase within a system state. All phases 
within the phase space of a system state are necessary to maintain the tension between 
adaptation and adaptability. This, it is argued, can be achieved through preserving the integrity 
of the adaptive cycle. For this reason, there is also no ecologically better system state within state 
space. Thus, as long as the present system state emerged through self-organizing (and re-
organizing) processes, so as to preserve the integrity of the adaptive cycle, all system states 
should be considered ecologically equivalent.  
 
Despite the inability to determine an objective function defined in terms of ecological attributes 
alone to determine the healthiest system state, it has been previously advocated that natural 
integrity should be used to identify the health of an ecosystem. In this case, ecosystem health 
would be identified by its degree of naturalness, where naturalness reflects the structure and 
species composition of an ecosystem prior to anthropogenic action or invasion of exotic species 
(Angermeier & Karr, 1994; Wicklum & Davies, 1995). Hence, the healthiest ecosystem would be 
those that are pristine and unaltered by human economic activity (Karr & Chu, 1999).  
 
The underlying premise of natural integrity is that a separation between anthropogenic action 
and ecosystems should be preserved. The implication of this premise is that while ecosystems 
altered by human economic activity may be preferable for utilitarian reasons, they cannot 
provide an objective reference point for ecosystem health. Hence, natural integrity would 
appear to resolve the problems of defining ecosystem health by ecological attributes alone, while 
avoiding subjective accounts.  
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The ability to provide an objective reference point of naturalness, however, has been questioned. 
This is because delineating what is the natural compositional character of an ecosystem is 
steeped in subjectivity. To see this, consider the case of ecosystems in New Zealand. Should 
natural integrity be defined at the time of human arrival with the Māori circa 1280 (Wilmhurst et 
al., 2008), or at the time of European colonization circa 1840?  The selection as to which of these 
two reference points is the more natural is not an objective proposition (Lele & Norgaard, 1996). 
In fact, even if a pre-human or a pre-European state could be agreed upon, there remains the 
problem that our understanding of what these historical species assemblages once looked like is 
incomplete. Accordingly, most attempts to implement natural integrity are based on the earliest 
recorded biotic assemblage, which is usually well after European colonization (McGlone, 1989).  
 
For argument’s sake, let us suppose that sufficient historical information were available to guide 
the ecological restoration of the natural composition of an ecosystem. We are still however left 
with a number of problematic issues. Not least is that natural integrity would signify ecosystem 
modelling from a static perspective, so that all perturbations outside a natural range would 
represent a decrease in health. Yet, this understanding does not account for the fact that many 
ecosystems are now highly altered, where many necessary species are extinct, so that restoring a 
static reproduction of past ecosystems is not practically possible (Landres et al., 1999; Reeves & 
Duncan, 2009). Moreover, by defining an ecosystem by composition alone, ecological 
functionality is inherently ignored (Ehrlich & Ehrlich, 1992; Thompson, 2000). Given the 
significance of ecological functioning, many restoration efforts have adopted ecological 
functions, rather than composition as the critical measure of restoration success and ecosystem 
health (Hobbs & Norton, 1996). For example, the index of biological integrity develops a scale of 
health, which measures natural integrity by aggregating various ecological functions (e.g. 
nutrient cycling) calibrated to a naturalness benchmark (Karr et al., 1986). Hence, ecosystem 
health would be determined by comparing the present state of these ecological functions with 
their relative range of natural variability (Hobbs & Norton, 1996). Alternatively, ecosystem 
health could be defined through integrating the compositional measure of natural integrity with 
ecological functionality (Figure 2.14) (Loucks, 2000). 
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While including a functional component in determining natural integrity appears more 
pragmatic, it has been rightly criticized because the restoration of ecological functionality can be 
achieved through adding suitable non-native species (Aronson et al., 1993; Lockwood & Pimm, 
2001). That is, substitutions of native species for non-native species are possible, which can 
maintain the ecological functioning of a module within an ecosystem. In fact, Holling (2001) has 
argued that any module can be manipulated by non-native species or anthropogenic action 
without it affecting the structural integrity of the ecosystem, as long as a communication channel 
can be formed between the manipulated module and the rest of the ecosystem. As Sagoff (2005; 
p. 229) contends:   
“No ecologist has proposed a non-question-begging definition of … ecosystem [health] for 
which scientific studies have shown that non-native species generally or as a rule ... damage 
ecosystem [health].” 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.14: The continuum of ecological functionality against natural composition 
(adapted from Loucks, 2000). 
 
The realization that non-native species need not degrade ecosystem health is significant. This is 
especially so, as ecosystems have open and permeable boundaries, which allows many new and 
old relationships between species to be continuously formed and broken through species 
migration and species invasion (Post et al., 2007). This movement of species results in processes 
of re-organization, which if the ecosystem cannot accommodate the novel change then 
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ecosystems may ‘irreversibly’ transition into an alternative system state. This alternative system 
state may be a completely novel system state with an entirely new species composition (Figure 
2.15).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.15: The transformation towards novel system states via biotic or abiotic change 
(adapted from Suding et al. 2004). (a) A ‘natural’ ecosystem in accord with the adaptive cycle 
is altered by changes in environmental/abiotic conditions (A > B) or by the invasion, 
extinction or migration of species (A > C). It can be returned to its historical state (B > A) 
through ecological restoration. (b) Once in a re-organized system state (either B or C), internal 
re-organizing through new biotic or abiotic conditions can result in a genuinely novel system 
state with no apparent historical analogue (B or C > D).  
 
The presence of novel system states with no apparent historical analogue are becoming more 
commonplace and will continue to do so in the future, as most ecosystems today are impacted 
by human economic activity (Table 2.2 for some examples of novel system states) (Vitousek et al., 
1997; Lindenmayer et al., 2008). In fact, according to Seastedt et al. (2008; p. 547), “most 
ecosystems are now sufficiently altered in structure and function to qualify as novel systems.” 
Certainly, the rate at which ecosystems are transitioning into novel system states with no 
historical analogue has increased immensely with human economic activity (Hobbs et al., 2006; 
Genkai-Kato, 2007). It is not only ‘direct’ human manipulation through exotic species 
introduction, habitat fragmentation and land conversion that has resulted in novel system states 
with no apparent historical analogue. Novel ecosystems are also occurring and will continue to 
do so, by indirect human manipulation altering climatic and other environmental conditions. 
Accordingly, all ecosystems are vulnerable to the ongoing impacts of human economic activity 
(Memmott et al., 2006; Seastedt et al., 2008).  
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Ecosystem  System state description Citations 
New Zealand’s 
tussock grasslands 
Pastrolism and forest removal resulted in a novel 
system state composed of native and non-native 
grass species.  
Duncan et al., 
2001. 
Puerto Rico’s ‘new’ 
forests 
Regenerating forests on degraded lands composed 
largely of non-native species, resulting in novel 
forest states. 
Zimmerman et al., 
2000; 
Lugo, 2004 
Western United 
States’ rivers 
Rivers altered by regulation, altered flows and 
invasive species predominant in these novel river 
systems. 
Postel et al., 1998; 
Kowalewski et al., 
2000 
Tropical agro-
forestry systems 
Diverse combinations of native and non-native 
plant species interact together to derive novel agro-
ecosystems. 
Ewel et al., 1991; 
Ewel, 1999 
Kelp forests Removal of sea otter by hunting resulted in a shift 
to novel sea urchin state. 
Estes & Duggins, 
1995 
Black sea Overfishing caused collapse of fisheries and a 
transition into a novel jellyfish state. 
Daskalov, 2002 
Table 2.2: Some empirical examples of novel system states found in various ecosystems 
(adapted from Hobbs et al., 2006). 
 
In sum, when we consider the arguments for and against the use of natural integrity as an 
operational definition for ecosystem health, it is evident that natural integrity is an unsuitable 
definition. After all, natural integrity cannot provide an objective definition of ecosystem health, 
is not practically utilizable, and appears inappropriate given the realization that many 
ecosystems today are novel system states with no apparent historical analogue. However, the 
greatest difficulty with ecosystem health defined by natural integrity is that paradoxically we 
find that ecosystems must be managed if they are to remain healthy, despite the insistence that 
ecosystem health requires the separation of human agents from ecosystems (Hilderbrand et al., 
2005). After all, “how can anything be restored by human agency the essence of which is to be 
independent of human agency?” (Attfield, 1994; p. 45).  
 
2.2.6 Utility & Ecosystem Services  
A value-free appeal for strict objectivity using ecological attributes alone cannot be attained 
when defining the concept of ecosystem health (Lackey, 2001; Norton, 2005). As Russow (1995; 
p. 365) concludes, “… the claim that scientific descriptions or measures of ecosystem health … 
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are value neutral is simply false.” Accordingly, it would seem that the most appropriate 
conception of ecosystem health is that which is defined by the degree of utility experienced by 
human agents when various societal needs are satisfied. Hence, it is human agents, acting as 
citizens, through their ‘subjective’ preferences, which should determine what is ‘good’ for the 
health of ecosystems. For this reason, it is recognized here that ecosystem health should be 
treated in part as an economic concept. Therefore, within an ecosystem, it is those system states 
where utility can be expressed that will be preferred. Consequently, the preference for certain 
system states over others will determine the health of ecosystems.  
 
This conclusion may lead to some ecologists dismissing the concept of ecosystem health 
altogether. This is because some ecologists believe that the use of value-based definitions for 
interpreting the status of ecosystems is completely inappropriate (Ryder, 1990; Lancaster, 2000). 
Presumably, this stance arises because by assuming that ecosystem health is value driven, it is 
conceived that the actual structure and functioning of the ecosystem is neglected for preferences 
that have no ecological context. But, while utility is a subjective concept, which does not directly 
account for things-in-themselves as it is felt and expressed in the mind (Straton, 2006). It is not a 
wholly subjective concept. This is because for utility to be experienced there must also be an 
external system that precedes its expression (Farber et al., 2002).  
 
One might argue that this external system need not be an ecosystem, but rather a ‘firm’ that is 
able to produce various goods and services needed by society.  However, this argument neglects 
the fact that for an ecosystem to supply goods and services it must be treated in its entirety as a 
functioning and productive system. This is because utility experienced from ecosystems are 
‘ecosystem services’, which are benefits that are not supplied singly. Rather, ecosystem services 
are derived directly or indirectly in bundles by the ecological functioning of an ecosystem 
(Fisher et al., 2009). Hence, ecosystem services “are the result of complex interactions between 
biotic and abiotic components of ecosystems” (De Groot et al., 2002; p. 394). From this respect, 
ecosystem services can be considered ‘valued’ ecological functions (Sala et al., 2000). Thus, while 
some ecologists might be apprehensive about a value-based conception of ecosystem health 
because it would neglect ecosystems and their ecological functioning, this is not so.  
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What is crucial to experiencing utility is the establishment of a ‘connection’ between subjective 
accounts and the ‘objective’ ecosystem (Menger, 1950). This understanding of utility attained 
through a connection between human agents and an ecosystem is the basis of the connective 
theory of value (Foster, 2006) or the complex systems approach to value (Straton, 2006). The 
connective theory of value recognizes that utility flows not from the ecosystem, but from a 
connection developed between the ecosystem and a human agent, who has the capacity to 
perceive ecosystem services that provide various benefits. Therefore, if human agents do not 
make a connection with an ecosystem, in that they do not perceive any ecosystem services 
supplied, then utility will not be felt, expressed or experienced. This is important and recognizes 
the significance of experts as they are more likely to be able to perceive ecosystem services that 
are supplied by ecosystems. This realization that many human agents do not experience utility 
from ecosystems is recognized by the many missing markets for ecosystem services. It is well-
established that there is a significant lack of correspondence between the perceived and the 
actual value of ecosystem services in the marketplace (Barkmann et al., 2008). This discrepancy 
in valuing ecosystem services is likely to be generated through human agents being unfamiliar 
with ecosystem services resultant from a disconnection from ecosystems. Usually human agents 
make the critical error that socio-economic systems are isolated and disconnected from 
ecosystems (Norgaard, 1984; Folke et al., 2002a). Indeed, as Carpenter et al. (2009; p. 1309) have 
recently stated: 
“In many cases, there is a disconnection between the location where the costs are borne [and 
where the ecosystem services are supplied]. ... Increasingly, [human agents] live in cities, 
whereas ecosystem services on which they depend (but of which they are largely unaware) 
are generated far from cities.” 
 
However, by defining ecosystem health in part as an economic concept, this connection between 
human agents and ecosystems can be appropriately acknowledged. Significantly, if the 
connection between socio-economic systems and ecosystems is acknowledged, then the co-
dependency of these systems can be accounted for. In potentially forming this connection, the 
communication channel between socio-economic systems and ecosystems can in turn be 
appropriately recognized. This communication channel allows information about ecological 
functioning to be passed on to human agents through economic signals as utility experienced 
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from ecosystem services (Farber et al., 2006). As an economic signal, human agents can adapt to 
change by adapting their behaviour. Hence, a connection between socio-economic systems and 
ecosystems allows these systems to be integrated together into a single system; a ‘socio-
ecosystem’ (Limburg et al., 2002). This integration is coherent, as socio-economic systems can 
also be conceptualized as complex adaptive systems, because human agents interact with one 
another and can adapt their behaviour according to different socio-economic conditions.   
 
The realization that ecosystem health is in part an economic concept, which can be interpreted 
by ecosystem services perceived, might suggest that the concept of ecosystem health is 
redundant as it is subsumed more directly by the conception of ecosystem services. However, it 
is important to recognize that the ecosystem health concept is important, as a focus on 
ecosystem services alone does not lead to long-term sustainability. This is because the 
(anthropocentric) ecosystem services concept, while requiring a productive and functioning 
system for generating their supply, does not account for the ‘dynamic capacity’ of ecosystems, 
which is necessary to sustain the supply of ecosystem services (Folke et al., 2002a). However, it 
has been previously argued that it is necessary to preserve the integrity of the adaptive cycle in 
the long-term. In preserving the integrity of the adaptive cycle the dynamic capacity of 
ecosystems, as a tension between adaptation and adaptability, can also be maintained. 
Therefore, a complete and novel definition of ecosystem health can be espoused, which ensures 
the continued legitimacy of the ecosystem health concept. Ecosystem health is defined here as a 
function of utility from ecosystem services perceived subject to preserving the integrity of the 
adaptive cycle. It is the maintenance of these two aspects that make ecosystem health genuinely 
a subjective and objective concept. 
 
In many respects, this definition of ecosystem health recognizes the preferences of human 
agents, as accounted for by ecosystem services perceived, and the preferences of species, as 
accounted for by the self-organizing processes that occur in accordance with the adaptive cycle. 
Hence, this definition which considers both the preferences of human agents and other species 
of an ecosystem appears to be neatly validated by way of the formation of scale-free networks, 
which has been shown to structurally underpin ecosystems as complex adaptive systems. This is 
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because ecosystems as scale-free networks are formed from self-organizing processes, which are 
derived from nothing other than preferences (Barabási, 2003). From this perspective, it becomes 
evident that ecosystem services are not necessarily an anthropocentric conception, but rather can 
be interpreted from an ecocentric perspective. This is reasoned because all species, whether 
human agents or not, connect with an ecosystem as they can experience utility by ‘perceiving’ 
ecosystem services that satisfy their own (species specific) needs. Hence, the connective theory 
of value, it is argued here, genuinely defines the formation of ecosystems as meeting grounds or 
integrated networks where species interact with each other. It is the connective theory of value 
then that underpins the novel definition of ecosystem health developed here. 
 
In establishing the importance of preferences and the connective theory of value, it becomes 
possible for human agents to connect and self-organize with an ecosystem allowing for the 
recognition of a socio-ecosystem. But, human agents are not usually just a passenger species of a 
socio-ecosystem. Rather, today we are, intentionally or unintentionally, the driver species or hub 
of many (if not all) ecosystems through direct and indirect human economic activity (O’Neill & 
Kahn, 2000). Hence, it is appropriate for human agents to direct ecosystems towards those 
preferred system states that provide the greatest utility (Figure 2.16).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.16: Ecosystem health is defined here as a function of utility from ecosystem services 
perceived subject to preserving the integrity of the adaptive cycle. Accordingly, if the present 
system state is x1 then a management action should be implemented to make a transition into 
the preferred system state x2. Note y1 represents thermodynamic equilibrium. 
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In recognizing the importance of preferences, it is established that choice should be given to that 
system state that has the greater fitness-connectivity product (Barabási & Albert, 1999). In this 
case, fitness reflects the bundle of ecosystem services supplied, while connectivity reflects the 
preferential weight of these ecosystem services to satisfy societal needs. With the notion of a 
fitness-connectivity product in mind, it is now possible to define the ECOPY index. The ECOPY 
index is the discounted and preferentially weighted aggregation of the ecosystem services 
supplied for satisfying various societal needs. However, prior to discounting the ECOPY index, 
the utility index is represented as the ECO index or Ecosystem Outcome index. The ECO index is 
represented by the aggregation of utility generated by an ecosystem service in a system state 
with the preferential weight of that ecosystem service for satisfying societal needs. Significantly, 
this construction of the ECO index is compatible with the self-organizing processes of 
ecosystems through a fitness-connectivity product and is in keeping with other formulations of 
an ecosystem services index (e.g. Banzhaf & Boyd, 2005; Martin & Blossey, 2009). By discounting 
this aggregation the ECOPY index is determined. Cost utility analysis can be performed by 
accounting for management action costs for directing the ecosystem to the preferred system 
state. Hence, one might represent the use of cost utility analysis according to Equation 2.2. 
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Equation 2.2: A possible formulation for cost utility analysis and the ECOPY index.  
Here cj is the cost of management action j;  
r is the rate of time preference; 
pi is the ‘probability’ that system state i actualizes after management action j;  
μn is the preferential weights for ecosystem service n; and 
sni is the utility score of the degree that the ecosystem service n is supplied in system state i 
through out all phases of the adaptive cycle. 
 
Presently, while researchers recognize the importance of ecosystem services, there is much 
debate about how to classify and define the list of ecosystem services so that they can be made 
operational. For example, Boyd and Banzhaf (2007) have argued that many ecosystem services 
are strictly speaking ecological functions. The challenge is that when trying to form the utility 
index, ECOPY, there is a need to develop a list of (anthropocentric) ecosystem services that are 
all defined from the same standpoint to ensure that an appropriate determination of accounts 
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has been undertaken. However, to date, there remains as yet no fully endorsed list of ecosystem 
services (Kremen, 2005; Egoh et al., 2007). Nevertheless, one well-known study that has classified 
a list of ecosystem services is that developed in the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project 
(Capistrano et al., 2006). This list remains the most recognizable and well-developed list of 
ecosystem services (Raymond et al., 2009). For this reason, this list of ecosystem services was 
broadly adopted here. Specifically, in the list of ecosystem services devised from the Millennium 
Ecosystem Assessment project, there is a defined taxonomy of four classes of ecosystem services 
(Table 2.3). These four classes of ecosystem services are provisioning services which provide for 
benefits through goods that are obtained from the ecosystem, regulating services which provide 
benefits through controlling and regulating various ecological functions, supporting services 
which are various ecological processes that allow for the generation of other ecosystem services, 
and cultural services which provide non-material benefits including non-use benefits.   
   
Criteria Ecosystem services  Relevance of ecosystem services  
Regulating 
Services 
Climate regulation Ecosystem regulates temperature & precipitation and acts as a 
source of and sink for greenhouse gases 
Disease regulation Ecosystem regulates the abundance of pathogens 
Water regulation  Ecosystem regulates hydrological flows 
Water & air  
Purification 
Ecosystem purifies & breaks down excess nutrients in water or 
stores pollutants in air 
Biological & 
Erosion control 
Ecosystem controls potential biological catastrophes & stabilizes 
against erosion, thus, retaining soils 
Provisioning 
Services 
Food 
 
Ecosystem supplies food produce (e.g. fish, grains, wild game, 
fruits) 
Fuel Ecosystem supplies extractable raw materials for fuel & fibre 
(e.g. fuelwood, logs, fodder) 
Freshwater Ecosystem supplies freshwater for use & storage 
Biological products Ecosystem supplies biological resources such biochemicals & 
genetic resources for medicinal or commercial use 
Supporting 
Services 
Pollination Ecosystem allows the movement of floral gametes 
Soil formation Ecosystem allows the re-formation & accumulation of 
soil/organic matter 
Nutrient cycling Ecosystem allows the processing, cycling & acquisition of 
nutrients (i.e. nitrogen, phosphorus) 
Primary production Ecosystem allows primary production (i.e. photosynthesis) 
Cultural 
Services 
Educational values Ecosystem provides opportunities for non-commercial uses  
Aesthetic values Ecosystem provides aesthetic qualities 
Spiritual values Ecosystem provides spiritual qualities 
Recreational values Ecosystem provides opportunities for recreational uses 
Table 2.3: The list of (anthropocentric) ecosystem services that an ecosystem may supply 
(adapted from Curtis, 2004; Capistrano et al., 2006). 
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It has been recognized that ecosystem health is in part an economic concept. But, this 
recognition of subjectivity in defining the status of ecosystems also applies to the determination 
of the representative scale of an ecosystem. That is, like ecosystem health, the scale of 
ecosystems is partially an economic concept too (Levin, 1992; Norton & Ulanowicz, 1992). 
Hence, the representative scale chosen for conceptualizing an ecosystem should be defined by 
the utility experienced according to ecosystem services perceived. This representative spatial 
scale chosen, however, should not be viewed as a wholly subjective determination without an 
ecological context. After all, the spatial scale defined should account for the spatial scales of the 
aggregated set of ecological functions, which generate the set of ecosystem services.  
 
It is important to recognize that even with a representative scale defined there must be a more 
explicit account of the nested set of sub-systems of an ecosystem and its surrounding 
environment. After all, if a single representative spatial scale was used, then, ecosystems would 
be mistakenly assumed to be isolated phenomena, rather than a hierarchy or nested set of 
adaptive cycles. In fact, not to undertake a multiple spatial scale conceptualization of an 
ecosystem is sure to bring about catastrophe and ‘court disaster’ for the management of 
ecosystems (Holling, 1995; Kay & Regier, 2000; Norton, 2005). Indeed, many failures in the 
management of ecosystems have arisen from a mismatch of scale between ecological functioning 
and anthropocentric scale determination (Cleveland et al., 1996). This problem can be overcome 
through ensuring that a multiple scale perspective is considered and applied.  
 
While the determination of the spatial scale of each module or sub-system should be a relatively 
easy undertaking, the scale determination of the surrounding environment might appear more 
problematic. Nevertheless, the boundary used for the surrounding environment should be 
defined by both an economic and an ecological aspect. Thus, the boundary should encapsulate 
the affected human agents from which ecosystem services can be perceived and be directly 
beneficial for, and it should include the ecological processes (e.g. water and material movement) 
that directly impact on the ecological functioning and structure of the ecosystem. Hence, for a 
lake ecosystem this ecological boundary might be defined by its catchment area. Accordingly, 
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the surrounding environment should be defined at the supra-local scale, which is considered 
here a bioregion. Within a bioregion the assumption of system isolation and closure is not 
unfounded. This is because within a bioregion there is a ‘sense of place’, which demonstrates 
some degree of homogeneity, scale discontinuities and dynamics that change at relatively slow 
rates (Nijkamp, 1999).   
 
2.2.7 Conclusion  
The task of this chapter was to define what a healthy ecosystem is. It has been previously 
advocated that ecosystem health be defined by ecosystem science (Belaoussoff & Kevan, 1998; 
2003). In undertaking such a task, this chapter reviewed and critiqued, in a progressive manner, 
various objective functions of ecosystem health. In doing so, the perspectives of population 
ecology and systems ecology were synthesized. Ecosystems then, are thermodynamic networks, 
which have a multiplicity of system states. Ecosystems as thermodynamic networks through 
self-organizing processes form a complex system with a scale-free network topology (Jordano et 
al., 2003). However, species within ecosystems have the capacity to adapt their behaviour. 
Hence, ecosystems are best conceptualized as a complex adaptive system (Levin, 2003; 2005). As 
complex adaptive systems, it was reasoned that health should maintain the tension between 
adaptation to prevailing ecological conditions and adaptability if and when ecological 
conditions change. Consequently, we should not be focused on ecosystem development through 
the maximization and preservation of ecological capital per se. Instead, we should preserve the 
integrity of the adaptive cycle. This is because in preserving the integrity of the adaptive cycle, 
the tension between adaptation and adaptability can be maintained.  
 
Ecosystems have neither an ecologically best phase, nor an ecologically best system state. A 
value-free definition of ecosystem health using ecological attributes alone cannot be attained. 
Ecosystem health then, is not an ecological concept alone, but is in part an economic concept. 
Hence, a novel definition of ecosystem health was established. Ecosystem health is proposed 
here to be better defined as a function of utility defined by the subjective preferences of human 
agents, subject to preserving the integrity of the adaptive cycle. Those system states that should 
be targeted by management action are those that provide utility through ecosystem services 
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perceived to satisfy various needs. Hence, the ECOPY index is defined by the aggregation of 
utility generated by ecosystem services in a system state with the preferential weights of those 
ecosystem services that satisfy the needs of human agents. The validity of using the preferences 
of human agents to define ecosystem health is based upon the fact that ecosystems are also 
governed by the preferences of species for favourable conditions according to a scale-free 
network topology.  
 
With this definition of ecosystem health, it is believed that the ecosystem health concept can 
once again be properly acknowledged, so that the health of ecosystems can be defined on its 
own terms at the ecosystem level and not simply by the toxicology, pathology and epidemiology 
of organisms and species. Moreover, in defining ecosystem health as both a subjective and 
objective concept, it is recognized that this fits with the methodological approach of a post-
classical economics and cost utility analysis. However, despite the argued inappropriateness of 
cost benefit analysis for evaluating environmental projects, this is not sufficient to ignore the use 
of neoclassical economic theory. After all, this methodology claims to offer the optimal 
management of ecosystems, where utility (i.e. ECOPY) is maximized. Hence, in the next chapter 
the neoclassical economics approach to ecosystem management is investigated.  
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Chapter 3: A Critique of the 
Neoclassical Economics Approach to 
Ecosystem Management 
 
The Mecca of the economist lies in economic biology rather than in economic dynamics… 
But biological conceptions are more complex than those of mechanics. 
 
Alfred Marshall 
 
3.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, an objective function of ecosystem health was proposed. It was 
concluded that ecosystem health is a function of utility defined by the subjective preferences of 
human agents, subject to preserving the integrity of the adaptive cycle. With ecosystem health 
defined, what is left is to determine those management actions that can direct ecosystems 
towards preferred system states (Walker et al., 2002). Hence, this chapter is the first of three that 
discusses and synthesizes the relationship between ecosystem management and the 
methodology of economic theory. This relationship needs to be discussed as there are two 
aspects required for successful ecosystem management: one, knowledge about ecosystem 
behaviour; and two, choice of management action. Without these two aspects appropriately 
considered, ecosystem management will not be undertaken in an efficient manner. But, what 
makes undertaking these aspects difficult is the presence of uncertainty.  
 
Despite the presence of uncertainty, the application of neoclassical economic theory claims to 
offer the hope of knowledge that is free of doubt, and choice that is rational (McCloskey, 1983; 
Bromley, 2008). Hence, neoclassical economic theory presents a methodology apparently 
capable of bringing about the optimal management of ecosystems, such that utility is 
maximized. But, it will be argued that the complex dynamics of ecosystems means the promise 
of optimal ecosystem management is illusory. Hence, this chapter provides a critique of 
neoclassical economic theory as well as the approaches in ecosystem management that are 
methodologically consistent with neoclassical economic theory. There are two management 
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approaches that are shown in this chapter to be methodologically consistent with the basis of 
neoclassical economic theory. These are anticipative and adaptive management. Accordingly, 
the critique of the neoclassical economics approach to ecosystem management is discussed in 
two parts, where the first part critiques anticipative management and the second part critiques 
adaptive management.     
 
3.1 Anticipative Management & Expected Utility  
The premise of anticipative management is that the resource manager has all necessary 
knowledge of the ecosystem to be managed. This knowledge is represented in an uncomplicated 
manner as a short summary of macro-level ecosystem behaviour referred to here as a macro-
regularity. The macro-regularity is assumed to be stored efficiently in a (mathematical) model. 
Hence, this known model represents the generalizable macro-regularity of ecosystem behaviour. 
Generalizable macro-regularities are said to capture the ubiquitous causal laws (i.e. whenever 
this then that) that underpin ecosystem behaviour. This knowledge allows the resource manager 
to have predictive power to infer the set of mutually exclusive system states and their associated 
objective probabilities that would occur for any given management action (Meffe & Carroll, 
1994; Holling & Meffe, 1996). Uncertainty is represented in anticipative management by the 
objective probabilities of the various system states occurring and is referred to as risk.  
 
Anticipative management does not assume that the resource manager is omnipotent or has 
perfect foresight. It recognizes that ecosystems are ‘noisy’. Therefore, uncertainty is said to be 
found in stochastic or unpredictable irregularities, which are however, conceived as well-
behaved randomness. Given this assumption of stochasticity, neoclassical economists depict the 
expectations of the resource manager according to the rational expectations hypothesis (Lucas & 
Prescott, 1971). Predictive power is retained with the rational expectations hypothesis, despite 
stochasticity, because it is assumed that the resource manager knows that the objective 
probabilities for the set of system states that could be actualized are normally distributed about 
a given mean (Sargent, 1993). Consequently, the epistemological uncertainty of the resource 
manager is modelled as zero, when planning over the long-term.  
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The managerial implication of anticipative management, given the rational expectations of the 
resource manager, is the strategy of command-and-control (Holling & Meffe, 1996). Here, the 
resource manager is said to be able to command the ecosystem by the chosen management 
action into those preferred system states, which maximizes expected utility for a given budget. 
The resource manager is then said to be able to control any interference from exogenous 
disturbances that may prevent the preferred system states from eventuating.  
 
With the capacity to command-and-control an ecosystem, it might be assumed that the resource 
manager would simply choose that management action, subject to a given budget, which when 
implemented maximizes the sum of utilities multiplied by their associated objective 
probabilities. However, this representation of choice would be inappropriate as it neglects the 
effects of uncertainty on the utility function. That is, the inappropriateness of maximizing the 
expected payoff is because different human agents will have different preferences towards these 
expected payoffs. For example, a resource manager who is risk averse, where two expected 
payoffs are the same, will choose the more certain prospect. Only a resource manager who is 
risk neutral will choose that management action which maximizes the expected payoff. This is 
because their expected utility function increases linearly with expected payoff. Accordingly, 
given that different preferences exist for uncertain prospects it is expected utility that is 
maximized and not necessarily the expected payoff per se.    
 
Expected utility theory has been developed in order to detail the mathematical underpinnings of 
the choice by expected utility (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947). In expected utility theory, it 
is assumed that resource managers have sufficient knowledge from the known macro-regularity 
that they can: one, detail the set of possible system states of an ecosystem; two, determine the 
probabilities of these mutually exclusive system states occurring for any given management 
action; and three, enunciate the utilities as ecosystem services generated for each system state 
(Machina, 1987).  
 
It is worth noting that despite the significance of expected utility theory a suitable multi-criteria 
analytical method might be required to aggregate the bundle of ecosystem services supplied. 
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One such method applicable with the assumptions of expected utility theory is multi-attribute 
utility theory, as it extends the one-dimensionality of expected utility to the case where multiple 
attributes are considered (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). However, for the purpose of simplicity, 
expected utility theory will continue to be referred to from here onwards. This is acceptable as 
arguments made pertain to expected utility theory and multi-attribute utility theory.  
 
It is presumed that the optimal management action, which is followed by the resource manager, 
is directed towards maximizing expected utility. But, to maximize expected utility and achieve 
the optimal management of ecosystems, it is necessary that the logic of choice of the resource 
manager is well-defined and follows various rational choice axioms (von Neumann & 
Morgenstern, 1947). These axioms include the invariance axiom, the dominance axiom and the 
axiom of transitivity. Briefly, the invariance axiom states that different representations of the 
same economic evaluation must be given the same preference. The dominance axiom states that 
the dominant alternative must be chosen. Finally, the transitivity axiom states that if 
management action x is preferred to management action y and y is preferred to management 
action z, then x must by necessity be preferred to z (von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1947).  
 
With the macro-regularity of the ecosystem known and the logic of choice axiomatized, the 
resource manager can lay claim to being globally rational, in that one can conceivably always 
respond in an optimal manner (Loasby, 2001a; Bromley, 2008). That is, “if [epistemological] 
knowledge is perfect, and the logic of choice complete and compelling, then choice disappears; 
nothing is left but stimulus and response” (Loasby, 1976; p. 5). Hence, the resource manager will 
achieve optimal ecosystem management, where utility is maximized.  
 
It is this recognition of knowledge that is free of epistemological uncertainty and choice that is 
rational that characterize neoclassical economic theory. It is these assumptions based in an 
ahisotrical body of logical propositions (e.g. rational choice axioms) that allow definitive 
solutions of optimality (Foster, 2006). These attractive assumptions are made possible, as the 
methodological foundations of neoclassical economics are grounded in mathematical modelling 
and the formal logic of deduction. It is deductive logic, which dictates that whenever a given 
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event or action occurs a set of outcomes ‘must’ necessarily follow (in keeping with a point 
attractor), that leads to the predictive power and the ideas of logical necessity found in 
neoclassical economics (Earl, 1995; Lawson, 1997).  
 
3.1.1 Empirical Violations & Bounded Rationality 
Despite the attractiveness of neoclassical economic theory it has come under much criticism. For 
example, the rational expectations hypothesis assumes that the epistemology of the resource 
manager is free of doubt prior to any acknowledged learning that is genuine. Moreover, if the 
stochastic variation of an ecosystem were found to be zero, then rational expectations would 
have little difference from the completely deterministic models of perfect foresight, where 
“probability is knowledge, not uncertainty” (Davidson, 1991; p. 132). Hence, the genuine 
difference of the rational expectations hypothesis from the absurdity of self-fulfilling 
expectations is a ‘stochastic euphemism’ (Earl, 1983). In consequence, as Poole (1976; p. 504) 
surmises,  
 “…rational expectations theory might be regarded … as only slightly amending [defunct] 
perfect certainty models. One needs only to substitute the assumption of perfect knowledge 
of probability distributions for the assumption of perfect knowledge of outcomes.”  
  
Empirical evidence has also demonstrated that expected utility theory and its axioms of rational 
choice cannot be vindicated either. In fact, there is now an ever-increasing body of evidence that 
indicates that expected utility theory is contrary with how human agents make choices in reality 
(e.g. Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; Tversky & Kahneman, 1971; Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; 1979; 
1982; Kahneman et al., 1990; Prelec & Loewenstein, 1991; Hey, 1995; Gintis, 2000). As Starmer 
(1999; p. F8) concludes:  
“One thing we have learned … is that expected utility theory is descriptively false. 
Mountains of experimental evidence reveal systematic violations of the axioms of rational 
choice, and the more we look, the more we find.” 
 
These violations have led to the emergence of various modifications to expected utility, such as 
prospect theory (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). In prospect theory, the expected utility function is 
altered so that it resembles a sigmoidal shape. This sigmoidal shape reflects behavioural 
evidence that human agents are ‘less sensitive to gains than equivalent losses’ (Kahneman & 
Tverksy, 1979). However, while this modification is an improvement, it has not gone far enough. 
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If we attempt to explain knowledge and choice through rational expectations and expected 
utility theory, respectively, a critical failure occurs because they provide a descriptively false 
account of human agency.  
 
A plausible account of actual human agency is provided by bounded rationality. Bounded 
rationality should not be confused with irrationality (March, 1994). Rather, the understanding 
and actions of human agents are “intentionally rational but only limitedly so” (Simon, 1957; p. 
xxiv). Bounded rationality arises because of cognitive limitations, resultant from the 
computational capacity and knowledge of a human agent. Thus, bounded rationality recognizes 
the cognitive constraints of human agents, which inhibit their ability to perceive and process 
information. In exposing the dimension of human agency, Simon (1959; p. 272) argues that: 
“The agent’s information about his environment is much less than an approximation to the 
real environment. … In actual fact the perceived world is fantastically different from the real 
world. The differences involve both omissions and distortions, and arise in both perception 
and inference.” 
 
Bounded rationality is not the consequence of information scarcity. It is caused by an inability of 
human agents to cope with an overabundance of information (Hodgson, 1988). Human agents 
are continually bombarded with stimuli, and, in order to make sense of these, it is required that 
it is filtered and computationally reduced into more manageable terms (Sterman, 2000). Our 
minds do not attempt to gather every detail about a system, as a perfect internal representation. 
Rather, they reduce information to that where macro-regularities in the form of mental models 
can be conceived.  
 
The actual filtering and reducing process to allow the formation of mental models is what our 
perception and cognitive processing of information aim for. Perceptual filters, first, adjust the 
various senses to ‘stimuli’, whereby a stimulus that goes through this initial perceptual filter 
becomes ‘data’. Then, conceptual or cognitive processing filters extract this data, so that what 
goes through this subsequent filter is expressed as ‘utilizable information’ (Boisot & Canals, 
2004). The capability of a human agent to perceive information as data is thus determined by 
their computational capacity, while their capability to process and analyse information 
cognitively defines the degree of their knowledge (Fransman, 1998). From the conceived 
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information, it is hoped that a mental model can readily be formed as a short summary of 
system behaviour. This mental model in turn allows inferences as expectations (or informal 
predictions) to be generated from it (Figure 3.1).  
 
 
Figure 3.1: A representation of the cognitive dimension of the boundedly rational resource 
manager (adapted from Boisot & Canals, 2004).  
 
Mental models are established in an ‘evolutionary’ manner initially by the random accumulation 
of information by trial-and-error, but over time adaptive learning occurs, as expectations 
represented as prior situated interactions are adjusted according to posterior actualities 
observed (Staddon & Simmelhag, 1971; Einhorn, 1982; Dosi et al., 1999). Hence, expectations 
adapt over time, not merely as a result of new information obtained, but also as knowledge itself 
changes. Accordingly, expectations and the knowledge that brings about expectations are both 
subject to possible revision. Mental models then, do not develop from truth-conserving 
deductive logic, but rather at their foundations develop from another mode of logic. This 
content-increasing, but more uncertain logic, is induction. Inductive logic reasons in reverse to 
deductive logic as it attempts to gather facts to construct general theories, rather than assume 
theories (i.e. macro-regularities and rational choice axioms) to determine its logical implications. 
Thus, induction is a mode of logic that indicates that certain phenomena are actually operative, 
as it “is the study of how knowledge is modified through its use” (Holland et al., 1989; p. 5).   
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The problem is that when the resource manager attempts to evaluate an ecosystem, it is likely to 
be apparent that his or her perception is far from adequate. Perception can only recognize 
simple patterns, so that only partial internal presentations are formed (Churchland et al., 1994; 
Lootsma, 2001). Hence, the resource manager in attempting to ascertain any kind of longer-term 
macro-regularity as a short summary of system behaviour would become confused when using 
their immediate perception (Wolfram, 2002). Accordingly, from this perceptive account, the 
resource manager would consider the ecosystem a random entity, even if some kind of 
complicated structure is recognized. The resource manager then, in order to make any sense of 
the ecosystem managed would have to fall back on ‘endless’ description of historical accounts, 
because no simple summary of the behaviour of the ecosystem could be found (Potts, 2000).  
 
This failure to ascertain a macro-regularity is presumably because of the overabundance of 
incoming sensory data. Therefore, ecosystems are said to be computationally complex. That is, 
“ecosystems are not only more complex than we [perceive], but more complex than we can 
[perceive]” (Egler, 1977; p. 11). The immediate perception of the resource manager is only able to 
discern macro-regularities in simplistic systems, where patterns are obviously regular. This 
makes sense as our mental models are certainly not mathematical models (Manski, 2004). 
 
One solution for overcoming computational complexity is to simplify ecosystems through 
stabilizing outputs of various ecological variables. This would presumably ensure that the 
strategy of command-and-control could be implemented (Carpenter & Gunderson, 2001). 
However, in the long-term, simplifications of ecosystems often lead to ecological catastrophe 
and further biodiversity loss, as the resilience and adaptive capacity of the ecosystem to buffer 
disturbances can become fundamentally compromised (McCann, 2000; Rammell et al., 2007). 
This effect is known as the paradox of ecosystem management, as “any attempt to manage 
ecological variables inexorably has led to less resilient ecosystems” (Holling, 1995; p. 25). For 
example, managerial attempts to suppress fires in forests, has resulted in the build up of forest 
floor ‘fuel’, resulting in less regular, but more intense fires that have altered the species 
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composition of these forest ecosystems and in turn reduced their resilience (Holling & Meffe, 
1996). Accordingly, Holling and Meffe (1996; p. 329) conclude that: 
“The command-and-control approach, when extended uncritically to the treatment of 
[ecosystems], often results in unforeseen and undesirable consequences. A frequent, perhaps 
universal result of command-and-control… is reduction of the range of natural variation of 
systems – their structure, function, or both – in an attempt to increase their predictability.” 
 
3.1.2 Heuristic Rules & As-If Optimization  
Bounded rationality emphasizes the cognitive dimension in processing, analysing and 
integrating information. By recognizing the cognitive dimension, it also recognizes that 
information collection and deliberation are costly and time-consuming exercises (Murphy, 1994). 
With bounded rationality, information is not given and the logic of choice is neither an 
operation of necessity nor necessarily capable of providing the rational course of action. Thus, 
with bounded rationality it is recognized that choice is not simply that of “choosing among fixed 
and known alternatives, to each of which is attached known consequences.” Rather, bounded 
rationality is with respect to the intervention of “perception and cognition which recognizes that 
[choices] are not given but must be sought” (Simon, 1959; p. 272). Hence, one must first choose 
how to choose (Potts, 2000).  
 
Given the time-consuming and costly nature of information collection and deliberation, and 
given that the complexity of ecosystems means a large amount of information would be 
necessary to administer a strict interpretation of the use of expected utility theory, it is 
reasonable to assume that the resource manager would choose and use heuristic rules. Heuristic 
rules are fast and frugal inferences (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974; Arthur, 1994). They are frugal 
because their inferences are based only on a single piece of information. They are fast because 
they limit the search for information by a simple computable stopping rule.  
 
At first, heuristic rules might appear inappropriate. After all, heuristic rules only use 
momentary searches of information and they do not attempt to integrate all available 
information, which can inevitably lead to large biases and errors (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979). 
For example, the representative bias results when an applied heuristic rule ignores using an 
appropriate sample size to determine a general inference; a tendency known as the law of small 
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numbers (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). Moreover, the availability bias results in only data that is 
easily available to be used, as opposed to finding accurate data (Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
1974). Hence, heuristic rules cannot bring about the optimal management of ecosystems.  
 
Gigerenzer et al. (1999), however, have argued that heuristic rules are still useful as they can lead 
to an inference, when the collection, integration and deliberation of information is considered 
too costly. As Pitz and Sachs (1984; p. 152) put it, there is always “a tradeoff [which] exists 
between cognitive effort and judgemental accuracy.” Thus, resource managers who employ 
heuristic rules certainly do not endeavour towards an optimal solution. Rather, they satisfice, in 
that they will choose actions, which will surpass their initial expectations (Conlisk, 1996). Hence, 
heuristic rules differ from rational choice, as heuristic rules focus on generating a propensity for 
some success rather than the avoidance of all errors and biases (Nickles, 1989). The reason 
heuristic rules can, nonetheless, be informative is because they are facilitated by an adaptive 
rationality, as they can be rational relative to their specific ecological context that they are 
adapted to (Gigerenzer & Selten, 2001; Holling et al., 2008). For example, it has been shown that 
the recognition heuristic, which involves choosing that which is familiar developed through an 
adaptation to a specific ecological context, provides solutions better than random (Gigerenzer et 
al., 1999). Significantly, Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) describe the adaptive rationality when 
using heuristic rules as an ecological rationality.  
 
With these reasons for using heuristic rules apparent, it is now not surprising that there are 
numerous axiomatic violations against the descriptive application of expected utility theory. 
However, while some behavioural economists foresee these violations as sufficient evidence that 
expected utility theory is flawed, neoclassical economists interpret these violations in quite the 
opposite way (Dyer, 1990). This is because from the perspective of neoclassical economics, if 
expected utility theory is not deliberately used, resource managers will invariably use heuristic 
rules, which result in far from optimal solutions. Thus, expected utility theory provides a logic 
of choice that allows resource managers the potential to evaluate in an optimal way.  
 
 72
Neoclassical economists claim that there has never been any effort to portray a theory that 
makes substantive claims about any actual human agency. The underlying purpose of 
neoclassical economic theory is to express how human agents ought to act and behave (Kornai, 
1971). When this perspective is understood, it becomes reasonable to make assumptions which 
are at variance with actual behaviour (Friedman, 1953).  
 
With the availability of expected utility theory, it is reasonable to use this method, as-if the 
resource manager were globally rational (Baron, 2000). This as-if optimization makes expected 
utility prescriptive, as it tells resource managers how they can improve their evaluations 
(Holling, 2001; Lootsma, 2001). Thus, despite the presence of gross empirical violations, this 
does not invalidate the prescriptive potential of expected utility (Manski, 2004). Hence, where 
as-if optimization is assumed, then, the resource manager can treat their bounded rationality as 
only a constraint on information. For this reason, what becomes important is to learn and gather 
information, so that bounded rationality can be overcome (Cyert & March, 1963; Sargent, 1993). 
 
3.2 Adaptive Management & Systematic Learning  
While adaptive learning will almost always occur, it is the idea of a prescriptive and systematic 
scientific method of adaptive learning, which is considered to be the solution for addressing 
bounded rationality and its associated problems. It is this systematic method that brings into 
being a differentiable approach to ecosystem management termed adaptive management 
(Holling, 1978). This is because generalizable macro-regularities, it is maintained, can be 
discovered by adaptive management allowing in time the optimal management of ecosystems. 
Thus, “in theory, adaptive management recapitulates the promise that Francis Bacon articulated 
four centuries ago: to control nature one must understand her” (Lee, 1999; p. 9).  
 
However, despite the development of adaptive management some 30 years ago, there remain 
few examples where the approach has resulted in practical success. Indeed, as Walters (2007; p. 
304) concludes after reviewing over 100 case studies of adaptive management applied to 
ecosystems, “the practice of adaptive management has been radically less successfully than one 
might expect.” It is often suggested that the reason for this failure is because resource managers 
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need to have incentive structures to want to be formally educated about the systematic approach 
to adaptive learning that underpins adaptive management (e.g. McLain & Lee, 1996; Nyberg, 
1998; Johnson & Williams, 1999; Walters, 2007). The rest of this chapter critically discusses the 
adaptive management approach.  
 
Adaptive management accepts the bounded rationality of the resource manager, but treats this 
uncertainty as an opportunity for further learning through scientific investigation. In 
recognizing the importance of using a scientific method for analysis, adaptive management 
differs from the unsystematic adaptive learning of trial-and-error, where learning is haphazard 
at best (Nyberg, 1998). Scientific investigations in adaptive management are performed through 
the systematic and explicit construction of ecosystem models, which are developed wherever 
possible as mathematical models.  
 
Mathematical models are constructed through meticulous probing of the ecosystem by using 
random or stratified sampling techniques for obtaining quantitative data for various 
presumably relevant ecological variables. In collecting quantitative data and subsequently 
constructing mathematical models, it is considered possible to obtain macro-regularities about 
ecosystem behaviour. After all, “the usual experience with ecosystem data is that there is not 
enough to define the [whole ecology of an ecosystem] with any confidence, but far too much for 
a single [resource manager] to assimilate” (Lee, 1993; p. 61). 
 
Given that a large volume of quantitative data may be collected for many ecological variables, 
adaptive management prescribes the use of statistical analysis (Nyberg, 1998; McCarthy & 
Possingham, 2007). With the use of statistical analysis, a statistical model can be constructed that 
‘fits’ various variables together. The fitting process of statistical analysis estimates unknown 
quantities called parameters of the various ecological variables modelled. The statistical model 
established is then used to provide a macro-regularity from the data much of which may be 
irrelevant and irregular (Levin & Pacala, 1997). However, there may be a considerable number 
of ecological variables and therefore also potentially a considerable number of statistical models 
that could be generated. Hence, the task of statistical analysis is to select the best model. The best 
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model according to the criterion of maximum likelihood is that model, where a short statistical 
summary is found, which predicts with the greatest accuracy the behaviour of the ecosystem 
from the data available (Clark, 2007). 
 
The construction and selection of models should not be conceived as a strictly objective affair 
(Clark, 2007). It is likely when investigating ecosystems that the number of ecological variables 
will be so large that it would be too costly and time consuming for the resource manager to 
estimate and test all possible model variants. Thus, there is often a requirement with statistical 
analysis for a subjective assessment to be used, both in determining the initial ecological 
variables to be analysed and the subsequent models to be constructed. 
 
Any model selected from the available data should not necessarily be considered the correct or 
generalizable macro-regularity of the ecosystem that provides accurate prediction of its 
behaviour. In fact, the initial models selected may be poor and misleading. Hence, modelling by 
adaptive management is not a once-off procedure as biases and errors are often retained 
(Walters, 1997; Norton, 1999). Rather, modelling with adaptive management is an incremental 
and sequential process, where models are revised as updated information is found (Hilborn, 
1992). That is, over time, as the resource manager systematically and adaptively learns which of 
their statistical models accurately fit the available data set, he or she is presumably able to 
discard poorly performing models, and construct and select new more accurate ones (Arthur, 
1994). And so, with further learning and information, in accordance with the law of large 
numbers, an accurate model construction can, so it is theorized, be determined (Figure 3.2).   
 
The theorized convergence on to the generalizable macro-regularity of the ecosystem is “a kind 
of foreshadowing of the rational expectations [hypothesis] that assumes an ultimate validity to 
the concept of objective probability” (Rosser, 2001; p. 13). Hence, prior to convergence, the 
expectations of the resource manager can be represented by the adaptive expectations 
hypothesis. In this hypothesis, it is maintained that the formal prediction by the model selected, 
as a statistical inference, should be altered in proportion to the determined error of the previous 
prediction. Hence, adaptive expectations are determined as a statistical shadow of past 
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information signals. Thus, adaptive expectations are backwards-looking, incorporating changes 
and making adjustments as more information is gathered (Sargent, 1993). Accordingly, over 
time with systematic and adaptive learning, it is conceived that adaptive expectations can 
converge onto rational expectations. Despite some economists remaining cautious about claims 
of convergence (Blume & Easley, 1982; Bray & Kreps, 1987), it appears that expectation without 
epistemological uncertainty is the critical criterion of neoclassical economic theory (Phelps, 1987; 
Sargent, 1993). For this reason, it is maintained here that neoclassical economics is defined by the 
deductive process of research. That is, research through mathematical modelling allows in time 
the potential for formal prediction and control to be made to allow for the optimal management 
of ecosystems.  
 
 
Figure 3.2: The systematic and adaptive learning of the adaptive management is theorized to 
converge onto the generalizable macro-regularity of the ecosystem allowing objective 
probabilities to be inferred for state space.  
 
If this convergence onto the generalizable macro-regularity of the ecosystem occurs, then the 
problem of computational complexity appears resolved. The perceived randomness of 
ecosystems would have been reduced to a short statistical summary. Accordingly, as Simon 
(1972; p. 169) concludes “incomplete information … and complexity … tend to merge: … 
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uncertainty, whatever its source, is the same.” Thus, with the potential of the generalizable 
macro-regularity known, the resource manager presumably can accurately predict by statistical 
inference the behaviour of the ecosystem managed for any management action. The optimal 
management action can subsequently be chosen by expected utility theory. Hence, with 
convergence “adaptive management offers the hope that by [systematically and adaptively] 
learning … we can reach and maintain a managed [stochastic] equilibrium” (Lee, 1993; p. 58).  
 
This theorized convergence onto the generalizable macro-regularity with systematic and 
adaptive learning, however, is not likely to be easily translated in reality (Clark, 2007). This is 
because the variability in ecosystem data sets may limit the degree of statistical rigour that can 
be achieved. In fact, with ecosystems it may not be possible to meet many of the assumptions of 
conventional statistical analysis (Nyberg, 1998). Even if these assumptions could be applied, for 
convergence to hold, then at the very least the rate of convergence through systematic and 
adaptive learning would have to be greater than the background rate of ecosystem change 
(McCain & Lee, 1996; Dosi et al., 1999). 
 
3.2.1 Bayesian Statistics & Ignorance  
At some point, a management action is likely to be required for implementation, even though 
the generalizable macro-regularity for the ecosystem has not yet been fully established. Model 
inaccuracies or incompleteness results in uncertainty as ambiguity (Ellsberg, 1961). Specifically, 
ambiguity is the “uncertainty about probability, created from missing information that is 
relevant and could be known” (Camerer & Weber 1992; p. 330). Hence, ambiguity is important 
where an insufficient amount of quantitative data is available for complete model construction. 
However, the problem of ambiguity is sought to be resolved by the Bayesian statistics tradition 
with the use of direct computations of subjective probabilities prior to management action. This 
is because an ill-defined or unknown parameter can be assigned a subjective probability 
distribution that reflects the present state of (expert) knowledge of the resource manager 
(Nyberg, 1998). That is, subjective information can be generated to develop unknown 
parameters in the constructed mathematical model of the ecosystem.  
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The specification of the subjective prior probabilities for unknown parameters, which is 
presumably undertaken by a simple heuristic rule (e.g. anchoring and adjustment heuristic), 
may appear quite unscientific. However, as the sample size of new quantitative data is collected, 
the relative importance of the prior distribution in determining the posterior distribution is 
considered to diminish (Bergerud & Reed, 1998). Moreover, as previously alluded to, there is a 
growing realization that statistical analysis is a subjective methodology, so the explicit use of 
subjective probabilities does not appear a contradiction (Clark, 2007). This realization, coupled 
with the problems of using conventional statistical analysis because of the variability in 
ecological data sets, has seen research in adaptive management towards mathematical models, 
such as Bayesian networks that are, at least initially, constructed completely subjectively 
(Nyberg et al., 2006). Briefly, Bayesian networks represent variables connected to other variables 
where a causal relationship exists. Associated with each relationship is a given probability 
distribution. Hence, when these variables and relationships are modelled, a directed graph or 
network can be formed, which allows the potential for Bayesian inferences to be made. 
Significantly, in these cases, where mathematical models like Bayesian networks are used, 
subsequent evaluation presumably would be administered, in an as-if optimal manner by 
subjective expected utility theory (Savage, 1954).  
 
A problem may arise, as it is still assumed that the resource manager has a considerable amount 
of information to ascertain state space for the ecosystem managed. However, given that 
information may be inaccurate and incomplete, it is possible that the outcomes of the 
implemented management action do not bring about any system state formally predicted by the 
model constructed (Holling, 1978). This problem of an unexpected outcome reflects another 
more severe form of uncertainty termed ignorance (Perman et al., 2003). Ignorance recognizes 
that outcomes are not all known and presumably remain undiscovered.  
 
Ignorance alone is not necessarily a problem for adaptive management. This is because with 
adaptive management an unexpected outcome from an implemented management action is 
viewed as an opportunity for further learning and model adjustment. Ignorance, however, is a 
problem when one considers that the effects of management actions that generate state 
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transitions may be irreversible. For example, hysteresis effects in lake ecosystems can prevent 
the possibility of the lake ecosystem returning to its system state prior to the management action 
by reversing the management action implemented (Mäler, 2000). Thus, in shallow lake 
ecosystems reduced water availability can lead to a state transition. But, once the alternative 
system state is reached, the system is unlikely to return to its previous system state simply by a 
return to precipitation levels previously observed (Solé & Bascompte, 2006).  
 
There are various strategies that might be employed in undertaking an economic evaluation 
despite ignorance. For example, one means is to determine the probabilities from the 
constructed model for a subset of known system states, and lump all remaining probabilities 
into a residual subset. This procedure is similar in kind to real options theory. In real options 
theory, an option value of the residual component is quantified in addition to the calculations of 
expected utility. In accounting for an option value the importance of flexibility is recognized 
where ignorance remains (Trigeorgis, 1996). Accordingly, real options theory captures the 
necessary conditions of economic evaluations under ignorance, namely, “irreversibility, ongoing 
uncertainty and some leeway in timing” (Dixit & Pindyck, 1994; p. 23).  
 
The resource manager, alternatively, under ignorance could adopt a neoclassical interpretation 
of the preference for liquidity. Under this interpretation, it is considered rational to postpone 
any management action generating a state transition for those “things which are unknown now, 
but which will become known in time” (Hicks, 1974; p. 39). This neoclassical interpretation of 
liquidity preference, as such, reflects the precautionary principle. In its simplest form, the 
precautionary principle states that precaution should be maintained against a management 
action where there exists an absence of information that clarifies the likely set of future 
outcomes of a given management action. Thus, the use of the precautionary principle is justified 
through a positive quasi-option value, which reflects the willingness of the resource manager to 
avoid a potentially irreversible action given the expectation of future information becoming 
available (Arrow & Fisher, 1974; Prato, 1998).  
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A similar approach to the precautionary principle is the safe minimum standard. This risk 
averse approach was originally defined as a gain-loss ratio, where, unless expected gains were 
well above unity, a management action should not be implemented (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1952; 
Bishop, 1978). More recently, the safe minimum standard has been redefined where potentially 
irreversible management actions should not be undertaken under ignorance, “unless the social 
costs [of not implementing the proposed management action] are somehow intolerable, 
unacceptable or excessive” (Berrens et al., 1998; p. 149).  
 
3.2.2 Active & Passive Adaptive Management  
Resource managers may feel resigned to either management action by trial-and-error where 
ignorance exists, assuming that outcomes may be determined by historical happenstance or 
simply delaying management action by collecting more information through careful monitoring. 
However, with adaptive management there is an alternative, where postponing management 
action until sufficient data is obtained is not necessarily needed. The alternative is to actively 
and aggressively probe the behaviour of the ecosystem through experimentation. Importantly, 
the likelihood of experimentation will depend on the scale of analysis investigated. However, 
where experimentation can be performed, we can distinguish two strategies of adaptive 
management, termed active and passive adaptive management (Walters, 1986).  
 
Through the use of experimentation active adaptive management can attempt directly to 
address the problems of ignorance. Hence, it is the necessity to systematically learn while 
recognizing the potential costs of ignorance that drives active adaptive management efforts 
(Walters, 1986). Specifically, this active strategy identifies uncertainties and then attempts to 
administer manipulative experiments to test a range of predictions as hypotheses from various 
incomplete models constructed concerning those identified uncertainties (Lee, 1993; Norton, 
2005). If the predictions as hypotheses are confirmed from the experimental evidence, then the 
identified uncertainty may be resolved and the best model construction may be found (Walters 
& Holling, 1990). However, even “if the [hypotheses] fail, an adaptive design still permits 
learning, so that future experiments can proceed from a better base of understanding” (Lee, 
1993; p. 53). Importantly, in testing model predictions as hypotheses that are amenable to 
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empirical examination, active adaptive management is exemplified by the hypothetico-
deductive method. 
 
It is important to recognize, however, that the experiments that are undertaken with active 
adaptive management are not the precise undertaking as observed in controlled laboratory 
conditions (Lee, 1993). While active adaptive management and laboratory science both assume 
methodological closure, in that they are attempting to isolate the system modelled from 
interference, a critical difference is the degree of interference that is controlled. In laboratory 
conditions we might be able to control up to 95 per cent of interference through strict 
experimentation that is randomized and replicable. However, in field experiments the resource 
manager may be fortunate to control even 50 per cent of interference (van Eijnatten, 1993). 
Furthermore, it may be difficult to find homogeneous areas to serve as replicas to check 
experimental reliability. Hence, achieving precise hypothesis testing by active adaptive 
management is unattainable (Walters & Green, 1997). Finally, despite active adaptive 
management arguing that large-scale experiments are necessary, most experiments are likely to 
be performed only on a small-scale. The small-scale of these experiments limit results from 
being easily extrapolated to scales necessary for inferring appropriate management action 
(Costanza et al., 2007b).  
 
Passive adaptive management, on the other hand, does not involve any experimentation per se. 
It presumes that the best model of ecosystem behaviour is that determined by careful 
monitoring and statistical analysis alone. Thus, passive adaptive management is exemplified by 
quantitative induction, as the model constructed is a short statistical summary developed 
entirely from past observations and quantitative data collected from monitoring efforts.   
 
To that end, Holling (1978) and others (e.g. Wilhere, 2002; McCarthy & Possingham, 2007), 
despite problems of experimental replication and control, have argued that active adaptive 
management should guide ecosystem management. This is because active adaptive 
management, even though unable to provide precise hypothesis testing in its experimentation 
might potentially provide more useful information for reliable model selection, when trial-and-
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error in times of ignorance is considered too risky given the irreversibility of management 
actions (Lee, 1999). Furthermore, the passive strategy is likely more readily to confuse 
anthropogenic effects with environmental effects (Walters, 1997). However, the greatest 
fundamental drawback of the passive strategy is the problem of inductive insufficiency (Popper, 
1959). Specifically, inductive insufficiency recognizes that an inference made from past data 
alone has an inherent circularity, as model inferences about expected outcomes are presumed to 
be repeated based solely on past information. It is for reasons of avoiding inductive insufficiency 
and historicism that the philosopher of science Popper (1959) believed that science should be 
guided by the hypothetico-deductive method. Accordingly, it is reasonable to conclude that 
active adaptive management should guide ecosystem management.   
 
Nevertheless, the strategy used should depend on the fiscal resources available and the 
economic payoffs involved (Rogers, 1998). After all, there is always a trade-off between the 
accuracy of the science undertaken and costs involved with information collection. Hence, active 
adaptive management would only be considered a rational strategy, if the expected net benefits 
of gaining additional information from experimentation are positive (Failing et al., 2004). Once 
again, the economy of research matters.  
 
3.2.3 Multi-Agent Simulations & Randomness   
Up until this point, the models discussed for adaptive management have been exclusively 
considered to be either conventional or Bayesian statistical models. However, the use of 
statistical models is becoming more widely criticized because they do not specifically account 
for the actual spatial micro-mapping of an ecosystem, as a networked structure (Levin & Pacala, 
2003). Accordingly, in recent times, with the development of computational methods, there has 
been a methodological shift amongst some researchers in modelling ecosystems away from 
statistical analysis and towards multi-agent simulations (Bousquet & Le Page, 2004; Pascual & 
Dunne, 2006). This is because not only can simulations model the actual micro-mapping of an 
ecosystem, but they can examine more easily the complex dynamics of ecosystems (Epstein, 
1999). Nevertheless, while multi-agent simulations are considered useful for these reasons, they 
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are often conceived to be doing much the same task as statistical analysis. However, as 
recognized by Wolfram (2002) this conclusion is incorrect.  
 
With statistical analysis much of the variability and complexity in ecosystems, as demonstrated 
in long-term data sets, is simply treated as noise and left as an ‘unknown’ or irregular stochastic 
element. But, when using multi-agent simulations of a network model (e.g. a food web) much of 
this seemingly irregular variability, which is treated as random in statistical models, can 
potentially be captured. This is because multi-agent simulations can capture the complex 
dynamics of ecosystems - dynamics that lie somewhere between the regular and the random 
(Section 2.2). Hence, there are potentially macro-regularities or short summaries that can explain 
complex dynamics. Complex dynamics need not derive from a cumbersome amount of detail, 
where no short summary can be found (Roe, 1998; Lansing, 2003). Yet, despite macro-
regularities potentially being present with complex dynamics, statistical analysis assumes much 
of this complexity is random even though they are completely deterministic and noise-free 
(Wolfram, 2002). Thus, while statistical analysis may explain broadly some of the behaviour of 
ecosystems through non-linear accounts of a few strong linkages, it is unable to portray 
sufficiently, in a short statistical summary, the complex dynamics of an ecosystem (Foster, 2005; 
2006). In fact, whether an equation-based mathematical model is stochastic or not, complex 
dynamics has the potential to be inserted into a set of equations, though this is a far from easy 
undertaking and will not be represented by a simple macro-regularity or short summary (let 
alone be solvable) (Epstein, 1999). Thus, just as our perception fails us in revealing macro-
regularities in complex systems, it appears that statistical analysis may not be analytically much 
better (Wolfram, 2002). Yet, unlike the informal nature of perception, which leads to confusion 
where complexity is present, there may well remain a false belief with equation-based 
mathematical models, which can capture complicated but not complex dynamics, that the actual 
macro-regularities of ecosystem behaviour can be completely revealed in an equation-based 
mathematical model. 
 
It has been argued that statistical analysis cannot find any short statistical summary, as a macro-
regularity, that can derive complex dynamics. Nevertheless, despite this realization of the 
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limitations of statistical models, there is a reluctance in using multi-agent simulations, even 
though these simulations can capture the dynamics of complex systems (Axelrod, 1997; Janssen , 
2002a; Kokkoris, 2005). This reluctance is perhaps because with multi-agent simulations there 
appears a ‘hidden’ computation or detachment between the complex dynamics that can 
potentially emerge at the macroscopic level and the microscopic local interactions from where 
these dynamics emerged (Chopard & Droz, 1999). Consequently, this detachment resultant from 
emergent properties makes it extraordinarily difficult to establish proofs of complex simulated 
output.  
 
Multi-agent simulations are, however, mathematical models, and despite claims to the contrary, 
they still maintain the use of deductive logic, which recognizes that they can in part be 
compatible with neoclassical economic theory (Epstein, 1999). Indeed, mathematics and their 
models represent the science of drawing necessary and logical conclusions. Nevertheless, multi-
agent simulations are different from the analytical methods usually prescribed in neoclassical 
economic theory. This is because multi-agent simulations can also generate complex and 
emergent macro-regularities through modelling systems as a networked set of interactions 
amongst agents. This is not the case with statistical analysis, which assumes that generalizable 
macro-regularities can be determined from an aggregated collection of an ecosystem’s parts. To 
ignore emergent properties, and maintain a strictly reductionist approach to science, as 
statistical analysis does, could potentially lead to catastrophic consequences. This is especially 
so, when one considers that equation-based mathematical modelling may not even provide a 
reasonable approximation of the complex dynamics of ecosystem behaviour over the longer 
temporal scales found with ecosystem management. Indeed, “the history of ecosystem 
management has been shown to realize that aggregated models and the analytical methods 
associated with them are inadequate for long-term considerations” (Anderies, 2002; p. 33).  
 
“Science does not simply describe and explain nature; it is part of the interplay between nature 
and ourselves; it describes nature as exposed to our method of questioning” (Heisenberg, 1958; 
p. 69). Hence, our methods, even if erroneous to the actual structure and behaviour of 
ecosystems, still may be reflected in some manner by our management actions resultant from 
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their findings. As such, the use of statistical models for adaptive management may, given their 
inability to capture complex dynamics, result in the simplification of ecosystem models. When 
these simplified models are implemented for ecosystem management, they may result in 
biodiversity loss, which dangerously may not even be apparent to the resource manager.    
 
 
3.2.4 Ecological Network Analysis & Computational Irreducibility  
Some ecologists have realized the potential of multi-agent simulations and have attempted to 
quantify the micro-mapping of an ecosystem by ecological network analysis (Janssen, 2002a; 
Pascual & Dunne, 2006). These micro-maps include the many interactions and feedbacks 
between species and abiotic components that define an ecosystem as a networked structure. The 
use of ecological network analysis is significant as it is now evident that the “character of [a] 
modelled complex ... system is embedded in the fine detail of the many entities and their 
interactions, not in the gross pattern of a few strong linkages” (Bradbury, 2002; p. 54). 
Nonetheless, despite the applicability of ecological network analysis, to date, ecologists have 
neither been able to develop a network model of an entire ecosystem (Scharler et al., 2005), nor 
have they performed a multi-agent simulation, which has generated any accurate power of 
prediction for an entire ecosystem (Winemiller & Layman, 2005).  
 
One reason for this limited success is obtaining the fine detail for modelling ecosystems. Indeed, 
usually network models of ecosystems only account for predator-prey relationships. This is 
because only predator-prey relationships can be objectively quantified with any confidence, 
either by experimentation or by quantitative dietary analysis, which indicates indirectly the food 
preferences of species (Baird & Ulanowicz, 1989). However, even determining the quantitative 
weights of these relationships is not easy, as direct experimentation or quantitative dietary 
analysis are problematic, painstaking and costly processes (Berlow et al. 2004). Many other 
interactions between species are left, as even determining whether these interactions are present 
or absent is difficult, let alone easily quantified or standardized amongst other relationship 
types (Baumgärtner, 2004). In fact, even for predator-prey relationships the relationship is often 
not defined as a quantitative weight, but only by a positive or negative sign indicating the 
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direction of the interaction. But, even if these predator-prey relationships were quantified, 
another problem arises, as interactions may not be fixed point values. The weight of these 
interactions may vary over time because of migratory changes for example (Abrams, 2001). 
Consequently, given these problems, many of the necessary interactions of an ecosystem are left 
out completely (Dell et al., 2005). For this reason, ecological network analysis should accept that 
weights be elicited subjectively akin to Bayesian statistical updating, even when they are 
unlikely to be replaced by an objective weight in due course.  
 
Nevertheless, if we assume that all interactions amongst species could be quantified accurately, 
then there still remains a problem of species aggregation. Despite tropho-species being relatively 
easy to define, they may mask other interactions not associated by this aggregation. The result is 
that all species and interactions may have to be explicitly accounted for. Yet, in order to model 
an ecosystem there is always a fundamental need to compress information and simplify 
constructed models in some way (Doak et al., 2008). Consequently, at some point, a subjective 
compromise has to be made as to how species are aggregated and what fine detail will be 
neglected.  
 
Let us suppose that somehow all aggregations and their associated interactions are accounted 
for in a complete network model, so that all the fine detail required in order to appropriately 
model an ecosystem is determined. Nonetheless, a further problem is revealed when computing 
these multi-agent simulations. Unlike simple systems where the outcomes of the simulation 
under a variety of initial conditions can be recognized in only a small number of model 
iterations, this does not appear to be the case when simulating complex systems. This is because 
when modelling complex systems there may not be a computational short-cut within a fixed 
period of time in which formally to predict the likely outcomes (Wolfram, 2002). That is, there is 
no finite amount of computation that can guarantee the nature of the final outcomes of a 
complex system for any given initial conditions. The simulation may take an irreducible amount 
of computational effort. This is because of the endogenous nature of complex dynamics 
resulting in the network model never settling down. Hence, when modelling an ecosystem as a 
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complex system, it may be found to be non-computable or computationally irreducible (Epstein, 
1999; Wolfram, 2002). 
 
The implication of computational irreducibility is that there may not be any means of formally 
predicting the behaviour of a complex system, except by running the network model and seeing 
whether the system will ever settle down (Wolfram, 2002). This potential inability to formally 
predict a complex system is despite that the entire micro-mapping of the ecosystem may be 
known precisely. Instead, it appears that where complex dynamics are present, we may forever 
fall short of achieving accurate prediction, as the network models when simulated may generate 
macro-surprises if an arbitrary computational stopping point is imposed (Casti, 1994; Pahl-
Wostl, 2007). In fact, even if computational reducibility were achieved and the model system did 
settle down, the result would be complex output, where the computational cost of deciphering 
its macro-regularity would be so large that the costs would overwhelm any possible benefits 
(Epstein, 1999). After all, the macro-regularity certainly would not be perceptibly obvious, so 
that resource managers are back to the problem of bounded rationality. Despite the claim by 
Simon that undertainty whatever its source is the same, it has been shown that uncertainty 
generated by complexity is not the same as ignorance and incomplete information.  
 
For formal predictions to be possible, the analytical methods used to generate the predictions 
must be more sophisticated than the model it is attempting to predict. This problem was 
recognized by the economist Hayek (1952; p. 185) in his Impossibility Theorem, where he stated 
that “any apparatus of classification must possess a structure of a higher degree of complexity 
than is possessed by the object that it classifies.” Nonetheless, while it may be assumed that 
statistical analysis or multi-agent simulations are analytically more sophisticated than the 
systems they attempt to analyse, this is not the case when analysing ecosystems given their 
complex dynamics. As such, the best possible models of ecosystems that display complex 
dynamics are those models of computational equivalence in that they too generate complex 
dynamics (Bradbury, 2002).  
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3.2.5 Conclusion  
In science, it was once believed that if one can succeed in finding the macro-regularities for a 
system, then there will always be a means formally to predict system behaviour. However, with 
the findings of chaos theory over 30 years ago (May, 1976), this belief came into question. It was 
recognized that both the mathematical model and its initial conditions must be known precisely, 
in order to make accurate formal predictions as deductive inferences (Gleick, 1987; Rosser, 2005). 
The development of chaos theory propelled the realization that not all systems are predictable. 
However, as developed in the previous chapter it is recognized that ecosystems are not chaotic. 
Nevertheless, it is argued that a similar result to the presence of chaos is found with ecosystems 
given their complex dynamics. This is because complex dynamics can result in the problem of 
computational irreducibility, which illustrates that even if all our epistemological problems of 
incomplete information are resolved, there may not be a means of formally predicting the 
behaviour of ecosystems as the model may not settle down. But, even if the model does settle 
down we are left with complex dynamics. Hence, for all intents and purposes, ecosystem 
behaviour cannot be formally predicted using mathematical models (Peterson et al., 2003). 
Indeed, for similar reasons, Charles (2001) states that it is an illusion to conceive of predictability 
in ecosystems and a fallacy to believe that management can control ecosystems. 
 
Resource managers cannot free themselves of doubt. Hence, they should forgo the use of 
mathematical modelling alone for the management of ecosystems. Resource managers should 
surrender aspirations of being able to make formal predictions of ecosystems as deductive 
inferences that result in the determination of objective probabilities. Hence, the optimal 
management of ecosystems is unattainable (Mäler, 2000; Folke et al., 2002a; Folke et al. 2005; 
Pahl-Wostl, 2007). However, this is not to say that neoclassical economic theory and 
mathematical modelling are not useful. In fact, multi-agent simulations, in particular, provide an 
example of mathematical modelling that allows investigations of complex phenomena. But, the 
point is that the hope of global rationality, where knowledge that is free of doubt and choice is 
rational appears impossible (McCloskey, 1983; Bromley, 2008). Considerations of global 
rationality might be appropriate when considering simple and complicated systems, but not 
when modelling ‘real’ ecosystems as complex systems (Froger & Munda 1998).  
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In the tradition of adaptive management, it could be reasoned that formal predictions should be 
treated as hypotheses, which if validated by real data confirm the predictive power of the 
mathematical model. However, the capacity to quantitatively validate the complex output of 
multi-agent simulations has been found to be difficult, first and foremost, because the generated 
data is but itself a hypothesis (Costanza et al., 2004). That is to say, this argument is indefensible 
because “we cannot assume that the data accurately represents the real [ecosystem] ... and 
therefore constitutes the best test of the model” (Rykiel, 1996; p. 238). Lets suppose that this is 
not an issue, an that the problems resultant from complexity could be overcome through 
validation with experimentation in accordance with the principles of active adaptive 
management. But, experimentation within ecosystems is ‘rough and ready’, and while 
potentially illuminating, it is likely to neither provide the precise confirmation of models nor be 
able to be used for extrapolating large-scale dynamics, so as to provide insights on the macro-
regularity of ecosystem behaviour (Lee, 1999; Kinzig et al., 2003). Isolating ecological variables 
and experimentally testing them does not demonstrate the objectivity of the model (Loasby, 
2001a).  
 
While adaptive management held the promise of overcoming the problems of bounded 
rationality (Lee, 1993), this is not so. Even with complete and objective information, which is 
most unlikely given the widespread subjectivity in modelling, it is unlikely in the long-term that 
resource managers would be able to formally predict ecosystem behaviour. Thus, it is 
recognized here that the problems that have limited the practical success of adaptive 
management may not merely be that there is a need formally to instruct resource managers of its 
experimental methodology and its analytical methods for improved implementation (Johnson & 
Williams, 1999). Rather, the ongoing failures of adaptive management may be that it is unable to 
disseminate accurate macro-regularities of ecosystem behaviour. Hence, it is necessary to 
consider alternative approaches to ecosystem management that may be more appropriate for 
evaluating and managing ecosystems. One such approach is adaptive co-management. Adaptive 
co-management can be methodologically consistent with a post-classical economics approach, 
and is the basis of discussion in the next chapter.  
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Chapter 4: A Post-Classical Economics 
Approach to Ecosystem Management 
 
The success of everything depends on intuition, the capacity of seeing things in a way which 
afterwards proves to be true, even though it cannot be established at the moment 
 
Joseph Schumpeter 
 
4.0 Introduction 
Unravelling the complexity of ecosystems is a major challenge. In neoclassical economic theory 
there is an assumption that the deductive process of research, founded in constructing 
mathematical models, is a sufficiently sophisticated computational means of addressing the 
complex dynamics of ecosystems. However, this assumption has been found wanting. Given the 
complex dynamics of ecosystems, mathematical modelling ‘alone’ is not sufficient for analysing 
ecosystems over the long temporal scales necessary for their sustainable management. 
Nevertheless, despite this problem it remains true that there are short summaries that are able to 
depict complex dynamics. It is this realization that indicates that modelling remains very useful. 
Hence, the network models formed by ecological network analysis and multi-agent simulations 
can be informative. Indeed, multi-agent simulations can depict ‘persistent’ emergent 
phenomena, in which to determine a plausible state space of ecosystems (Anderies, 2002; 
Janssen, 2002a). Despite this, multi-agent simulations should not be applied uncritically given 
the generation of complex dynamics.  
 
Some economists, who come from fields such as ecological economics, evolutionary economics, 
institutional economics, neo-Austrian economics and post-Keynesian economics, are aware of 
some of these problems with mathematical modelling and neoclassical economic theory, which 
are grounded in the logic of deduction. These economists frequently apply mathematical models 
in their analysis, but seemingly do so in a critical manner. However, they have often resisted a 
shift away from mathematical modelling, because of the belief that incorporating informal 
methods would be unscientific (Downward et al., 2003; Lawson, 2003). But, much of 
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mathematical modelling used for representing ecosystem behaviour is nevertheless subjective 
anyway (Nyberg et al., 2006; Clark, 2007). In fact, as recognized by Foster (2006; p. 1089):  
“neoclassical economics confronts a fundamental difficulty – it is inadmissable to use formal 
... theorizing ... to make predictions concerning the future or even prediction concerning past 
historical events, since the choice of conditional relations is subjective and the result of such 
analytics is not necessarily superior to informed judgement ...” 
 
With these thoughts in mind, one method that appears appropriate for evaluating and 
managing ecosystems given their complex dynamics, is the bounded rationality approach of 
employing heuristic rules for deriving subjective probabilities for a range of future outcomes 
(Mäler, 2000). A plausible range of future outcomes could be inferred in part by multi-agent 
simulations. Hence, from this account it is possible to determine subjective expected utilities, if 
need be, where the resource manager would choose that management action that satisfices with 
their expectations. The prescribed use of heuristic rules appears to make much sense given the 
limitations of achieving the assumed concept of global rationality that underpins neoclassical 
economic theory. After all, there is a need to establish an alternative form of rationality, in which 
to ascertain the degree of irrationality in the choices and actions of resource managers. And sure 
enough, with heuristic rules there is an (bounded) adaptive rationality. An adaptive rationality 
indicates that heuristic rules are not irrational. Rather, they are rational depending on the 
specific ecological context to which they have adapted from (Payne et al., 1993; Gigerenzer & 
Selten, 2001). Reasonable grounds for proof of this adaptive rationality lies in the fact that “the 
only way that human [agents] could have ever survived as a species for as long as we have is 
that [we have] developed [a] kind of [evaluation] apparatus [that is] capable of making quick 
judgements based on very little information” (Gladwell, 2005; p. 11-12).  
 
In recognizing the usefulness of heuristic rules, it is also appreciated that human agents, can 
through the use of their (long-term) memory store large amounts of information and 
knowledge. Indeed, while our ‘working’ mind can only account for seven bits of information at 
a time, our memory can store over 100,000 bits (McLucas, 2003). In appreciating the significance 
of knowledge it is proposed that a path that goes beyond the use of heuristic rules, which are 
bounded by the cognitive and computational limitations of the working mind, can be achieved. 
This makes sense when it is considered that greater payoffs may be attainable when knowledge 
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is applied through a process of problem solving (Lowe, 1992; Baguley & Robertson, 2000; 
Beinhocker, 2006). Specifically, problem solving involves the mind identifying the problem as a 
representation and subsequently applying an appropriate solution (Newell & Simon, 1972; 
Krems, 1995; Woll, 2002). Therefore, problem solving like heuristic rules reflects an adaptive 
rationality. However, despite this correspondence, problem solving differs from the application 
of heuristic rules because there is a genuine attempt to retrieve appropriate knowledge to make 
useful inferences for the specific problem at hand.  
 
For these reasons, it is argued here that through the use of memory (and the support of other 
analytical methods) some kind of generalizable macro-regularity can be recognized and 
subsequently inferred. This allows the opportunity to use subjective expected utility theory to 
find as-if optimal solutions for the management of ecosystems. The capacity potentially to detect 
and infer macro-regularities in ecosystems is because, while perception is limited in making 
sense of complexity, this is not necessarily so with memory. This is because while perception can 
only form partial and simplistic internal representations (Lootsma, 2001), it is with knowledge 
that there is the capacity to construct a detailed and more general mental model of the managed 
ecosystem (Beinhocker, 2006). Accordingly, the use of knowledge is proposed as an effective 
approach for ecosystem management.    
 
In this chapter there are two parts. The first develops a general discussion that acknowledges the 
significance of the expert mind, which allows intuitions to occur. Then, continuing with a 
general discussion, a depiction of a socio-economic system from an institutional and social 
psychological perspective is developed, where experts are considered central to its structure. In 
establishing the significance of expertise, it is recognized that experts develop a connection with 
a specific ecological context allowing them the capacity to establish a ‘genuine’ adaptive 
rationality as opposed to a bounded adaptive rationality. This finding establishes the 
methodological basis of a post-classical economics (and cost utility analysis) around the 
intuitions of experts. Hence, it is argued in the second part of the chapter that expertise should 
be used for ecosystem management. A discussion is developed on how to bring the knowledge 
of a diverse and representative group of experts together. In doing so, the approach of adaptive 
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co-management is developed, which is an approach that attempts to bring about a shared 
common knowledge, while recognizing the importance of institutions adapting to change given 
the inability formally to predict and control ecosystems. Despite the relevance of adaptive co-
management, it is a relatively new approach to ecosystem management. Accordingly, a novel 
methodology is developed, which integrates in a systematic way several useful and 
psychologically appropriate methods for uncovering and synthesizing the knowledge and 
preferences of experts.   
 
4.1 Neural Networks & Intuition  
There are two philosophical conceptions of the mind that are widely professed. In the classical 
conception, the mind is conceived as a computational system (Newell & Simon, 1972; 1990). 
Hence, the mind is viewed as a passive serial structure controlled by a neural central processing 
unit that learns by converting and storing perceived stimuli and data into information as quasi-
linguistic symbols, which form an internal representation of the examined system (Clark, 1997). 
Inferences are considered a computation, which involves an algorithmic process of retrieving 
input as symbols and manipulating these symbols by an appropriate set of rules searched for 
from a database of rules. Rules are also represented by symbols and are formed as if-then 
structures, which are learnt and are the basis of what knowledge is. Hence, “the larger and 
richer the [database] of rules that [are] available for construction [achieved through adaptive 
learning], the more elaborate are the structures that can be generated” (Simon, 1982; p. 189).  
 
An immediate problem with the mind as a computational system is that searching for an 
appropriate set of rules for complex problems may take a very long time to exhaustively search 
for the best available solution. There could be thousands of rules to consider, which are stored in 
the memory. Little wonder that human agents rely on heuristic rules, as it would take 
considerable effort to search for and retrieve the presumably large set of rules for inferring ‘best’ 
available solutions for complex problems (Thagard, 1996). 
 
The alternative philosophical conception of the mind is the connectionistic system, whereby the 
mind is viewed as a neural network or parallel-processing structure. Knowledge in a neural 
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network is depicted, not as a database of rules, but as a networked set of concepts. Concepts are 
abstract mental representations that act to simplify, aggregate and condense information. These 
concepts are networked by causal connections, which are akin to the if-then structure of rules. 
The underlying plausibility behind the mind as a neural network is that it is neurologically 
inspired, as concepts and the connections are analogues for the physical elements of the brain as 
neurons and synapses, respectively. Hence, the connectionistic system resembles the actual 
neural architecture of the brain, which has been empirically shown using neural imaging 
techniques to resemble a complex system (Bassett et al., 2006). Despite this ‘correlation’ between 
the brain and mind, some prudence remains necessary as it is a critically addressed issue 
(Churchland, 1996).  
 
The learning of concepts occurs in much the same way as the learning of rules, in that they are 
developed by forming generalizations. However, unlike learning with the computational system 
of the mind, in a neural network, learning also occurs where concepts can become causally 
connected with other concepts, depending on whether these concepts are associated with one 
another. If an association between concepts is ‘found’ through resemblance or perceptive 
repetition, then this causal connection, which resembles in effect a micro-regularity, can become 
more weighted. Hence, over time knowledge grows into a network of concepts with varying 
weights (McClelland & Rumelhart 1986). Moreover, with further learning, weights can be 
adjusted and information can be aggregated, so that concepts may be ‘recoded’ to form a 
broader, more general concept. This hypothesized capacity for recoding is significant, as it can 
substantially reduce informational overload (Thagard, 1996). Recognizing more general patterns 
is a key task of the mind (Bromley, 2006).  
 
The network of concepts formed is representative of a complex system like that found with the 
brain. This assertion is reasonable because the causal connections between concepts acts are not 
randomly generated, rather they are learnt. Hence, it has been hypothesized that the mind, if a 
neural network, is hierarchical and modular in its architecture (Thagard, 1996). One obvious 
advantage of a complex system and network of concepts is that knowledge is organized. This is 
different to a database of rules, which are viewed as an unorganized and disconnected store of 
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isolated if-then structures (Patel et al., 1994). The organization of concepts allows for more 
powerful kinds of computation and reduces the time-consuming process of searching, because 
the networked structure allows information to be quickly communicated to those activated 
concepts within modules that closely match the complex problem that the human agent is 
confronted with (Clark, 1997; Loasby, 2001a). Once relevant concepts are quickly selected and 
retrieved that match the specific ecological context, they can be used to make inferences, which 
potentially allow for the efficient determination of ‘best’ available solutions.  
 
With learning, not only does knowledge potentially increase, but it also may increase a specific 
knowledge type, termed tacit knowledge. Tacit knowledge is held implicitly so that it is not 
easily codified into an explicit knowledge that can be called upon for establishing reasoned 
responses by conscious deliberation (Polanyi, 1967; Tsoukas, 2003). One reason why this 
knowledge is not easily codified is because it is said to be found in the causal connections of the 
neural network (Dreyfus, 1979; Nonanka & Takeuchi, 1995; Churchland, 1996). In light of the 
great difficulty of codifying tacit knowledge, the philosopher of science Polanyi (1967; p. 4) 
stated that “we can know more than we can tell.” That is, it appears we can be more capable at 
what we do, than we are capable of describing and articulating to others how we actually do it 
(Epstein, 2005). Given the difficulty of communicating tacit knowledge, it is acquired through 
experiential immersion and ‘intimate’ engagement with a specific ecological context. 
Accordingly, tacit knowledge is a localized and specialized knowledge that reflects much of the 
important fine detail of a specific ecological context (Claxton, 1997; Flyvberg, 2004).  
 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986) have argued that with the acquisition of tacit knowledge through 
experience, a distinct qualitative mind shift may occur. This mind shift generates a 
methodological transition where a mode of rule-following is replaced at a critical knowledge 
threshold with a mode of knowing that reflects a neural network. It is this methodological 
transition that defines the difference between lay agents and experts. This transition is 
supported by empirical research, as it has been shown that experts have highly organized 
knowledge structures (e.g. Bruer, 1993; Ross, 2006). Hence, experts are not simply human agents 
that have more rules available to them. Indeed, if they were they might be poorer at problem 
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solving and making evaluations than lay agents, as they would be computationally bound and 
limited by the inability to easily search for a specified rule amongst an ever increasing set of 
rules (Ansburg & Hill, 2003).  
 
A useful network of concepts can be formed by experts, because they have through much 
learning deciphered and become familiar with what sensory data as patterns requires 
‘focussing’ their attention to and what can be ignored. Hence, experts do much of their problem 
solving by recognizing familiar patterns and situations to those previously experienced within 
their specific ecological contexts (Earl, 1986; Gladwell, 2005). This understanding of expertise 
recognizes that experts are not solely those with scientific (or academic) knowledge, but also 
those with local knowledge, such as individuals found in user groups and local communities 
(Colding & Folke, 2001; Brunner et al., 2005). For example, experts for a lake ecosystem could 
include local fishermen and other recreationalists, as well as hydrologists and limnologists.  
 
According to Dreyfus (1997; p. 21), experts given their highly organized knowledge, are able to 
infer differently, in that “intuitive behaviour gradually replaces reasoned responses.” 
Specifically, an intuitive response is an expert judgement that gives rise to a particular course of 
action with a conviction of plausibility, without the use of clearly articulated reasons 
(Hodgkinson et al., 2009). This concealed psychological mode of inference makes sense, as 
intuitions use in their inferences the accumulated stores of tacit knowledge of the expert 
(Behling & Eckel, 1991; Khatri & Ng, 2000). Given the concealed nature of intuitions, they appear 
automatic and effortless, even though intuitive responses only come about after a long period of 
knowledge accumulation. This is because an inference and potentially an action can be 
performed without having to go through the costly process of forming a conscious link to the 
mental model formed prior to each inference undertaken (Ballard, 1991; Pennings et al., 2005). 
Hence, action in this state can become a continuous stream of movement, which is not 
necessarily rendered to any conscious deliberation (Lawson, 1998; 2003). Thus, experts, unlike 
lay agents, are capable of a non-representational intelligibility, sometimes referred to as 
‘apperception’ or ‘ecological perception’ (Gibson, 1979; Ross, 2006), which asserts a 
phenomenology of expertise (Clark, 1995; 1997; Dreyfus, 1997).  
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The actual inference of intuitions is an emergent (and therefore non-reductionistic) 
phenomenon, established by the spreading of concept activation in parallel across the micro-
mapping of the mental model. Hence, with intuitions a multitude of concepts are used for 
solving the problem faced (Sadler & Shefy, 2004; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008a). Hence, intuitive 
responses are emergent subconscious inferences (Clark, 1997; Patel et al., 2005; Betsch, 2008). The 
emergence of intuitions is analogous to consciousness, as it is not a single neuron that exhibits 
consciousness, but many working together that allow the emergence of consciousness 
(Gladwell, 2005). It is because of this emergent capacity that intuitions appear to be able to 
capture the causal complexity of the mental model formed in the mind, so that “an outcome 
[generated] from several different combinations of conditions” (Ragin, 1987; p. 20), can be 
comprehended in an interdependent way.  
 
Despite the potential of intuitions to recognize macro-regularities from the network of concepts 
in the mind, a typical assumption is that serious analysis must be carried out by reasoned and 
conscious deliberation alone. A consequence of this view is that the quality of analysis is 
expected to be eroded when intuitive psychological processes are evoked (Cacioppo & Gardner, 
1999). However, this assumption that psychological processes only ‘disrupt’ rationality is an 
unfounded generalization (Bernston et al., 1993; Kunda, 1999; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). This is 
because the emergent nature of intuitions would suggest that they are able to comprehend and 
recognize macro-regularities in complex dynamics as they are formed from generalizable micro-
level knowledge as a network of concepts (Mainzer, 1996; Leonard & Swap, 2005; Hodgkinson et 
al., 2009). That is, while a neural network does not represent the actual dynamics of ecosystems, 
they can through their micro-mapping of concepts lead to intuitions, which potentially can make 
useful inferences that correspond with the causal structure of a specific ecological context.  
 
This assertion is supported by psychological research, as empirical evidence indicates that 
complex problems are much more easily detected and inferred using intuition than by applying 
an inference through reasoning and conscious deliberation (Simonton, 1980; Schooler & Melcher, 
1995; Kahneman, 2003a; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006a; Dijksterhuis et al., 2006b). Indeed, Mintzberg 
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(1976; p. 57) found that successful (business) managers in complex organizations are intuitive 
thinkers “who revel in ... complex, mysterious systems with relatively little order.” Accordingly, 
experts might initially have both conscious deliberative and subconscious faculties activated 
during preliminary investigations. However, where complex (but familiar) settings are 
recognized, experts naturally adjust their inferences towards intuitive responses (Kahneman & 
Frederick, 2005). For this reason, it is intuitions that can genuinely provide an adaptive 
rationality. This is because experts with their emergent intuitions are intimately ‘connected’, 
actively engaged and co-adapted with their specific ecological context. Significantly, it is this 
connection, in accord with the connective theory of value (Section 2.2.6), which allows experts to 
perceive various ecosystem services that can satisfy societal needs.    
 
However, while intuition appears very useful for integrating and synthesizing information for 
forming inferences about complex systems, it is also a mode of inference that is vulnerable to 
error (Gladwell, 2005; Dowling & Chin-Fang, 2007). This is in part because the automatic nature 
of intuition driven by the memory, means that it can be a conservative and slow learning 
process that is not particularly adaptable (Kahneman, 2003b; Betsch, 2008). Moreover, intuition 
is inherently limited to criticism and appraisal, given its non-transparent or concealed nature. 
Accordingly, it will be maintained later in this chapter that conscious deliberation through 
reasoned responses, while costly, effortful and tends to apply its reasoning in serial (so that 
computational power is bounded and limited), should be used to aid and inform the intuitive 
responses of experts (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). It is when vasious analytical methods, 
conscious deliberation and intuition are considered together that experts can gain an ‘informed 
intuition’ (Thagard, 2001; Miller & Ireland, 2005). An informed intuition provides transparency 
and analysis to the process, while recognizing the significance and usefulness of intuitive 
responses for making inferences about complex phenomena.   
 
4.1.1 Emotions & Bivalence 
Expert knowledge, which is networked, intuitive and built around stores of tacit knowledge, 
allows the uncertainties generated from complexity and information to be simultaneously 
addressed. This is because experts appear to have the capacity to comprehend and infer macro-
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regularities within complex systems while adaptively learning. But as yet there is little 
comprehension of how this knowledge of complex system behaviour is used in choosing an 
appropriate action. It is proposed here that a proper account of choice should embody the 
neuro-chemistry necessary for emotional responses. This is because emotions, which stem from 
the prefrontal limbic system of the brain, appear to be critical for the purposes of choice and the 
determination of a real utility function (Gifford, 2005).  
 
Neurological research demonstrates that human agents with prefrontal brain damage make 
irrational choices (Damasio, 1994). This is despite their cognitive powers being exemplary. These 
patients appear to have the ingredients for an economic evaluation, as they can acknowledge the 
outcomes available to them, the likely consequences of various actions, and how to direct their 
acquired knowledge logically (Damasio, 1994; 2003). Hence, it is not the lack of cognition of 
these patients that limits their capacity to rationally choose and evaluate. Rather, prefrontal 
brain damage prevents them from using their emotional responses. Thus, choice is determined 
to a large extent by our emotions, as emotions “provide a natural means for the brain and mind 
to evaluate the environment within and around the [human agent], and respond accordingly 
and adaptively” (Damasio, 2003; p. 54).  
 
Emotions, like our perception and intuition, appear automatic and effortless (Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Vromen, 2007). In fact, neuro-economists Camerer et al. (2004; 2005) maintain 
that automatic behaviour driven largely by our emotional responses is the default mode of 
operation. Hence, while the capacity to supersede this emotional automatism for cognitive 
computation is partially possible, this capacity is much less frequent than the cognitively 
calculating utility maximizer that some might portray. In fact, nullifying the automatism of 
emotions, as has been indicated, results invariably in irrational behaviour (De Sousa, 1991; 
Damasio, 1994).  
 
Through extensive neural mapping, it is understood that emotions are experienced in a 
superordinate division as either positive or negative valences (Lang et al., 1990). However, 
consistent with prospect theory (Section 3.1.1), it is also understood that evaluations determined 
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by our emotions are not made as a final absolute state of welfare. Rather, a neutral reference 
point or frame is first considered to which marginal values changes are then developed around 
this frame. In fact, without some kind of reference point, the conception of utility makes little 
sense (Earl, 1986). This relative reference point reflects our aspiration levels, and is determined 
by our implicit memory and acknowledged by our emotional responses (Thagard, 2000). 
However, despite the subjectivity of our aspiration levels, generally, the reference point or 
neutral aspiration level usually corresponds to our present state of welfare (Earl, 1983; 
Antonides, 1996; Gifford, 2005).  
 
This bivalent emotional response of two intervening evaluative channels, one positive and the 
other negative, allows an actual utility function to be formed (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). 
Preference, then, is naturally given to those outcomes that generate positive outcomes. 
Preferences and utility functions are therefore not merely theoretical constructs. They are real 
neurological entities (Glimcher & Rustichini, 2004; Zak, 2004). Hence, it is through positive and 
negative emotions that a common utility metric is formed. That is,   
“the operation of the brain to evaluate [gains as positive outcomes] and [losses as negative 
outcomes] are the fundamental solution of the brain to interfacing sensory systems to action 
selection and execution systems. Computing the [gain] and [loss] value of sensory stimuli, 
and then using selection between different [gains] and avoidance of [losses] in a common … 
currency appears to be the fundamental design that brains use in order to produce 
appropriate behaviour” (Rolls, 1999; p. 5). 
 
The bivalent emotional response of two evaluative channels seems to serve two distinct 
purposes. One is that we are rewarded with the pleasurable feelings from positive emotions 
when our actions are successful. The other is that positive emotional responses explain the 
incentive to be motivated to approach as yet unemotionally charged neutral stimuli. This effect 
is termed the positivity offset by Cacioppo and Gardner (1999). It provides insight into the 
intrinsic exploratory behaviour of human agents, and the urge to experience certain kinds of 
novelty (Scitovsky, 1976). Hence, while a positivity offset may result in over-optimism (Pulford 
& Colman, 1996), it appears necessary as a mechanism for learning. Without the positivity offset, 
human agents might well be expected to be unwilling to approach any stimuli not previously 
known, because irrational choices presumably would be required where unknown stimuli is 
perceived, given the lack of experience to deal with such novelty. However, an irrational 
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response does not have to occur as memory can facilitate the tentative comprehension of these 
novel experiences through forming analogies, where certain concepts and cases considered 
applicable are activated in the mind to comprehend some forms of novelty (Thagard, 1996; 
Gifford, 2005). Indeed, where novel and unfamiliar surroundings are faced human agents 
naturally seek out familiar patterns under the surface of things (Earl, 1986). Nonetheless, as 
discussed in Chapter 5, where the novel outcome is qualitatively different from that expected, 
even this capacity to apply useful analogies is likely to fail.  
 
Despite the effects of the positivity offset in human agents, psychologists have found that agents 
are generally “more sensitive to losses than equivalent gains” (Kahneman & Tversky, 1979; p. 
268). Hence, in keeping with prospect theory, the utility function of human agents appears less 
steep for gains than for equivalent losses. This difference in sensitivity between positive and 
negative valences explains, in part, framing effects, where choices have been shown to differ 
dramatically depending on how the problem is depicted (Dowling & Chin-Fang, 2007). 
Significantly, this sensitivity difference can be elucidated in evolutionary terms, because 
repairing an adverse outcome is likely to be less easy than abstaining from an opportunity in the 
first instance. This greater sensitivity to negative emotions, as acknowledged by prospect theory, 
is termed the negativity bias. This bias, which acts as an alarm, explains the uncertainty and loss 
aversion of human agents making them act more cautiously (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; 
Beinhocker, 2006).  
 
Economic theory contends that for choice to be far-reaching, it must account not only for the 
utility of the future outcomes, but also for their time-delay and uncertainty. Naturally, our 
emotional systems are capable of attaching uncertainty and delay-adjusted values to outcomes 
(Damasio, 1994; Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999; Finucane et al., 2000). For example, more certainty 
generates positive feelings of confidence, while more uncertainty generates negative feelings of 
doubt. However, where discounting is concerned, much evidence indicates that delay-adjusted 
values are not adjusted at a constant rate of time preference (Loewenstein, 1987; Benzion et al., 
1989; Loewenstein & Prelec, 1992; Cropper et al., 1994; Baron, 2000). Rather, human agents 
appear to discount with a hyperbolic and declining rate of discount, so that long-term 
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expectations of outcomes are discounted at a lower rate compared to short-term expectations. 
However, it is likely that experts are less likely to ‘suffer’ from steep hyperbolic rates fo discount 
given that the wealth of experience that they have accumulated provides greater confidence in 
the ‘predictability’ of the future (Earl, 2009).  
 
The actual discernment of the adjusted emotional responses for the potential utility of expected 
outcomes is acquired by experiential immersion and is stored in the implicit memory as tacit 
knowledge. This implicit adjustment of emotional responses for future outcomes is defined by 
the ‘somatic marker hypothesis’ (Damasio, 1994; Huettel et al., 2002). This hypothesis contends 
that human agents mark implicitly in their minds the outcomes and actions from past 
experiences felt with an associated positive or negative somatic marker. When an expected 
future outcome is juxtaposed with a relevant somatic marker developed from a comparable or 
analogous past event, it provides the human agent with an automatic feeling, indicating either 
an incentive or disincentive for that particular outcome perceived. Thus, the somatic marker 
hypothesis highlights that there is a difference in the region of brain activity between utility that 
is actually experienced and potential utility imagined (Damasio, 2003). While both experienced 
and potential utility are evaluated by emotional content, potential utility generates only 
‘secondary’ emotions as they developed partially with a cognitive connection unlike 
experienced utility, which develops entirely within the limbic system (Tom et al., 2007).  
 
Through evidence obtained from functional magnetic resonance imaging, neuroscientists have 
discovered that the somatic marker hypothesis, which depicts the emotional system working in 
concert with cognition, is how the brain works when making choices (Damasio, 2003). Emotion 
is inherently intertwined with our perceptions and intuitions, as “emotion binds together 
virtually every type of information that the brain can encode” (Watt, 1998; p. 5). In 
understanding this, it is evident that all information held our minds is value-based (Dowling & 
Chin-Fang, 2007). Thus, critical to the appropriate finding and adjustment of values for our 
emotional system is that human agents can adaptively learn and understand the macro-
regularity of their system examined (Thagard, 2000; Huettel et al., 2002). Hence, it is argued that 
where complex systems are considered, it is with experts that emotion and knowledge can 
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potentially act together coherently and simultaneously, as they have implicit access to a macro-
regularity of complex dynamics at least for a specific ecological context.  
 
When cognition and emotion coherently and simultaneously work together, neurological 
research indicates that human agents can make insightful and rational choices without any 
immediate need for conscious deliberation or analysis (Behling & Eckel, 1991). In fact, the 
bounded and constrained optimization of expected utilities can actually be computed 
automatically (intuitively) at the neurological level (Platt & Glimcher, 1999; Glimcher, 2003). 
Hence, human agents can be approximately utility as-if optimizers. However, this is not through 
the determination of conscious deliberation, but rather, is entirely automatic (intuitive) 
(Vromen, 2007).  Indeed, as neuro-economist Glimcher (2003; p. 8) maintains:  
“The available data suggest that the neural architecture actually does compute [preferability] 
for each available course of action. This is a real physical computation, accomplished by 
neurons, that derives and encodes a real variable. The process of choice that operates on this 
variable then seems to be quite simple: it is the process of executing the action encoded as 
having the greatest [preferability].”  
 
The significance of emotion attaching value to information also allows the possibility of 
reducing the range of information that is needed to be actively searched for (Dowling & Chin-
Fang, 2007). In fact, emotions can aid the limiting of information searches presumably quite near 
the optimal stopping point. This is because emotions in concert with the implicit memory can 
actually ‘calculate’ the costs and benefits of an information search and stop searching for 
information as soon as the benefits have been exceeded by the costs (Glimcher & Rustichini, 
2004). This is not surprising as at some point, choice under constrained optimization - in order to 
avoid the problems of infinite regress - must be undertaken “by intuition, unsupported by 
formal reasoning” (Elster, 1984; p. 135). But, in taking on this infinite regress problem through 
intuition it is possible to limit searches, one must assume, quite near the optimal stopping point. 
Accordingly, a post-classical economics developed here recognizes that the use of experts is not 
just an alternative low cost method for economic evaluation (Section 1.2). Rather, experts can 
provide rational and cost-effective choices within complex systems.     
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4.1.2 Beliefs & Habits  
The micro-level and macro-level knowledge held in the mind whether implicit or explicit, such 
as rules, concepts, causal connections and emergent intuitions, reflect ‘theories’. These theories 
when networked attempt to encapsulate a coherent general unity of understanding, which 
allows human agents some capacity to cope despite the problems of ignorance and complexity 
(Earl, 1986; Ezzy, 2002; Thagard, 2005). The specific belief in a theory is determined by its 
weight, which for a neural network is reflected in the weighted connections in the (expert) mind 
as the predominant neural pathway between a set of concepts. The weight of a theory is 
significant because human agents ultimately act on the theories that they believe in (Rosser, 
2001; Bromley, 2008). Hence, the theories believed are what Argyris (1993) defines as the 
‘theories-in-use’. 
 
Greater belief or weight in a theory is acknowledged when positive feelings of confidence are 
felt. Confidence in a theory does not mean certainty is found in a theory. Rather, it means that 
human agents do not feel doubt about its validity (Bromley, 2008). Confidence is increased in a 
theory through perceptive repetition that works, as “repetition changes nothing in the object 
repeated, [it] does change something in the mind which contemplates it” (Deleuze, 1994; p. 90). 
That is, belief in a theory is achieved empirically through the experiential repetition of expected 
phenomena in accordance with inductive logic. Thus, where actual outcomes correspond with 
expectations, then the causal connections along the neural pathway that depicts the theory 
increase in weight and provide more confidence in the theory.  
 
The actual degree of confidence required before adopting a theory, as a theory-in-use, has been 
found to depend on how costly it might be if the theory was found to be inadequate (Thagard, 
2005). Premature adoption can easily result from confirmation biases. This is where a human 
agent subconsciously or consciously seeks evidence that confirms a theory, while ignoring 
information that may negate it (Wason, 1968; Evans, 1990).  
 
Where utility is generated repeatedly from expectations and actions legitimized by the theory, 
then this theory-in-use can develop as a subconscious habit. The development of habits does not 
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merely reinforce confidence in the theory; rather their development demonstrates that a belief 
has become settled and ‘fixed’. While the formation of habits might appear unreasonable, there 
is a psychological need to engage in mental routines. This is because the payoff might be 
considerable in forming habits given the cognitive effortlessness involved, but also the 
continuity of habits provides a state of comfort (Lawson, 2003).  
 
The call for querying the beliefs of oneself, like the formation of beliefs, comes about 
emotionally, not cognitively, through the negative feelings of doubt as our expectations of 
positive outcomes have not been met from actions motivated by the theory adopted. Doubt 
erodes confidence in and weight of the theory-in-use (Peirce, 1931-1958; Thagard, 2000). The 
uncomfortable feelings of doubt develop in order to signal that the continued use of the theory, 
whether subconsciously or consciously known, may lead to further disutility. It makes sense 
that doubt is manifested emotionally as beliefs may well be concealed under much subconscious 
reasoning (Thagard, 2007). Hence, given that doubt is signalled through negative emotions, it 
would appear inappropriate to use a probability calculus to reflect the degree of belief of a 
human agent (e.g. Bayesian networks) (Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Thagard & Litt, 2006).  
 
Doubt manifests where disbelief exists, which results from incoherence as empirical evidence or 
alternative theories cannot be easily assimilated with the rest of what one believes (Thagard, 
2000; Bharathan & Josephson, 2006). The most obvious source of incoherence is direct 
contradiction between theories. However, doubt also occurs when a theory is not adopted as a 
belief because in so doing it would diminish some coherence in other theories believed in. Thus, 
in this latter situation, where a theory is not completely contradictory, such that outright 
abandonment of one’s beliefs or the alternative theory is not evidently necessary to restore 
coherence (i.e. weak incoherence), the tension between adoption and abandonment may cause 
anxiety (Thagard, 2007). In a similar way, anxiety is also caused when someone is required to act 
in a specific ecological context where they do not have expertise or competence (Kelly, 1955).  
 
The feelings of doubt compel the mind to attempt to rectify this incoherence, as “doubt is [that] 
uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass into the state of 
 105
belief; while [confidence] is a calm and satisfied state which we do not wish to avoid, or to 
change to a belief in anything else” (Peirce, 1931-1958; 6.324). In order to do away with disbelief, 
the mind endeavours to ‘optimize’ coherence and generality, subject to local empirical realities 
(Churchland, 1996; Thagard, 2000; 2007). This need for theoretical unity is caused by consistency 
maximizing processes (Simon, 2004; p. 546), which can “play an operative role in the 
[evaluation] process”, as they motivate a calling to ‘ask’ why so as to move from doubt to belief. 
Accordingly, human agents may consciously search for further information or alternative 
theories so as to adequately re-comprehend or re-interpret past phenomena (Glöckner & Betsch, 
2008b). Hence, the task for a rational mind, where time, effort and costs permit, would be to 
postpone any further action and identify those theories previously-held that are in error. Once 
found, these theories would be retracted and other more plausible theories developed that 
explain past phenomena so that these theories can once again be used confidently for action 
(Dequech, 2000; Lawson, 2003; Bharathan & Josephson, 2006).  
 
However, while it is true that the mind will attempt to mitigate theory incoherence, empirical 
evidence suggests that the mind tends to patch over any incoherence, rather than consciously re-
evaluate and reflect rigorously on this inner tension (Perkins et al., 1991). This patching of 
incoherence in theories is achieved by the subconscious mind arbitrarily manufacturing a simple 
heuristic rule that brings about some coherence to the system of beliefs. Hence, most human 
agents do not strictly optimize coherence where their system of beliefs is wholly coherent and 
consistent (Kahneman & Frederick, 2005). Rather, human agents readily aim for a satisficing 
theoretical position of coherence that ‘makes sense’ (Kelly, 1955; Earl, 1983), where beliefs “hang 
together … and display good congruence with one’s most prominent prior beliefs” (Perkins et 
al., 1991; p. 98). 
 
The reason human agents use this ‘make sense’ epistemology, is to maintain the comfort of 
habituated action. It appears mental routines are “the most generalized motivational origin of 
human conduct” (Giddens, 1984; p. 54). Certainly, wherever human agents do not engage in 
habitual tasks, the negative feelings of doubt and anxiety readily proliferate, which are the very 
emotions that provide the incentive for the agent to overcome their inner tensions of 
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incoherence. Little wonder that human agents hold on to their beliefs despite incoherence or 
contrary evidence, and maintain biased rules according to the status quo bias and the belief 
perseverance effect (Ross & Anderson, 1982). After all, in holding on to habits human agents are 
able to avoid the time-consuming and costly process of cognitively re-evaluating beliefs held, 
and then having to find an alternative theory which may not be any better (Earl, 1986). 
Nevertheless, habituation can leave the mental models of human agents potentially locked-in 
and rigid, where they lose their adaptability (Beinhocker, 2006). This problem of habituation is 
addressed in the following chapter.   
 
4.1.3 Authority & Institutions 
In the previous sections, human agents have only been portrayed with the powers to learn and 
accumulate knowledge from their own experiences. However, human agents cannot experience 
everything, so that their ability to accumulate knowledge is limited (Choi, 1993; Loasby, 2001b). 
Human agents do not exist in isolation, limited only to their own understanding. Rather, human 
agents, as indicated previously (Section 1.2), are social beings, who through informal and formal 
relationships interact with other agents (Hodgson, 1988).  
 
Given their personal limitations of cognition and understanding, at some stage human agents 
will require “taking someone else’s word for it, whether it is an item of information or a method 
for reaching a [choice]” (Loasby, 1999; p. 19). Thus, rather than go through the costly process of 
acquiring information and developing knowledge through experience, which can cause much 
anxiety, it may be more attractive to adapt one’s own knowledge with the experiences of others. 
This knowledge can be obtained through the communication of information or direct 
observation.  
 
To limit the likelihood of incorporating poor information, human agents do not adopt 
information held by other agents at random. Rather they give preference towards those agents 
who have demonstrated successful patterns of behaviour in the past. Hence, human agents 
when overwhelmed by the problems of ignorance and complexity as a result of their bounded 
rationality will adopt the beliefs and information given to them by human agents they judge to 
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be experts (Earl & Potts, 2004). It is experts that tell these human agents what is rational to 
believe (Bromley, 2008). This makes sense as experts through their intuitive responses have been 
able to act rationally in their specific ecological context despite the problem of complexity. 
However, where multiple experts are available, it is that expert with perceived authority that is 
preferred. Authority is defined here by the degree of past success and the number of human 
agents who adopt the beliefs of the expert, hence forming a connection with them.  
 
Authority is an important factor in the belief adoption by human agents, because human agents 
usually lack the capability and time aptly to critique the knowledge of experts. Most agents will 
avoid any rigorous appraisal and readily accept beliefs and information given to them, if it is 
perceived to be within their capabilities and is not incoherent with their own beliefs (Petty & 
Cacioppo, 1986; Bromley, 2008). Significantly, the economist Keynes (1921; p. 15) understood the 
importance of authority and wrote that “… those who founded their expectation in the past 
have been so often wrong, that the man in the street is now prepared to believe anything which 
is told to him with … authority, and the larger the figure the more readily he swallows it.” 
Nevertheless, human agents will not immediately accept a particular course of action given to 
them by those in authority simply because it is said to provide greater utility. They will also 
need an explicit and understandable explanation for why such actions are considered rational 
and wise.  
 
The difficulty lies in that, whether the behaviour of the expert is observed or is communicated, 
the information elicited to other human agents is only able to be explicit knowledge. Much of 
the content of theories-in-use, which allows experts to act successfully through their intuitive 
behaviour and responses, remains completely implicit to them as it is tacit and emergent 
knowledge. In fact, much of the tacit knowledge that intuitive responses draw upon are often so 
implicit that even when experts are questioned they may claim that their successful behaviour 
can be explained by a limited and explicit set of rules (Mathews et al., 1989; Ericcson & Smith, 
1991). Indeed, frequently the ‘promoted’ or what Argyris (1993) calls the ‘espoused’ theories as 
reasoned responses that experts think they believe, are quite different from the theories-in-use, 
as a network of concepts, that they actually believe (Sadler-Smith, 2006). The inability to 
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articulate theories-in-use or the opaqueness of intuitive responses results in problems both for 
the expert and to others using expert knowledge, as the explicit information provided to other 
human agents about appropriate action will not lead to optimal solutions and may not even be 
adequate (Earl, 1983; McLucas, 2003; Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). This highlights the problem of 
using explicit rules as developed in expert system methodologies.  
 
Given that only explicit knowledge is readily available to human agents from experts, agents 
develop a naïve form of inductive logic of observations and information gathering developed 
from the promoted theories of experts as to why certain actions should be undertaken (Dequech, 
2001). The credibility of these theories may be tested perceptually and where these ‘tests’ 
satisfice, the human agent may adopt them as a subconscious habit (Maki et al., 1993; Gigerenzer 
& Selten, 2001).  
 
Human agents interact and exchange information (and tradeable commodities) with each other, 
which forms the basis of a socio-economic system through socio-economic services that 
generates a scale-free network topology. This complex system is established through the 
processes of self-organization and the preference to connect about the promoted knowledge and 
beliefs of experts that works. The knowledge captured by the emergence and upward causality 
of the networked structure depicts institutions, which through downward causality of negative 
and positive feedback influence the local interactions of human agents (Hodgson, 2002). Thus, 
reflecting on this circular causality, the economist Loasby (2001b; p. 407) has iterated that 
“knowledge changes institutions, as institutions shape knowledge.” Significantly, in this 
networked sense, experts and their theories, upon which institutions are grounded, act as 
knowledge hubs in the socio-economic system, as a scale-free network. Thus, the degree of 
authority an expert has is reflected by their past success and the number of connections in terms 
of the flow of information the expert has with other agents in the socio-economic system. This 
connectivity, then, reflects the number of agents that have beliefs that resemble those reasoned 
explicitly by the expert.  
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Institutions are significant, as they function as the acceptable ‘rules’ that channel the actions of 
individual human agents in social situations (Bromley, 2006). Hence, institutions can depict 
likely actions of human agents through providing information as to the average state of 
expectations (Potts, 2001). Moreover, institutions also serve to function much like the cognitive 
filters of a human agent, in that they select, organize and interpret information, which allows 
phenomena to be conceptualized, uncertainties to be dissolved and choices to be constrained 
(Choi, 1993; Dequech, 2001; 2004). These functions of institutions explain why human agents are 
eager to follow the average state of expectation, because without them, feelings of anxiety will 
ensue as agents must cope with resolving problems of ignorance and complexity seemingly 
alone (Loasby, 2001a; Rosser, 2001).  
 
From this perspective, the shaping of knowledge by the emergence of institutions results in 
social habituation, when utility is generated from these institutions (Bronk, 2009). Hence, this 
view explains how institutions are formed and maintained, rather than assuming that they are 
given constraints that regulate behaviour. This interpretation of institutions as social habits was 
first conceived by the economist Veblen (1909; p. 626), when he stated that institutions are 
“settled habits common to the generality of men.” Hence, when a social habit is formed that 
reflects a socially settled ‘understanding’, a general theory is said to be established, which may 
be implicit or explicitly recognized (Hodgson, 2000). Significantly, when this social habit has 
enduring pertinence and is codified, it might become officially recognized as a ‘law’ or formal 
institution rather than a convention or informal institution (Heiner, 1983; Bromley, 2006).  
 
The generation of a general theory provides both resilience and economy for a population of 
interacting human agents. Indeed, a general theory provides information for improved 
efficiency of resource uptake, allowing human agents effortless communication and interaction 
through lowering associated transaction costs. This is why society places a large stake on 
generality and coherence as a means to structure understanding and incrementally build 
knowledge capital. But, general theories are also potentially vulnerable to change and can lose 
their resilience. In fact, they may be felled by a single (contradictory) outcome.  
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However, it is more likely that where a contradictory outcome occurs, that experts who believe 
in a competing theory, will argue by providing reasoned responses as to why the present 
general theory needs changing. These explanations will not simply be that the competing 
promoted theory provides greater utility. Utility by itself is not a reason (Bromley, 2008). Rather, 
experts need to demonstrate that the competing theory they think they believe in can bring 
about new insights and can bring about greater explanatory coherence (Table 4.1) (Peirce, 1931-
1958; 7.220; Kauffman, 2000). Significantly, according to Thagard (1992) the history of science 
indicates that explanatory coherence is a fundamental ‘driving force’ behind theory 
replacement.   
 
Often experts, to whom the general theory is established from, become hostile to an attack on 
their authority from experts advocating an alternative theory. When this occurs they will assess 
the authority of the experts who proposed the alternative theory. Where their authority is 
considered less, they may have irritable feelings of annoyance and doubt over claims made 
against their (general) theory (Thagard, 2005; Thagard & Kroon, 2006).  
 
 Low agreement High agreement 
Low amount of evidence Speculative theory or 
hypothesis 
Establishing theory 
High amount of evidence Competing theory General theory 
Table 4.1: Scheme depicting the state of knowledge of theories. 
 
When claims against the general theory appear substantiated, the accumulated negative 
evidence resulting in incoherence may lead the experts, where the theory is explicit to redefine 
various stipulations in a presumably ad hoc manner. This could be achieved through attaching 
an additional theory to it, so as to fit the general theory with the ‘contradictory’ evidence. 
However, the result of these adjustments often makes the theory more complicated and less 
coherent. This lack of ‘simplicity’ may signal that the general theory has reached its limits of 
usefulness (Kuhn, 1962; De Landa, 2000). With continual poor empirical performance, some 
human agents may through the incoherence felt through using the theory, choose to re-evaluate 
their beliefs. In these cases, these human agents face an anxious and potentially costly period in 
a bid to substitute the discredited general theory with an alternative theory, in order to restore a 
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settling of belief once again (Rosser, 2001). The anxiety that ensues while searching for an 
alternative theory is not because human agents dislike changing theories. Rather, the anxiety 
manifests itself because agents ‘value’ their habituated action (Bromley, 2008). 
 
Where an alternative theory is chosen and this is found to provide utility, then other human 
agents who persevered with their beliefs may contagiously relinquish their previous beliefs and 
change their preferences towards the alternative theory. After all, popularity is attractive 
(Barabási, 2003). However, institutional change only occurs where a plausible and useful 
alternative theory exists. Institutional change does not occur without an alternative theory 
available, no matter how inappropriate the present theory may be (Bromley, 2006).  
 
Nevertheless, where an alternative theory exists and is considered suitable, it may due to its 
popularity become highly connected, where a process of re-organization occurs within the socio-
economic system. And so, the authority of those experts grounded in the discredited general 
theory is lost as the utility of the theory is questioned and connections are broken and formed 
elsewhere. This results in the collapse of the general theory, where the alternative theory re-
connected to becomes the ‘new’ general theory. This theory over time if reasonably successful 
will become socially habituated. If social habituation results, it will only come into question by 
experts from another competing theory, who then must be able to articulate understandable and 
reasoned responses to human agents for why it is justified for them to change and abandon their 
beliefs (Bromley, 2006). Only if these reasons are seen to be valuable will human agents begin to 
re-connect to this competing theory. And so, the process of self-organization and re-organization 
continues. Thus, while it is experts that provide information on what they think are appropriate 
beliefs, it is society that determines which of these promoted theories is valuable.   
 
Importantly, where the process of re-organization between different theories is successfully 
achieved, the socio-economic system can accommodate the change, while still maintaining its 
functionality. Hence, in this sense the experts that believe in the competing theory prior to its 
adoption are analogous to passenger species in ecosystems. However, the socio-economic 
systemmay transition into an alternative system state, if no theory can be readily believed in to 
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maintain functionality. If this state transition occurs a revolutionary change in theoretical 
understanding is required (Kuhn, 1962). Consequently, it has been demonstrated how a socio-
economic system as a system of inter-subjective belief is a complex adaptive system. This truth 
that socio-economic systems are complex adaptive systems, and therefore analogous to 
ecosystems, was “grasped intuitively by [the most authoritative economists including] Alfred 
Marshall, John Maynard Keynes and, of course, Joseph Schumpeter” (Foster, 2006; p. 1080).  
 
4.2 Adaptive Co-Management & Consensus  
In acknowledging the role of experts as knowledge hubs, and their capacity to infer appropriate 
actions through intuitive responses, it is contended here that experts should be employed as the 
methodological basis for ecosystem management. This use of expertise may appear in contrast 
to the democratic arguments that ecosystem management should go beyond the knowledge of 
experts and include the beliefs of all human agents (Functowicz & Ravetz, 1993). But, in 
recognizing that experts are knowledge hubs capable of acting successfully in complex systems, 
it is also recognized that they are hubs because human agents have ‘democratically’ selected 
them by their preferential attachment (Barabási, 2003). Hence, experts appear capable of 
representing the likely knowledge and average state of expectations of a community that 
preferentially selected them and subsequently adopted their promoted theories that ‘work’ 
(Hodgson, 2000). Therefore, there need be no dichotomy between democracy and experts, when 
experts are defined by experience. Consequently, the argument against the use of cost utility 
analysis because knowledge is considered undemocratic and not socially representative appears 
much less significant, when it is recognized that experts are those agents judged to be 
knowledge hubs by the preferences of a community. Indeed, it indicates that it is potentially the 
most cost-effective means by which to represent public choice.  
 
However, the use of the potentially limited and biased knowledge of a single expert for 
managing an ecosystem is not a credible exercise. Empirical evidence indicates that single 
experts place excessive confidence in their beliefs, which results in them failing to envisage 
possible outcomes that would call their beliefs into question (Tversky & Kahneman, 1971). 
Hence, the obvious solution is the use of a group of experts, in which to administer collective 
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evaluations (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). Empirical evidence suggests that a group of experts have 
the ability to process information and map survival-relevant features of complex dynamics 
considerably better than experts attempting evaluations alone (Laughlin et al., 2006). This is 
because the dissemination of knowledge of a group of experts can provide a ‘corrective function’ 
in that it is assumed to provide a larger and enriched pool of knowledge from the inherently 
specialized and limited knowledge of a single expert (Wilson & Howarth, 2002). Accordingly, 
with a group of experts the many modules of an ecosystem found at potentially at multiple 
hierarchical scales can potentially be accounted for, where together when organized the 
complete macro-regularity of an ecosystem can be stored in the collective mental models (or 
collective theories-in-use) of the group. It is the modularity or partial decomposability of 
ecosystems that allows knowledge to be generated despite their complexity (Simon, 1974), yet it 
is the inter-connected collection of this knowledge that forms the basis for understanding their 
behaviour.  
 
In forming a group of experts, an efficient and equitable process of evaluation can be conceived. 
Efficiency can be achieved by expertise, while equity can be achieved through the ‘interaction’ of 
a representative and diverse group of experts allowing the potential for a socially legitimate 
knowledge to be discerned. There is a need to appropriately select the group of experts to ensure 
that knowledge are diverse and adequately captures the multiplicity of ecological functions and 
ecosystem services supplied by the ecosystem managed. The selection process for the group of 
experts should not then be based around a random sampling method as used in selecting 
citizen’s juries or focus groups, which attempt to obtain a representative microcosm of society 
(Crosby, 1991; Coote & Lenaghan, 1997). Rather, the selection of experts should be based on an 
interviewing analyst (or facilitator) asking relevant local and scientific communities as to who 
are the ‘available’ and ‘authoritative’ experts that have knowledge of various ecological 
functions and ecosystem services (Earl & Potts, 2004). Once again, in keeping with a scale-free 
network topology (i.e. fitness-connectivity product), authority is defined by the product of 
previous patterns of success from the expert and the preference towards the promoted beliefs of 
the expert from within the community.   
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A problem remains, however, in working out how to integrate the implicit specialized 
knowledge of each expert. Indeed, even the sharing of knowledge, which is strictly explicit 
amongst a group of experts can prove to be difficult. For example, Fraser et al. (2006) describe 
how management failures often result from poor collaboration amongst experts, which all too 
often leave management actions chosen by those experts with the greatest power or with limited 
integration of knowledge amongst experts, so that knowledge is left reductionistic, additive and 
not emergent. Thus, without the integrated and active involvement of the many relevant 
experts, any proposed management action determined will face problems of political legitimacy 
when depicted to the wider community (Walker et al., 2002). 
 
In an effort to prescribe such a strategy to bring and synthesize scientific and local knowledge 
systems of belief together in groups, Folke et al. (2002b) and others (e.g. Olsson et al., 2004; 
Plummer & Armitage, 2007a) have defined what is known as adaptive co-management. 
Specifically, adaptive co-management emphasizes the need for collaboration and power-
sharing, so as to bring about a legitimate process for forming a shared common knowledge, 
while attempting to retain the systematic adaptive learning of adaptive management. Indeed, 
adaptive co-management is “a process by which institutional arrangements and ecological 
knowledge are tested and revised in a dynamic, ongoing, self-organized process of trial-and-
error” (Folke et al., 2002b; p. 8). This dynamic and ongoing learning that is socially legitimate is 
important, as adaptive co-management recognizes the inability to formally predict and control 
ecosystems, and hence emphasizes the need for institutions to adapt to change (Folke et al., 
2002a; Carlsson & Berkes, 2005).  
 
Collaboration is said to be achieved through the promotion of participatory processes and social 
learning (Keen et al., 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2007; Plummer & Armitage, 2007a). In this sense adaptive 
co-management is similar to a soft systems methodology where problems are resolved through 
ongoing participation (Checkland, 1981). With social learning each expert is viewed as a 
participant, so that each expert is not used merely as a nominal source of information as 
considered in Bayesian statistical methods (Stringer et al., 2006), but rather as a means to bring 
about a shared common knowledge, amassed and learnt, through the ongoing exchange of 
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information, throughout the managerial process. It is this participation from knowledge 
amassed about ecosystem behaviour to the choice of management action that provides 
legitimacy and a realistic institutional framing to the process of evaluation, when compared 
with stated preference methods (Robinson et al., 2002). Accordingly, in recognizing how 
participants can genuinely engage in the managerial process, it is also established that 
participants are themselves ‘resource co-managers’ and not just ‘subjects’.  
 
The significance of the participatory approach has been observed in the economic research by 
Straton (2004), who compared findings from citizen’s juries with that of stated preferences using 
choice modelling for the ‘valuation’ of the Bunaken National Park mangrove forest ecosystem in 
Indonesia. It was found that the participatory approach of a citizen’s jury, unlike choice 
modelling, provided closer reports of ‘value’ to that derived from an ecosystem analysis method 
that considered the actual structure and functioning of the ecosystem. The closer account of the 
‘subjective’ values given from the citizen’s jury with the ‘objective’ accounts of the systems 
analysis was argued to be because of ‘commonsense’ that can be generated through deliberation 
and discussion. This finding is significant as it provides evidence for the improvements in 
evaluation that can be gained through a participatory approach. One can foresee, however, that 
such advantages with a participatory approach can be further improved using the organized 
knowledge and genuine adaptive rationality of a diverse and representative group of experts, as 
opposed to the bounded adaptive rationality of lay agents acting as citizens.    
 
Group or collective evaluations about propositions are made by one of two methods; either by 
majority rules voting or by consensus. With consensus all or nearly all participants have to give 
their consent for the proposition, though they need not agree completely (Hunter, 2007). Indeed,  
“[c]onsensus building is a process of seeking unanimous agreement. It involves a good-faith 
effort to meet the interests of all stakeholders. Consensus has been reached when everyone 
agrees they can live with whatever is proposed after every effort has been made to meet 
interests of all stake holding parties” (Susskind et al., 1999; p. 6).  
 
Evidently, consensus is the preferred means of evaluation for adaptive co-management, as it 
provides resource co-managers with a sense of ownership and empowerment in the choice 
made, while also maintaining ‘equity’ by establishing a unified position where power can be 
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equalized amongst the diverse group of participants (Schmoldt & Peterson, 2001; Plummer & 
Armitage, 2007b). For this reason, the goal of participants should be to find consensus, so that 
majority rules voting should only be resorted to where consensus cannot be found (Malone, 
1975). In Table 4.2 a three-finger method of consensus is shown, which indicates that consensus 
need not be about complete agreement, but rather where all participants can support the 
proposition considered (Checkland & Scholes, 2001; Hunter, 2007).  
 
Belief Number of fingers 
“I agree” 3 
“I support it, I can live with it” 2 
“I disagree” 1 
Table 4.2: Group consensus by the three-finger method (Hunter, 2007). Here participants give 
agreement (3 fingers), disagreement (1 finger) or a ‘middling’ position (2 fingers), where 
support is given without complete consent. This middling position is consistent with soft 
system methodology of ‘accommodating’ a belief (Checkland & Scholes, 2001). 
  
Consensus can be made in a strictly cognitive form, whereby agreement is reached by the 
facilitated exchange of information alone. This cognitive form of consensus is found in the 
Delphi method, where usually anonymous participants through several rounds of iteration 
attempt to find consensus (Adler & Ziglio, 1996). The Delphi method has been considered an 
appropriate method of consensus building for adaptive co-management (Kofinas et al., 2007; 
Plummer & Armitage, 2007b). However, an immediate difficulty with the Delphi method is 
evident when it is conventionally applied, as information exchange forsakes any chance of tacit 
knowledge and the emotions being ‘communicated’ for an abridged common knowledge based 
exclusively on an explicit, somewhat reductionistic body of information. Moreover, the Delphi 
method has been criticized as it can easily lead to framing effects (Arnell et al., 2005). That is, 
consensus can be prevented as the localized and speciualized knowledge of experts prevents 
communication between experts as each expert expresses theri beliefs in differing languages 
(Van den Belt, 2004).  
 
For group evaluations to be genuinely effective there is a need to attain a cognitive and 
emotional consensus where there is some attempt to being about tacit knowledge transfer 
amongst participants. To achieve this there is a need to find convergence in the beliefs held, 
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which can be in part developed through the exchange of information through reasoned 
responses, and a convergence in the positive and negative feelings about the different 
management actions considered (Thagard & Kroon, 2006).    
 
4.2.1 Kith-and-Kin Rationality & Group Mind  
Despite the difficulty of tacit knowledge and emotional transmission, a number of researchers 
maintain that tacit knowledge transfer can be achieved where close geographical proximity is 
found within a small group. This is because a small and intimate congregation allows a rich 
array of multi-modal face-to-face interactions to occur (Desrochers, 2001). Such a position has 
empirical support. Human agents it appears have evolved to congregate in small groups 
structured by face-to-face interactions centred on kinship and reciprocity (Knauft, 1991). This 
prolonged experience of face-to-face interactions has shaped our mental capacities, so that we 
have become sensitive to the uncertainty distributions found in small groups. This is 
demonstrated by the fact that the problems of framing effects, which often prevent the 
satisfactory communication amongst human agents using differing ‘languages’ (Pahl-Wostl 
2007), readily disappears when presented within the kinship of a small group (Wang, 1996a; 
1996b). Accordingly, human agents appear to possess a kith-and-kin rationality (Landa & Wang, 
2001). This kith-and-kin rationality is established when relationships of trust are formed.  
 
Building trust is significant, as it is trust which lubricates collaboration (Olsson et al., 2004; 
Ostrom, 2007). The emergence of trust transpires through ongoing and long-term face-to-face 
interactions, in which a reciprocal process of relationship-building occurs. This is depicted in the 
social psychological theory of reciprocal interaction (Stryker & Statham, 1985; Layder, 1994). 
Specifically, the theory of reciprocal interaction maintains that self-disclosure and a series of 
reciprocated potentially risk-taking behaviours is necessary to build trust (Jourard, 1971). Hence, 
a relationship is established by a human agent taking the risk of self-disclosure, and then the 
agent to whom this information was disclosed, responds by indicating that either the disclosure 
is disapproved or approved by reciprocating a self-disclosure also considered of importance. As 
the reciprocation of self-disclosure continues, each agent can potentially increase their trust in 
the other agents that have been interacted with. This trust builds to a point where there becomes 
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a mutual belief in the integrity of all agents interacted with (Axelrod, 1984; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). 
This allows resource co-managers the belief that the intuitions, reasoned responses and beliefs of 
others have integrity, so that it becomes unreasonable to suspect that a participant is 
intentionally providing misleading information (Longstaff & Yang, 2008). Without the building 
of trust, it would be very unlikely for adaptive co-management to be implemented in a 
legitimate and collaborative manner leading to genuine consensus (Plummer & Armitage, 
2007a), where collective (intuitive) responses can be found. Significantly, while an ongoing face-
to-face interaction leading to reciprocity builds trust, it is in small groups that trust can be 
maintained. This is because within larger groups the effects of free-riding are more easily 
concealed (Olson, 1965; Ostrom, 2007).  
 
With the potential establishment of a kith-and-kin rationality, dialogue as practised in many 
traditional cultures through talking circles can result. Unlike mere discussion, it is with dialogue 
that unrestrained open communication of past experiences is possible (Hunter, 2007). In so 
doing, resource co-managers have the opportunity to share information, as well as exchange 
feelings for different propositions through facial and speech recognition (Thagard & Kroon, 
2006). This openness allows at least some transmission and even codification of tacit knowledge 
(Desrochers, 2001). Moreover, this openness allows the possibility of resource co-managers not 
holding to their own understanding firmly, but rather in a negotiable manner. Ultimately, this 
openness amongst the group allows each resource co-manager to give honest and genuine 
responses. In order to further enhance openness and collaboration, empirical research suggests 
that perspective taking should be used (Schober, 1998). Specifically, perspective taking, which 
can be actively facilitated and endorsed by the interviewing analyst, encourages the resource co-
managers to consider the understanding articulated by others. This allows the group to more 
easily identify outcomes where agreement can be found (Boland & Tenkasi, 1995).  
 
Dialogue coupled with perspective taking can establish a group mind as a kind of complex 
system within the group. While the macro-regularities of a module of an ecosystem can be 
found in the mind of a resource co-manager, it is the macro-regularities of an entire ecosystem 
that can be found in the group mind of the resource co-managers. Indeed, it is with a group 
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mind that tacit knowledge and emotions can be transferred amongst the resource co-managers 
so that knowledge linkages can occur between them allowing emergent properties of the group 
to develop (McDougall, 1920; Kerr & Kaufman-Gilliland, 1994; Hutchins, 1995). These 
knowledge linkages do not require that all knowledge must be transferred between all 
participants involved. As long as experts are of authority the knowledge required to be 
transferred is that where adequate interactions between different modules can be found. It is the 
role of the interviewing analyst to facilitate these knowledge linkages as they become apparent.  
 
It is the possibility of a (small) group mind established that brings about the potential of a 
cognitive and emotional consensus. This consensus in turn allows the possibility of the 
emergence of a coherent shared common knowledge and a collective intuitive response from the 
group about the appropriate course of management action. Significantly, this development 
supports the ideas of Ruitenbeek and Cartier (2001). They have argued that adaptive co-
management is an emergent approach to management as it establishes itself by way of self-
organizing processes of a small group through a participatory process. 
  
While the potential for genuine consensus exists, research in social psychology indicates that the 
communication structure of a group makes a profound difference to the ability of a group to 
make collective evaluations and share information effectively (Stasser & Titus, 1985; Hutchins, 
1995; Wilson & Howarth, 2002). In particular, Hutchins (1995) found that more communication 
is not always better. This is especially true if all the interactions in the group are allowed to 
influence group activities from the outset. Thus, if all interactions are developed immediately, 
then the group demonstrates considerable confirmation bias. The reason confirmation bias 
occurs is because the communication patterns of groups compel human agents to compromise 
their knowledge of those with the greatest power (Henrich & Gil-White, 2006). However, this 
problem of power differentials within the group can be greatly reduced, if the interviewing 
analyst as a facilitator ensures that all participants are given time to disclose information and if 
‘evaluations’ are established individually prior to consensus (Lamm & Trommsdorff, 1973; 
Clark, 1997). In general, participants when as individuals are generally much more comfortable 
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disclosing controversial information than when in a group. Hence, both individual and group 
evaluations are required. They are not substitutes for one another.  
 
It has been argued that experts can have knowledge of the modules of ecosystems and that 
through face-to-face interactions a group mind can be formed allowing the macro-regularity of 
an ecosystem to be inferred from the collective intuitive responses of a group mind. However, it 
was previously recognized that ecosystems are not isolated phenomena (Section 2.2.6). 
Accordingly, establishing a multiple scale perspective is critical, as to assume a single spatial or 
temporal scale for an ecosystem is certain to ‘court disaster’ (Norton, 2005). This makes sense as 
ecosystems are not only modular systems, but hierarchical systems. Therefore, it is necessary to 
model not just a single group, but a multiple set of groups, where each group represents a 
particular spatio-temporal scale of interest (i.e. bioregion, ecosystem and sub-systems of the 
ecosystem). In order to ensure that institutional or knowledge linkages between groups are 
formed it is maintained here that a few participants should belong to multiple groups. In doing 
so, cross-scale channels of communication can be formed between groups so that the multiple 
set of groups can be modelled as a nested set of complex systems. This innovation is important 
as previous research has indicated the difficulties in putting a multiple scale perspective 
together for analysis (Capistrano et al., 2006). 
 
4.2.2 Informed Intuition & Reflexivity  
Face-to-face interactions can establish a legitimate means for group consensus, which should 
underpin the basis for collective evaluations and adaptive co-management. However, at this 
point adaptive co-management appears nothing more than a typical participatory group process 
in accordance with a BOGSAT (Bunch of Guys Sitting Around a Table) approach (Schmoldt & 
Peterson, 2001). And indeed, empirical evidence of adaptive co-management being performed 
indicates that this is actually what is done. For example, adaptive co-management carried out in 
the Peam Krasaop Wildlife Santuary, a mangrove forest ecosystem in coastal Cambodia, 
highlighted that ecosystem knowledge and management actions chosen were determined only 
by a facilitated participatory group process of deliberation from members of local communities 
and government agencies (Marschke & Nong, 2003). Similarly, the Kristianstads Vattenrike 
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forest and wetland ecosystem in southern Sweden where adaptive co-management has been 
applied, has involved only regular group discussion (Hahn et al., 2006). It appears that adaptive 
co-management, has been able to embrace the need for collaboration, in keeping with co-
management, far more than the need to embrace systematic adaptive learning in accord with 
adaptive management. After all, if adaptive co-management is to be genuinely useful it needs to 
go beyond learning by trial-and-error. This conclusion was also recognized by Plummer and 
Armitage (2007a), who have suggested that despite the idealized narrative of adaptive co-
management, it could appear to be more ‘rhetoric’ than reality. 
 
What is evident is that for adaptive co-management to be effective, it must ensure an evaluation 
process that incorporates complex thinking, collaboration of local and scientific knowledge, and 
adaptive learning that is systematic that leads to a ‘careful’ weighing of beliefs and an 
evaluation of outcomes (Antunes et al., 2006; Plummer & Armitage, 2007a). It is when all three 
parts are completed that adaptive co-management can rise above generic group activity and the 
fallibility of using intuitive responses alone. Thus far, the first two of these three critical parts to 
adaptive co-management have been established, through recognizing the significance of the 
intuitive responses of resource co-managers and the importance of group consensus established 
through face-to-face interactions. These are significant developments, as adaptive co-
management has been previously framed only from the perspective of conscious deliberation 
amongst a group, where generic group activity can be enhanced through a mediated modelling 
methodology (Van den Belt, 2004). Previous work has ignored the multi-modalities of the 
subconscious mind and emotional responses when evaluating and managing ecosystems. 
Hence, this work brings about a systematic approach to learning and evaluation for adaptive co-
management similar to that of the mediated modelling methodology, but attempts to include all 
modalities, which are critical to the successful behaviour found with experts. Moreover, this 
systematic approach developed provides accountability to the process through making evidence 
transparent, which allows society to recognize that knowledge employed is best practice and 
that the management actions chosen are cost-effective and determined rationally.  
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However, while there are some ideas on how to approach learning and evaluation, there 
remains little evidence that details the means for adaptive co-management to be achieved in a 
systematic way. Indeed, Carlsson and Berkes (2005; p. 72) observe that “…although ecosystems 
and institutional systems show a large diversity, our [methods] for conceptualizing and 
analysing [adaptive] co-management are strikingly blunt, and more research needs to be done to 
refine these [methods].” Hence, the rest of this chapter develops a novel methodological 
approach for a post-classical economics that integrates several useful and psychologically 
appropriate methods that can facilitate and enhance the expertise of resource co-managers.  
 
In order to ensure that adaptive learning is systematic, it is essential that knowledge where 
possible can be made transparent. In fact, a critique of subjective methodologies is that they 
neglect the process of judgement making, and only detail the outcome of these judgements 
(Cooke & Goossens, 2004; Arnell et al., 2005). That is, to often inferences are made without some 
kind of promoted reasoning to support these inferences. Hence, there is a need for transparency 
and documentation so that a social memory of learning and evaluation can be established. It is 
this transparency that brings about accountability to the learning process, as it attempts to 
elucidate the ‘black box’ of the mind where knowledge is stored and choices are made.  
  
By attempting to make knowledge transparent and codified as possible, it allows participants to 
consciously reflect and constructively criticize their theories-in-use (Olsson et al., 2004; Pahl-
Wostl, 2007; Plummer & Armitage, 2007a). Indeed, “theories-in-use are often tacit cognitive 
maps by which human [agents] design action. Theories-in-use can be made partially explicit by 
reflecting on action” (Argyris, 1985; p. 82). While it is recognized that much of the knowledge of 
a resource co-manager will remain implicit to them, there should be at least an ‘attempt’ to make 
their mental models explicit. After all, this conscious reflection of their mental models can be a 
cathartic experience (Cossette & Audet, 1992; Eden, 1992), as it enables resource co-managers the 
chance to view their own specific understanding and conceptualizations as well those of others 
for the ecosystem managed. This in turn allows an opportunity for resource co-managers to 
monitor their feelings as to where doubt might remain about their knowledge or that of others, 
and either modify their theories-in-use or beliefs, if internal inconsistencies are recognized or 
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from dialogue and reasoned argument for why promoted theories need to be reconsidered 
(Thagard & Kroon, 2006). This process of reflexivity, which is unique to human agents, is 
significant (Betsch, 2005). Studies of expert performance indicate that expertise can be improved 
through critical self-appraisal and candid feedback, as it allows much faster adaptive learning 
than the rigid belief perseverance that is found when no reflexivity is undertaken (Glöckner & 
Betsch, 2008b; Hodgkinson et al., 2009).   
 
By mitigating doubt, it allows knowledge that can be validated and built on. This means that 
through documentation the components of knowledge and choice can be systematically 
developed in a multiple step process. In developing a multiple step process of systematic 
learning and evaluation, the potential for being overwhelmed by information is reduced (de 
Bono, 1998). 
 
The explicit dissemination of knowledge does not mean that intuition and tacit knowledge is 
negated. Rather, it means that intuition is tempered with documentation, so as to ensure that 
analysis has been based on a systematic comprehension of the available evidence. That is, 
intuition is employed, but conscious deliberation is also used to subsequently evaluate and 
deliberate on information elicited. Through moving back and forth between intuitive judgement 
and conscious deliberation and reflection, two forms of correction and learning can occur. First, 
internal consistencies in the documented information can be conceived on conscious reflection, 
hence potentially reflecting the need to alter theories-in-use. Secondly, the documentation 
allows the opportunity to monitor feelings on the elicited information, to gauge whether this 
information is in fact consistent with what one actually believes. Where doubt is recognized, 
then this provides the opportunity to further revise and adapt the information elicited. This 
process should, where time permits, continue until the resource co-manager is sufficiently 
satisfied that the information elicited resembles a consistent depiction of their theories-in-use. 
Hence, the recognition of feelings is important, as it is these feelings that provide the ‘passage’ 
between the documented information and the subconscious reasoning of the implicit memory. 
This novel methodological approach for ecosystem management, which incorporates intuition, 
conscious deliberation and various psychologically appropriate analytical methods (Table 4.3) is 
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termed informed intuition (Thagard, 2001; 2005). It is with the informed intuition methodology 
that the mental model of an expert is recognized as the primary mode of computation and 
evaluation. This methodology differs fundamentally with neoclassical economic theory, which 
considers mathematical modelling alone as the appropriate mode for computation and 
evaluation.   
 
Method Section Description of method 
History narratives Section 4.2.3 Historical narratives established. 
Fuzzy cognitive mapping Section 4.2.4 Fuzzy cognitive maps established by each expert, 
which are then merged to form a group map and 
analysed using static and dynamic analytical methods. 
Theory construction Section 4.2.5 Analysis provides output that informs experts for 
constructing theories to explain system behaviour. 
Theory selection 
 
 
Experimentation 
Section 4.2.6 
 
 
Section 4.2.7 
Where multiple theories constructed then argument 
structures formed to determine their plausibility and 
inference to the best explanation. 
Where multiple theories remain then experiment with 
that theory with the least experimental cost per 
plausibility. 
Scenario analysis Section 4.2.8 With the aid of the theory, plausible state space as 
futuristic narratives explored using intuitive mental 
simulations and multi-agent simulations. 
Preference mapping and 
choice 
Section 4.2.9 Preferences for ecosystem services given by multi-
criteria analytical methods allowing the determination 
of the utility index, ECOPY, for each system state.  
  Where doubt remains over weights or information 
elicited, then, information elicited in previous steps is 
revised and adapted, until doubt is mitigated. Final 
informed choice for appropriate management action 
determined by consensus. 
Table 4.3: The various methods applied in the informed intuition methodology. The first six 
methods represent the development of promoted knowledge of ecosystem behaviour, while 
the final step represents choice of management action by consensus.  
 
4.2.3 Qualitative Induction & Historical Narrative  
Much of the analytical and deliberative aspects of the informed intuition methodology are 
initially achieved by documenting, transcribing or mapping the knowledge of each resource co-
manager, which allows the potential determination of macro-regularities by qualitative 
induction. Significantly, it is qualitative induction, which has been previously argued to be the 
most appropriate mode of inference for adaptive co-management (Conley & Moote, 2003; 
Armitage et al., 2007). Qualitative induction differs from quantitative induction. Quantitative 
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induction attempts to make inferences as to the macro-regularities of ecosystem behaviour from 
a sample of quantitative data through a mathematical model. Qualitative induction, by contrast, 
makes inferences about ecosystem behaviour through observed features of the system with 
those not perceived. Hence, when formally applied, qualitative induction uses methods (e.g. 
grounded theory, case study research) that attempt to assemble qualitative features of a sample, 
in which short textual summaries can be generated (Riechertz, 2004; Wieland & Mirschel, 2008). 
Consequently, qualitative induction cannot “… escape from the particularities of its historical 
situations – let alone raise itself to abstract notions: its style is historical” (Toulmin & Gustaven, 
1996; p. 205). Thus, qualitative induction can only ever be a comparative and probabilistic mode 
of inference.  
 
Qualitative induction, however, is sufficient for adaptive co-management because there is no 
attempt to predict ecosystem behaviour formally. Rather, what is attempted with qualitative 
induction is to express an explicit explanation of ecosystem behaviour. Thus, qualitative 
induction does not reason from a normative perspective by prescribing how we ought to reason 
in accordance with a global rationality and compare this with how we actually reason, and 
correct our reasoning accordingly. Instead qualitative induction reasons in reverse, whereby it 
first attempts to gauge what reasoning is actually used and then corrects this codified 
knowledge to ensure it is coherent on reflection where need be (Gabbay & Wood, 2005; Haig, 
2005). It is this non-automatic and deliberate cognitive step that is consistent with an adaptive 
rationality and is what makes our intuition informed, and in turn, qualitative induction 
prescriptive (Damasio, 1994; 2003).  
 
An appropriate position to commence from, given the historical contingency and path 
dependence of ecosystems, is to construct a detailed historical account of past phenomena (Kay 
& Regier, 2000; Walker et al., 2002; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). Constructing an historical account by 
qualitative induction allows participants to pay attention to the issues involved that might 
otherwise be ignored with quantitative analysis (Bromley, 2006) and their intuition. Indeed, 
Reeves and Duncan (2009) have recently argued that defining an ecological history is necessary 
to facilitate ecosystem management, given that resource co-managers often struggle to manage 
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on long time scales needed for successful ecosystem management. Such an historical account 
enables all resource co-managers to be familiarized with the complex history of the ecosystem 
managed, including its previous system states. This history should be as long-term as possible. 
After all, “we cannot fully appreciate the present condition [of ecosystems] without going back 
decades, centuries or even millennia” (Costanza et al., 2007a; p. 522). In documenting its long-
term history, participants can become much more aware of historical understandings including 
the impact of human economic activity on the ecosystem managed (Renberg et al., 2009). In 
obtaining a ‘comprehensive’ history, resource co-managers can avoid mirroring past mistakes 
(De Landa, 2000). Moreover, a documented history limits the possibility of recent memory biases 
occurring. Indeed, without an historical account, research indicates human agents may assume 
that recent or easily remembered outcomes are more likely to occur in the future (Mullainathan, 
2002).  
 
In establishing an historical account, qualitative and quantitative data as well as memories, 
could be used, so as to establish a consensual chronology of historical narratives, as a series of 
previous system states. Significantly, a narrative format is conducive to qualitative induction, 
and provides ‘meaning’ to data. Moreover, a narrative approach is comprehensible to experts 
and lay agents alike (Beinhocker, 2006). This is significant, as a critical part of forming narratives 
is not just to inform intuition, but to demonstrate to society that an understandable, transparent 
and systematic evaluation approach has been completed.  
 
4.2.4 Knowledge Mapping & Artificial Neural Networks  
With history depicted, the knowledge of each resource co-manager can be individually mapped. 
This mapping of knowledge allows it to be broken down into multiple steps. While there are 
various suitable methods that could be used, several criteria appear essential for method 
selection that is compatible with an informed intuition approach developed here and adaptive 
co-management. The criteria of method selection include: one, be in accord with the modus 
operandi of the expert mind (i.e. neural network); two, allow transparency; three, allow different 
knowledge or belief systems to be synthesized together; and four, be sufficiently practical for 
resource co-managers from different backgrounds and lay agents alike to understand.   
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Given that the expert mind is conceptualized as a neural network, it has been proposed that it is 
psychologically appropriate and valid to document and map the micro-level knowledge of each 
resource co-manager employing fuzzy cognitive mapping (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2003). Fuzzy 
cognitive mapping is psychologically based in the psychology of personal constructs (Kelly, 
1955), and is a modification of cognitive mapping approach developed by Axelrod (1976). 
Specifically, fuzzy cognitive mapping is a means of qualitatively and quantitatively modelling 
expert knowledge that is structured around a network of concepts (Kosko, 1986).  
 
Fuzzy cognitive mapping is a method that has been used with success previously for bringing 
local and scientific knowledge together for ecosystem management, most notably the Kizilirmak 
Delta wetland ecosystem in Turkey (Özesmi, 1999). For this reason, Özesmi and Özesmi (2003) 
argue that it is a method conducive with participatory approaches such as adaptive co-
management. Significantly, while fuzzy cognitive maps are similar to probabilistic models, such 
as Bayesian networks, they differ in that they allow feedback and do not assume variables 
mapped follow strict probabilistic assumptions. Hence, fuzzy cognitive maps appear to be a 
more plausible representation of knowledge, as compared to Bayesian networks, which do not 
appear to be psychologically appropriate (Tversky & Koehler, 1994; Liu, 2000; Thagard & Litt, 
2006).  
 
In a fuzzy cognitive map, elicited conceptual variables and causal connections between variables 
as defined by a directed numerical weight are obtained through open-ended interviews. It is this 
directed numerical weight which can vary between any real number between zero and one, 
which makes fuzzy cognitive maps ‘fuzzy’, unlike simpler cognitive map representations 
(Özesmi, 1999). When these relationships, which depict casual connections between conceptual 
variables, are integrated together, they can form a directed network (Axelrod, 1976). With a 
completed fuzzy cognitive map elicited as a network, and then subsequently revised and 
adapted on conscious reflection (in order to improve coherence and consistency), it represents a 
transparent epistemological micro-map around which each resource co-manager ‘thinks’ they 
organize their own knowledge (Khan & Quaddus, 2004; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). That is, fuzzy 
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“cognitive mapping offers a window [on to the] subjective world” of participants, a world 
where actual “human evaluation processes always take place...” (Klein & Cooper, 1982; p. 64). 
 
To reiterate, the fuzzy cognitive map constructed should not be viewed as a formally validated 
depiction of how an ecosystem actually functions. Rather, the map provides only a depiction of 
the mental model that each resource co-manager thinks they conceptualize their knowledge 
about ecosystem behaviour (Hobbs et al., 2002; Bryson et al., 2004). In fact, while fuzzy cognitive 
maps in an abstract sense reflect the neural network of the mind, they certainly do not share the 
exact size, initial connections, connectivity, temporal properties and configurations of the mind. 
In fact, the fuzzy cognitive maps will inherently avoid much of the fine detail found in tacit 
knowledge that is necessary when genuinely capturing the complex dynamics of ecosystems. 
Nevertheless, despite these limitations fuzzy cognitive mapping remains appealing, as it 
provides a useful means for conceptualizing expert knowledge and performing subsequent 
analysis. 
 
Each elicited fuzzy cognitive map can be transformed, after a process of qualitative aggregation, 
into an adjacency matrix. In this form individual maps can be merged together, so as to 
construct a group fuzzy cognitive map that captures an explicit shared common knowledge 
(Özesmi & Özesmi, 2003; Khan & Quaddus, 2004). Some researchers have argued that prior to 
superimposing individual maps together, each map should be given a credibility weight of the 
perceived degree of authority of each resource co-manager (Taber, 1991). However, given that 
adaptive co-management focuses on the egalitarian assumption of participation where each 
participant is considered to be an authority in their own specific ecological context, it would 
appear inappropriate numerically to weight their degree of authority (Özesmi, 1999).  
 
With the group fuzzy cognitive map formed, it can once again be consciously reflected on and 
adapted where need be by consensus. With the group map transformed into the mathematical 
form of adjacency matrices, it is possible to undertake static analysis by various network theory 
indices that account for the structure of the map and dynamic analysis by undertaking artificial 
neural network simulations. The mathematics of artificial neural network simulations is 
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discussed further in Chapter 6 when fuzzy cognitive maps are applied in an empirical case study. 
However, briefly, simulations activate conceptual variables through inputting a weighted sum 
into the conceptual variable, which is partially determined by the directed numerial weight of 
the causal connection in the fuzzy cognitive map. The determination of activation outputs for 
each conceptual variable in the network allows their relative weighting in the map.   
 
4.2.5 Theory Construction & Multiple Theories 
The weighting of the micro-level knowledge or conceptual variables in a group fuzzy cognitive 
map is significant because the “true historian should feel compelled to establish some hierarchy 
of … [variables]” (Carr, 1961; p. 84). From the ranking, macro-level knowledge, as macro-
regularities of ecosystem behaviour, can potentially be constructed (Hodgson, 1999). 
Significantly, despite analysis providing output, the theory constructed should not be 
considered a mathematically-forced generalization obtained from the analysis. Rather, the 
analysis represented in graphs coupled with the historical narratives act as an aid for resource 
co-managers to more easily construct an explicit promoted theory, which emerges from the data. 
Thus, this understanding of theory emergence, affirms that, while it is often conceived that 
induction brings together data through which theory is induced, this is actually not so. Instead 
the promoted theory emerges from the pattern recognition of the resource co-managers, who 
determine a generalization, as a relevant psychological abstraction formed from the comparative 
relationship observed in the data with previous knowledge acquired (Shneiderman, 2002; Haig 
2005). The explicit theories constructed as a macro-regularity of ecosystem behaviour, then 
should be represented in a short textual summary (Lee, 2002; Pinkstone, 2002). In forming a 
short textual summary that emerges from the development and analysis of fuzzy cognitive 
maps, this approach it is believed better prescribes ‘grounded theory’, a method of qualitative 
induction (Glaser, 1998).  
 
Importantly, the short textual summaries constructed do not claim universality or reflect what is 
objectively ‘out there’. In fact, the promoted theories documented may not accurately reflect the 
behaviour of the ecosystem. This is for two reasons. First, the theories constructed are inherently 
subjective and are developed from the mental models of resource co-managers, which do not 
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reflect the actual organization of an ecosystem. Secondly, and more significantly, the short 
textual summaries will not adequately capture the causal complexity of the behaviour of the 
ecosystem. This is because it will not be able to reflect the theories-in-use of the resource co-
managers, given the difficulty to codify their own tacit knowledge and their emergent intuitions 
(Polanyi, 1967). Therefore, while through (systematic) adaptive learning the theories-in-use may 
progress towards generalizable macro-regularities, the explicit and promoted theories are only 
ever ‘bounded’ generalizable macro-regularities, as they will always be partial and incomplete 
depictions of ecosystem behaviour (Ezzy, 2002; Reichertz, 2004).  
 
Nevertheless, these promoted theories are important, as they not only aid and inform the 
intuitive responses of resource co-manager, but demonstrate to society that an understandable, 
transparent and systematic evaluation approach has been completed. This is critical as it is this 
explicit documentation that provides accountability (i.e. checks-and-balances) to the process of 
using intuitive responses, which are an inappropriate approach when used alone, given their 
concealed psychological nature. Indeed, informed intuition reflects a process where choice of 
management action is a matter of establishing a collective intuitive response amongst a group of 
resource co-managers, but recognizes that the authority of these resource co-managers is 
governed by society. Thus, it is society that judges from the documented information available 
whether a systematic evaluation has been accomplished that leads to cost-effective management 
actions and sustainable outcomes.   
 
Now, given the inherent incompleteness or boundedness of the promoted theory constructed, it 
is possible that multiple, and even contradictory theories may emerge from the same data. In 
fact, contradictory ‘certitude’ may exist where contradictory theories are constructed, which 
resource co-managers confidently think that they believe in (Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). 
Significantly, in expressing inductive logic in this way, it is reasoned here that it is a logical form 
developed by repetition indicating that it is underpinned by a periodic macro-state. However, 
while the emergence of multiple theories may seem undesirable, it is with multiple theories that 
confirmation biases are less likely. This is because resource co-managers should demonstrate the 
reasoning for the promoted theory constructed to others. Therefore, for the theory adopted to be 
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legitimate, a process of theory selection should be performed and be a transparent affair 
(Achinstein, 1970). Hence, the adoption of a theory where multiple theories are constructed is a 
twofold process of theory construction followed by theory selection. In using theory selection 
the best available theory made explicit can potentially be found.  
 
4.2.6 Theory Selection & the Inference to the Best Explanation  
The promoted theory selected from the multiple theories constructed, is that theory which is the 
inference to the best explanation (Lipton, 2004). The inference to the best explanation as a means 
of theory selection does not attempt to evaluate theories based on prediction, like the 
hypothetico-deductive method, nor should it construe that theories should be evaluated in 
terms of statistical probabilities as found with Bayesian accounts of confirmation or the criterion 
of maximum likelihood (Putnam, 1992). After all, it has been shown that these methods of 
theory evaluation are inappropriate when dealing appropriately with psychological (and 
ecological) matters. Theory selection should use explanatory goodness as reflected by the 
plausibility of the theory, rather than the role of probabilities in reasoning. Hence, plausibility 
unlike probability reflects the epistemic reasonableness of a theory in a comparative way with 
other theories, regardless of its previous occurrence (Thagard, 1992; Gabbay & Wood, 2005). 
That is, the inference to the best explanation is that theory amongst rival theories that has the 
’loveliest’ explanation, not the likeliest explanation (Lipton, 2004).  
 
In understanding that plausibility or explanatory adequacy of the theory should be the yardstick 
for theory selection, it is necessary that a plausibility value be established (Rescher, 1976). In 
order to determine a plausibility value, it is appropriate to consider various epistemic criteria, 
which act as ‘filters of plausibility’. According to Haig (2005) the most practicable set of 
epistemic criteria are those established by the psychologist Thagard (1988; 1992). This particular 
set of epistemic criteria includes consilience, simplicity and analogy. These three criteria form 
into a framework termed the theory of explanatory coherence, which allows the comparative 
evaluation of theories. This framework based around coherence is psychologically more 
appropriate than depictions of probability in the belief systems of human agents, as has been 
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argued previously both at the individual psychological level (Section 4.1.2) and at the social 
psychological level (Section 4.1.3) (Thagard, 2005).  
 
Of the three epistemic criteria that characterize the theory of explanatory coherence, the criterion 
of consilience should carry the most weight. Hence, there is a lexicographic ordering between 
the various criteria, so that simplicity and analogy should only be considered where two 
theories appear to have similar degrees of consilience. Specifically, consilience accounts for both 
empirical adequacy towards explanatory completeness and explanatory breadth of the theory 
constructed. Thus, above all, consilience asks how much the theory explains (Thagard, 1988). A 
strongly consilient theory then, is one that not only has sufficient explanatory power to explicitly 
explain the data, but is also potentially capable of explaining a diverse range of other 
phenomena in similar cases. In doing this, a strongly consilient theory is able to fit into a more 
generalized pattern. Hence, in keeping with previous arguments (Section 4.1.3), a strong 
consilient theory is a resilient theory.   
  
Simplicity, a pragmatic criterion, is considered by Thagard (1988) to be the second most 
important criterion. Specifically, simplicity maintains that where all other things are equal, a 
theory is more plausible if it is not complicated and does maintain many ad hoc assumptions 
(Thagard, 2000). Hence, the simplicity criterion reflects Occam’s Razor, which stipulates a 
preference towards theories that make an economy of assumptions. Simplicity is significant 
given that theories are likely to be nearing their usefulness the more complicated and ad hoc that 
they become (Kuhn, 1962; De Landa, 2002).   
 
Analogy, the last of the criteria, which also should be the least weighted criterion, is nevertheless 
important. This is because analogies (or associational suggestions of belief) can enrich the 
integrity of a theory by expressing its equivalence. Hence, good analogies enhance the coherence 
of a theory, as it makes the unfamiliar become familiar (Haig, 2005). After all, as indicated 
previously in regards to learning (Section 4.1.1), “nothing unknown can ever become known 
except through its analogy with other [phenomena already] known” (Peirce, 1960; L75: 286).  
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Given this understanding of plausibility, resource co-managers can preferentially assign 
plausibility weights by a process of lexicographic ordering of the set of epistemic criteria for 
each theory evaluated (Thagard, 1992). In order to support theories constructed, participants 
should find empirical evidence to support their theories, so as to develop a plausible argument. 
This empirical evidence should be given believability values to indicate how strongly believed 
the evidence is, and reliability values to indicate the quality of the source that the evidence was 
obtained from. With theories and empirical evidence established connections can be made 
between theories and evidence, so as to indicate whether their relationship is explanatory (i.e. 
mutually-reinforcing) or contradictory in nature. This allows the argument of theories and 
empirical evidence to be transformed into a networked structure.  
 
Once resource co-managers are satisfied with the reasoned argument constructed, it can be 
simulated using the connectionistic algorithm called Explanatory Coherence by Harmony 
Optimization (ECHO). The ECHO model, like fuzzy cognitive mapping, is grounded in the 
mathematics of artificial neural networks (Thagard, 1992; 2001). The ECHO model has been 
designed to account for the theory of explanatory coherence and thus attempts to show the 
computability of coherence relations (Thagard, 1992). Hence, in running simulations with the 
ECHO model it can be shown whether theories in the networked argument formed are coherent 
or not. This is indicated through coherent theories, which are ones that explain more and are 
simpler, being activated during the simulation through an excitatory (i.e. positive) connection 
weight. On the other hand, incoherent theories result in being deactivated during the simulation 
through an inhibitory (i.e. negative) connection weight. Hence, the ECHO model attempts to 
‘optimize’ the coherence of the argument given (Convince Me, 2009). The activation outputs from 
the simulation represent ECHO-adjusted plausibility (and believability) values for the theories 
in the argument.  
 
These ECHO-adjusted plausibility values can then be correlated with the original plausibility 
values given by participants, in order to assess the coherence of the argument made. A coherent 
argument is indicated by a positive correlative relationship. Hence, a positive correlative 
relationship provides evidence that the argument used is coherent for determining the 
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plausibility of the hypotheses in order to decipher the inference to the best explanation. 
However, a negative correlative relationship indicates an incoherent argument. In this case, 
participants should reflect and potentially revise the values and the structure of the argument 
given. Hence, the ECHO model provides a means of allowing participants the opportunity to 
structure, restructure and assess their beliefs and reasoning where multiple theories arise. Once 
arguments are found to be coherent, the most plausible theory amongst contradictory theories 
should be adopted. While with explanatory theories, a meta-analysis can be performed to 
construct a meta-theory that encapsulates the mutually-reinforcing theories. Further 
development of the ECHO model is discussed in Chapter 6 when it is applied in an empirical 
case study.  
 
4.2.7 Experimentability & Defocused Attention  
Where two or more plausible theories remain, then it may be necessary to experiment for scales 
of analysis where experimentation permits. However, before experimentation it is appropriate 
to consider experimentability, which refers to the ability to satisfactorily test the various theories 
in an economic manner. Certainly, as the logician Peirce (1931-1958; 5.599) states “in view ... of 
the enormous expensiveness of experimentation … is the consideration of economy.” 
Experimentability is critical, as the theory that can be experimented on at the least cost should be 
the preferred theory for experimentation, where everything else is equal (Rescher, 1978). 
Naturally, it makes sense that this economic caveat should be established through an economic 
evaluation. Hence, consistent with economic arguments made involving cost utility analysis in 
Chapter 1, resource co-managers should identify that theory, which establishes the least 
experimental cost per plausibility. After all, the economy of research matters. 
 
Experimentation, where it can be performed, should proceed in a comparative manner. Thus, 
resource co-managers should investigate untreated and treated experimental outcomes and ask 
themselves why experimental outcome x rather than experimental outcome y? The use of 
comparative experiments, while not well-known in laboratory science, is in fact used widely in 
forestry and other field trials. Forestry trials indicate that despite the difficulty of isolating a 
single variable to experiment on, it is possible to make useful inferences (Lawson, 2003). Of 
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course, the successful implementation of these experiments requires that resource co-managers 
are reasonably confident that the various aspects of the experiment bar the theory experimented 
with is approximately the same throughout the experimental duration. Confidence in the 
experimental results can be ascertained by comparing doubts over the implementation of the 
experimentation with the relative expectance of the experimental outcomes observed. Where 
sufficient confidence exists, then resource co-managers have the capacity to develop 
believability in their theory experimented with by perceptive repetition that works in that short-
term expectations are affirmed. Where expectations are repeatedly ‘disconfirmed’, the theory 
should be abandoned.    
 
In addition, to experimentation and in keeping with adaptive management, systematic learning 
and evaluation should readily employ careful and systematic monitoring of the ecosystem 
managed (Folke et al., 2002a; Armitage et al., 2007). Monitoring should be carried out by experts 
from scientific backgrounds as well as those from local communities, who are on the ground and 
are experientially immersed with the ecosystem on a regular basis (Berkes & Folke, 2002). 
Hence, monitoring should involve both observations and the collection of quantitative and 
qualitative data. In particular, data should be collected that provide information to discern 
trends about the state of ecological functioning and the flow of ecosystem services.  
 
The probing of qualitative and quantitative data can be completed by exploratory data analysis 
(Yu, 1994; Haig, 2005). Specifically, exploratory data analysis uses a variety of appealing 
descriptive techniques, including graphical techniques, trend analysis and ratios, which when 
used might potentially reveal phenomena in the scrutinized data (Bateson, 1979). However, in 
order to make this information reveal phenomena in the scrutinized data useful for the 
intuitions of resource co-managers, so as to accumulate tacit knowledge, monitoring should, in 
part, be commenced with an effort towards a defocused attention and the detection of 
unfamiliar patterns. Previously, it has been recognized that experts can make useful intuitive 
responses in specific ecological contexts that they are familiar with, as they can focus their 
attention on appropriate information (Section 4.1). Hence, to continue to accumulate tacit 
knowledge resource co-managers need to develop a defocused attention, where they become 
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sensitive to unfamiliar patterns by not ignoring subtle signals of information (Bohm & Peat, 
2000; Danermark, 2001; Magnani, 2001), and being experientially open towards phenomena that 
might otherwise be ignored (Bateson, 1979; King et al., 1996).  
 
An openness to experience and a defocused attention concerns “the breadth, depth, and 
permeability of consciousness” (McCrae & Costa, 1997; p. 826). Hence, while a defocused 
attention might appear an unscientific pursuit, this is not necessarily so as a defocused attention 
achieved through an open-minded exercise of ‘meditation’ is a necessary means for giving the 
mind a free rein towards accumulating tacit knowledge (Peirce, 1931-1958; 6.315; 6.458). This 
meditative approach of defocused attention achieves this end, as it enables the mind to incubate 
knowledge and detect unfamiliar patterns forming causal connections in the mind from sensory 
data that might be ignored otherwise by resource co-managers assuming ‘familiarity’ with the 
ecosystem managed (Mandler, 1995; Lawson, 2003; Simonton, 2004).  
 
4.2.8 Scenario Analysis & Reasonable Expectations 
With a single best theory adopted, it is possible for resource co-managers to explore future state 
space for the ecosystem managed. While the importance of exploring state space is critical for 
evaluation, exploration should not be considered as an approximation for prediction. On the 
contrary, exploration is used to give “a picture of the [state] space within which [future] 
adaptation is feasible” (Adger & Vincent, 2005; p. 400). That is, exploration is about establishing 
a plausible mapping of state space. The exploration of state space can be investigated by multi-
agent simulations. Indeed, Kofinas et al. (2007) have argued that multi-agent simulations can be 
conducive with adaptive co-management. To compute these simulations a network model 
would need to be developed by ecological network analysis. Construction of the ecosystem 
network model would, given the difficulties of obtaining quantitative data (Section 3.2.4), 
combine quantitative data, where available, with weights elicited subjectively. Hence, given that 
much if not all of the micro-mapping in a network model will be subjective for many 
ecosystems, the accuracy of the network model constructed will partially depend on its 
subsequent qualitative validation. Specifically, qualitative validation is concerned with 
determining whether each component of the network model is a reasonable representation of 
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the ecosystem. It is determined by evaluating the interaction weights elicited against their 
continuity with the theory adopted and local empirical realities (Carpenter, 2002; Jakeman & 
Letcher, 2003).  
 
Once the network model is validated, multi-agent simulations could be computed to determine 
a plausible mapping of state space. However, given that complex dynamics will be generated, 
there will always be a need for an intuitive understanding, so as to interpret the large amounts 
of quantitative data into a definable set of system states. Hence, because intuition is necessary, it 
is not unreasonable to avoid computing multi-agent simulations altogether. In avoiding multi-
agent simulations, any temptation that the simulated output is used for (formal) prediction is 
prevented. Moreover, while adaptive co-management recognizes the potential of multi-agent 
simulations, Kofinas et al. (2007) report that those participants from local communities, who 
might be unfamiliar with this method, would be wary of believing outcomes it produces. 
 
Accordingly, instead of computing multi-agent simulations it might be more effective simply to 
‘compute’ mental simulations. These mental simulations are, in effect, quasi-deductive 
inferences or intuitive (informal) predictions, so as to establish an emergent and plausible 
representation of the set of system states within an ecosystem. They are termed here quasi-
deductive inferences as the theories-in-use of resource co-managers remain hidden, unlike the 
complete and explicit deductive inferences ascertained from the application of mathematical 
modelling. The generation of these system states can be informed and aided by the network 
model, historical narratives and the adopted theory as a bounded generalizable macro-
regularity. The system states can be depicted as futuristic narratives, in accordance with scenario 
analysis (Godel, 1987; Wilkinson & Eidinow, 2008). The use of scenario analysis has been 
previously advocated by Peterson et al. (2003) and applied for the purposes of adaptive co-
management for an ecosystem in the Northern Highland Lake District of Wisconsin. These 
researchers found that scenario analysis provided a legitimate method for local and scientific 
communities to start dialogue and construct a set of plausible futuristic narratives.  
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The qualitative aspect of scenario analysis allows it to be effective in dealing with problems of 
complexity and temporal discontinuities in state space that often limit the effectiveness of 
quantitative analysis undertaken by multi-agent simulations (van der Heijden, 1996). 
Accordingly, it is reiterated that the intuitions of the resource co-managers are recognized to 
‘oversee’ multi-agent simulations when evaluating the complex dynamics of ecosystems. 
However, once again this does not mean that the deductions inferred by multi-agent simulations 
are not informative. On the contrary, multi-agent simulations can allow resource co-managers to 
understand ‘persistent’ emergent phenomena and help determine a plausible state space and the 
qualitative behaviour of ecosystems (Anderies, 2002; Janssen, 2002a). Nevertheless, where multi-
agent simulations are used, they should always be applied critically and for the intent of 
informing intuition as “the purpose of simulations is to aid intuition” (Axelrod 1997, p.  4).  
 
The plausibility of the system states explored by mental or multi-agent simulations is 
maintained through the theory adopted and the expertise of the resource co-managers 
(Wegener, 1993; Peterson et al., 2003). For the purposes of avoiding confusion resultant from 
bounded rationality, research indicates that the number of future system states should be 
limited for purposes of evaluation to between two and three possibilities (Jefferson, 1983; van 
der Heijden, 1996). With state space satisfactorily explored, it is possible, though contentious, to 
elicit (intuitive) subjective probabilities for the range of future outcomes as ‘reasonable’ 
expectations for the short and long-term for a given management action (Loasby, 1990).   
 
4.2.9 Preference Mapping & Choice of Management Action 
In order to aggregate ecosystem services into the utility index, Ecosystem Outcome (ECO) 
(Section 2.2.6), there is a need to find a suitable multi-criteria analysis method that can determine 
preferential weights of ecosystem services from cardinal measurements. One method that can 
form indices and is compatible with adaptive co-management and post-classical economic 
sentiments is the analytical hierarchy process (Saaty, 1980; 1995). This method has been 
successfully applied to form indices of ecological phenomena (Kangas & Kuusipalo, 1993), and 
has been used as a practical method to bring about collective evaluations for the elicitation of 
preferences specific to ecosystem management (Kangas, 1994; Prabhu et al., 1996; Mendoza & 
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Prabhu, 2001). In fact, Ananda and Herath (2009) argue that the method enhances collaboration 
and consensus, if group dialogue breaks down. The method remains widely used to this day for 
expert elicitations, and until recently it was believed that the use of the analytical hierarchy 
process for aggregating ecosystem services into an index was entirely novel. However, in a very 
recent study, Zhang and Liu (2009) have employed the method for determining preferential 
weights for five ecosystem services for evaluating the Ruoergi Plateau marshland ecosystem in 
China.  
 
Despite the usefulness of the analytical hierarchy process, it has been criticized. One criticism is 
that the method is entirely without adequate axiomatic foundations (Belton & Gear, 1985; Dyer 
& Wendell, 1985). Nevertheless, while the method is not as mathematically rigorous as multi-
attribute utility theory, it is still based on various axioms, which include that preferences be 
made on a ratio scale with reciprocal properties (Saaty, 1986; Forman & Gass, 2001). An 
additional criticism of the analytical hierarchy process is its intransitivity (Dyer & Wendell, 
1985). Nevertheless, empirical evidence suggests the axiom of transitivity required for rational 
choice need not hold, as breachs of the transitivity axiom for choice is not always irrational 
(Rosenbaum, 1991; Lootsma, 2001). However, instead of ignoring these problems of 
intransitivity, the method, while not mathematically forcing preferences from intransitivity, still 
acknowledges where intransitive preferences are made through a measure of internal 
inconsistency termed the consistency index.  
 
The analytical hierarchy process, specifically, is a multiple step method of expert elicitation, 
which attempts to decompose evaluations into a hierarchical network of modules (Saaty, 1986). 
In decomposing the evaluation of preferences for ecosystem services, resource co-managers 
avoid informational overload that might occur with other methods. Moreover, the hierarchical 
network appears analogous to the modular topology that actual ecological functions are found. 
Similar to the work of Zhang and Liu (2009), a three-level hierarchical network of ecosystem 
services is developed. At the pinnacle of the hierarchical network is the objective or utility index 
(i.e. ECO) (Figure 4.1). The next level of the hierarchy contains the various criteria of ecosystem 
services (i.e. cultural, regulatory, provisioning or supporting criteria). Finally, and unlike the 
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work of Zhang and Liu (2009), the full classification of ecosystem services developed in the 
Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project was considered for the bottom level of the hierarchical 
network formed (Table 2.2).  
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Figure 4.1: Diagram of the hierarchical network for determining preferential weights for 
ecosystem services. 
 
The mapping of preferences is achieved by systematic pairwise comparisons (Saaty, 1980; 1995). 
The use of comparisons is significant, as it allows preferences to be mapped without isolating 
them. Moreover, the use of pairwise comparisons allows trade-offs between ecosystem services 
to be directly examined. With pairwise comparisons between ecosystem services elicited, 
preferential weights can be determined. The actual determination of preferential weights is 
discussed in Chapter 7 when the analytical hierarchy process is applied in an empirical case 
study.   
 
At this point, assuming utilities and costs are known, it may be thought that the choice of 
management action is complete. After all, it would seem appropriate to use preferential weights 
elicited and calculate that management action, where subjective probabilities are used, which 
maximizes the sum of subjective expected utilities for a given budget. However, while this 
calculation is appropriate, the final choice should not be deduced by calculation as this would 
negate choice to necessity. Choice if it is genuine is “amongst thoughts, and thoughts … are not 
given” (Shackle, 1961; p. 273). Hence, information obtained is to bring about transparency in 
which to aid resource co-managers, so that a collective intuitive response can be determined. 
Indeed, “multi-criteria analysis methods [are] not a prescriptive answer but a transparent and 
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informative [evaluation] process which helps to uncover how intuitive procedures can be 
informed by a structured rational analytic process” (Ananda & Herath, 2009; p. 2543). This is 
important as while multi-criteria analytical methods provide analysis of parts (i.e. ecosystem 
services), it is intuition that provides the final synthesis of all information for the purposes of 
choice (Mintzberg, 1976). 
 
It is entirely reasonable then, even when one management action dominates all others, that 
doubt still proliferates, which may be the result of previous weights or information elicited not 
reflecting the knowledge or preferences of resource co-managers fittingly (Thagard & Kroon, 
2006). Therefore, the monitoring of feelings is important, as where doubt remains, there should 
be an effort made to revise and adapt information elicited within the time constraints available. 
Only once doubt within the group has been ‘sufficiently’ mitigated, should the final informed 
and rational choice for the appropriate management action be consensually facilitated in order 
to establish a collective intuitive response.  
 
4.2.10 Conclusion  
In science, it is often assumed that all serious evaluation must only be performed by conscious 
deliberation and reasoning. Any form of evaluation where psychological processes are evoked, 
are presumed to be less than rational responses (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). Indeed, “until 
comparatively recently only the brave and most farsighted individuals would acknowledge the 
utility of intuition” (Hodgkinson et al., 2009; p. 277). However, intuition once neglected in 
scientific and economic research is now gathering much attention (Betsch, 2008). It is intuitive 
responses, as subconscious emergent inferences, that appear able to generate some kind of 
macro-regularity in complex dynamics (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008b). Thus, this chapter 
established a means to allow the intuitions of experts to be used as a credible methodological 
basis for ecosystem management.  
 
In doing this it was recognized that intuitions are rational only to specific ecological contexts, 
where tacit knowledge has been developed through an ongoing participation with the 
ecosystem. Hence, to use intuition, there is a need to use a diverse group of experts to cover, all 
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modules of and modes of participation in an ecosystem. In acknowledging the importance of a 
group of experts, it was further recognized that adaptive co-management with its emphasis on 
collaboration can be used to generate a shared common knowledge. But, because adaptive co-
management is a relatively new approach for ecosystem management, research to date has 
focussed attention on processes to bring about collaboration. Much less work has been made in 
establishing a methodology suitable for systematic learning and evaluation within the adaptive 
co-management process (Plummer & Armitage, 2007a). To address this shortfall, this chapter 
developed a novel methodological approach for allowing systematic learning and evaluation. 
This methodology is based around informed intuition. In developing this approach, several 
useful and psychologically appropriate methods have been integrated in a novel way for aiding 
and informing the expertise and intuitions of resource co-managers. The consequences of such a 
methodology can be expected to improve ecosystem management from the implementation of 
methods prescribed in neoclassical economic theory.  
 
However, while this approach appears a useful improvement for ecosystem management, it still 
suffers from the problem of habituation, which prevents knowledge and institutions adapting to 
change. Indeed, Simon (1987) expressed that intuition is problematic, as it is based on past 
experiences of familiarity, which can become ‘frozen’ into habits of mind. While informing 
intuition by conscious deliberation and various analytical methods undoubtedly help through 
adaptive learning, they may not be sufficient to overcome the settling of beliefs that prevent 
mental models adapting to change. Hence, in the next chapter this problem is specifically 
addressed, which results in a complete and novel methodology for adaptive co-management.  
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Chapter 5: Surprise & Abduction 
 
You need chaos in your soul to give birth to a dancing star 
Friedrich Nietzsche 
 
5.0 Introduction 
An inherent difficulty with adaptive co-management as it presently stands is that it leads to 
problems when an unexpected outcome comes to pass. The potential of an unexpected outcome 
occurring is reasonable given the endogenous nature of complex dynamics in ecosystems, where 
small events or actions can result in large potentially irreversible consequences in the long-term 
(Beinhocker, 2006). Indeed, a lesson learnt from history is that trends in the behaviour of 
ecosystems never continue ‘smoothly’, rather changes can be abrupt (Costanza, 2000). Thus, 
while the informed intuitions of resource co-managers appears very useful for inferring macro-
regularities in complex dynamics, they only work well where familiarity is observed (Gladwell, 
2005; Duggan, 2007).  
 
There are however many examples of unexpected outcomes occurring in ecosystems (King, 
1995; Capistrano et al., 2006). In fact, recently, Doak et al. (2008) and McLaughlin (2008) have 
argued that unexpected outcomes are commonplace in ecosystems. Unexpected outcomes often 
result from ‘irreversible’ transitions into alternative system states. However, unexpected 
outcomes also occur within system states. For example, the unexpectedly rapid increase of 
spruce bark beetle in Alaska resulted in over one million hectares of spruce forest lost to disease 
(Matsuoka et al., 2006). This rapid beetle spread was unexpected despite that these spruce forest 
ecosystems were well-studied. Berg et al. (2006) have argued that this unexpected outcome was 
because previous research never ‘imagined’ the ‘possibility’ of widespread beetle infestations.  
 
A famous example of an unexpected outcome is the northern cod collapse in the marine 
ecosystems off the coast of Newfoundland. Prior to the collapse, this fishery was thought to be 
well-managed through the collaboration of scientific knowledge from government agencies and 
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the local knowledge from inshore fishermen. Indeed, based on a century of knowledge 
developed it was taken as a matter of ‘fact’ that this fishery could yield a sustainable allowable 
catch of 250,000 tonnes per year. However, in the mid-1980s fishermen reported declining 
catches contradictory to scientific data collected. Scientists in time recognized that fish stock 
trends were declining and recommended that the total allowable catch of the fishery be reduced. 
Despite these regulatory efforts, the fishery unexpectedly collapsed from a biomass of 400,000 
tonnes in 1990 to 1700 tonnes by 1993 (Finlayson & McCay, 1998). Since this collapse there has 
been a moratorium on all fishing of northern cod. Nevertheless, this fishery has not recovered. 
In fact, it appears that since this collapse a state transition has occurred, as crab and shrimp 
species once small in number, are now abundant (Lilly et al., 2000; Rose, 2004). With this state 
transition the local communities that once relied on this fishery have since economically 
collapsed as well, as the infrastructure and techniques needed to harvest shrimp and crab are 
quite different from that of cod fish (Dolan et al., 2005). The exact social cost of the fishery 
collapse remains unknown, but efforts to soften the social cost by several government 
intervention packages have totalled over three billion (Canadian) dollars (Hamilton & Butler, 
2001). Once again, the northern cod fishery collapse is a stark example of the interactive co-
dependency of the health of ecosystems and the ‘health’ of socio-economic systems.  
 
In these unexpected circumstances, such as the collapse of the northern cod fishery, it is 
necessary to generate novel hypotheses by creative conjecturing to explain why the unexpected 
outcome occurred. In the case of the northern cod fishery, several promoted novel explanations 
were actually conjectured to explain the collapse. These include: the proliferation of technology 
allowing fishermen to catch greater numbers of fish; the problem of uncertainty generated from 
the complexity of this resource; and the problem of institutional rigidity and lock-in, where 
governments and local communities alike demanded that this fishery remained profitable. This 
unquestioned pursuit for profit was because much investment in infrastructure had been 
developed based on the settled belief that this fishery could ‘always’ support a sustainable 
allowable catch of 250,000 tonnes per year (Hutchings, 1996; Hamilton & Butler, 2001).  
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The creative conjectures that are formed to explain unexpected phenomena have been argued to 
be the result of a distinct logic termed abduction, first developed by the logician Peirce (Lawson, 
1997; Bromley, 2006). Accordingly, abduction is concerned with the creative act of making up 
hypotheses that explain unexpected phenomena (Davis, 1972). Yet, despite abduction as a 
creative logic, some philosophers of science have remained sceptical about its autonomy. 
Kapitan (1992; p. 2), for example, states that “… there is no abductive correctness that cannot be 
reduced to deductive or inductive validity.” Popper (1959; p. 46) makes a similar point 
maintaining that, while science advances by creative conjecture and refutations,  
“the initial stage, the act of conceiving or [creating an hypothesis], seems … neither to call for 
logical analysis nor to be susceptible of it. The question how it happens that a new 
[hypothesis] occurs … may be of great interest to psychology; but it is irrelevant to the logical 
analysis of scientific knowledge.”  
 
For these reasons, many economists have been oblivious to the existence of abduction. But, any 
we have already gathered from the previous chapter that the logical analysis of knowledge 
needs to be expanded to include tacit knowledge and intuition, both of which are psychological 
forms of knowledge. Nevertheless, even those economists that recognize abduction or at least 
might be willing to entertain its mode of reasoning have remained, for the most part, attached 
either to qualitative induction or the deductive process of research for the purposes of analysis 
(Finch, 1999; 2002; Lee, 2002). However, in an effort to avoid these concerns, this chapter first 
establishes abduction as a valid and autonomous logic. It then argues that abduction is not only 
an autonomous logic, but a logic that should be genuinely embraced by resource co-managers. 
In arguing for the necessary and systematic application of abductive logic, a novel 
methodological approach is developed that integrates an informed intuition with abductive 
logic. This proposed methodology termed the abductive process of research should it is argued 
underpin adaptive co-management, as it prepares resource co-managers for unexpected 
outcomes and allows institutions the capacity to adapt to (ecological and economic) change. This 
methodology is a significant contribution to ecosystem management, as the capacity to evaluate 
and manage unexpected phenomena in ecosystems has been acknowledged as a critically 
needed research area (Longstaff, 2009).  
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5.1 Abduction & Logical Form 
The differentiation of abduction from deduction is a relatively simple undertaking. This is 
because with deduction, such as that exemplified by the hypothetico-deductive method, we 
work with hypotheses we have selected, yet in abduction we are merely ‘fishing’ for hypotheses 
(Danermark, 2001). By taking a step back, abduction emphasizes that hypothesis generation can 
be a methodological rather than an amethodological process. Thus, abduction is a form of a 
posteriori reasoning from evidence to explanation. Abduction then, reasons in the opposite 
direction to that of deduction, as it follows the sequence of facts-before-theory rather than 
theory-before-facts (Aliseda, 2003). Accordingly, abduction has a different function to 
deduction. It seeks possible explanations for phenomena, whereas deduction seeks to be able to 
extend the explanation for the purposes of prediction (Glymour, 1980; Haig, 2005).  
 
While abduction can be easily differentiated from deduction, many have found the differences 
between abduction and induction less obvious. Even those that recognize the relevance and 
autonomy of abductive logic would sometimes concede that it is but a kind of induction. This is 
because both forms of logic involve an uncertain process of developing ‘theory’ (Thagard, 1992). 
Nevertheless, there are qualitative differences between the two. With abduction unlike 
induction, we are examining information obtained from a single (unexpected) outcome. Hence, 
abduction is a local logic (Emery & Emery, 1997). It does not attempt to yield theories as 
generalizations like inductive logic. Rather, abduction yields only ex-post-facto hypotheses (Peng 
& Reggia, 1990). Thus, with abductive logic efforts are made to explain (unexpected) 
phenomena. However, with inductive logic efforts are made to develop general theories of 
association between phenomena through the use of these theories (Bromley, 2006).   
 
At this point, given the arguments for the autonomy of abduction, it is possible to depict the 
various modes of logic discussed (Figure 5.1). It is observed that unlike deduction or induction, 
abduction follows a unique path of logic from the empirical outcome to the suggested theory 
and finally to the hypothesized case, which reflects the generation of an ex-post-facto hypothesis. 
Hence, abduction proceeds from a known quantity to two unknown premises. This yields a 
tautological argument, as abduction must actively ‘appeal’ to the validity of one premise in 
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order to make other premises valid. Accordingly, hypotheses generated by abduction are not 
matters of belief, as given the weakness of reasoning between the first and subsequent premises, 
these creative conjectures are easily refutable with additional information.  
 
Despite the tautological argument that is produced by abduction, Figure 5.1 illustrates that it 
does have a logical form leading to inference, as the entire logical matter is contained, piecemeal, 
in its premises. Peirce (1931-1958; 5.188) understood this fact and stated that “although 
[abduction] is very little hampered by logical rules, [it] nevertheless is logical inference, 
asserting its conclusion only ... conjecturally, it is true, but nevertheless having a perfectly 
definite logical form.” Hence, abduction is a legitimate and autonomous logic, albeit, a weak 
possibilistic mode of logic. Nevertheless, it is abduction that provides the necessary first step 
upon which all science initially depends. Hence, abductive logic through its creative 
conjecturing is a genuinely experimental logic (Hoffman, 1999; Danermark, 2001). 
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OUTCOME
Particular 
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CASE
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Suggested 
RULE
DEDUCTION INDUCTION ABDUCTION
 
Figure 5.1: A representation of the various modes of logic. A perforated box depicts 
uncertainty in the premise, which is also indicated in the shading of the arrows, where ‘black’ 
arrows depict certainty and ‘yellow’ arrows depict potential uncertainty in the logic.  
 
5.1.1 Surprise & Creative Conjecturing 
The impetus for the creative conjecturing by abduction is the experience of an unexpected 
outcome. However, creative conjecturing only occurs when the mind is overwhelmed by the 
psychological shock triggered from the unexpected outcome. It is with this shock that the 
psychological resilience of habitual behaviour can be reduced, so that beliefs are now called into 
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question (Rolls, 1999). Hence, creative conjecturing only occurs when a difference to that 
expected makes a difference (Bateson, 1979). It is when a difference (i.e. the unexpected 
outcome) makes a difference (i.e. the psychological shock) that the emotion of surprise is 
generated, as surprise is “a condition in which perceived reality departs qualitatively from 
expectations” (Holling, 1986; p. 293). Without surprise, observations are fleeting, so that 
resource co-managers would continue to manage ecosystems within their comfortable state of 
settled belief and assumed familiarity (Reichertz, 2004; Lewis, 2005; Thagard & Litt, 2006; 
Bromley, 2008). However, it is with feelings of surprise that resource co-managers are forced to 
re-consider their position of understanding. Hence, abductive logic is of the form (Peirce, 1931-
1958; 5.168): 
The surprising fact, C, is observed: 
But if A were true, C would be a matter of course, 
Hence, there is reason to suspect A is true. 
 
A representation of the psychological processes that unfold in the mind of the resource co-
manager awoken by an unexpected outcome can be depicted. Here, as a result of the 
psychological shock, the habitual neural pathway within the mind loses its resilience, becomes 
unstable, and undergoes a rapid loss of organization through a surge of positive feedback where 
belief momentarily is absent. It is with this loss of organization that the mind makes a sudden 
transition into an unstable chaotic state (Lewis, 2005). However, it is in this chaos that there is an 
increased sensitivity and where experimental processes of creativity can be found, which 
activates a myriad of concepts while allowing the reshuffling and synthesizing of many remote 
causal connections found in the mind (Koestler, 1975; Hoffman, 1999). Hence, this 
transformation unleashes stores of tacit knowledge so as potentially to create new pathways. It 
is these novel, but tacitly inspired, pathways formed in the chaos, which can in part by codified 
and translated into the generation of explicit novel hypotheses that attempt to explain the 
unexpected outcome observed (Figure 5.2).  
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Figure 5.2: A simplistic representation of a neural network and how a psychological shock 
triggered by an unexpected outcome can reshuffle and transform the mind from an habitual 
neural pathway (A) used prior to the surprise, to an alternative neural pathway (B), which 
may generate a novel hypothesis (!). Note that the neural pathway followed depends on the 
weight of the connections, as indicated by the direction of the arrows in the diagram.  
 
The set of novel hypotheses that are generated from the creative conjecturing “comes to us like a 
flash” (Peirce, 1931-1958; 5.181). Hence, the proposed novel hypotheses only come known after 
they have been created in the mind. Accordingly, creative conjecturing is an act of insight and 
an inference (Anderson, 1986). Given that hypotheses created by abductive logic are formed 
from psychological processes, it would appear to be a random and spontaneous process, akin to 
a neo-Darwinian interpretation of natural selection (Dawkins, 1976). If this relationship is true, 
then, creative conjecturing can be depicted as a massive search of possible novel hypotheses, 
which are then selectively retained by various heuristic rules that prune rejected ‘branches’ 
(Campbell, 1960; Dennett, 2004).  
 
Following this depiction, the psychologist Simonton (1988; 2004) has argued that those human 
agents that are more creative must be those that generate a larger quantity of hypotheses and 
who have the patience to ‘experiment’ perceptively with a number of hypotheses through a 
process of trial-and-error. Evidently, if this interpretation of creative conjecturing were accurate, 
then abductive logic would appear to be a logic of random guessing. If so, abductive logic 
would appear to be a futile exercise, as there would be no means to determine which hypotheses 
are likely to be of utility. One would be forced to consider every possible hypothesis, however, 
unreasonable. 
 
The psychologist Sternberg (1997), however, has criticized this interpretation by arguing that it 
is an implausible account of creativity. Sternberg (1997) instead postulated that creative 
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conjectures are not random guesses, but rather plausible guesses. Hence, if this possibility were 
true, then creative agents are those more proficient at generating better hypotheses in the first 
instance. The idea of plausible guessing from an evolutionary perspective would have merit, as 
plausible guessing would enhance the likelihood of survival if and when human agents are 
confronted with an unexpected outcome (Carruthers, 2002). Accordingly, there is presumably 
something that can potentially guide our guesses away from the absurd and towards that which 
is plausible. Indeed, Peirce (1931-1958; 5.172) contended:  
“Consider the multitude of theories that might have been suggested. Think of what trillions 
of trillions of hypotheses might be made of which one only is true; and yet after two or three 
or at the very most a dozen guesses, the scientific man hits pretty nearly on the correct 
hypothesis. By chance he would not have been likely to do so in the whole time that has 
elapsed since the earth was solidified.”  
 
For creative conjectures to be plausible guesses, it is nevertheless necessary that the operation of 
constraints that can potentially ward us away from the absurd be explained. While Peirce (1898) 
maintained that the operation of constraints is entirely instinctual, this explanation does not 
seem satisfactory (Hoffman, 1999). However, in recognizing the chaotic dynamics that appear to 
dictate the creative processes in the mind, the understanding as to why creative conjectures are 
plausible guesses can also be established. There are two possible reasons for the plausibility 
observed in explanations generated by creative conjecturing. First, chaotic dynamics have 
bounds as to where its dynamics can and cannot go (Section 2.1). Secondly, and more 
significantly, other settled beliefs in the mind not abandoned at the moment of psychological 
shock provide control and guidance to channel and select knowledge into a more restrictive set 
of plausible hypotheses (Hintikka, 1998; 1999; Hintikka et al., 2001; Paavola, 2004). This is 
because novel hypotheses generated must attempt to cohere with other modules that remain 
settled within the mind. Indeed, with the mind shocked by the unexpected outcome, it attempts 
to find novel hypotheses to explain the outcome in order to regain sufficient coherence in the 
mind with the generation of hypotheses.  
 
However, this guidance through establishing coherence can only occur where knowledge is 
organized as a network of concepts and not as a disorganized database of rules. This explains 
why in a lay agent’s “mind there are many possible hypotheses … [yet] in the expert’s mind 
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there are few” (Suzuki 1973; p. 19). Therefore, it is argued here that abductive logic can be a 
genuinely useful logic and therefore plausible guessing for an expert, but is only random 
guessing for a lay agent. It is with expertise that promoted hypotheses can be novel and 
plausible. Their knowledge that is networked and built around stores of tacit knowledge allows 
their creative conjectures to appear wise, rather than mere random ‘fantasy’. Hence, expertise 
provides both the genuine capacity to bring about intuitive responses and the ability to be 
creative.    
 
Given that abduction has a logical form, is experimental, is formed from the chaos of 
‘unknowing’, is bounded by knowledge, is creative and appears random, it appears reasonable 
to contend that this logic can be represented by a chaotic macro-state. If this assumption is 
correct, then abduction is not merely an informal mode of inference (Nickles, 1989; Aliseda, 
2003). Rather, it is a logic with the same mathematical status to that of deduction or induction, 
which have been defined by a point and periodic macro-state, respectively (Table 5.1).  
 
Mode of Logic  Consequence Macro-state 
Deduction Necessity Point 
Induction Actuality Periodic 
Abduction Possibility Chaotic 
Table 5.1: The various modes of logic and their relevant consequences 
and macro-states. 
 
It needs to be reiterated that the creative conjectures generated by abduction are strictly a once 
off, so that these novel hypotheses while potentially bringing coherence to the mind do not yet 
hold much, if any, weight in the mind. That is, hypotheses generated by abductive logic are not 
yet matters of belief or theories-in-use. Hence, the various hypotheses generated by abduction 
are considered, at best, speculative or latent alternative ‘theories’ (Table 4.1). However, on rare 
occasions the magnitude of the psychological shock may be sufficiently large to completely 
discredit various theories believed. If this occurs, there may be a search for alternative theory to 
fulfil the function that the discredited theory maintained. This search may lead to the 
adjustment of the theory believed, or the adoption of a competing theory, which may be one of 
the speculative theories generated by abduction. But, given that theories generated by abduction 
have little weight, despite their potential plausibility, it would appear irrational to immediately 
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act on them. Rather, it would appear rational to delay action and gather additional information 
to form a belief through perceptive repetition that works (Ferrari-Filho & Conceicao, 2005). 
Thus, according to Keynes (1921; p. 161) those that act based on speculative theories must have 
considerable animal spirits, which are “a spontaneous urge to action rather than inaction.” 
Hence, animal spirits reflect a preference to embrace novelty and unconventional action, but 
such actions are surely the response of the desperate (Gough, 1979). However, it will be shown 
later in this chapter how unconventional action can be undertaken in a rational manner.  
 
5.2 Genuine Uncertainty & Demi-Macro-Regularities  
It should not be conceived that only human agents are capable of generating novelty through 
their creative endeavours. It has been discussed in Chapter 2 that ecosystems are open systems 
with permeable boundaries, so that novelty can occur through invasion, migration and 
extinction of species resulting from biotic or abiotic changes in the ecosystem and surrounding 
environment (Section 2.2.5) (Post et al., 2007). The result is the presence of novel system states 
with no historical analogue. Accordingly, given the presence of novel system states, there 
appears no obvious way of identifying all possible configurations that may occur. That is to say, 
with novelty it must be assumed that ecosystems as complex adaptive systems are non-ergodic 
(Kauffman, 2000). Non-ergodicity entails that the future of an ecosystem is not necessarily 
epistemologically reflected in the past, as the future is neither completely given from the past 
nor represented in the present system state (Kauffman, 2000; Hodgson, 2002; Pahl-Wostl, 2007). 
Quite simply, there is not always a recognized nexus that links the past, the present and the 
future with ecosystem behaviour. Accordingly, the assumption of ergodicity, which implies “the 
presumption of a pre-programmed system where the past, present and future reality are 
predetermined, whether the system is stochastic or not” (Davidson, 1996; p. 480-481), should be 
relinquished for the management of ecosystems.  
 
The economist Davidson (1994; 1996), however, has argued that it is possible to retain the 
assumption of ergodicity, when only short-term expectations are considered. This is because 
under a (very) short temporal horizon, the conditions of ergodicity remain a reasonable 
approximation. However, for the sustainable management of ecosystems there is a need to carry 
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out economic evaluations in the long-term (Janssen, 2002a). After all, the choices required for the 
management of ecosystems require the determination and implementation of potentially 
irreversible management actions, where the payoff from the action may be many years to come. 
Hence, when managing ecosystems all economic evaluations worth undertaking appear ‘crucial’ 
and non-ergodic (Shackle, 1955; Davidson, 1994; 1996). Thus, rational resource co-managers 
should be aware that during the time between the implementation of the management action 
chosen and its payoff period, unforeseeable changes are likely to occur.  
 
With the realization of non-ergodicity, there is another form of uncertainty that should be 
considered in evaluating and managing ecosystems, termed here genuine uncertainty (Lane & 
Maxfield, 2005). Genuine uncertainty “implies both the endogeneity of the source of uncertainty 
and the perceived unlistability of all the potential outcomes of a course of [management] action” 
(O’Driscoll & Rizzo, 1985; p. 258). A consequence of genuine uncertainty is the 
inappropriateness of the probability calculus for the long-term sustainable management of 
ecosystems. Thus, although complexity invalidated the usage of objective probabilities for 
determining the likelihood of future outcomes for a given management action (Section 3.2.4), it is 
recognized that with the presence of genuine uncertainty that all forms of probability are 
theoretically irreconcilable with the long-term management of ecosystems (Table 5.2). This is 
because the axioms of probability rest on the assumption of state space being closed and 
bounded (Shackle, 1970; Davidson, 1991).  
 
Form of 
Uncertainty 
Knowledge of system states Probability function 
Risk All states in set known Objective probabilities known 
Ambiguity All states in set known Objective probabilities unknown,  
but knowable 
Ignorance All states unknown;  
but knowable 
Objective probabilities unknown,  
but knowable 
Complexity All states unknown;  
but knowable 
Objective probabilities unknowable,  
but subjective probabilities relevant 
Genuine 
uncertainty 
All states in set unknowable Subjective probabilities irrelevant 
Table 5.2: The various forms of uncertainty discussed and their association with state space 
knowledge and probability theory. 
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Genuine uncertainty, in addition to complexity, provides another fundamental area in which to 
critique the foundations of neoclassical economic theory. However, genuine uncertainty might 
appear to lead to analysis having no definitive content. Consequently, for some economists, “in 
cases of [genuine] uncertainty, economic reasoning would be of no value” (Lucas, 1981; p. 224). 
The lack of an ergodic assumption would appear to leave analysis hopelessly nihilistic and an 
exercise of pure chaos. Literally, anything goes (Coddington, 1982; Rogers, 1989). However, the 
non-ergodicity of ecosystems and the genuine uncertainty it manifests, should be respected as 
complexity and novelty is an inherent facet of ecosystem behaviour (Kauffman, 2000).  
 
Despite the problems of making crucial economic evaluations for ecosystem management, this 
does not mean that resource co-managers should retire into a pessimistic state of resignation and 
struggle blindly onwards. Rather, they should at least attempt an economic evaluation despite 
the pervasive presence of genuine uncertainty. After all, the requirement of rationality is not 
diminished with genuine uncertainty. It is still possible to implement management actions that 
are positively foolish and irrational (McKenna & Zannoni, 2000; Foster, 2006). Moreover, 
resource co-managers can at least develop some kind of meta-model of the ecosystem, which 
may provide an understanding of possible outcomes. Hence, while resource co-managers may 
be surprised by what outcomes that do occur, they should attempt evaluations of ecosystems as 
they may become “less bemused and make less costly errors” (Earl & Kay, 1985; p. 35).  
 
While resource co-managers are faced with genuine uncertainty in their economic evaluations, 
this does not mean that novelty should be considered to derive from the indeterministic forces 
of spontaneity and chance. If it is assumed that novelty is indeterministic, so that it violates the 
notions of causality and determinism, then science must abandon one of its prime objectives – 
that of explanation. Thus, resource co-managers are obliged, if not obligated to search for all 
forms of causation in ecosystems. This sentiment is also shared by the economist Hodgson (2002; 
p. 276) who explains that:   
“Once we affirm an uncaused cause, we say that science should explain this much, but no 
more. ... Neither the principle of determinacy nor the uncaused cause can be verified by 
experience. But the principle of determinacy is preferable to the uncaused cause in that it 
does not place dogmatic bounds on the scope of scientific inquiry and explanation.”  
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In spite of the necessity to investigate for explanations, it has been previously realized however, 
determinisms that allow formal predictions are an unwarrantable form. But, it is realized that 
this determinism, which simply correlates various management actions with one plausible set of 
future outcomes, still should be rejected as this supposes conditions of causal closure (Hodgson, 
2002; 2004). That is, while ecosystems in this case need not be considered ergodic, they are 
assumed from the standpoint of methodology to be ergodic. It follows that these forms of 
determinism should be rejected, as they result in the mistaken assumption of ergodicity. 
However, according to Hodgson (2004), it is possible to acknowledge causality and 
determinism, despite the presence of non-ergodicity, through the principle of universal 
causation. This principle simply demands that ‘everything is determined with something else’.   
 
One can conclude that, given the novelty in ecosystems, knowledge of them must be fallible. 
Hence, no matter the amount of comprehension, ecosystems will forever remain problematic 
(De Landa, 2002). That is, surprises will always occur when managing ecosystems, all from their 
complexity and novelty. Knowledge of ecosystems will not lead to generalizations that 
approximate causal laws. Indeed, Seastedt et al. (2008) has stated recently in light of the novelty 
in ecosystems that the search for (bounded) generalizable macro-regularities will be an 
‘unproductive exercise’. Thus, because of complexity and novelty, ecosystems simply do not 
obey causal laws. In fact, given the non-ergodicity of real systems that demonstrate an open 
causality (Jørgensen et al., 2007), Lawson (1997; p. 282) argues that “the most fundamental 
feature of [neoclassical] economics is the generalized insistence on the ... unsustainable 
commitment to the ‘whenever this then that’ structure of laws.” The whole of ecosystem science 
is a ‘body of knowledge’ that should be up for constant re-evaluation and reconsideration. That 
is, ecosystem science “is walking upon a bog and can only say, this ground seems to hold for the 
present” (Peirce, 1898; p. 176). Hence, ecosystem science is not so much about the ‘truth’. Rather, 
it is about systematically generating a utilizable body of knowledge about ecosystems and their 
behaviour (Bradbury, 1999).  
 
Despite the fallibility of knowledge in ecosystems, it is still possible to detect some kind of 
macro-regularities that reflect ecosystem behaviour. However, these proposed macro-level 
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theories can no longer be the potential presence and detection of bounded generalizable macro-
regularities as presented in the previous chapter. Rather, it is argued here that these macro-
regularities can only ever be bounded demi-macro-regularities. Demi-macro-regularities reflect 
only somewhat resilient and enduring causal tendencies in time and space (Table 5.3) (Popper, 
1990). That is, demi-macro-regularities are partial causal tendencies, which “indicate the 
occasional, but less than universal, actualization of a … tendency, over the definite region of 
time-space” (Lawson, 1997; p. 224). Hence, unlike generalizable macro-regularities which hope 
and aim to capture the ubiquitous causal laws of ecosystem behaviour (i.e. whenever this then 
that), demi-macro-regularities hope and aim to capture predominant causal tendencies of 
ecosystem behaviour (i.e. whenever this then ‘usually’ that). However, given the presence of 
complexity and novelty, causal tendencies to which demi-macro-regularities attempt to capture 
are only resilient to a point, and therefore are vulnerable to change. 
 
Type of 
uncertainty 
Reasons for uncertainty Ergodicity  Type of explicit/ 
promoted macro-level 
theory 
Risk Complete information 
(stochasticity) 
Ergodicity & 
casual laws 
Generalizable macro-
regularity 
Ambiguity & 
ignorance 
Incomplete information Ergodicity & 
causal laws  
Towards  
generalizable  
macro-regularity 
Complexity Complexity & incomplete 
information 
Ergodicity & 
causal laws 
Bounded generalizable  
macro-regularity 
Genuine 
uncertainty 
Novelty, complexity & 
incomplete information 
Non-ergodicity & 
causal tendencies 
Bounded  
demi-macro-regularity 
Table 5.3: A representation of the various types of uncertainty discussed 
 in relation to knowledge. 
 
5.2.1 Complex Logic & Genuine Economic Efficiency 
The success of a theory depends on its usefulness, but given the fallibility of knowledge it 
remains a ‘hypothesis’ and nothing more. The mind of a resource co-manager creates (i.e. 
abduction) and uses (i.e. induction) theories in order to make sense of the ecosystem, allowing 
them the potential to use resources efficiently. But because ecosystems through novelty can 
potentially develop new ‘rules of the game’, they will remain forever problematic and full of 
surprises. Hence, there is a need to develop theories ad infinitum (Allen & Strathern, 2005). For 
this reason, no matter how confident resource co-managers are of their promoted theories or 
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theories-in-use, they will still at some point be an inadequate representation for explaining 
future phenomena. Therefore, the adaptation towards a particular set of theories and the 
habituation of beliefs is an inappropriate course of action.  
 
Rigid mental models generated by past success forming habits and a settling of theories-in-use 
are unlikely to function effectively, when the inevitable unexpected outcome occurs because the 
neural pathways become heavily weighted and locked-in to a certain way of automated 
behaviour (Beinhocker, 2006). This rigidity may exist even when surprise is felt and disrupts the 
mental model temporarily through a psychological shock, as the novel hypotheses generated by 
abductive logic are unlikely to be believed sufficiently in order to act rationally on them. In fact, 
the use of detailed, but rigid mental models may result in inferior courses of action to the 
deliberate use of heuristic rules (Winter, 1971). However, instead of reverting back to heuristic 
rules, it is maintained here that resource co-managers must avoid a reactionary mindset and the 
excessive fixing of beliefs (Seastedt et al., 2008). That is, resource co-managers must avoid 
excessive belief in their theories, so that theories of ecosystem behaviour are considered demi-
macro-regularities and not generalizable macro-regularities.  
 
Given the non-ergodicity of ecosystems, precaution is necessary to avoid habituation and the 
adaptation to a constructed theory despite its past success. Hence, resource co-managers should 
ensure that their mental models remain sufficiently flexible, where they continue to have “all the 
sincerity and simple-mindedness of the child’s vision, with all the plasticity of the child’s mental 
habits” (Peirce, 1898; p. 192). That is, resource co-managers should focus on the adaptability of 
their mental models (Olsson et al., 2004).   
 
In having a flexible mental model, resource co-managers will continue to have the opportunity 
to unlearn or adjust theories-in-use more easily and be able to readily take up alternative 
theories when beliefs no longer are effective (Hedburg, 1981). Thus, what is needed is a 
combination of adaptive learning and ‘adaptable’ learning. It is with adaptive learning that 
beliefs can be formed in order for resource co-managers to act. It is with adaptable learning that 
resource co-managers have the opportunity to adapt beliefs to alternative theories. It is with 
 158
adaptable learning then, that it is possible to contemplate the sustained functioning of 
ecosystems and socio-economic systems despite the non-ergodicity of ecosystems. Indeed, a 
focus on mental model flexibility lessens the likelihood of applying a completely inadequate 
theory to an ecosystem, which may result in ecological and economic catastrophe. For example, 
greater flexibility in the mental models of local fishermen and scientists from government 
agencies in the northern cod fishery case of Newfoundland (Section 5.0), would provide 
opportunities to properly consider the need to adjust, as well as, the ability to adjust the moment 
that ecological data was found to be counter to expectations.  
 
Despite the need for adaptability of theories-in-use, it has been understood previously that 
human agents naturally seek coherence, the formation of habits and preservation of beliefs. This 
is because when human agents do engage in non-habituated behaviour, even if only 
momentarily, negative emotions of doubt and anxiety ensue (Giddens, 1984). Thus, the natural 
inclination of human agents is to mitigate this discomfort and return to a state of comfort found 
where theories readily cohere, so that beliefs can become settled. It appears that a primary 
reason for human agents to go about thinking, whether by abduction or otherwise, is to explore 
means to ‘remove’ doubt and return to a habitual state where one can go about action without 
thinking (de Bono, 1998; Bromley, 2006). Therefore, one can surmise that “human [agents] like 
order most of the time, their appetite for chaos and uncertainty is distinctively limited” 
(Jefferson, 1983; p. 136). But, to achieve mental model flexibility requires resource co-managers 
to think and “battle against this natural law of growth [or belief formation]” (Peirce, 1898; p. 
192).  
 
In order to prevail over the habituation and continue thinking, efforts should be made to 
intentionally improve mental model flexibility. To achieve this end, we need a logic that works 
with novelty, rather than against it, like the logic of induction, which seeks generalizations. 
Hence, it is reasoned that resource co-managers should affirm chaos and uncertainty through 
genuinely embracing abductive logic in a prescriptive sense. It is with abduction through its 
ability to impose the instability of positive feedback and difference can bring about disruption 
and an unsettling in the minds of resource co-managers. That is, when abduction is genuinely 
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embraced, resource co-managers can avoid conforming, so that they can remain open-minded 
and not habituated (Bromley, 2006). One might say that by genuinely embracing abductive logic 
it might be possible to ‘pull’ the mind away from generalizable macro-regularities, so that demi-
macro-regularities can instead be appropriately inferred. These sentiments are consistent with 
those of the philosopher Nietzsche, which he termed: 
“The combat that wills to maintain itself. This was the unintelligible and authentic depth out 
of which Nietzsche wanted to establish a new cohesion, beyond the [human] agent, between 
body [i.e. habit] and chaos – a state of tension between the fortuitous cohesion of the [human] 
agent and the incoherence of chaos” (Klossowski, 1997; p. 50).  
 
In potentially circumventing the natural inclinations of resource co-managers towards habit-
taking by them genuinely embracing abduction, it is hypothesized that a complex logic (or 
complex epistemology) can be established. This complex logic lies at the edge of chaos between 
the forces of order generated by the repetition (or periodic macro-state) of inductive logic and 
the forces of disorder generated by the difference (or chaotic macro-state) of abductive logic 
(Figure 5.3). If this complex logic occurs, it would, given the properties of complexity (Section 
2.2), allow sufficient structural integrity in the mind to permit one to act rationally on their 
beliefs, while allowing one the opportunity for flexibility, so as to be ready to adapt to change.    
C
H
A
O
T
IC
 
M
A
C
R
O
-S
T
A
T
E
P
ER
IO
D
IC
 M
A
C
R
O
-S
T
A
T
E
N
E
O
C
L
A
SSIC
A
L E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
S
PO
ST
-C
LA
SSIC
A
L
 E
C
O
N
O
M
IC
S
D
E
D
U
C
TIV
E PR
O
C
E
SS O
F R
E
SE
A
R
C
H
A
B
D
U
C
TIV
E PR
O
C
E
SS O
F R
E
SE
A
R
C
H
P
O
IN
T 
M
A
C
R
O
-S
T
A
T
E
 
Figure 5.3: A summary of the various modes of logic. The juxtaposition between habit and 
abduction is hypothesized to form a complex logic. Note that p represents a probability 
coefficient and ρ represents a possibility coefficient.   
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The complex logic that is envisaged suggests that an ecological rationality is revealed, as there 
appears to be a ‘match’ between the mental models of resource co-managers and the ecosystem 
managed, in the sense that knowledge of ecosystem behaviour can now be rational relative to 
the behaviour of the ecosystem managed as a complex and adaptive system. This depiction of an 
ecological rationality established extends that defined by Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), who 
recognized the importance of an adaptive rationality, but not a rationality for adapting to 
change. Hence, it is expert intuition that provides a genuine adaptive rationality that allows 
resource co-managers the potential to detect macro-regularities in complex systems, while it is 
the systematic application of abduction that can bring about an ecological rationality, able to 
also adapt to change. It is when resource co-managers genuinely embrace abduction that their 
mental models can become complex adaptive systems. This is important because “we find ... 
that we need to build a model complex adaptive system in order to model a complex adaptive 
system” (Bradbury, 2002; p. 54). 
 
Resource co-managers that embrace abduction can bring about within their mental models, a 
dynamic balance between adaptation and adaptability analogous to Holling’s adaptive cycle 
metaphor (Figure 2.13). Thus, the r-to-K forward stage represents the natural law of growth and 
belief formation through perceptive repetition that works by inductive logic, while Ω-to-α back 
stage represents the disorganization and creative conjecture by abductive logic. Accordingly, 
just as there is a need to preserve the integrity of the adaptive cycle in ecosystems (Section 2.2.4); 
the same should also be said for the mental models of resource co-managers. That is, there is a 
need to prevent the settling of belief and ensure that a continuous process of forming and 
reforming of the beliefs of resource co-managers occurs. Thus, when considering multiple 
groups where each group represents an adaptive cycle, it becomes possible to model a panarchy. 
The use of metaphor should not be of concern, as “metaphor is essential to economic thinking, 
even to economic thinking of the most formal kind” (McCloskey, 1983; p. 507).  
 
Now, if this continuous process is maintained, a dynamic balance between the ‘exploitation’ of 
utility through adaptation and the ‘exploration’ for flexibility through adaptability might be 
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found (Nooteboom, 1999; Potts, 2000; Ulanowicz, 2002). It is this dynamic balance that 
represents an economic efficiency of the post-classical kind - a genuine economic efficiency - 
where the potential for attaining sustainable pathways appears possible. 
 
5.2.2 Potential Surprise & Possibility  
It has been argued that in order to maintain a flexible mental model, that abduction should be 
genuinely embraced. But, here lies an immediate difficulty, as abductive logic is an a posteriori 
mode of logic. It reasons from evidence to explanation, so that it is only stimulated through a 
surprise from an unexpected outcome occurring. Hence, abduction would appear to be an 
entirely reactionary logic. However, it is proposed that it is possible to overcome this problem. 
This is because the gap that is formed between the acquired knowledge of one resource co-
manager and the future outcomes generated by another resource co-manager is sufficient to 
stimulate a surprise, albeit a potential surprise (Senge, 1990). A potential surprise amounts to 
“the surprise we should feel if the given thing did happen” (Shackle, 1961; p. 68). While a 
potential surprise does not provide the same degree of psychological shock as an actual 
surprise, so that it is more consistent with ‘secondary’ emotions (Section 4.1.1), it is still capable 
of generating abductive inferences (Shackle, 1983; Breiter et al., 2001; Tom et al., 2007). But, 
before abductive logic through potential surprises is discussed, which are termed here abductive 
exercises, a discussion on potential surprise itself is needed.  
 
It was realized by the economist Shackle (1961) that if we can envisage how surprised we would 
be about the occurrence of a future outcome, then we are in a position to develop a potential 
surprise, which provides a non-probabilistic understanding of future outcomes. This is because 
with potential surprise it is maintained that a relationship exists between the degree of disbelief 
as doubt and the degree of potential surprise (Shackle, 1961). Hence, potential surprise reflects 
the degree of ‘possibility’ of that outcome becoming part of a set of plausible outcomes. Potential 
surprise then expresses “perfect plausibility or perfect credibility or perfect possibility without 
any implication or suggestion of perfect certainty” (Shackle, 1979; p. 33).  
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Perfect possibility means that a resource co-manager would be completely unsurprised if the 
future outcome occurred as they are unable to conceive of any obstacle that prevents the 
occurrence of that future outcome from occurring. That is, perfect possibility indicates that there 
is no disbelief. Hence, perfect possibility is not a matter of gathering a sufficient amount of 
empirical evidence. Rather, it is a matter of the existence of an unobstructed path to its 
occurrence (Earl, 1986). Perfect impossibility then, is where there is complete disbelief, as a 
resource co-manager would be utterly astonished if the future outcome occurred. This is because 
they can conceive an insurmountable obstacle or obstacles that come to mind that prevent the 
occurrence of that future outcome from occurring. Thus, potential surprise is bounded and has 
an upper limit of utter astonishment (Shackle, 1961).  
 
The bounding of potential surprise allows potential surprise, as a measure of degree of disbelief, 
to be transformed from a category to a variable. This transformation has immediate appeal, as it 
becomes feasible to determine the weighted possibility of future outcomes. Hence, the 
uncertainty of future outcomes, like probability, can be represented on a zero-to-one scale, 
where a zero potential surprise value represents perfect possibility. In this way, potential 
surprise becomes a non-probabilistic, but quantifiable, measure of uncertainty, which is 
necessary given the presence of genuine uncertainty precludes the appropriate use of a 
probability calculus. Therefore, given a potential surprise function can be represented on a zero-
to-one scale as weighted possibility, it represents an account of genuine uncertainty, which 
appears very useful for the economic evaluation of ecosystems. This has been recognized 
previously by Young (2001), who employed potential surprise for an economic evaluation of an 
‘ecosystem’. In Chapter 7, potential surprise will be used in an empirical case study. In doing so, 
this study will build on the work of Young (2001) and will develop a genuinely post-classical 
economic evaluation. The specific potential surprise method is also discussed in detail then.  
 
Despite the usefulness of transforming potential surprise on to a zero-to-one scale, various 
economists have critiqued potential surprise and have attempted to transform it into a 
probability function (e.g. Edwards, 1961; Ford, 1987). Nevertheless, while potential surprise can 
be located on a zero-to-one scale, there is no immediate relationship with probability. In fact, 
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potential surprise contrasts with probability, as with probability, all outcomes are treated on an 
equal level despite the likelihood of each outcome not necessarily being considered of an equal 
status. This is important as potential surprise being an account of possibility theory avoids the 
problems of additivity, distribution and closure (Shackle, 1972; Young, 2001). Indeed, potential 
surprise is a genuinely open-ended concept. It allows outcomes not originally conceived to be 
incorporated without them altering the potential surprise values of outcomes already 
considered (Earl, 1986). Hence, the sum of potential surprise values need not equal unity. For 
this reason, it makes little sense to multiply utility with its associated potential surprise value.  
 
5.2.3 Abductive Exercises & Imagination  
Potential surprise not only can be used as a measure of disbelief represented as weighted 
possibility for economic evaluations, but it can also be used to allows resource co-managers the 
promise of devising abductive exercises. Specifically, these ‘exercises’ allow the generation of 
novel hypotheses through juxtaposing the future outcomes established by one resource co-
manager with the potential surprise values of these future outcomes by another resource co-
manager. Hence, where a potential surprise value is given between, but not equal to zero and 
one, then the surprised resource co-manager is in a position to generate novel hypotheses to 
explain the possibility of this outcome actually occurring. These abductive exercises form the 
basis of a social learning where genuine dialogue, perspective taking and constructive 
interaction between resource co-managers can take place. Indeed, Wildemeersch (2007) defines 
genuine social learning as learning found in groups that dialogue over unexpected outcomes. 
For this reason, the use of abductive exercises is an important innovation for adaptive co-
management to bring about genuine social learning in a systematic way.  
 
The application of abductive logic to future outcomes does not generate explanations of actual 
unexpected outcomes as ex-post-facto hypotheses. Rather, a potential surprise generates future 
explanations as ex-ante-futuro hypotheses. The heightened uncertainty leading to the generation 
of novel hypotheses, as ex-ante-futuro hypotheses should not be of scientific concern. After all, 
the only logical difference when applying abduction to future unexpected outcomes, as opposed 
to actual unexpected outcomes, is that future outcomes generate a potential surprise, which 
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increases the uncertainty in the premises of the inference. This is because there is now 
uncertainty present in the outcome that activates the feelings of ‘surprise’. Moreover, if future 
outcomes are considered possible (i.e. through a potential surprise value of less than one) and 
the novel hypotheses they generate are considered plausible, what difference is this from 
knowledge generated from actual outcomes? Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari (1994; p. 5) maintain 
“the job of philosophers is to make concepts in the plane of immanence.” Resource co-managers 
should be no different. They should propose novel hypotheses in the plane of possibility.  
 
By genuinely embracing abduction, resource co-managers should not just form ex-ante-futuro 
hypotheses, but systematically develop ex-post-facto hypotheses through continually exploring 
sensory data through ongoing monitoring where they juxtapose and contrast their expectations 
with local empirical realities (Section 4.2.6). In undertaking these procedures of abduction in a 
systematic way, resource co-managers can ‘create’ potentially difficult, unmanageable and 
disruptive hypotheses and concepts, which might not easily cohere with their present beliefs. 
Thus, the minds of resource co-managers can become contrite ‘fallibilists’ and genuine scientists, 
as they are forced to ‘think’, question and self-critique their beliefs held with novel, yet plausible 
explanatory hypotheses (Yu, 1994; Colebrook, 2002). Hence, these disruptive hypotheses can 
potentially create doubt, increase experimentation of thought, prevent beliefs from settling 
down and raise awareness to alternative theories and different ways of thinking. It is these 
disruptive hypotheses that enable the mental models of resource co-managers to remain flexible. 
It is these aspects that highlight the importance of systematically applying abductive logic for 
ecosystem management, and in particular adaptive co-management.  
 
The idea that mental models should be disrupted and altered has been considered a key task of 
scenario analysis, especially where it is seen as a suitable method for analysing systems where 
genuine uncertainty is present (Chermack, 2007). However, despite this task of scenario analysis, 
it is taxing to envisage how it can achieve such disruptions, when the construction of scenarios 
are based in intuitive mental simulations as quasi-deductions established from theories-in-use as 
past repetitive knowledge governed by inductive logic.  
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Scenario analysis appears to have an in-built conservatism, which results in future outcomes 
being developed as projections from the past (Slaughter, 1998; Dupuy, 2004). For this reason, 
scenario practitioners, such as Jefferson (1983) argue that for scenario analysis to be useful it 
must be creative. Hence, in recognition of the need to be creative, Loasby (1990) maintains that a 
‘scenario mentality’ is required, where the imagination and creative brainstorming are 
developed. Only then can constructed future qualitative narratives transcend beyond mere 
‘reasonable’ expectations and the probabilistic accounts of the past (Section 4.2.7). Accordingly, it 
is with the imagination, a kind of pseudo-deduction, that scenario analysts consider it possible 
to escape the repetitions of the past (Bromley, 2008). But, to make this imaginative process 
useful, and allow imagined future outcomes to break from the past knowledge, mental models 
need to be disrupted, so that connections between concepts can be formed and broken (Shackle, 
1979; Bronk, 2009). Thus, it would appear necessary that abduction is genuinely embraced, so 
that novel hypotheses can be systematically generated as ex-post-facto hypotheses and ex-ante-
futuro hypotheses. Accordingly, it is only when mental models are disrupted that the 
imagination can break away from past phenomena, so that it can construct future outcomes that 
appear to have no historical analogue. This understanding appears to be supported by others 
(Marshall, 1920; Bronk, 2009), including Shackle (1972) who considered the imagination a 
‘kaleidic’ process. Indeed, the philosopher Coleridge maintained the imagination is formed “out 
of the chaos of the elements or shattered fragments of the memory” (Richards, 2002; p. 122). It is 
with the systematic application of abduction that we can begin to consider the possibility of 
‘disrupting’ the memory and allowing for creative scenario construction. Hence, it is in this way 
that we can systematically capture Schumpeter’s (1954; 1964) conception of creative destruction.  
 
Despite that our imaginings are bounded, most imagined future outcomes will be artefacts of 
fantasy (Loasby, 2001a). Hence, imagined future outcomes when initially depicted are not 
possibilities, but only potentialities. For this reason, resource co-managers should employ a 
scientific imagination that prevents the detachment from an ecological reality (Shoemaker, 
2001). Indeed, a scientific imagination is “not that imagination that bodies forth, the forms of 
things unknown, but a docile imagination, quick to take Dame Nature’s hints” (Peirce, 1931-
1958; 2.148). Other researchers have also concurred with this assessment by claiming that a 
 166
protocol should be maintained when using imagination (Dupuy, 2004; Chermack, 2007). Such a 
protocol “expands the range of possibilities we can see, while keeping us from drifting into 
unbridled science fiction” (Shoemaker, 1995; p. 27). Specifically, this protocol is that the 
imagination should be guided by local empirical realities. In practical terms, this means that a 
scientific imagination is generated from those with expertise, who have access to historical 
narratives, adopted theories, network models, and the analysis of multi-agent simulations. 
 
5.2.4 Abductive Process of Research & Institutional Flexibility 
Whether theories are created from imagined future outcomes as ex-ante-futuro hypotheses or 
actual outcomes as ex-post-facto hypotheses, in order to act on this potential knowledge it is 
necessary to build sufficient belief in them. After all, it would be irrational to act on these weak 
hypotheses prior to obtaining sufficient belief in them regardless of the presence of non-
ergodicity, as there would be no way of knowing if they could provide any form of systematic 
work for generating utility. Hence, an important step when systematically applying abductive 
logic is to make hypotheses generated as explicit and transparent as possible. In making 
hypotheses transparent, it is possible to determine those explicit and proposed hypotheses, 
amongst potentially many, that are the most plausible for explaining the particular surprising 
phenomenon. Plausible novel hypotheses are those hypotheses that are inferences to the best 
explanation (Sections 4.2.6). Once plausible hypotheses are established, understanding about 
them can be developed through monitoring and experimentation (where appropriate). Hence, 
weak hypotheses generated by abduction can be amplified and in turn believed in allowing the 
potential to act unconventionally in accord with these hypotheses (Ansoff, 1979). It is in this 
sense that subtle signals of information generated from genuinely embracing abductive logic can 
be used. Accordingly, when abductive logic is developed in a prescriptive sense, knowledge of 
the past, the present and the future can be integrated together.   
 
In potentially developing belief in these alternative hypotheses through perceptive repetition 
that works, it is then possible that the minds of resource co-managers may feel doubt or anxiety 
in their beliefs sufficient enough to re-evaluate their knowledge held in their mental model. If 
much doubt is felt, it may reflect strong incoherence where alternative hypotheses appear to 
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contradict other theories believed. In this case, resource co-managers may abandon various 
beliefs. Alternatively, anxiety may ensue to reflect weak incoherence between beliefs (Thagard, 
2007). In this case, the mind in an effort to restore coherence will attempt to develop a theory to 
mitigate the anxiety that can account for both sets of beliefs. Thus, when abduction is genuinely 
embraced, incoherence between beliefs in time can be established which leads to the possibility 
of creative theory building. After all, “anxiety is the handmaiden of creativity” (Goleman et al., 
1992; p. 44). In such cases of incoherence, the mind might patch over such incoherence with a 
simple heuristic rule (Perkins et al., 1991). However, with a genuine attempt to explicate 
theories, it appears possible to prevent uncritical theory building.  
 
But, with this potentially new theory established, once again new disruptive hypotheses can be 
established through resource co-managers exploring and imagining novel outcomes. Hence, the 
process of hypothesis generation can continue. This is important for beliefs to not settle down, 
remain endogenous and avoid becoming habituated. After all, ecosystems will be forever 
problematic and full of surprises. Accordingly, it is important to carry out adaptive co-
management as “a continuous problem-solving process” (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; p. 65). Hence, 
an abductive process of research is proposed (Figure 5.4), which is argued here should be the 
basis of an adaptive co-management and of a post-classical economics. This novel research 
process extends previous methodological applications of abductive logic (e.g. Haig, 2005) by 
combining the knowledge development of inductive logic with knowledge creation of abductive 
logic achieved the prescriptive application of actual and potential surprises. In doing so, a 
continuous process can be established that allows for systematic adaptive and adaptable 
learning through forming and reforming belief (akin to the adaptive cycle). Hence, it is with the 
abductive process of research that the mental models of resource co-managers can resemble 
complex adaptive systems, which is necessary when modelling ecosystems as complex adaptive 
systems. That is, the “best models of complex adaptive systems, in the sense of increasing our 
understanding of them, will be other complex adaptive systems” (Bradbury, 2002; p. 62).  
 
It is foreseen that in time with numerous iterations of the research process that a complex logic 
can be formed where an ecological rationality can be established. In fact, if the abductive process 
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of research is undertaken over numerous iterations, it might begin to indicate the resilience of 
mental models over the long-term. For example, where resilience is found in promoted theories 
as bounded demi-macro-regularities and mental models would indicate greater certainty in the 
future. This would generate confidence and suggest to resource co-managers that adapting and 
exploiting present ecological conditions is appropriate and sustainable. However, where mental 
models are being repeatedly disrupted, then this would indicate the likelihood of much future 
uncertainty. This would generate doubt and suggest to resource co-managers that there is a 
need for less adaptation and an increased focus towards adaptability and exploration through 
an increased preparedness for change. Hence, the proposed abductive process of research is 
foreseen to provide ‘clues’ for resource co-managers on the appropriate dynamic balance 
between adaptation and adaptability. In using these clues resource co-managers have the ability 
to be less bemused and make less costly errors when evaluating and managing ecosystems. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: A representation of the proposed abductive process of research, where methods 
developed in Chapter 4 are integrated with the systematic application of abductive logic. Note 
the research process begins at the body of knowledge (i.e. all available knowledge, both 
implicit and explicit) and that the darker arrows depict knowledge of lesser disbelief.   
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The ability of resource co-managers to maintain a flexible mental model that varies between a 
focus on adaptation and adaptability depending on the resilience of their mental models allows 
institutions, to which they are connected as knowledge hubs (Section 4.1.3), valuable information 
to adapt to change. Significantly, the importance of flexible institutions has been previously 
recognized (Holling, 2001; Adger, 2003; Bromley, 2006). Indeed, North (1995, p. 26), states that 
“the key to continuing good economic performance is a flexible institutional matrix that will 
adjust in the context of … change.” Hence, through the use of the proposed abductive process of 
research, it appears that resource co-managers, as experts, can alter and disrupt institutions 
allowing human agents to receive signals which may allow them a better preparedness to cope 
with change and unexpected phenomena both at a cognitive and emotional level. This signalling 
may allow institutions avoid becoming socially habituated and instead ensure that they 
maintain their adaptive capacity. With the capacity to adapt, socio-economic systems can 
continue to function despite unexpected changes to ecological conditions (Adger & Vincent, 
2005; Plummer & Armitage, 2007a; Rammell et al., 2007). Accordingly, with a flexible 
institutional structure it is foreseen that socio-economic systems and ecosystems can co-develop 
in harmony, where it appears possible that genuine economic efficiencies can be sustained in the 
face of genuine uncertainties (Figure 5.5).  
 
 
Figure 5.5: The economic trade-off between adaptation and adaptability of institutions depicts 
a genuine economic efficiency. 
 
It is when abduction is genuinely embraced through the proposed abductive process of research 
that the costly boom-and-bust cycles resultant from institutional rigidity can be avoided. In 
avoiding institutional rigidity, socio-economic systems can maintain sustainable pathways and 
avoid economic collapses like that found with the coastal communities of Newfoundland when 
the northern cod fishery collapsed. It is through the use of the proposed abductive process of 
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research that resource co-managers could have altered and broadened institutional structures by 
incorporating plausible abducted hypotheses (e.g. the problem of technology allowing fishermen 
to catch greater numbers of fish) into the body of knowledge before the collapse (Section 5.0). In 
doing so, the socio-economic systems would have become prepared for change, including the 
possibility of ecological collapse and the transition of the marine ecosystem to a system state 
dominated by crab and shrimp species.      
 
5.2.5 Constructive Co-Management & Ecological Engineering  
Given the abductive process of research would appear to create beliefs and knowledge that 
would not be apparent otherwise, it suggests that resource co-managers have the opportunity to 
act unconventionally, yet still rationally. Indeed, “eventually, in a fruitful combination with past 
memories, imagination and reasoning, feelings [and intuition] lead to the emergence of foresight 
and the possibility of creating novel, non-stereotypical responses” (Damasio, 2003; p. 80). With 
the capacity to act unconventionally, yet nevertheless rationally, it is proposed that purposeful 
intention and feed forward can be emphasized for ecosystem management. Hence, resource co-
managers have the opportunity to construct and transform ecosystems. While complexity led 
resource co-managers to explore rather than formally predict state space, it is with the pervasive 
presence of genuine uncertainty resultant from the novelty in ecosystems, that creative 
processes can in every respect be legitimized and not negated. Therefore, it appears reasonable 
to conclude that ecosystem management can be about applying appropriate knowledge about 
ecosystem behaviour, so as to ‘transform’ them in an ecologically rational manner. It is this 
realization that brings into being the novel ecosystem management approach termed here 
constructive co-management.  
 
Wherever constructive co-management is employed, it should recognize that resource co-
managers can actively transform ecosystems. It is in this sense that human agents can go beyond 
co-development with ecosystems and realize the possibility of co-construction. This co-
construction is possible because while it is realized that ecosystems did not fall like ‘manna from 
heaven’, and were instead constructed through time-consuming ecological and evolutionary 
processes, the same cannot be said of technology. Indeed, the intentional and creative actions of 
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resource co-managers differ from this construction by nature, as technology and engineering are 
wholly a human endeavour (Kauffman, 2000). It is with technology and engineering that we as 
human agents can, in part, differentiate ourselves from other species (Daker, 2002). Hence, 
resource co-managers through ecological engineering can intentionally alter the interactions of 
species in novel ways that generate novel system states never occurred previously (Odum & 
Odum, 2003; Hobbs et al., 2006). Therefore, with the potential emergence of novel system states 
constructed by ecological engineering, it appears possible that these novel system states can 
increase the production of ecosystem services and in turn, improve ecosystem health 
(McDonough & Braungart, 2002; Walker et al., 2004).  
 
It is important to recognize that the co-construction of ecosystems is a legitimate means for the 
improvement of ecosystem health. This is because ecosystem health is not related to the criterion 
of naturalness, or that which has already occurred in the past (Section 2.2.5). There appears no 
available evidence that demonstrates that engineered ecosystems cannot be as healthy, if not 
healthier than natural or pristine ecosystems (Sagoff, 2005). We must not fall into the belief that 
natural ecosystems must be healthier than novel system states that are ecologically engineered. 
After all, the only criterion of ecosystem health stated here, other than to direct ecosystems 
towards preferable system states is the preservation of the integrity of the adaptive cycle. The 
preservation of the adaptive cycle means that engineered ecosystems should not need continued 
intervention by management action to function. Hence, many present engineered ecosystems, 
such as found in modern agriculture, that do not preserve the integrity of the adaptive cycle, are 
not compatible with constructive co-management. That said, resource co-managers employing 
constructive co-management should not be eager to transform ‘natural’ ecosystems. While it is 
true that these systems are not necessarily healthier than engineered systems, they do provide 
examples of a ‘base-datum of normality’ that is self-sustaining (Leopold, 1941).  
 
Given the legitimacy of direct ecological engineering to improve the health of ecosystems, it is 
not human economic activity exacerbated by modern technology per se that needs to be 
prevented. Rather, what is important is the way we conceptualize and interact with ecosystems 
that matters. Hence, when undertaking ecosystem management what is important is to find a 
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methodology that is fitting with ecosystems, as complex adaptive systems. It has been argued 
here that the abductive process of research engenders such a fit through the formation of an 
ecological rationality. Hence, with the abductive process of research, resource co-managers are 
able to develop an ‘intimate’ knowledge of the ecosystem managed, where human economic 
activity can be appropriately applied to the local context. For example, an ecosystem was 
recently developed, not through restoration, but through incorporating a locally appropriate, 
but creative seed mix to a degraded native grassland in Colorado. With the new non-native 
plants established, they have allowed the ecosystem to thrive producing a novel grassland 
ecosystem, which has allowed many native species to thrive, while producing an ecosystem 
with improved adaptive capacity and many ecological functions not previously available. 
Accordingly, this novel system state now supplies various ecosystem services, including 
improved water purification for neighbouring streams (Cherwin et al., 2009).  
 
5.2.6 Conclusion  
In science, there is a general belief that it is theoretically possible for the boundary conditions of 
a system to be pre-stated. However, it is recognized that where complex adaptive systems are 
concerned, this is not possible given their non-ergodicity resultant from their complexity and 
novelty. Ecosystems as complex adaptive systems are non-ergodic with no recognizable nexus 
that always exists, that links the past, the present and the future. Thus, precaution is necessary 
to avoid habituation and the fixing of belief. Hence, resource co-managers should ensure that 
their mental models remain flexible. In order to bring about the need for the adaptability of 
mental models held, it has been argued that resource co-managers should genuinely embrace 
abductive logic. With the systematic application of abduction, a novel methodological approach 
is proposed, termed here the abductive process of research. It is this research process that makes 
creative conjecturing of abductive logic genuinely methodological rather than amethodological. 
Moreover, it is this research process that grounds the ‘knowledge’ of ecosystem behaviour and 
‘choice’ of management action for ecosystem management around Shacklean potential surprise 
and not probability. This is essential when recognizing that ecosystems as complex adaptive 
systems are not systems that can be controlled and predicted, but rather systems that are forever 
problematic and full of surprises.  
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This novel methodological approach, which systematizes and integrates informed intuition and 
abduction allowing for the expertise of resource co-managers to be extended, is considered a 
significant contribution for ecosystem management and the development of a post-classical 
economics. Yet, without their systematization they can all too easily be neglected and ignored, 
leading to ecosystems being put on to unsustainable pathways. This is because ecosystems will 
not be treated as complex, emergent, adaptive and novel phenomena. This is the problem with 
the deductive process of research that has been argued previously to underpin neoclassical 
economic theory and adaptive management. However, through the proposed abductive process 
of research, a complex logic and an ecological rationality is said to be found, where resource co-
managers can ‘think’ and ‘act’ in a manner that is consistent with our conceptualization of 
ecosystems as complex adaptive systems. For this reason, the proposed abductive process of 
research is cautiously put forward as the elusive ‘science’ of sustainability, as it allows the mind 
of resource co-managers and science itself to be modelled as a complex adaptive system.     
 
Over the last three chapters the relationship between ecosystem management and the 
methodology of economic theory has been critiqued and synthesized. In doing so, the same 
progression of concepts as established in Chapter 2, when reviewing and critiquing ecological 
theory has also been observed in the methodology of economic theory. This progression of 
concepts has brought about discussions on deduction, induction and abduction, which has led 
to the critique of the deductive process of research and the development of the proposed 
abductive process of research. It is this methodological approach that is considered appropriate 
for managing ecosystems, given their complexity and novelty. This need for the use of this 
methodology is now more than ever, as unwanted ecological change has been exacerbated by 
‘detached’ (non-intimate) human economic activity. But, at this point this proposed research 
process is entirely a theoretical conception. It is with its practical implementation that a better 
assessment of its capacities can be indicated. Accordingly, in the next chapter the proposed 
abductive process of research is practically applied by way of an empirical case study.  
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Chapter 6: The Knowledge of 
Te Waihora 
 
 
 
 
 
Te Rūnanga O Ngāi Tahu 
 
6.0 Introduction 
Abductive logic needs to be genuinely embraced to disrupt the mental models of resource co-
managers. This disruption is necessary to bring about mental model flexibility, given the 
realization that ecosystems as complex adaptive systems are non-ergodic and full of surprises. 
Hence, in recognizing the importance of abduction, the abductive process of research was 
proposed. This novel research process systematically integrates the methods of an informed 
intuition developed in Chapter 4 with the systematic application of abduction developed in 
Chapter 5. In doing so, it is believed that knowledge can capture the complex and adaptive 
behaviour of ecosystems. This system behaviour can be represented as a promoted theory or 
bounded demi-macro-regularity, which are limited representations of system behaviour (Section 
5.2).   
 
The proposed abductive process of research integrates a systematic application of various 
methods, including fuzzy cognitive mapping (Section 4.2.3). Özesmi (1999) has previously 
employed fuzzy cognitive mapping successfully for the purposes of forming a shared common 
knowledge amongst a number of participants when investigating the Kizilirmak Delta wetland 
ecosystem in Turkey. However, this proposed research process goes beyond the mapping and 
integration of maps. Indeed, the proposed methodology attempts to construct theories of system 
behaviour and scenarios that can emerge from the analysis of the fuzzy cognitive maps (Warren, 
1995). Furthermore, the proposed abductive process of research attempts to disrupt the mental 
models through plausible hypotheses that are generated through the systematic application of 
abduction. This potential for disruption is significant, as a key task of scenario analysis is to alter 
mental models (Chermack, 2007). Hence, the proposed abductive process of research is seen as a 
Hoki mai koe ki te pä Orariki e 
Tü ana ki te taha o te kahu tai pöuri 
O Te Waihora moana 
E rere ana ki a tätou e 
 
Let us return to the village of Orariki 
That stands beside the darkened waters 
of Te Waihora 
That flows to us all 
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development for scenario analysis, while building upon the work of Özesmi which explored 
fuzzy cognitive mapping in ecosystem management.  
 
In this chapter the proposed abductive process of research is applied for the purposes of 
investigating the ‘degraded’ ecosystem called Lake Ellesmere. This lake is known to the local 
indigenous Māori, as Te Waihora, meaning ‘spreading water’. Hence, an original empirical case 
study of the proposed abductive process of research is performed. In trialling this novel 
methodology, it is hoped that it will convey its usefulness to actual resource (co-)managers and 
scientists alike, while providing insights for the sustainable management of Te Waihora. In 
order to assist in the repeatability of this methodological approach, Figure 6.1 below indicates 
the sequence of steps used.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1: A representation of the abductive process of research taken from Figure 5.4. For the 
purposes of referral, both the section where each method has been developed in previous 
chapters and the section where the analysis is performed in this chapter are indicated.   
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6.1 Te Waihora & Lake Management 
Te Waihora while named a lake is better described in its present geomorphological state, as a 
coastal lagoon (Hemmingsen, 1997). This is because Te Waihora is separated from the Pacific 
Ocean by a beach barrier called Kaitorete Spit (Figure 6.2), which is a long narrow strip of land 
and loose shingle (Kirk, 1994). However, intermittently the shingle fraction of Kaitorete Spit is 
breached by the sea (regardless of management action), making Te Waihora brackish in nature 
(Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). Importantly, because the lake is sometimes 
open to the sea, marine species are able to enter and contribute to the biodiversity of the 
ecosystem (Davies et al., 1996).  
 
 
Figure 6.2: The coastal side of the beach barrier, Kaitorete Spit. 
 
Te Waihora is located between two major land forms, the Canterbury Plains and Banks 
Peninsula. Once the lake spread over a vast amount of the Plains with a mean sea level (asl) of 
up to four metres (Reid & Holmes, 1996). However, today the area of Te Waihora is reduced 
markedly through the purposeful drainage of lake water and lake margins, and its subsequent 
conversion to farm land. Nonetheless, Te Waihora, while it is a shallow lake with a mean depth 
of around one metre and a maximum depth of around two metres, remains to this day a large 
lake by area, covering approximately 20,000 hectares (of lake water). This makes Te Waihora the 
fifth largest lake, by area, in New Zealand.  
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The catchment area of Te Waihora is some 276,000 hectares of the Canterbury Plains and Banks 
Peninsula, within which over 40 catchment tributaries feed the lake ecosystem with inflowing 
freshwater (Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). Specifically, the catchment area 
covers four hydrological regions: the Upper Catchment consisting of the headwaters of the 
Selwyn River; the central Canterbury Plains; the Lower Catchment with heavy soils around the 
lake drained in part by the Halswell River; and parts of Banks Peninsula drained predominantly 
by the Kaituna River (Gough & Ward, 1996).  
 
Like many, if not all, ecosystems, Te Waihora is not a homogeneous system of shallow brackish 
water throughout, but rather a heterogeneous system that contains many varied and different 
modular sub-systems that make up the larger system complex. Certainly, while Te Waihora is 
predominantly an environment of shallow brackish water, there are areas of vegetation along 
the lake margin that are more typical of freshwater wetlands. Wetlands are a type of ecosystem 
that lie between terrestrial and aquatic boundaries, and in the case of Te Waihora, these 
wetlands appear to function independently of the main body of open water (Figure 6.3). 
Significantly, the vegetation around these wetland areas provides a highly diverse range of 
habitat for a myriad of species (Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). In fact, 
Partridge et al. (1999) highlighted 30 vegetation types, which presently support more than 160 
native and exotic bird species, making Te Waihora an ecosystem of outstanding regional and 
national ecological importance (O’Donnell, 1985; Boffa Miskell Limited & Lucas Associates, 
1993; Department of Conservation, 2000). Yet, in spite of this amazing biodiversity, Te Waihora, 
somewhat surprisingly, remains one of New Zealand’s most under appreciated environmental 
resources (Davies et al., 1994).  
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Figure 6.3: A wetland habitat found along the  
lake margin of Te Waihora.  
 
Under the Ngāi Tahu Claims Settlement Act 1998, the previous crown ownership of the Te 
Waihora lake bed was bequeathed to the Māori tribe Te Rūnanga O Ngāi Tahu. Thus, Ngāi Tahu 
holds lake bed ownership and customary tribal authority or rangatiratanga over lake 
management, which they do in joint agreement with the Department of Conservation under the 
Joint Management Plan 2005 (Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). Specifically, 
according to the plan the Department of Conservation is responsible in accordance with the 
Conservation Act 1987 for the lake margin management of the many endemic species and 
protected wetland habitats. The management role of Ngāi Tahu is to provide kaitiaki or 
guardianship of the lake ecosystem, while recognizing that all things are connected in accord 
with the concept of whakapapa, which lies at the core of Māori knowledge. In its most basic 
meaning, whakapapa is a sense of connectedness between nature, humans and spirit, and acts as 
an integral part for sustainable ecosystem management (Tau et al., 1999). In this sense, 
whakapapa appears equivalent to the ecological rationality that is argued to be established 
when abduction is genuinely embraced, in that a connection is found between the imagined 
possible and the actual. Indeed, whakapapa,  
“is the principle from which order and chaos may be understood. It places order upon space 
and time. It is the binding agent between opposite fields and connects the living with the 
dead, atua with humankind, and the intangible with the tangible” (Tau, 1999; p. 138).  
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In order to facilitate their guardianship responsibilities, Ngāi Tahu also work with other 
agencies besides the Department of Conservation in the ongoing management of Te Waihora. 
Indeed, there is a multiplicity of agencies involved in lake management. This signifies that for 
successful ecosystem management of Te Waihora there is a need for collaboration amongst the 
various agencies that manage and govern this lake ecosystem. To represent the complexity of 
this lake ecosystem, the need for collaboration has been formally recognized, in accord with a 
‘mountains to sea’ or ki uta ki tai management approach (Department of Conservation & Ngāi 
Tahu, 2005). It is the sense of connectedness found with whakapapa that forms the basis for 
managing ecosystems in a collaborative manner, “as it emphasises the links to others rather than 
the individuality of members of a group” (Gibbs, 1996; p. 7). In fact, the lake’s complexity and 
the need for collaboration amongst a multiplicity of agencies, led Gough and Ward (1996) to 
conclude that Te Waihora should be managed by a soft systems methodological approach, 
which is in keeping with the principles of adaptive co-management.   
  
The other agencies include the North Canterbury Fish and Game Council, which ensures that 
the monitoring and control of sports fish (e.g. brown trout) and game resources (e.g. mallard 
duck) are achieved. In addition to recreational fishing, commercial fishing of long and short-
finned eel occurs on the lake, and to make sure that such fishing is sustainable and of good 
practice, the Ministry of Fisheries controls this fishing through a set annual quota system. The 
regional and local authorities of Environment Canterbury, Selwyn District Council and the 
Christchurch City Council are also responsible for the management (and land use) of the lake 
ecosystem.  
 
In particular, Environment Canterbury is responsible for monitoring of lake water quality and 
the deliberate managerial control of lake levels by means of artificially opening the lake to the 
sea by bulldozers and dredges through the shingle fraction of Kaitorete Spit. This artificial lake 
opening remains today the foremost management action for the lake and has been imposed 
regularly throughout the past century. The rationale for the lake opening is primarily to ensure 
that lake waters do not inundate surrounding agricultural land (Kirk, 1994; Gough & Ward, 
1996). However, since the introduction of the National Water Conservation Order (NWCO) in 
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1990, ecological concerns have been integrated in lake level management, in order to conserve 
the many wetland habitats found along the lake’s margin (Glennie & Taylor, 1996).  
 
6.1.1 Eutrophication & Lake State 
The pressures of agricultural practices have not only decreased the size of Te Waihora, as well as 
the extensiveness of the lake margin wetland habitats, but such practices have also resulted in 
the decline of lake water quality through the ongoing build up of nutrients (i.e. phosphorus and 
nitrogen) and sediment, which flow into the lake via catchment tributaries. In fact, this 
accelerated ecological change has been so marked that the lake is now not only very shallow, but 
while still highly productive, it is nevertheless severely nutrient-rich or hyper-eutrophic (Gough 
& Ward, 1996; Ward et al., 1996). These processes of eutrophication and sedimentation, caused 
by the (excess) accumulation of nutrient and sediment inputs, respectively, are an 
acknowledged problem for the management and health of many lakes (Schindler, 1977; 
Carpenter et al., 1999b). This is because, surprisingly, it is the deeper and less productive 
nutrient-poor (or oligotrophic) lakes that generally provide more value or ecosystem services to 
human agents (Carpenter & Cottingham, 1997; Wilson & Carpenter, 1999).  
 
The typical response of shallow lakes, like that of Te Waihora, is one of two different plant-
abundant system states. Shallow lakes are either dominated by an abundance of submerged 
macrophytic plants (i.e. weedbeds) and a community of piscivorous fish or they are dominated 
by an abundance of phytoplankton (i.e. algae) and a community of planktivorous and 
benthivorous fish (Scheffer et al., 1993; Scheffer, 1997; Van Nes et al., 2002). Where shallow lakes 
are dominated by phytoplankton, the lake is said to be in a turbid (i.e. murky) water state, where 
sediment is suspended in the water column. Turbid water states are generally considered to be 
in a poor state of health. Where the lake is dominated by submerged macrophytic plants, it is 
said to be in a clear water state. These clear water states have ‘qualities’ or ecosystem services 
supplied not dissimilar to that of an oligotrophic lake. This is because, unlike phytoplankton, the 
submerged macrophytic plants, amongst other things, enhance the clarity of the lake water, as 
they stabilize and trap lake sediments preventing wave-induced sediment disturbance and the 
discolouration of the water column resultant from suspended sediment (Scheffer et al., 1993). 
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The improved lake water clarity with a clear water state is significant, as the improved 
perception of water quality is likely to increase the number of ecosystem services perceived to be 
supplied by the lake for many user groups (Hayward & Ward, 2009).  
 
Submerged macrophytic plants once used to be prevalent in the lake waters of Te Waihora. 
However, with the ongoing eutrophication of its lake waters and with the environmental shock 
of the Wahine storm in 1968, the lake transitioned from a (partially) clear water state into its 
present turbid water state (Figure 6.4) (Sagar et al., 2004). Nevertheless, Te Waihora, despite its 
turbidity, differs from other turbid water states as it still supports a diverse range of species and 
the dominant algae found in the lake are chlorophyta or green algae, rather than cyanophyta or 
blue-green algae (Burns & Mitchell, 1974; Gerbeaux, 1993). The lack of blue-green algae is of 
significance for lake health. This is because such algae when in bloom are toxic to many other 
species. Indeed, decomposing blue-green algae can reduce the dissolved oxygen content of the 
lake water, resulting potentially in the extensive loss of aquatic life.  
 
 
Figure 6.4: The lake waters of Te Waihora  
 illustrating its present turbid water state. 
 
Fortunately to date, algal blooms of a widespread nature have not occurred in the lake waters of 
Te Waihora, unlike the neighbouring lake of Lake Forsyth, known to Māori as Te Wairewa, 
meaning ‘rising water’. The reason for the limited presence of algal blooms is said to be because 
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of the prevailing windiness of Te Waihora. It is wind that not only oxygenates the lake, but 
through its mixing effect suspends sediment in the water column, which limits light, and thus 
prevents surface algal blooms at times when ecological conditions would otherwise stimulate 
them (Gough & Ward, 1996; Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). Accordingly, as 
Partridge (2005; p. 119) stipulated, despite Te Waihora being hyper-eutrophic and in a turbid 
water state:   
“Its health isn’t all that bad. [However] if you were to go out and just look at the nutrient 
levels in the water and match them with other places around the world, you would come to 
the conclusion that it was highly nutrified and virtually dead. The reason that this lake has 
managed to survive is because it’s shallow [and] because it’s extremely windy ... so it’s 
constantly being stirred.”  
 
Although Te Waihora continues to be a highly diverse, resilient and productive lake ecosystem 
(Hughey et al., 2009), with increased nutrient load it may lead to a saturation point where algal 
blooms will occur despite the mixing effect of prevailing winds. In fact, for the first time in many 
years, this year has seen some persistent algal blooms occurring on the lake (Jellyman, 2009; 
pers. comm.). But, even if the widespread occurrence of algal blooms does not eventuate, the 
health of the lake, represented by Māori through its whakapapa, is perceived to be severely 
degraded. This loss of health is particularly associated with the diminishing success of the lake 
as a source of customary food or mahinga kai, which in turn has resulted in the loss of 
whakapapa or connection with the lake. This in turn has resulted in the alienation by Māori with 
the lake (Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). Hence, Māori recognize that the 
welfare of the lake is inherently interrelated with their own welfare (Arnold, 2007; pers. comm.). 
(This supports the definition of ecosystem health through the connective theory of value defined 
in Chapter 2). Indeed, Tau et al. (1990; p. 34) in affirming Māori concerns about the health of the 
lake has stated that: “Since European colonization, the management of the lake has been 
determined by the demands of agriculture and economics of reclamation, with the result that Te 
Waihora’s mahinga kai value is now negligible.” Certainly, prior to European colonization and 
the introduction of agricultural practices on the Canterbury Plains, Māori had described Te 
Waihora, as the great fish basket of Rākaihautū. This was because Te Waihora was revered as an 
excellent place to source a bountiful supply of mahinga kai and other ecosystem services 
(Goodall, 1996; Arnold, 2009; pers. comm.).  
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The objective, then, of Māori in the next two decades is to transform Te Waihora into a Mahinga 
Kai Cultural Park, where an abundant supply of mahinga kai and other ecosystem services can 
once again be sourced (Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005). In making such a 
transformation, it is believed that a ‘restoration’ of the lake’s health could be achieved, which 
could in turn establish a re-connection with the lake by Māori (and other resource users), 
providing the impetus for the renewal of a tribal resource-use culture. This objective broadly 
defined is a key focus for this empirical case study. Accordingly, this case study of Te Waihora, 
will determine cost-effective management actions for improving the health of this ecosystem. 
This is considered pertinent, as while considerable efforts have gone into reporting the science of 
Te Waihora (e.g. Taylor, 1996; Gerbeaux, 1989; 1993; Ward, 1994; Sagar et al., 2004), much less has 
been done in identifying preferable outcomes and appropriate management actions to bring 
about change for this ‘degraded’ lake ecosystem (Hughey et al., 2009).  
 
6.2 Boundaries & History  
The economic evaluation of Te Waihora began with the selection of suitable participants that 
cover both local and scientific knowledge of this lake ecosystem. In line with arguments made 
by Cooke and Goossens (2004), the selection of participants (i.e. experts and therefore resource 
co-managers) by the interviewing analyst was initiated by asking a range of user and scientific 
groups who might be suitable for this economic evaluation (Section 4.2). After this initial 
discussion, a set of appropriate and available participants were chosen that covered the many 
ecological functions and ecosystem services that can be supplied by the lake. Hence, a diverse 
range of expertise was selected. Participants in this study had backgrounds in, botany, ecology, 
economics, environmental science, farming, fishing, geology, history, hydrology, resource 
management, limnology, political science, recreation and social science. Most participants were 
represented from within various formal agencies or groups. In fact, even farmers that 
participated in this study belonged to the Waihora Ellesmere Trust, which is an active charitable 
trust of local community members.  
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Given that ecosystems are not isolated phenomena, a multiple scale perspective was developed 
(Section 2.2.6). Accordingly, in addition to the behaviour of the ecosystem being inferred, there is 
an attempt to elicit the behaviour of its surrounding environment (as a bioregion) and its sub-
systems as well. Hence, participants, dependent on their relevant expertise, were assigned to 
one of three groups, which represented a particular system examined from this multiple scale 
perspective. A few participants were placed in more than one group for the purposes of 
stimulating knowledge linkages between groups (Section 4.2.1). The actual systems examined in 
this multiple scale perspective were: the Canterbury bioregion, the Te Waihora lake ecosystem, 
and the various sub-systems of Te Waihora. Group sizes in face-to-face group meetings for each 
representative system were small, and varied between three and nine participants. Each group 
came together several times during the course of this empirical case study. Prior to any dialogue 
developed in groups, participants were informed of the goal of consensus, the three-finger 
method of consensus (Table 4.2), and appropriate group norms and the role of the interviewing 
analyst in achieving consensus in accordance with previous work (Wilson & Howarth, 2002).  
 
The participants designated the spatial scale for each of the systems examined by consensus in a 
face-to-face group meeting, where boundaries determined for each system were made with the 
management of Te Waihora lake ecosystem in mind. The determined boundaries for the 
Canterbury bioregion and Te Waihora lake ecosystem and its sub-systems are shown in Figures 
6.5 and 6.6, respectively. Seven sub-systems were determined reflective of their distinct 
functionality from other sub-systems in the lake ecosystem. The sub-systems demarcated were: 
the Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit, Greenpark Sands, Kaituna Lagoon, the Lake Side of Kaitorete 
Spit, Open Water, the Surrounding Agricultural Land, and the Western Bank Wetlands. All 
seven sub-systems are described in Appendix 6.1. The approximate areas for each of the systems 
examined are shown in Table 6.1.  
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Figure 6.5: The designated boundary (highlighted in ‘red’) for the Canterbury bioregion. Note 
that the Canterbury bioregion boundary selected covers the catchment area of Te Waihora 
(defined in ‘grey’), the environs of Christchurch city and Banks Peninsula. Map insert depicts 
the South Island of New Zealand (from Taylor, 1996; Hughey & Taylor, 2009). 
 
 
System/sub-system Area (ha) 
Te Waihora 31,500 
Canterbury bioregion 407,000 
Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit 500 
Greenpark Sands 900 
Kaituna Lagoon 700 
Lake Side of Kaitorete Spit 800 
Open Water 15,800 
Surrounding Agricultural Land 10,500 
Western Bank Wetlands 900 
Table 6.1: Approximate areas of the various systems examined.  
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Figure 6.6: The designated boundary (highlighted in ‘black’) for the Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem. The designated boundaries (highlighted in ‘red’) for the sub-systems of Te 
Waihora are also shown (from Kirk, 1994). 
Where CK is the Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit sub-system; 
GS is the Greenpark Sands sub-system; 
KL is the Kaituna Lagoon sub-system; 
LK is the Lake Side of Kaitorete Spit sub-system; 
OW is the Open Water sub-system; 
SA is the Surrounding Agricultural Land sub-system; and  
WB is the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system.  
 
With the determination of spatial scale complete, participants worked with abridged 
information including quantitative and qualitative data of the history of Te Waihora and 
Canterbury, going back approximately 10,000 years (Section 4.2.2). This number of years was 
chosen based on previous arguments made by De Landa (2000) and Costanza et al. (2007a), 
where it is recognized that when investigating ecosystems that it is important to understand the 
system, if possible, prior to anthropogenic action. With the aid of this information, participants 
after an individual process of review, determined by consensus a depiction of the history of Te 
Waihora (Appendix 6.2a) and the Canterbury bioregion (Appendix 6.2b). These historical 
qualitative narratives for Te Waihora and Canterbury bioregion contextualized the unique 
LK 
OW 
KL 
GS 
CK 
SA 
WB 
Figure removed for reasons of copyright 
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dynamic changes of these systems, and are summarized in the form of historical timelines in 
Figures 6.7 and 6.8, respectively.  
 
 
Figure 6.7: A historical timeline indicating conceived system states that have occurred 
previously for the Te Waihora ‘lake’ ecosystem on a logarithmic timescale.  
 
 
Figure 6.8: A historical timeline indicating conceived system states that have occurred 
previously for the Canterbury bioregion on a logarithmic timescale. 
 
A succinct examination of the historical timelines and historical qualitative narratives highlights 
that in the context of geological time, Te Waihora is a relatively recent ecological feature within 
the Canterbury landscape, as it only became a body of water between 5000 and 8000 years ago 
(Hemmingsen, 1997). Yet, despite its recent nature, it has undergone numerous systemic 
changes in this relatively short time period. This highlights the dynamism of the lake. 
Nevertheless, despite these geomorphological and ecological changes, it is the anthropogenic 
changes over the past 100 years that have resulted in the greatest levels of ecosystem change. 
Hence, this historical account reflects trends that indicate the rapid change of ecosystems and 
the development of novel system states, as a result of human economic activity and in particular 
because of agricultural production (Carpenter et al., 1999b; Hobbs et al., 2006).  
 
With the establishment of the history and spatial scales, participants within the Te Waihora 
group, determined by consensus appropriate short-term and long-term temporal scales for the 
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economic evaluation. Accordingly, with the acknowledgement of the dynamic nature of Te 
Waihora, it was agreed that 25 years was a sufficient period of time to account for the long-term, 
while five years was considered a suitable time period in which to account for short-term 
phenomena.   
 
6.2.1 Qualitative Aggregation & Fuzzy Cognitive Mapping  
With boundaries and history complete, open-ended interviews of individual participants began 
for the construction of individual fuzzy cognitive maps (Section 4.2.3). Significantly, previous 
research has indicated that fuzzy cognitive maps are vulnerable to issues of scale and scope 
(Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004; Fairweather et al., 2006). However, by participants understanding the 
history and establishing the spatial and temporal scales of the system examined, the 
opportunities of eliciting inappropriate conceptual data were considered to be reduced.   
 
The interviews elicited initially the principal concepts as ‘drivers of change’ that came to mind 
for the system examined. This initial conceptual data collected was shown to the participants 
during the interviewing process. With the facilitation of the interviewing analyst, effort was then 
made to recode this conceptual data, into broader conceptual variables through a series of 
qualitative aggregations, where conceptual data was grouped so as to identify key conceptual 
variables. With a number of conceptual variables constructed, finalized conceptual variables 
were established by participants acknowledging that they were satisfied with them.   
 
From the conceptual variables developed, causal connections between the conceptual variables 
were then elicited by the participants. The elicitation of the causal connections required making 
pairwise comparisons between conceptual variables and indicating the direction and weight of 
causation between conceptual variables with an arrow and a value established on the interval 
scale [0, 1]. Some previous researchers have preferred to use the interval scale [-1, 1], as this 
provides a positive-negative calculus that can indicate whether causal consequences are 
negative or positive in nature for the incoming conceptual variable (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). 
However, the use of a positive-negative calculus has proven to be confusing for fuzzy cognitive 
mapping, and has resulted in conceptual variables being negated from further analysis 
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(Fairweather et al., 2006). Accordingly, a positive-negative calculus was not used in the 
construction of the fuzzy cognitive maps in this study.  
 
Once the causal connections were established between the conceptual variables, the participants 
were asked to reflect on their fuzzy cognitive map. In some cases, upon reflection, the 
participants chose to add or subtract various conceptual variables or causal connections. With 
changes complete, all participants were satisfied with their fuzzy cognitive maps for the 
examined system. Table 6.2 indicates the number of individual fuzzy cognitive maps constructed 
for each system.  
 
System Number of fuzzy cognitive maps 
constructed 
Te Waihora 9 
Canterbury 12 
Coastal side of Kaitorete Spit 4 
Greenpark Sands 4 
Kaituna Lagoon 4 
Lake side of Kaitorete Spit 4 
Open Water 4 
Surrounding Agricultural Land 4 
Western Bank Wetlands 5 
Table 6.2: The number of fuzzy cognitive maps constructed for each system examined.  
 
The completed individual maps were aggregated and superimposed to form a group fuzzy 
cognitive map for each system. Specifically, there are a variety of methods for aggregating maps 
together (Kosko, 1988; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2003). However, most group maps are constructed by 
simply additively superimposing each individual map together (Laszlo et al., 1996). Hence, this 
method was used in this study. Significantly, the behaviour of a group map may be quite 
different from that of the mere addition of behaviours observed with the set of individual maps. 
This is because different relationships may exist in the group map, which are not necessarily 
found in any of the individual maps (Khan & Quaddus, 2004).  
 
Once all individual maps were superimposed to form a group map, they were further 
investigated by the interviewing analyst. Upon investigation it was found in the case of the Te 
Waihora group map, that a total of 37 conceptual variables were constructed. Some of these 37 
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conceptual variables were recoded and merged by the interviewing analyst upon reflection of 
the conceptual data used to code the conceptual variables during the interviewing process 
(Simon, 1996). This recoding process by the analyst was conservatively completed to avoid 
excessive bias in the work. Accordingly, after recoding the total number of conceptual variables 
was condensed to 30 for the Te Waihora group map. Connections of the condensed conceptual 
variables were obtained by summing and averaging the values of the conceptual variables that 
originally made up the newly formed condensed conceptual variable. Examples of this recoding 
include the elicited conceptual variables Lake Level Management and Lake Opening, which were 
recoded to the conceptual variable Lake Opening. Similarly, the conceptual variables Chemical 
Lake Inputs and Nutrient Runoff were recoded as the conceptual variable Nutrient Runoff. For the 
Canterbury group map, a total of 46 conceptual variables were recorded, which were 
subsequently recoded by the analyst to 37 conceptual variables. The conceptual variables 
elicited in the various sub-systems were far fewer than the larger systems examined. Because of 
this few conceptual variables were recoded.  
 
With conceptual variables recoded, the participant size of each group fuzzy cognitive map was 
determined, where the number of conceptual variables elicited was deemed sufficient by an 
accumulation curve, which showed in all cases a diminishing return in eliciting any additional 
conceptual variables (Figure 6.9) (Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). 
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Figure 6.9: Accumulation curve of conceptual variables elicited  
for the Te Waihora group map.  
 
For the purposes of analysis it is important that the numbers of conceptual variables elicited in a 
group map are limited to no more than 25 conceptual variables. Beyond this number and the 
analysis of fuzzy cognitive maps has been shown to be counter-productive (Özesmi & Özesmi, 
2004). In order to limit the group maps to only 25 conceptual variables, those group maps with 
more than this number had some conceptual variables removed based on their ‘centrality 
values’. Centrality is an index that can indicate the significance of the conceptual variable in the 
map. Further discussion of centrality will be depicted in the next section.  
 
The conceptual variables removed from further analysis, in the case of the Te Waihora group 
map, were Oxygen, Recreation Distance, Sunshine, Urban-Rural Development and Wind, which in 
each case had low centrality values relative to other conceptual variables. For the Canterbury 
group map the conceptual variables removed included, Aging Population, Ecological Environment, 
European Colonial Ambitions, European Colonial Perceptions, European Colonial Skills, Geological 
Environment, Hydrocarbon Costs and Early Māori Use and Modification. Apart from low centrality 
values, some of these conceptual variables were left out of the group map as they did not 
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connect with the main body of conceptual variables. The removal of some of the conceptual 
variables while necessary for analytical reasons was nevertheless unfortunate, as it left the 
Canterbury group map without an account of some potentially significant historical conceptual 
variables, despite their original elicitation.  
 
A simplified representation of the group map constructed in graphical form for Te Waihora is 
illustrated in Figure 6.10. This map indicates the most significant conceptual variables for the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem. These variables appear broadly consistent with the key drivers of 
change obtained in a recent study completed by Hughey et al. (2009). Significantly, when this 
map was developed by the analyst and reflected back to the group, participants were in general 
satisfied with its construction, as influential causal connections between conceptual variables 
were appropriately recognized. For example, participants recognized that the map indicated the 
influence of inflow quantity on lake opening. 
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Figure 6.10: A simplified group map for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. Note that only key 
conceptual variables and their connections are indicated, given the causal complexity of the 
group map. The direction of the arrows indicates the causal direction of the connection 
between conceptual variables, while the weight of the arrow indicates the magnitude of the 
connection.  
 
6.2.2 Static Analysis & Centrality   
With each group map constructed satisfactorily as indicated by consensus, they were then 
transformed from conceptual variables as nodes and causal connections as weighted arrows into 
the mathematical form of an adjacency matrix (Harary et al., 1965). By transforming each group 
map into an adjacency matrix, where conceptual variables were listed both on a vertical and 
horizontial axis forming a square matrix, it was possible to commence static analysis of the 
maps. This static analysis helped illuminate the network structure of the group maps, and 
decipher the rank of conceptual variables according to their significance. In order to determine 
this information, static analysis by various network theory indices based in matrix algebra was 
performed. Relevant network theory indices for analysing fuzzy cognitive maps include: 
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indegree, outdegree, centrality, complexity ratio, hierarchy, and density, which is a relatively 
simple network theory index that measures map connectivity (Harary et al., 1965). Table 6.3 
summarizes the equations used to determine these various network theory indices. Each index 
will be discussed in more detail with its analysis.  
 
Index Equation 
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Table 6.3: Network theory index equations (adapted from Özesmi & Özesmi, 2004). 
Where N is the total number of conceptual variables; and 
CR and CT are receiver and transmitter variables, respectively. 
 
From Table 6.3 it is shown that indegree refers to the cumulative weights of connections coming 
into a particular conceptual variable, while outdegree refers to the cumulative weights of 
connections leaving the conceptual variable. With the determination of indegree and outdegree 
indices, the centrality index for each conceptual variable was deciphered by summing outdegree 
and indegree values together. Centrality then, indicates how connected in terms of cumulative 
weight a particular conceptual variable is relative to other conceptual variables.  
 
Figures 6.11, 6.12 and 6.13 depict indegree and outdegree values, as well as their sum generating 
centrality values for the principal conceptual variables in the constructed Te Waihora group 
map, the Canterbury group map and the Western Bank Wetlands group map, respectively. The 
centrality values of conceptual variables in the Te Waihora group map indicate that the Lake 
Opening conceptual variable is the most central. The other central conceptual variables of note 
were Inflow Quantity, Catchment Land Use and Inflow Quality. This indicates that factors relating 
to catchment water flows into the lake are conceived to have a significant influence on the lake 
ecosystem. This assertion is in keeping with previous findings (e.g. Davies et al., 1996; Hughey et 
al., 2009).  
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Figure 6.11: Normalized centrality values of the 15 most central conceptual variables of the Te 
Waihora group map. 
 
The centrality values for the Canterbury group map shown in Figure 6.12, indicates the 
conceived importance of agricultural and economic factors in the Canterbury bioregion, given 
the high centrality values given to the conceptual variables Dairying Profitability, Agricultural 
Technology, Water Availability and Commodity Prices. This recognition of agricultural and 
economic factors is in accordance with previous findings (e.g. Boffa Miskell Limited & Lucas 
Associates, 1993).  
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Figure 6.12: Normalized centrality values of the 15 most central conceptual variables of the 
Canterbury group map. 
 
The centrality values for the Western Bank Wetlands group map shown in Figure 6.13, 
demonstrates that the conceptual variables Stock Grazing and Willow Invasion are the most 
central variables. Significantly, these two central conceptual variables, as well as other 
conceptual variables, such as High Soil Fertility, Lake Level Fluctuations, Land Use Intensification 
and Variable Salinity correspond with previous findings, in that they are considered important 
factors in the functioning of this sub-system (e.g. Clark & Partridge, 1984; O’Donnell, 1985; 
Department of Conservation & Ngāi Tahu, 2005).  
 197
Conceptual Variables
St
oc
k G
ra
zin
g
W
ill
ow
 In
va
sio
n
Fr
es
hw
ate
r I
nf
lo
ws
La
nd
 U
se
 In
ten
sif
ica
tio
n
Li
m
ite
d 
Re
m
na
nt
 V
alu
in
g
Po
or
 V
eg
eta
tio
n 
M
an
ag
em
en
t
La
ke
 O
pe
ni
ng
s
La
ke
 L
ev
el 
Fl
uc
tu
at
io
ns
H
ig
h 
So
il 
Fe
rti
lit
y
Va
ria
bl
e S
ali
ni
ty
Re
cr
ea
tio
n
Co
m
m
er
ici
al 
Fi
sh
in
g
Ca
na
da
 G
ee
se
 Im
pa
cts
Er
os
io
n
W
in
d
C
en
tr
al
it
y
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Indegree
Outdegree
 
Figure 6.13: Normalized centrality values of the 15 most central conceptual variables of the 
Western Bank Wetlands group map. 
 
In addition to centrality values, map structure was also examined through the types of 
conceptual variables found, which include transmitter, receiver and ordinary variables. 
Transmitter variables or forcing functions are those conceptual variables with only a positive 
outdegree and zero indegree, while receiver variables are those conceptual variables with only a 
positive indegree and zero outdegree. Ordinary variables are all other conceptual variables that 
have both a positive indegree and outdegree.  
 
The conceptual variables in all maps that are either transmitter variables or receiver variables 
are depicted in Table 6.4. Of note, few conceptual variables are either transmitter variables or 
receiver variables, indicating that most conceptual variables are ordinary variables. Of interest, 
the conceptual variable Climate Change is both a variable in the Te Waihora and the Canterbury 
group map, yet for the Canterbury group map it is not a transmitter variable, as one might 
initially expect. This may indicate that climate change is conceived to be not completely 
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exogenous within the Canterbury bioregion, which suggests the influence of anthropogenic 
climate change phenomena.  
 
Group fuzzy cognitive map Transmitter Variable  Receiver Variable  
Te Waihora Climate Change Salinity 
Canterbury Economy Deregulation --- 
Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit --- --- 
Greenpark Sands --- Evaporation, Sediment 
Size 
Kaituna Lagoon Freshwater Inflows --- 
Lake Side of Kaitorete Spit --- --- 
Open Water Sea Level Change --- 
Surrounding Agricultural Land Poor Waste Management,  
Drought on Sand Soil 
Salt Spray 
Western Bank Wetlands Wind, Exotic Plantings Sedimentation 
Table 6.4: The conceptual variables that are either transmitter or receiver variables in the 
various group maps constructed. 
 
Table 6.5 depicts the static map structures of the various group maps constructed using the 
network theory indices; density, complexity ratio and hierarchy. The density values, which 
indicate the density of connections in the maps, were higher in general with larger systems than 
for the smaller sub-systems, as might be expected. However, the density value for the Western 
Bank Wetlands group map was relatively higher, when compared with other sub-system group 
maps. This may indicate the greater level of ‘complexity’ that is conceived to exist in this sub-
system. Significantly, given that there are few transmitter or receiver variables in any of the 
group maps, the complexity ratio index provided little evidence about map structure. The 
hierarchy index, on the other hand, did provide evidence of map structure, in that all values 
were close to zero or at zero, indicating that the network of the group maps were democratic not 
hierarchical (or top-down) in structure (Eden et al., 1992).  
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Te Waihora 5.08 1 0.0007 
Canterbury 6.52 0 0.0000 
Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit 3.53 0 0 
Greenpark Sands 3.73 --- 0.0138 
Kaituna Lagoon 3.44 0 0 
Lake Side of Kaitorete Spit 2.88 0 0 
Open Water 3 0 0 
Surrounding Agricultural Land 4.79 0.5 0.0038 
Western Bank Wetlands 5.56 0.5 0.0018 
Table 6.5: Network theory indices indicating the map structure of the 
 various group maps constructed. 
 
6.2.3 Dynamic Analysis & Simulated Activation Outputs   
In addition to static analysis, dynamic analysis was performed by artificial neural network 
simulations. The mathematics of these simulations is that each conceptual variable sums its 
inputs and yields an output according to a particular mathematical function (Kosko, 1987; 1992). 
Specifically, the conceptual variable is activated to whatever degree the inputs dictate, and this 
value will pass a signal to its neighbouring conceptual variables that are connected with this 
conceptual variable (Özesmi, 1999). The signal arriving at the neighbouring conceptual variables 
is determined by both the the weight of the connection en and the activation input an of the 
sending conceptual variable. Accordingly, the signal downstream to a conceptual variable is 
determined by the weighted sum of the individual products of the activation input and the 
connection weight, which is then transformed by an activation squashing function f into the 
interval space [0, 1] at each computational step (Figure 6.14) (Özesmi, 1999; Kosko, 1987; 1992).  
1
n
n n
j
f a e
=
 
× 
 
∑
 
Figure 6.14: A simulated conceptual variable (node) in a fuzzy cognitive map. Briefly, 
activation inputs a are multiplied by the connection weights e and these products are 
summed. The sum is input into an activation squashing function f. The result is output as an 
activation input to neighbouring variables (adapted from Özesmi, 1999).  
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These dynamic simulations of the constructed group fuzzy cognitive maps were undertaken in 
the spreadsheet computational programme called Fuzzy Thought Amplifier designed by Fuzzy 
Engineering Systems. This computational programme is specifically designed to undertake 
artificial neural network simulations of fuzzy cognitive maps. Each group map was entered into 
the programme in the form of an adjacency matrix. A non-linear logistic activation squashing 
function was selected for the simulations (Section 4.2.4). Various other activation squashing 
functions could have been used. However, according to Özesmi (1999) a logistic function 
provides for an improved representation of activation levels of conceptual variables. With a 
suitable activation squashing function chosen, it was possible to run simulations.  
 
In undertaking these simulations, it was found in all cases that the simulations ceased when the 
activation output settled down on a fixed value (i.e. point attractor) over a repeated number of 
iterations. The number of iterations required before the simulation settled down was relatively 
small with no simulation requiring more than 25 iterations. Theoretically, at least, the 
simulations could have converged towards various types of attractors (e.g. a periodic or a 
chaotic attractor) (Dickerson & Kosko, 1994; Hobbs et al., 2002). However, simulations of each 
group map were found to settle down on a point attractor. With convergence found, given the 
possible presence of non-linear dynamics in the group maps, simulation outputs were 
subsequently tested for the presence of multiple equilibria, where the initial values for some 
‘randomly’ chosen conceptual variables were altered. In all cases, a point attractor remained 
indicating that only a single equilibrium existed.  
 
For the most part, previous researchers have indicated that it is desirable that fuzzy cognitive 
maps, once simulated, find a point attractor as it allows an easy interpretation of results, which 
then can be used to make deductive inferences. Consequently, there is some discussion in the 
literature about various appropriate means of forcing simulations to settle down on to a point 
attractor if it does not readily occur after a reasonably large number of iterations (Hobbs et al., 
2002; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2003). This is considered necessary as simulations that do not settle 
down on a fixed value are regarded as problematic for analysis. However, the settling down of 
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simulations on to a point attractor is neither seen as necessary nor entirely beneficial in this 
work. This is because there is no effort made to find mathematically-forced generalizations and 
inferences from the data. Rather, efforts are made to establish theories from the data. Hence, in 
this work, while point attractors are acceptable, more rich and complex simulated outputs are 
preferred. This highlights that future research can investigate means of increasing the non-
linearity and complexity found in the dynamic analysis of fuzzy cognitive maps.  
 
Figures 6.15 and 6.16 depict the activation outputs of the 15 most activated conceptual variables 
in the Te Waihora group map and the Canterbury group map, respectively. The activation 
outputs for the various sub-systems examined are explained in the next section following the 
systematic application of abductive logic. The activation outputs in the Te Waihora group map, 
once again, provided evidence of the influence the Lake Opening conceptual variable has on the 
map. This suggests that this conceptual variable is a conceptual hub of the map. However, some 
re-ordering of conceptual variables is evident in the dynamic analysis when compared with the 
static analysis. Of particular interest, is the importance attributed to the conceptual variables 
Unaesthetic Lake, Native Habitat Loss, Lake Margin Management and Ngāi Tahu Values. Conversely, 
the conceptual variables Inflow Quantity and Catchment Land Use were significantly less 
influential in the dynamic analysis when compared with their corresponding centrality values. 
This adjustment in the order of conceptual variables might be attributed to the effect that with 
simulations those conceptual variables with an indegree-outdegree ratio above one are 
favoured, while those conceptual variables with an indegree-outdegree ratio below one are less 
favoured. This is not an inherent bias of the simulation, but reflective of the fact that conceptual 
variables with an indegree-outdegree ratio above one, are those able to ‘receive’ more activation 
weight throughout the computational steps of the simulation.    
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Figure 6.15: Normalized simulated activation output of the 15 most activated conceptual 
variables of the Te Waihora group map. 
 
The activation outputs for the Canterbury group map shown in Figure 6.16, affirms the 
importance of agricultural factors, given the influence of the conceptual variables Agricultural 
Technology and Dairying Profitability on the map. This suggests that these conceptual variables 
are the conceptual hubs of the map. However, re-ordering did occur in the map when compared 
with the static analysis, as the conceptual variables Environmental Degradation and Urban 
Population increased in their influence, while the conceptual variables Commodity Prices and Food 
Demand all decreased in their influence. This change indicates the importance of environmental 
factors. The high activation output for all conceptual variables highlights the problem of 
including transmitter variables (i.e. Economy Deregulation) in a simulation, which, because these 
variables do not receive or accumulate activation weight, skews (but does not re-order) the 
activation outputs of other conceptual variables.  
 203
Conceptual Variables
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l T
ec
hn
olo
gy
Da
iry
in
g P
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l D
eg
ra
da
tio
n
Ur
ba
n 
Po
pu
lat
io
n 
La
nd
 P
ric
es
Su
pp
ly
Go
ve
rn
m
en
t P
ol
icy
Re
gi
on
al 
Re
so
ur
ce
s
W
ate
r A
va
ila
bil
ity
Co
m
m
od
ity
 P
ric
es
Fo
od
 D
em
an
d
Av
ail
ab
ili
ty
 of
 Im
po
rte
d 
Go
od
s 
Co
m
m
un
ity
 A
tti
tu
de
s
La
ws
 &
 In
sti
tu
tio
ns
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l L
ab
ou
r S
av
in
g
Si
m
u
la
te
d
 A
ct
iv
at
io
n
 O
u
tp
u
t
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
 
Figure 6.16: Normalized simulated activation output of the 15 most activated conceptual 
variables of the Canterbury group map. 
 
The resilience of the group maps was also examined using two analytical procedures 
(Fairweather et al., 2006). One procedure altered the outgoing connection weights of prominent 
conceptual variables to zero. This has the effect of the conceptual variable not being activated 
without it being removed from the map. Another procedure removed significant connection 
weights from the map.  
 
In recognizing the likelihood of the conceptual variable Lake Opening being the conceptual hub 
of the Te Waihora group map, the resilience properties of the map were ascertained by zeroing 
the outdegree connection weights of this conceptual variable. This resulted in the Lake Opening 
conceptual variable still being the most activated conceptual variable, as might be expected 
(Appendix 6.3a). However, some re-ordering of conceptual variables occurred, while significant 
decreases in the activation output of many conceptual variables also occurred, highlighting the 
vulnerability of the map structure to change. The resilience of the map was also investigated. 
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The map was found to be fairly resilient, however, the conceptual hub changed from the Lake 
Opening conceptual variable to the Inflow Quality conceptual variable with the removal of the 
most weighted connection. Moreover, when the five most weighted connections were removed, 
the Inflow Quantity conceptual variable decreased markedly in its activation output and the 
conceptual variable Unaesthetic Lake became the conceptual hub of the map (Appendix 6.3b).  
 
The resilience of the Canterbury group map was examined by zeroing outdegree connection 
weights of the conceptual variables Agricultural Technology and Dairying Profitability (Appendix 
6.3c). The result was that most conceptual variables were fairly resilient, however, the 
conceptual variable Water Availability altered considerably. The resilience of the map was also 
examined by the removal of significant connections. It was observed that the map was resilient 
to either the removal of the single most weighted or the five most weighted connections. 
Significant change only occurred with the conceptual variables Water Availability and Commodity 
Prices, which both decreased in their activation outputs (Appendix 6.3d).  
 
6.2.4 Actual Abductions & Explanatory Coherence by Harmony Optimization 
Participants investigating the sub-systems of Te Waihora generated novel explanatory 
hypotheses as ex-post-facto hypotheses for actual unexpected phenomena. Only participants 
examining sub-systems undertook this process, as the investigation of smaller scales is more 
likely to decipher ‘interesting’ signals not otherwise perceived at larger scales. Unexpected 
outcomes were found through either actual observations from a field excursion or from 
exploratory data analysis in the form of recent trends evaluated from various forms of available 
qualitative or quantitative data. Surprises recognized from the exploratory data analysis were 
determined through comparing expectations for qualitative and quantitative data with actual 
trends. The expectations given by participants were made on a simple scale reflecting whether 
the data trend was increasing, decreasing or had no change (Appendix 6.4a). In future work, 
other exploratory data analysis methods could be used including graphical techniques and 
ratios.  
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Two surprising phenomena were observed from field observations; one from the Greenpark 
Sands sub-system and the other from the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. The surprising 
phenomena observed in Greenpark Sands was “the sighting of a four wheel drive vehicle and 
other vehicle tracks, despite a total recreational vehicle ban in this protected wetland area”. 
Likewise, the unexpected outcome in Western Bank Wetlands was “the observation that many 
pockets of the wetland around Hart’s Creek and Taumutu Commonage were planted in various 
native tree species, which despite presumably the best intentions of the planter are completely 
inappropriate for these wetland conditions”. 
 
From trends of qualitative and quantitative data another two surprising phenomena were 
identified; one from the Kaituna Lagoon sub-system and the other from the Lake Side of 
Kaitorete Spit sub-system. The surprising phenomenon in the Kaituna Lagoon was “the feeling 
that recreational hunting trends were increasing marginally, despite indicator trends suggesting 
otherwise”. Similarly, the surprising phenomenon for the Lake Side of Kaitorete Spit was “the 
explanation for the stability of the data trends in this sub-system”. In all cases, two promoted ex-
post-facto hypotheses were generated in order to explain the surprising phenomena found.  
 
Once elicited each of these ex-post-facto hypotheses were evaluated, where participants gathered 
supporting empirical evidence for these hypotheses. Plausibility values for the hypotheses, as 
well as, believability and reliability values for the empirical evidence were elicited (Appendix 
6.4b). Plausibility values for the hypotheses were given on a one-to-nine scale, where one 
represented a low plausibility value and nine represented a high plausibility value for the 
hypotheses evaluated. In accordance with the theory of explanatory coherence, participants 
were informed that plausibility values should be determined by way of lexicographic ordering 
from the set of epistemic criteria of consilience, simplicity and analogy, where consilience is the 
most important criterion. This was important to ensure that participants recognized that 
plausibility values are associated with explanatory goodness and not probability (Section 4.2.5). 
Empirical evidence gathered in order to support the ex-post-facto hypotheses were given 
believability and reliability values on a one-to-nine scale and one-to-three scale, respectively.  
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Hypotheses and empirical evidence were then constructed by participants into a networked 
structure as an argument, where connections between hypotheses and evidence were depicted 
as either explanatory or contradictory in nature. In all cases, participants indicated a 
contradictory connection between rival ex-post-facto hypotheses, while explanatory connections 
for the empirical evidence towards the relevant hypotheses. With the argument established, 
participants reflected on their argument. Once they were satisfied with the argument, it was 
simulated using the artificial neural network programme, Convince Me (Thagard, 2001; Haig, 
2005; Convince Me, 2009). This programme is underpinned by the Explanatory Coherence by 
Harmony Optimization (ECHO) model. Significantly, the implementation of the ECHO model is 
the first undertaking using this method for analysis relevant to the management of ecosystems.  
 
The ECHO model, as previously discussed (Section 4.2.5), is designed to account for the theory of 
explanatory coherence. Specifically, when an argument is simulated using the ECHO model, 
coherent theories are activated through an excitatory (i.e. positive) connection weight. On the 
other hand, incoherent theories are deactivated through an inhibitory (i.e. negative) connection 
weight. Coherence is determined in the ECHO model by a set of algorithmic rules designed to 
reflect the theory of explanatory coherence. Accordingly, once simulated, the ECHO model 
attempts to ‘optimize’ the coherence of the argument (Thagard, 1992).  
 
In undertaking these simulations of these constructed networked arguments, it was found in 
each case that the simulations settled down on to a fixed value (i.e. point attractor) after a small 
number of iterations. All simulations used the default settings in the Convince Me programme 
for the level of excitatory and inhibitory weights given. Once settled down, the ECHO-adjusted 
plausibility and believability values were correlated with the original plausibility and 
believability values given by the responsible participants. In all arguments, a positive correlative 
relationship was found between the ECHO-adjusted plausibility values with the actual 
plausibility values given by the participant. With a positive argument correlation found in all 
cases, the coherence of the argument was supported by the ECHO model. This provided 
evidence that arguments were adequate in their reasoning.  
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With reasoning considered adequate, the ECHO-adjusted plausibility values generated for each 
ex-post-facto hypothesis were compared for each argument. Suitable experiments and associated 
costs to analyse the hypotheses were devised by the participants. Experimental costs per ECHO-
adjusted plausibility were determined, and that hypothesis with the least cost per ECHO-
adjusted plausibility was chosen as the preferred hypothesis - the inference to the best 
explanation. The ECHO-adjusted plausibility values, argument correlation and experimental 
costs are shown in Table 6.6. No experimentation was performed in this empirical case study.  
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Greenpark 
Sands 
Resource 
constraints 
limited 
C 0.73 7.0 Increase signage and 
penalties for 
inappropriate 
recreational vehicle 
use on wetland 
$750 $110 
People will never 
change 
  3.5 $210 
Kaituna 
Lagoon 
Personal 
observations  are 
incorrect 
C 1.0 6.9 Investigate the data 
collection accuracy of 
the indicator  
$250 $40 
Empirical 
indicator data 
collected is 
inaccurate 
  3.6 $70 
Lake side 
of Kaitorete 
Spit 
Coarse sand 
substrate 
promotes stability  
C 0.22 6.8 Investigate 
information about 
coarse sand  
$250 $40 
Lack of sea level 
pressure because 
of climatic 
conditions 
  4.0 --- --- --- 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Sound riparian 
Management? 
C 0.86 4.0 Beneficial output of 
native tree species 
for wetlands trial 
$4000 $1000 
Poor wetland 
understanding  
  6.8 Wetland re-
education trial 
$2000 $290 
Table 6.6: The ECHO-adjusted plausibility values generated and experimental cost per 
plausibility values determined for promoted ex-post-facto hypotheses. Note C refers to a 
contradictory argument structure between ex-post-facto hypotheses and ‘bold’ cost per 
plausibility values indicate the preferred hypothesis – the inference to the best explanation.   
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Somewhat unexpectedly, all the plausible ex-post-facto hypotheses, as inferences to the best 
explanation were subsequently adopted by the relevant participants to be placed into their 
individual fuzzy cognitive maps, except for the ex-post-facto hypothesis generated for the 
surprising phenomenon in the Kaituna Lagoon. The fact that three participants adopted these 
plausible hypotheses into their mental models indicates the significance of systematically 
applying abduction. Accordingly, where plausible ex-post-facto hypotheses were adopted, they 
were considered a new conceptual variable in their individual maps. Hence, each responsible 
participant incorporated the new conceptual variable and adjusted weighted connections in 
their individual maps. This had the effect of also ‘disrupting’ the group map constructed. Figure 
6.17 depicts the change in the centrality values of the conceptual variables in the Western Bank 
Wetlands group map before and after the actual abduction of the ex-post-facto hypothesis (and 
now conceptual variable) Poor Wetland Understanding. As can be seen, with the addition of this 
conceptual variable into the group map, marginal increases to the centrality values of the Land 
Use Intensification, Limited Remnant Valuing, Poor Vegetation Management and High Soil Fertility 
conceptual variables were found, while marginal decreases to centrality values of the Lake 
Openings and Lake Level Fluctuations conceptual variables were also found. The lists of the final 
conceptual variables used for each of the systems examined are detailed in Appendix 6.5. 
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Figure 6.17: Normalized centrality values of the 15 most central conceptual variables of the 
Western Bank Wetlands group map after the actual abduction of the hypothesis Poor 
Wetland Understanding.   
 
With the sub-systems changed, the various sub-system group maps were simulated. The 
activation outputs for the Western Bank Wetlands group map are shown in Figure 6.18. It is 
shown that unlike the Te Waihora group map (Figure 6.14) and the Canterbury group map 
(Figure 6.15), a similar ordering occurs to that observed in the static analysis. This can be 
attributed to the indegree-outdegree ratios for all conceptual variables in the map being close to 
unity. Significantly, the conceptual variables Stock Grazing and Willow Invasion appear to be the 
conceptual hubs of the group map. The resilience of the Western Bank Wetlands group map was 
examined by zeroing outdegree connection weights of the conceptual variables Stock Grazing 
and Willow Invasion (Appendix 6.3e). It was found that the map was fairly resilient, with only a 
few conceptual variables being altered. When significant weighted connections were removed 
from the map, it remained resilient with no significant changes to any of the conceptual 
variables (Appendix 6.3f).   
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Figure 6.18: Normalized simulated activation output of the 15 most activated conceptual 
variables of the Western Bank Wetlands group map. 
 
The activation outputs for the other sub-system group maps are shown in Appendix 6.6a-f. 
Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit group map indicated that the conceptual variable Stock Grazing 
was highly influential. Similarly, the Stock Grazing conceptual variable was also found to be 
highly influential in the Greenpark Sands group map. In the Kaituna Lagoon, Lake Side of 
Kaitorete Spit and the Surrounding Agricultural Land group map, the Stock Grazing conceptual 
variable was again influential; however, other conceptual variables were also prominent. In the 
Open Water group map, by far the largest sub-system, the most influential conceptual variable 
was Water Quality. It might have been expected that the conceptual variable Lake Opening would 
be the most influential in accordance with the findings of the Te Waihora group map. However, 
in the Open Water group map, the lake opening and lake level management of the lake waters 
of Te Waihora was reflected in the Lake Opening and Lake Level Fluctuations conceptual variables. 
Hence, in accounting for this difference, the most influential conceptual variables are similar in 
both the Te Waihora and the Open Water group maps.     
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6.2.5 Construction & Plausibility of Promoted Theories 
From the examination of centrality values and activation outputs for each group map, each 
group, as a group, attempted to develop an explicit macro-level theory or theories, as bounded 
demi-macro-regularities, that encompassed the output of the relevant group maps (Section 4.2.4). 
Most systems examined resulted in only a single theory constructed to explain the phenomena 
of the group map. However, the Te Waihora group map and Western Bank Wetland group map 
provided two theories to explain the phenomena generated from the analysis. In the case of the 
Te Waihora group, there was some debate made by a few participants, where they believed that 
the activation output for the Unaesthetic Lake conceptual variable was too high, while the 
activation output for the Catchment Land Use conceptual variable was too low. This led to some 
discussion, where those that supported the significance of the Unaesthetic Lake conceptual 
variable, argued its significance based around the effect of lake alienation. This discussion led to 
the development of ‘lake alienation’ being a theory from the analysis.   
 
For these two group maps where multiple theories were constructed, plausibility values were 
determined by participants to decipher the more plausible theory. Prior to eliciting plausibility 
values, participants were informed that the plausibility values were based on the lexicographic 
ordering of consilience, simplicity and analogy on a one-to-nine scale. Each group, as a group 
then elicited that the theories constructed were explanatory or mutually reinforcing of one 
another. Figure 6.19 illustrates the argument for the two explicit theories Cultural Eutrophication 
(i.e. eutrophication resultant from human economic activity) and Lake Alienation constructed to 
explain the analysis of the Te Waihora group map. Empirical evidence used in the argument 
was the conceptual variables of the relevant group maps, while believability values reflected 
transformed activation outputs from baseline activations.   
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Figure 6.19: The conceptual diagram of the argument for the construction of the theory that 
explains the behaviour of the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. Conceptual variables from the Te 
Waihora group map were used as evidence for the theories constructed, while activation 
outputs were used as believability values of the evidence. Reliability values of the 
constructed theories were fixed for all empirical evidence.  
 
Tables 6.7 and 6.8 indicate the various theories generated for the Te Waihora group map and the 
Western Bank Wetlands group map, respectively. Support for an explanatory argument in both 
the Te Waihora and Western Bank Wetlands group map was found through a positive argument 
correlation. Hence, both theories were adopted by the corresponding groups by consensus and 
subsequently put together by meta-analysis to form a reconstructed meta-theory of the 
examined system.    
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Meta-analysis:  
Reconstructed theory 
Te Waihora  Cultural 
eutrophication 
E 0.35 8.4 The Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem is driven by 
biophysical (e.g. lake opening 
regime) and social factors in 
accordance with cultural 
eutrophication resulting in 
lake alienation. 
Lake 
alienation 
 --- 8.4 
Table 6.7: The ECHO-adjusted plausibility values and meta-analysis of theories constructed 
for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. Note E refers to an explanatory argument structure. 
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Meta-analysis:  
Reconstructed theory 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Inappropriate 
vegetation 
management 
E 0.48 8.5 The Western Bank Wetlands 
are driven by inappropriate 
vegetation and lake level 
management of a highly 
complex system. 
Inappropriate 
lake level 
management 
 --- 8.5 
Table 6.8: The ECHO-adjusted plausibility values and meta-analysis of theories constructed 
for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. Note no experimentation was required, even 
though this spatial scale allows for experimentation, because a single meta-theory was found.  
 
Table 6.9 depicts the final theories constructed, as bounded demi-macro-regularities (i.e. short 
textual summaries), by group consensus for the various systems examined. Validation of the 
theory constructed for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem was found by the fact that none of the 
sub-system theories constructed were deemed by participants to be contradictory or surprising 
to this constructed theory. This capacity for theory validation highlights the importance of 
undertaking an evaluation on multiple scales. However, it was recognized that when comparing 
the conceptual variables elicited in the sub-systems with that of Te Waihora, that social 
conceptual variables (e.g. Ngāi Tahu Values) considered important at the ecosystem scale were 
not evident in any sub-system. This may be the result of interviewing different participants; 
however, it may also reflect emergent conceptual variables that are not specific to any one sub-
system. If this is so, it highlights that conceived phenomena found with ecosystems are not 
always considered reductionistic. This would imply that undertaking multi-scale evaluations are 
critical for ecosystem management. However, it was also recognized that some phenomena are 
consistent over different spatial scales. This was particularly evident with the promoted theory 
constructed for the Surrounding Agricultural Land group map, which closely resembled the 
theory constructed for the Canterbury group map.  
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System Constructed theories of system behaviour 
Te Waihora The Te Waihora lake ecosystem is driven by biophysical (e.g. lake 
opening regime) and social factors in accordance with cultural 
eutrophication resulting in lake alienation. 
Canterbury The Canterbury bioregion is driven by the pursuit of profit through 
agriculture constrained by environmental factors. 
Coastal Side of 
Kaitorete Spit 
The Coastal Side of Kaitorete Spit is driven by beach and dune 
dynamics as commenced by long shore drift. 
Greenpark Sands Greenpark Sands is controlled by the lake opening regime and its effects 
on salinity and lake level. 
Kaituna Lagoon Kaituna Lagoon is driven by accelerated self-reclamation.  
Lake Side of 
Kaitorete Spit 
The Lake Side of Kaitorete Spit is a stable system, affected only by 
localized erosion. 
Open Water The Open Waters of Te Waihora are driven by the lake opening regime 
and water quality inputs. 
Surrounding 
Agricultural Land 
The Surrounding Agricultural Land is driven by agricultural practices 
that are profit motivated. 
Western Bank 
Wetlands 
The Western Bank Wetlands are driven by inappropriate vegetation and 
lake level management of a highly complex system. 
Table 6.9: Adopted macro-level theories for each of the systems examined. 
 
6.2.6 Ecosystem Network Model & Future Outcomes 
With theories adopted, efforts were made to explore and imagine state space by scenario 
analysis for the respective systems examined. However, for purposes of simplicity only the 
Western Banks Wetlands sub-system was investigated further at this sub-system scale of 
analysis. Importantly, prior to the construction of futuristic qualitative narratives, an ecosystem 
network model of Te Waihora depicting the micro-mapping of the ecosystem was constructed 
by ecological network analysis. This network model was developed to facilitate and guide 
management and the use of scenario analysis by participants. The ecosystem network model 
was not used for formal analysis by multi-agent simulations to generate emergent phenomena, 
in keeping with arguments previously made (Section 4.2.6). However, this form of mathematical 
modelling remains a valid option for future employment of the methodology.   
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Despite the limited understanding of some of the relationships between species found on the 
lake, information for ecological network analysis was elicited by four participants. The network 
model constructed with consultation with participants formed 22 species aggregates (including 
organic matter and detritus) after a process of qualitative aggregation. In addition, to these 22 
species aggregates, five forcing functions were also developed. These forcing functions included: 
Sun (or Solar Radiation), Increased Nutrients, Increased Salinity, Increased Lake Level and Increased 
Sediment. Significantly, neither a decrease in forcing functions nor the abundance of the species 
aggregates was accounted for in this network modelling exercise. 
 
With all variables, as species aggregates or forcing functions developed, each participant made 
pairwise comparisons on a matrix between each variable on the interval scale [-1, 1], which 
indicated the type of relationship found (Table 6.10) (Dunne, 2006). These values represented, 
where applicable, the survivability between any two species aggregates. Hence, the magnitudes 
of the values represented the significance of the relationship, while the positive-negative 
calculus represented whether the relationship was beneficial or detrimental to the survival of 
each species compared. 
 
Relationship type Magnitude and sign of relationship 
Neutralism 0, 0 (no interaction) 
Anabolism +x, 0 
Catabolism -x, 0 
Commenalism 0, +x 
Amenalism 0, -x 
Predation +x, -x 
Altruism -x, +x 
Mutualism +x, +x 
Competition -x, -x 
Table 6.10: A depiction of the relationship types between species. 
 
From these initial values elicited, 19 positive-negative sign contradictions were found, in that 
there were differences not in magnitude, but in relationship effect. Where possible, these sign 
contradictions were revised by the appropriate participants. The remaining sign contradictions 
were averaged. However, in future work these remaining sign contradiuctions could have been 
debated where networked argument structures could be developed using the ECHO model. The 
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completed matrices were averaged amongst the participants and relationships determined 
between variables were plotted as an ecological network model representation of the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem. This representation was subsequently given to participants to examine 
where changes were made through a process of qualitative validation. The validation compared 
the network model constructed to the theories adopted for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and 
its various sub-systems, and empirical evidence. While empirical evidence in the form of 
quantitative analysis is limited for many relationships on the lake (especially those relationships 
between nutrients and primary productivity) (Taylor, 1996; Sagar et al., 2004), it was considered 
after some fine-tuning that the network model was an adequate representation of Te Waihora in 
terms of the potential relationships that could be found on the lake.   
 
The complexity and diversity of Te Waihora is visually evident by the number of interactions 
and species as indicated in the constructed network model representation of the lake ecosystem 
(Figure 6.20). However, despite the ‘bewildering’ number of interactions between species 
assemblages, the network model in Figure 6.20 is only partially represented as weak interactions 
are not indicated even though these interactions can be significant in the structure and 
functioning of an ecosystem (Dell et al., 2005). Indeed, it was perceptively evident by 
participants that Macrophytes, Chlorophyta and Cyanophyta are significant species aggregates, in 
that they interact with many other species, suggesting that they are potential driver species of 
the ecosystem. Moreover, Zooplankton and Benthic Invertebrates also appear to be highly 
connected species aggregates, suggesting that these species aggregates are also potential driver 
species. These perceptions were supported by determined centrality values (data not shown), 
and have been inferred previously in the literature (Sagar et al., 2004). In terms of the forcing 
functions, Increased Nutrients and Increased Lake Level indicated positive effects to the 
survivability of species aggregates, while Increased Salinity and Increased Sediment provided 
negative effects to the survivability of most species aggregates.  
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Figure 6.20: The ecosystem network model of the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. Arrow 
thickness depicts interaction weight, while arrow direction depicts the interaction effect. The 
colour of the arrow depicts the type of relationship between species aggregates (or 
functions). Note that only relationships found with a medium (0.33-0.66) or strong (0.66-1.00) 
interaction weight are shown. Table 6.11 indicates species examples of species aggregates.   
 
Species Aggregates Species Examples 
Agricultural Herbivores Sheep, Cattle 
Agricultural Vegetation Creeping Bent, Pasture Grasses 
Benthic Invertebrates Chironomids, Amphipods, Nematodes 
Benthivorous Fish Smelt, Bullies, Inanga, Flounder, Mullet 
Carnivorous Birds Waders, Swamp Birds, Gulls, Terns, Herons 
Decomposers Fungi, Protozoa, Bacteria 
Feral Carnivores Cats, Stoats 
Feral Herbivores Rabbits, Hares 
Freshwater  Lakeshore 
Vegetation 
Raupo, willows 
Halophytic Lakeshore 
Vegetation 
Glassswort, Native Musk 
Humans Recreational Hunters, Commercial Fishing 
Macrophytes Ruppia, Potamogeton 
Piscivorous Fish Brown Trout, Eels, Kahawai, Perch 
Waterfowl Birds Ducks, Swans, Canada Geese 
Zooplankton Freshwater Mysid, Calanoid Copepods 
         Table 6.11: Species examples within species aggregates.  
 
Catabolism (-, 0) 
Anabolism (+, 0) 
Commensalism (0, +) 
Amenalism (0, -) 
Predation (+, -)  
Altruism (-, +) 
Mutualism (+, +)  
Competition (-, -) 
Key: The relationship 
types by colour coding 
for the ecosystem 
network model 
constructed above. 
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As individuals, various participants, including some outside the allocated groups - which is a 
practice considered appropriate with scenario analysis (van der Heijden, 1996) - were directed to 
construct future outcomes of both positive and negative utility. Group maps, theories 
constructed and the network model developed, where available to participants, for aiding 
scenario construction. Each participant was informed that future outcomes need not be 
considered simple cause-and-effect outcomes from the promoted theory of the system 
investigated. Moreover, they were informed that future outcomes that are likely to provide 
positive utility at the ecosystem level must preserve the integrity of the adaptive cycle. Each 
future outcome, which is representative of a (future) system state for the system, was detailed by 
the participants in a futuristic qualitative narrative. However, the interviewing analyst after 
collating the various future outcomes reinterpreted some of the future outcomes by qualitative 
aggregation where outcomes were considered to be equivalent. This ensured that the number of 
final future outcomes considered was limited to no more than seven per system examined and 
were as diverse as possible from one another. The title of each of these future outcomes 
constructed for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem, Canterbury bioregion and the Western Bank 
Wetlands sub-system are shown in Table 6.12, while futuristic qualitative narratives of each 
future outcome are detailed specifically in Appendix 6.7a-c.  
 
System  Future Outcome Abbreviation 
Te Waihora Agriculture-Dominated AD 
Algal Bloom AB 
 Clear Water (Full) CF 
 Clear Water (Partial)  CP 
 Turbid Water  TW 
Canterbury  Dry Climate DC 
 Globally-Attuned GA 
 Intensive Agriculture IA 
 Lifestyle LS 
 Slums SL 
 Suburban Sprawl SS 
 Tourism TO 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands  
Agriculture AG 
Native Freshwater Wetland  NF 
Native/Weedy Freshwater Wetland NW 
 Saltmarsh SM 
 Willow-Dominated Swampland WD 
Table 6.12: Future outcomes for the various systems investigated. 
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An examination of the various future outcomes constructed, as futuristic qualitative narratives, 
for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem reflects present ecological and limnological understanding of 
shallow lake dynamics. This provides some confidence in their plausibility, but also indicates 
conservatism towards the range of future possibilities. This conservatism was to be expected 
given that mental models had not been disrupted from the use of abductive exercises. However, 
one participant did initially consider the ecosystem in the future to not even be a lake, but rather 
a bay or estuary. However, they decided to abandon both these outcomes, conceiving them to be 
implausible within the temporal scale of this study. The future outcomes constructed for the 
Canterbury bioregion, also as expected reflected the past. However, one outcome (i.e. Slums) 
appeared to have no apparent historical analogue. Finally, the future outcomes constructed for 
the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system resembles actual ecological processes occurring in the 
system presently. For example, the Willow-Dominated Swampland reflects the ongoing pressures 
of willow invasion. 
 
With future outcomes constructed, participants elicited potential surprise values on a zero-to-
one scale to reflect the possibility of each future outcome occurring relevant to background 
policies for each system investigated (Section 5.2.3). Hence, in the case of Te Waihora and the 
Western Bank Wetlands, it was assumed that potential surprise values be given with the 
assumption that status quo management actions are maintained. Prior to eliciting potential 
surprise values for future outcomes in accordance with background policies, participants were 
informed that potential surprise values need not sum to unity, but at least one outcome must be 
given a potential surprise value of zero (Shackle, 1949; 1961). Hence, effort was made to explain 
the difference between potential surprise and probability, in order to avoid possible confusion 
between these functions. However, some confusion was apparent where the investigating 
analyst had to regularly instruct participants throughout the process of elicitation the necessary 
differences between potential surprise and the more familiar function of probability. Once 
potential surprise values were elicited and reflected on, they were then averaged amongst 
values given by the participants for each future outcome. These potential surprise values are 
depicted graphically in Chapter 7.  
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In light of the potential surprise values given, participants by group consensus determined 
neutral outcomes for each system examined. These neutral outcomes are representative of a 
system state that is difficult to disbelieve and provides no utility or disutility to that found at 
present. Not surprisingly, each group chose the future ‘imagined’ outcomes that are the present 
system states for the system examined. Hence, neutral outcomes for the Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem, Canterbury bioregion and Western bank Wetlands sub-system were Turbid Water 
(TW), Globally-Attuned (GA) and Native/Weedy Freshwater Wetland (NW), respectively.  
 
6.2.7 Imagined Abductions & Theory Resilience 
Future outcomes that generated potential surprise values between zero and one provided the 
opportunity for imagined abductions or abductive exercises to occur. Accordingly, participants 
were ‘forced’ to think and generate ex-ante-futuro hypotheses as possible explanations of these 
surprising phenomena (Section 5.2.4). Despite participants being informed of abductive logic, a 
few participants initially developed hypotheses more conducive with inductive logic. In these 
cases, the interviewing analyst re-informed the participants of abductive logic, so that its mode 
of reasoning from evidence to (novel) explanation was clarified.  
 
Examples of ex-ante-futuro hypotheses generated from the potential surprises are shown in Table 
6.13 and 6.14 for the Canterbury bioregion and Te Waihora lake ecosystem, respectively. The 
plausibility and believability values given by participants for various ex-ante-futuro hypotheses 
are shown in Appendix 6.8a-b. No future outcomes in the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system 
generated potential surprise values between zero and one. For this reason, no ex-ante-futuro 
hypotheses were elicited from participants. Accordingly, no experimental cost per plausibility 
analysis was performed given that only the larger systems were examined. All arguments were 
found to have positive argument correlations, while some ex-ante-futuro hypotheses from the 
future outcomes could be reconstructed by meta-analysis, where hypotheses generated were 
deemed to be explanatory, rather than contradictory in nature.  
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Meta-analysis: 
Reconstructed 
hypothesis 
Dry 
Climate 
Irrigation prohibited in Canterbury  C 0.89 6.8  
 Poor understanding of suitable dry 
climate farming 
  4.0  
Intensive 
Agriculture  
New Zealand government becomes a 
dictatorship 
C 0.89 6.8  
Environmental concerns are unfounded   4.0  
Lifestyle Lifestyle experts persuaded of these 
benefits  
E, C 0.57 7.1 Increasing 
environmental 
awareness  Strong green government elected   7.1 
 Fundamental basis of agriculture is 
viewed as unsustainable  
  6.8  
Slums Loss of social capital & institutions  E 0.44 6.7 Social capital 
collapse  Collapse of capitalism   6.6 
Suburban 
Sprawl 
Mass migration from Bangladesh or 
parts of Europe 
E, C 0.24 7.9 Food surplus 
mass migration  
 Agriculture export led, where surplus 
food allows migration 
  7.5 
 Colonization of New Zealand   3.5  
Tourism Oil prices drop to low levels or 
alternative cheap energy 
E, C 0.47 7.6 Cheap travel 
 Substantial increase in tourism demand 
through surplus capital 
  7.6 
 Colonization of New Zealand    2.6  
Table 6.13: The ECHO-adjusted plausibility values generated for promoted ex-ante-futuro 
hypotheses of unexpected phenomena found in the Canterbury bioregion. Note E, C 
indicates that the argument structure between hypotheses had both explanatory connections 
and contradictory connections. This is possible where there are more than two hypotheses 
evaluated.    
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Meta-analysis:  
Reconstructed 
hypothesis 
Clear 
Water 
Less intensification of catchment land 
use  
E, C 0.65 8.2 Decreased 
intensification & 
abstraction Decreased catchment abstraction --- --- 8.2 
 Lag period between nutrient load and 
state transition shorter than expected 
--- --- 2.0  
 Biophysical drivers change altering 
clarity and switching behavior 
--- --- 2.1  
Algal 
Bloom 
Hot summer with little wind (i.e. calm 
conditions) 
E, C 0.5 6.9  
 Irreversible saturation levels of 
nutrients reached  
--- --- 7.3 Irreversible 
saturated 
nutrient levels  Incremental nutrient load exceeds 
prescribed environmental limits 
--- --- 7.0 
 Less sediment in water column leading 
to increased light penetration 
--- --- 6.8  
 Increased catchment abstraction --- --- 5.7  
Table 6.14: The ECHO-adjusted plausibility values generated for promoted ex-ante-futuro 
hypotheses of unexpected phenomena found in the Te Waihora lake ecosystem.  
 
With plausible ex-ante-futuro hypotheses determined to explain the potential surprise of future 
outcomes, three participants determined plausible connection weights for these ex-ante-futuro 
hypotheses as potential conceptual variables into the relevant group maps. The connection 
weights were averaged amongst the participants. The results for the addition of the Decreased 
Intensification conceptual variable are shown in Figure 6.21. It should noted that none of the 
participants considered removing or decreasing connection weights as a result of the addition of 
the Decreased Intensification conceptual variable into the group map. The results of incorporating 
other ex-ante-futuro hypotheses added to their relevant group maps are shown in Appendix 6.9a-
g.  
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Figure 6.21: Normalized centrality values of the 15 most central conceptual variables of the Te 
Waihora group map after the incorporation of the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Decreased 
Intensification.   
 
Given that the conceptual variable Decreased Intensification was the second most central variable 
in the Te Waihora group map and that it was disruptive as it appeared in contradiction with the 
Catchment Land Use conceptual variable, participants suggested that the present theory 
constructed was vulnerable to change. However, simulations performed, using the two 
analytical procedures for examining the resilience of the group maps, suggested to participants 
that the group map remained resilient. Table 6.15 summarizes the resilience of promoted theories 
and group maps constructed with the addition of the various plausible ex-ante-futuro hypotheses 
as conceptual variables into the relevant group maps. An examination of Table 6.15 suggests that 
under some possible outcomes both the Te Waihora and Canterbury theories that emerged from 
the group maps are vulnerable to change, which in turn suggests that considerable non-
ergodicity for the future is conceived to be present in these systems. It is also observed that the 
Dictatorship conceptual variable would provide resilience both in the theory and the group map. 
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This result appears quite anomalous, and is suggestive of the paradoxical view of one 
participant.  
 
System  Plausible ex-ante-futuro hypotheses/ 
Introduced conceptual variables  
Promoted 
theory resilience   
Group map 
resilience  
Te Waihora  Decreased intensification & abstraction  Vulnerable  Resilient 
 Irreversible saturated nutrient levels Resilient  Resilient 
Canterbury  Irrigation prohibited Vulnerable  Vulnerable 
 Dictatorship Resilient  Resilient 
 Increasing environmental awareness Resilient  Resilient  
 Social capital collapse Vulnerable Resilient 
 Food surplus mass migration Vulnerable  Vulnerable  
 Cheap travel  Vulnerable  Resilient 
Table 6.15: The resilience of theories and the group maps with the integration of plausible ex-
ante-futuro hypotheses. 
 
In spite of the possibility of further reconstruction of theories that were found to be vulnerable 
to change by accommodating these plausible ex-ante-futuro hypotheses into promoted theories 
and the subsequent development of new future imagined outcomes through scienario analysis 
from these altered theories, this was not undertaken in this empirical case study. This was not 
performed because of time constraints with the participants, but is seen as future work that 
needs to be explored. Nevertheless, an iteration of the abductive process of research has been 
demonstrated, which was the task of this chapter. Indeed, it is foreseen that this process may not 
find a resilient set of group maps and theories indicating not only that resource co-managers 
need to prepare for change and uncertainty in future, but that the proposed abductive process of 
research has potential to disrupt mental models and provide a means of bringing about a 
continuous process of problem-solving. Accordingly, beliefs may be formed and reformed in an 
endogenous manner and may not settle down. This indicates that this methodology is governed 
by a non-linear potentially complex macro-state in keeping with the potential of developing an 
ecological rationality. Moreover, the significance of abductive logic when systematically applied 
has been demonstrated in the fact that the disruption allows the potential to bring about mental 
model flexibility and the avoidance of a reactive mindset formed through habituation. These 
features are critical for scenario analysis and the management of ecosystems as complex 
adaptive systems.  
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6.2.8 Conclusion  
The purpose of this chapter was to practically apply the abductive process of research to an 
empirical case study. Hence, the various steps indicated in Figure 6.1 have been completed in 
order to examine the ‘degraded’ Te Waihora lake ecosystem. In doing so, a multiple scale 
evaluation of Te Waihora began. With the systematic application of various appropriate 
methods, including fuzzy cognitive mapping, participants were able to infer and construct 
explicit theories, as bounded demi-macro-regularities, which explain the behaviour of the 
various examined systems. Hence, knowledge of Te Waihora has been revealed, which is 
necessary for the appropriate ecosystem management of this lake ecosystem as complex 
adaptive system. With this knowledge discerned, a post-classical economic evaluation of Te 
Waihora using cost utility analysis and potential surprise can be performed. This it is hoped will 
reveal cost-effective management actions, which if implemented, is conceived to improve lake 
health. It is this task, which is attempted in the following chapter.  
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Chapter 7: The Choice of 
Management Action for Te Waihora 
 
The most surprising future is one which contains no surprises  
 
Herman Kahn 
 
7.0 Introduction 
In the previous chapter, a macro-level theory of ecosystem behaviour was constructed for the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem. Given that multiple scales were evaluated, theories of system 
behaviour for the Canterbury bioregion, which Te Waihora is nested within, and the various 
sub-systems of Te Waihora were also constructed. With this knowledge revealed, future 
outcomes and their associated potential surprise values were also elicited. This information 
provides some of the ingredients to practically apply a post-classical economic evaluation of Te 
Waihora, which is a principal purpose of this thesis.  
 
Previously, Young (2001) applied potential surprise as a non-probabilistic function, for an 
economic evaluation of a proposed highway development affecting the ‘quality’ of an 
‘ecosystem’ in Belize. This was a significant development, as potential surprise until then was an 
underdeveloped method in terms of in-depth empirical work. However, despite this pioneering 
work, Young’s study expressed the benefits supplied by the ecosystem examined in monetary 
terms. Moreover, much of the ingredients for the economic evaluation of the ecosystem 
appeared to be given. But, as recognized previously, that for any management action to be 
considered legitimate, it is necessary that some form of transparent reasoned response is 
developed for the motivation of implementing management actions. It is this knowledge that 
provides the necessary ‘checks-and-balances’ to the managerial process.  
 
In this study, knowledge is used from that developed in the previous chapter, while ‘value’ in 
this economic evaluation is expressed by ecosystem services, which is captured in the ECOPY 
index or Ecosystem Outcome Protection Years (Section 2.2.6 & Equation 2.2). Hence, this 
economic evaluation, while building on the work of Young, performs the novel undertaking of 
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applying a genuinely post-classical economic evaluation, where cost utility analysis is integrated 
with the potential surprise method on multiple scales for the economic evaluation of the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem. Indeed, while Cullen et al. (1999; 2001) recognized the importance of 
cost utility analysis for the economic evaluation of environmental projects, given the difficulties 
in monetizing benefits, these researchers only employed cost utility analysis at the species level 
using the index, Conservation Output Protection Years (COPY). While there have been recent 
efforts to extend cost utility analysis beyond species management (e.g. water quality 
environmental projects) (Hajkowicz et al., 2008), this is the first comprehensive use of cost utility 
analysis for economic evaluation at the ecosystem level. Similarly, while Young (2001) 
recognized the relevance of employing Shacklean potential surprise for the economic evaluation 
of ecosystems, because of their non-ergodicity, he employed the neoclassical approach of cost 
benefit analysis with potential surprise. It is with this economic evaluation that these previous 
works are extended to form a novel and practical application of a genuinely post-classical 
economic evaluation of an ecosystem. From this evaluation, it is hoped that cost-effective 
management actions can be determined that can improve the health of this ‘degraded’ lake 
ecosystem. 
 
Specifically, this chapter examines the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and one of its sub-systems, 
the Western Bank Wetlands, in order to apply a practical post-classical economic evaluation of 
this ecosystem. The chapter begins by documenting the methods used (e.g. analytical hierarchy 
process; Section 4.2.9) and elicited outputs of preferential weights and utility scores for 
ecosystem services. These weights and scores allow for the construction of the ECOPY index. 
The chapter then, discusses in a critical manner, the two stage potential surprise method 
developed by Shackle (1949; 1955; 1961) for undertaking economic evaluations. This two stage 
method applies an ascendancy function for generating (primary) focus outcomes, and then uses 
gambler preference mapping for comparing gain-loss pairings for proposed management 
actions. This two stage method is employed for cost utility analysis and the ECOPY index to 
ascertain cost-effective management actions, which are evaluated against comparative research. 
In order, to aid and facilitate the reading of this chapter, Figure 7.1 depicts the various sequence 
of steps used for the practical application of the post-classical economic evaluation.    
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Figure 7.1: Diagram indicating the sequence of steps used 
in this post-classical economic evaluation of Te Waihora.  
Note each section where each analytical step is undertaken is also indicated.  
 
 
Section 7.3: Proposed 
management actions 
Section 7.1: Preferential 
weights and utility 
scores elicited for 
ecosystem services of 
each future outcome 
Section 7.1: Formation of 
ECO index for each 
future outcome  
Potential surprise values 
for future outcomes 
Section 7.2: Ascendant 
ECO-potential surprise 
pairings generate 
primary focus outcomes 
Section 7.2: ECO-potential 
surprise pairings for 
future outcomes 
Section 7.3: Potential 
surprise maps of PV cost 
per ECOPY gained (or 
lost)-potential surprise 
pairings for actions   
Section 7.3: Potential 
surprise values and 
present value (PV) costs 
for management actions 
Section 7.4: Gambler 
preference mapping by 
formation of PV cost per 
ECOPY gained-PV cost 
per ECOPY lost pairings 
for management actions 
Section 7.4: Cost-effective 
management actions 
indicated 
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7.1 Preferential Weights & Utility Scores  
In Chapter 2, ecosystem health was defined in part as an economic concept. The validity of this 
economic conception of ecosystem health was established through the fact that the scale-free 
network of an ecosystem as a complex adaptive system is defined by a fitness-connectivity 
product (Barabási & Albert, 1999). This fitness-connectivity product reflects the bundle of 
ecosystem services supplied and the preferential weight of these ecosystem services to satisfy 
needs. It is this product that establishes the ECOPY index. Hence, in order to quantify the 
ECOPY index there is a need to determine utility scores and preferential weights for ecosystem 
services in different systems states (i.e. future outcomes) (Section 2.2.6).  
 
Accordingly, preferential weights for ecosystem services were elicited from nine participants 
from the Te Waihora group and the Canterbury group with the aid of Table 2.3. The Canterbury 
group gave preferential weights for ecosystem services representative of the present system 
state for the Canterbury bioregion. Similarly, the Te Waihora group gave preferential weights 
representative of the present system state for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. In order to bring 
legitimacy to the preferential weights determined for the Te Waihora group, preferences were 
determined by participants from government agencies and local communities. In all cases 
participants were requested to elicit preferences from the perspective of the needs of citizens 
(Section 1.2).  
 
Elicited preferential weights for ecosystem services were analysed using the analytical hierarchy 
process, which, as explained previously (Section 4.2.8), is a multi-criteria analysis method that 
decomposes ‘complex’ evaluations into a hierarchical network. This use of the analytical 
hierarchy process for constructing the ECOPY index of all ecosystem services is a novel 
development. The three-level hierarchical network in this case is represented by the various 
ecosystem services and the criteria of ecosystem services (Figure 4.1). A greater number of levels 
could have been added to this hierarchical network, however, there is only a limited amount of 
data available about ecosystem services. Preferential weights were elicited by pairwise 
comparisons between ecosystem services on a one-to-nine scale (Table 7.1) (Saaty, 1980; 1995).  
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Linguistic  
Preference 
Numeric 
preferences 
Indifference 1 
Weak preference 3 
Medium preference 5 
Strong preference 7 
Overwhelming preference 9 
Table 7.1: Qualitative-numeric table for the elicitation of preferential weights 
 (adapted from Saaty, 1980). 
 
The pairwise comparisons that are elicited represent the cardinal intensity of preference between 
each ecosystem service pairing. These pairwise comparisons w as ratios between each ecosystem 
service pairing can be expressed in a ratio matrix A (Equation 7.1). It is in a ratio matrix that 
analysis can be undertaken and preferential weights determined for the set of ecosystem 
services. While this ratio matrix for the many ecosystem services would be computationally 
demanding to solve, there are many programmes (e.g. Expert Choice) dedicated to undertaking 
evaluations by the analytical hierarchy process. 
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Equation 7.1: Ratio matrix of pairwise comparisons.  
 
Accordingly, with all preferences for ecosystem services (and criteria for ecosystem services) 
elicited from participants, they were analysed by the computational programme Expert Choice 
(2009). This programme is specifically designed for the purposes of determining preferential 
weights, in accordance with the ratio mathematics of the analytical hierarchy process. From this 
analysis, it was found that preferential weights for ecosystem services were mostly consistent 
throughout. However, three participants had some inconsistencies in their elicitation of 
preferences greater than ten per cent, as indicated by a determined index of consistency. This 
consistency index calculates in the Expert Choice programme the degree of intransitivity of 
preferential weights given. Saaty (1980; 1995) suggests that where the consistency index for 
preferences is greater than ten per cent then preferential weights should be considered for 
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revision. Hence, these participants were asked if they wished to adjust and revise their 
preferences, in light of these inconsistencies. In each case, these participants adjusted their 
pairwise comparisons to a reasonably consistent set of preferential weights for the ecosystem 
services evaluated. These final averaged preferential weights developed are shown in Figure 7.2.  
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Figure 7.2: Preferential weights for ecosystem services from the Te Waihora group and 
Canterbury group assuming present-day Canterbury conditions (Globally-Attuned outcome).  
 
It can be observed from Figure 7.2 that there are considerable differences between the average 
preferential weights elicited for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem when compared with the 
Canterbury bioregion. In particular, preferential weights for Te Waihora are more evenly 
distributed, while preferential weights for Canterbury focus around the Food ecosystem service 
and provisioning ecosystem services more generally (Table 2.2). This might be expected, as the 
Canterbury bioregion is dominated by agricultural production, as indicated by the consensual 
theory constructed in the previous chapter (Table 6.8). Significantly, considerable preferential 
weight was given towards Spiritual Values for Te Waihora, signifying presumably the 
importance of whakapapa of the lake to Ngāi Tahu.  
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With the preferential weights of ecosystem services established by the analytical hierarchy 
process, it is necessary to determine utility scores for each future outcome, so that a multi-
criteria analysis can be calculated, where an ECO index can be determined for each future 
outcome. Equation 7.2 indicates the aggregation of preferential weights and utility scores used to 
calculate the ECO index in keeping with the ecosystem services index developed by Banzhaf and 
Boyd (2005), and the connective theory of value (Foster, 2006; Straton, 2006). 
 
µ=∑ n nECO s  
Equation 7.2: The ECO utility index.  
Here ECO is the ecosystem outcome index of utility; 
μn is the preferential weight for ecosystem service n; and 
sni is the utility score of the degree that the ecosystem service n is supplied in system state i. 
 
The determination of utility scores that reflect ecosystem services supplied for each of the future 
outcomes constructed is a difficult undertaking (Table 6.10). This is because it is difficult to 
determine the quantity and type of ecosystem services that will be generated for the future 
outcomes elicited (Peterson et al., 2002; Capistrano et al., 2006). It is known that it is difficult 
obtaining data of ecosystem services supplied even for present systems states (Kremen, 2005; 
Costanza et al., 2007b), let alone for future system states. For this reason, this work employs the 
use of subjective utility scores in accord with the ecosystem services work of Bohensky et al. 
(2006). Utility scores were developed on a scale based on only a few points of magnitude and the 
direction from those ecosystem services supplied from the neutral outcome. This scale for the 
utility scores of an ecosystem service and its transformed numerical equivalent is depicted in 
Table 7.2. These utility scores, while simplistic, is in keeping with post-classical sentiments as 
utility is depicted by marginal changes around a designated neutral frame. After all, what is 
critical is measuring changes in ecosystem servies from a particular management action, rather 
than the value of the entire ecosystem (National Research Council, 2005).  
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Qualitative linguistic scale Denomination Transformed numeric scale 
High decrease -- -1 
Low decrease - - 0.5 
No change 0 0 
Low increase  + +0.5 
High increase ++ +1 
Table 7.2: Utility scores of ecosystem services generated for a future outcome relative to the 
present system state. Note utility scores reflect averages over the adaptive cycle.  
 
From Table 7.2, utility scores were elicited by seven participants from appropriate groups with 
the aid of Table 2.3, before being reflected on and investigated by the appropriate group, as a 
group. In all cases, the group were satisfied with the utility values generated. The utility values 
developed are shown in Appendix 7.1. It was found that the utility scores generated for the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem for the various future outcomes differed substantially for each future 
outcome as an alternative system state. For example, the Algal Bloom future outcome (AB) was 
only given zero or negative utility scores relative to the neutral outcome. With the Agriculture-
Dominated future outcome (AD) high positive utility scores were found in provisioning 
ecosystem services, but high negative utility scores were found in cultural ecosystem services. 
However, in both Clear Water (Full and Partial) future outcomes (CF and CP) only zero or 
positive utility scores were found for all ecosystem services, with greatest utility increases found 
with regulatory and cultural ecosystem services. This finding differs from the arguments put 
forward by Hayward and Ward (2009), where they suggested a clear water state for Te Waihora 
may result in some negative consequences, because it may increase the likelihood of localized 
algal blooms through increased light availability in clearer waters.  
 
The determined ECO values for each future outcome provided an indication of the gains or 
losses of utility relative to the neutral outcome for each of the systems investigated (Table 7.3). 
With the potential surprise values established previously for background policies (i.e. status quo 
management actions for Te Waihora and Western Bank Wetlands) (Section 6.2.6), it was then 
possible to depict each future outcome as an ECO-potential surprise pairing. 
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System Gain outcome Neutral outcome Loss outcome 
Te Waihora Clear Water (Full) (CF), 
Clear Water (Partial) (CP) 
Turbid Water  
(TW) 
Algal Bloom (AB), 
Agriculture-Dominated (AD) 
Canterbury Intensive Agriculture 
(IA), Lifestyle (LS) 
Globally-Attuned 
(GA) 
Dry Climate (DC), Slums 
(SL), Suburban Sprawl (SS), 
Tourism (TO) 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Native Freshwater 
(NF), Agriculture (AG) 
Native/Weedy 
Freshwater 
Wetland (NW) 
Agriculture (AG), 
Saltmarsh (SM), Willow 
-Dominated Swampland (WD) 
Table 7.3: Gain and loss outcomes for the various systems examined. Note that the Agriculture 
future outcome can be both a gain and a loss outcome depending on which set of preferential 
weights is used.  
 
7.2 Ascendancy & Focusing 
For an economic evaluation using potential surprise, it should, according to Shackle (1961), be 
completed in two stages. First, there is a need to specify an ascendancy function. An ascendancy 
function is determined by subjectively examining future outcomes, as ECO-potential surprise 
pairings, before editing out rival future outcomes according to the weight that they arrest the 
attention of the mind. Secondly, there is a need to construct a gambler preference map. A 
gambler preference map allows the examination of rival management actions in a comparable 
manner. This is achieved by standardizing outcomes by removing their potential surprise. This 
two stage method is both controversial and complicated. In this section, the controversy over the 
ascendancy function is examined, before it is applied to this empirical case study.  
 
In conceiving of the ascendancy function, Shackle (1949) proposed that a focusing mechanism be 
used. The reason for a focusing mechanism is because Shackle insisted that human agents do not 
add together all rival future outcomes. Rather, he maintained that human agents focus on those 
outcomes that arrest the attention of the mind. This focussing mechanism was reasoned because 
the ‘working’ mind of human agents is unable to compute large amounts of information (Ford, 
1990). Empirical evidence supports these claims, as the mechanism of focusing has been shown 
to be how human agents manipulate rival outcomes (Tversky & Kahneman, 1981; 1986).  
 
Nevertheless, regardless of empirical evidence for the apparent use of a focussing mechanism, it 
has remained controversial. For example, Ford (1987) has claimed that the use of a focussing 
mechanism would appear irrational, as it intentionally neglects all available information in the 
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economic evaluation. However, two factors need to be considered in response to this argument. 
First, participants in determining those outcomes that are ascendant should scan through all 
available information prior to finalizing those outcomes which they have focussed on. Secondly, 
given the presence of bounded rationality it makes sense to reduce the computational task 
involved through the focussing mechanism, so as to make subsequent analysis potentially more 
manageable (Earl, 1986). The need for easing the computation involved has been recognized in 
scenario analysis where a small number of outcomes that maintain their identity make for less 
confusion with subsequent analysis (van der Heijden, 1996). In fact, even three outcomes have 
been found to be too many, as there is a tendency to prefer the middling outcome (Jefferson, 
1983). For this reason, some scenario analysts choose to ‘focus’ their analysis on just two 
outcomes – the best-case and the worse-case outcomes (Earl, 1995).  
 
The ascendancy of each outcome reflects its capacity to arrest the attention of the mind (Shackle, 
1949). Hence, the determination of ascendancy is governed by participants scanning through the 
various rival outcomes, as pairings of ECO-potential surprise, to determine one outcome of 
significance, for the gain and loss rival outcomes. Thus, participants have the opportunity to 
consider the ascendancy of outcomes differently for gains and losses. It is important to recognize 
that ascendancy is not given to those outcomes that maximize utility (ECO) (Young, 2001). 
Rather, ascendancy reflects the subjective trade-off between the extent that the utility generated 
on the one hand and the potential surprise value on the other arrest the attention of the mind 
(Shackle, 1961). Accordingly, the ascendancy of an outcome is ascertained by its distance from 
the neutral outcome, the difficulty that the participant has in disbelieving the outcome, and the 
uncertainty aversion of the participant (Earl, 1983; 1986).  
 
The future outcomes that arrest the resource co-managers’ attention, in that they have the 
greatest ascendancy within gain and loss outcomes, are termed the ‘primary focus gain’ and 
‘primary focus loss’ (Shackle, 1961), which will be called hereafter the ‘focus gain’ and ‘focus 
loss’ outcomes. The focus gain and focus loss outcomes, in effect, represent ‘the best that could 
be hoped for’ and ‘the worst that could be feared’, respectively (Shackle, 1949; Young, 2001).  
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Shackle (1949) maintained that the determination of the focus gain and focus loss outcomes be 
completed by the elicitation of ascendancy weights for each future outcome on an interval scale 
[0, 1], where one represents that outcome with the greater ascendancy. In eliciting these 
ascendancy weights, participants are forced to consider all available information before 
determining those focus outcomes that arrest their attention (Young, 2001). However, when 
determining the focus outcomes according to background policies (i.e. status quo management 
actions for Te Waihora and Western Bank Wetlands) for the various systems investigated it was 
observed in each case that these focus outcomes was perceptively obvious. This was because 
these outcomes dominated all others. For example, when investigating the various ECO-
potential surprise pairings for the Canterbury bioregion, which is necessary given that this 
system will also change in the long-term, it was recognized that the focus gain and focus loss 
outcomes were located at the bottom right and bottom left of Figure 7.3. For this reason, the 
elicitation of ascendancy weights for the Canterbury bioregion was not considered necessary. 
Instead by group consensus the focus gain and focus loss outcomes were selected. These were 
the Intensive Agriculture (IA) and the Dry Climate (DC) future outcomes.   
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Figure 7.3: Focus outcome identification by ECO-potential surprise pairings for the 
Canterbury bioregion.  
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With the determination of Intensive Agriculture and Dry Climate as the focus gain and focus loss 
outcomes of the Canterbury bioregion, preferential weights for ecosystem services under these 
outcomes were elicited by four participants from the Canterbury group. Once again, the 
analytical hierarchy process was used for the determination of preferential weights, where the 
same participants who determined the present system state preferences (Figure 7.2), provided 
future preferences of citizens for these focus gain and focus loss outcomes. This preferential 
weighting of future outcomes is possible, as recognized by the somatic marker hypothesis 
(Section 4.1.1) (Damasio, 1994). In determining these preferential weights, this economic 
evaluation recognized that given the bioregion will change in the long-term as indicated by the 
focus gain and loss outcomes determined, that preferences are likely to change as well. This 
recognition is especially relevant to economic evaluations using an ecosystem services approach, 
as Banzhaf and Boyd (2005) argue that ecosystem services are likely to far less stable than 
tradeable commodities because of their limited exchange properties and poor information about 
them.  
 
The likelihood of preferential weights changing was observed, as Figure 7.4 indicates that 
preferential weights for the ecosystem services varied markedly from the preferential weights 
elicited for the Canterbury bioregion under present-day conditions or neutral outcome (Globally-
Attuned). The most notable differences between the preferential weights for ecosystem services 
amongst the various outcomes are observed with the Food and the Freshwater ecosystem services. 
It is to be expected that participants envisaged that if the Intensive Agriculture future outcome 
occurred that preferences within the Canterbury bioregion would focus considerable preference 
around the agricultural production of food. This preference on the Food ecosystem service, 
however, was found to be far less weighted if the Dry Climate future outcome occurred. Instead, 
participants envisaged that preferences around freshwater would be considered important.  
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Figure 7.4: Preferential weights for ecosystem services under the focus gain (Intensive 
Agriculture future outcome) and focus loss (Dry Climate future outcome) outcomes for the 
Canterbury bioregion. 
 
From these various preferential weights established for the Canterbury bioregion, four possible 
preferential weights were considered for further analysis, in order to determine the focus gain 
and focus loss outcomes for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and the Western Bank Wetlands 
sub-system. These preferential weights were Te Waihora preferential weights only, Te Waihora 
and present-day Canterbury preferential weights equally combined, Te Waihora and Intensive 
Agriculture preferential weights equally combined and Te Waihora and Dry Climate preferential 
weights, also, equally combined. Figure 7.5 depicts the identification of the focus gain and focus 
loss outcomes for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem under the status quo management action. The 
focus gain and focus loss outcome were determined to be the Clear Water (Partial) future 
outcome (CP) and Algal Bloom future outcome (AB), respectively. As indicated previously, these 
ascendant outcomes were determined by group consensus and did not require ascendancy 
weights given as they were considered perceptively obvious.  
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Figure 7.5: Focus outcome identification by potential surprise versus utility (ECO) 
for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem.  
 
The Western Bank Wetlands focus gain and focus loss outcomes were also identified directly by 
group consensus. Figure 7.6 depicts the identification of the focus gain and focus loss outcomes 
for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem under the status quo management action. The focus gain and 
focus loss outcomes were the Native Freshwater future outcome (NF) and Willow-Dominated 
Swampland future outcome (WD), respectively. Table 7.4 provides a summary of the focus gain 
and focus loss outcomes identified for each system examined. It should be noted that neutral 
outcomes for background policies were determined previously (Section 6.2.6).  
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Figure 7.6: Focus outcome identification by potential surprise versus utility (ECO) for the 
Western Bank Wetlands sub-system.  
 
System Focus gain outcome Neutral outcome Focus loss outcome 
Te Waihora Clear Water (Partial) (CP) Turbid Water (TW) Algal Bloom (AB) 
Canterbury Intensive Agriculture (IA) Globally-Attuned (GA) Dry Climate (DC) 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Native Freshwater 
Wetland (NF) 
Native/Weedy 
Freshwater Wetland 
(NW) 
Willow-Dominated 
Swampland (WD) 
Table 7.4: The focus gain and focus loss outcomes identified 
for each of the systems examined. 
 
7.3 Feasible Management Actions & Potential Surprise Mapping 
The identification of the focus gain and focus loss future outcomes for the Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem, Canterbury bioregion and the Western Bank Wetlands provided the basis for the 
economic evaluation of various additional management actions proposed. It is important to note 
that this application of focus gain and focus loss outcomes is a simplification of the potential 
surprise method originally developed by Shackle (1961). In his approach, each and every 
management action proposed should be be evaluated using an ascendancy function to 
determine its respective focus gain and focus loss outcomes. However, given that each 
management action proposed would be implemented on the same system, whether that is the Te 
NF 
AG 
WD 
NW 
SM 
Focus 
Gain 
Focus 
Loss 
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Waihora lake ecosystem or the Western Bank Wetlands, it was considered a valid simplification 
to assume that the focus outcomes determined by the status quo management action provide 
suitable benchmarks with which to compare various proposed management actions. Hence, the 
task here is comparing the capacity of various management actions proposed in directing the 
ecosystem into the system state determined to be the focus gain outcome and avoiding the 
system state determined to be the focus loss outcome. This simplification of Shackle’s potential 
surprise method is reasonable because not only are we comparing focus outcomes relative to the 
neutral outcome, but we are comparing the status quo management action relative to various 
proposed management acitons. An additional motivation for the simplification is because it was 
evident from the work of Young (2001) that undertaking an economic evaluation using Shackle’s 
potential surprise method is complicated and especially difficult for groups to administer.  
 
Nevertheless, this simplification is only appropriate where adaptive co-management is 
considered for a single ecosystem and may not be suitable for constructive co-management. 
Hence, while the simplification is useful, in that it simplifies a complicated process of evaluation 
allowing greater continuity and comparability between rival management actions, it does 
forsake the possibility of analysing various management actions between different ecosystems, 
which is the task of portfolio analysis. However, this simplification remains suitable for portfolio 
analysis as long as each ecosystem evaluated has its own specific focus outcomes determined 
from its own status quo management action. Incidently, this simplification is not suitable for 
constructive co-management because there is a need to go beyond the conservatism of the status 
quo when determining focus gain and focus loss outcomes. For example, one of the participants 
mentioned the possibility of a Bay/Estuary future outcome for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. 
However, while this future outcome was rejected before it was even considered for further 
analysis, it could have been achieved through the management action of extensively bulldozing 
and dredging Kaitorete Spit.   
 
In order to avoid conservatism, the ecological network model developed (Section 6.2.6) was used 
to stimulate the imagination of participants for developing new management actions that could 
be implemented to make a transition towards the focus gain outcome. A multitude of possible 
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management actions were proposed by participants. These proposed management actions are 
succinctly represented in Appendix 7.2a for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and Appendix 7.2b for 
the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. Of note, the management actions considered were all 
focussed on ecosystem management. Hence, this economic evaluation did not examine the 
impact of economic policy actions, such as the implementation of a tax on the runoff of 
agricultural pollutants.   
 
The proposed management actions were subsequently evaluated by seven participants for their 
feasibility by eliciting potential surprise values on the interval scale [0, 1], where a zero potential 
surprise value reflects perfect feasibility (or perfect possibility). That is, the degree of potential 
surprise elicited reflected whether the proposed management actions could be conceived to be 
feasibly implemented for ecosystem management within the next five years. Management 
actions proposed with an averaged potential surprise value greater than 0.9 were considered 
‘infeasible’ and were ignored from further analysis. The remaining management actions were 
discounted using a five per cent discount rate. The resultant present value (PV) costs over five 
and 25 years for the feasible management actions are shown in Table 7.5. The determination of 
the cost structures for each feasible management action is detailed in Appendix 7.3a for the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem and Appendix 7.3b for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. Potential 
surprise values for each management action were elicited by 11 participants from the Te 
Waihora and sub-systems group. These potential surprise values represented the surprise that 
would be felt if either the focus gain or focus loss outcomes as system states occurred relative to 
the neutral outcome with the implementation of each proposed management action. No 
imagined abductions (or abductive exercises) were recorded for potential surprises from these 
management actions. This further simplification was considered necessary so that the abductive 
process of research and post-classical economic evaluation could be considered separately. 
However, crucially, both methodologies are in fact intimately intertwined.  
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System  Feasible management actions  
A
bb
re
vi
at
io
n 
 
PV Costs 
(5 years,  
r = 5%) 
PV Costs  
(25 years,  
r = 5%) 
Te Waihora  Status Quo Lake Opening SQ $710,000 $2,311,000 
Active Macrophyte Re-establishment AR $5,240,000 $6,841,000 
Artificial Retention Basin RB $11,257,000 $13,845,000 
Controlled Opening Flow Outlet CO $21,494,000 $36,141,000 
Fish Biomanipulation FB $2,381,000 $3,982,000 
Higher Trigger Level Lake Opening HT $13,255,000 $14,620,000 
Riparian Restoration Planting RP $3,332,000 $4,933,000 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Status Quo DOC Monitoring SQ $35,000 $113,000 
DOC Land Purchase of Private Wetlands  LP $9,043,000 $9,141,000 
Riparian Restoration Planting RP $843,000 $960,000 
Wetland Education & Restoration WE $6,569,000 $6,726,000 
Willow Removal  WR $1,047,000 $1,311,000 
Table 7.5: Feasible management actions and their costs over the short and long-term for the Te 
Waihora lake ecosystem and the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. All costs are in New 
Zealand dollars.   
 
Utility (ECO) determined for each focus gain and focus loss outcome, was, like the costs of the 
feasible management actions, discounted (r = 5%) providing the ECOPY index. Discounted costs 
were subsequently determined for the amount of ‘one’ complete ECOPY gained or ‘one’ 
complete ECOPY lost. This PV cost per ECOPY gained (or lost) was plotted against the potential 
surprise value of the various feasible management actions. In the case of the Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem, ECOPY gains meant the ecosystem transitioning into the Clear Water future outcome 
(i.e. focus gain outcome), while ECOPY losses meant the ecosystem transitioning into the Algal 
Bloom future outcome (i.e. focus loss outcome).  
 
All economic evaluations were made in the short-term (i.e. five years) and the long-term (i.e. 25 
years). Preferential weights used in the economic evaluation were the ‘realistic’ average between 
Te Waihora preferential weights and Canterbury preferential weights, as this allowed both local 
and regional preferences to be considered. It should be noted that for the short-term five year 
evaluations, present-day Canterbury (Globally-Attuned) preferential weights were used. 
However, for the long-term 25 year evaluations, the preferential weights elicited for the Intensive 
Agriculture or Dry Climate future outcomes were used. This highlights that in the long-term the 
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bioregion itself is likely to be changing, thus, increasing the uncertainty present in the economic 
evaluation.  
 
Figure 7.7 depicts the PV cost per ECOPY gained versus potential surprise after five years of 
implementing the various management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. After five 
years it is indicated that the participants consider it to be strongly surprising for any of the 
management actions to bring about ECOPY gains through the occurrence of the Clear Water 
(Partial) future outcome. However, the least surprise is found with the management action 
Controlled Opening Flow Outlet (CO). A potentially efficient frontier is drawn, which reflects those 
cost-effective management actions that dominate inefficient management actions.  
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Figure 7.7: Potential surprise map for ECOPY gains (i.e. system transitions from neutral 
outcome to focus gain outcome) after five years (r = 5%) of implementing the various feasible 
management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. Note that where ECOPY gains are 
analysed, that the most cost-effective management actions are found at the bottom left of the 
diagram. 
 
Figure 7.8 depicts the PV cost per ECOPY lost versus potential surprise after five years of 
implementing the various management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. The potential 
surprise values are more clustered where ECOPY losses are concerned, indicating that the Algal 
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Bloom future outcome may occur, regardless of the management action implemented. Hence, 
least cost management actions, in general, were found to be on the potentially efficient frontier.  
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Figure 7.8: Potential surprise map for ECOPY losses (i.e. system transitions from neutral 
outcome to focus loss outcome) after five years (r = 5%) of implementing the various feasible 
management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. Note that where ECOPY lost are 
analysed, that the most cost-effective management actions are found at the top left of the 
diagram. 
 
Figure 7.9 depicts the PV cost per ECOPY gained versus potential surprise after 25 years of 
implementing the various management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem, but where 
the Canterbury bioregion has changed toward the Intensive Agriculture future outcome. In this 
case, the potential surprise values of any management action providing ECOPY gains through 
the occurrence of the Clear Water (Partial) future outcome remains similar to that after five years. 
This at first might appear counter-intuitive; however, it could reflect that if an Intensive 
Agriculture future outcome does occur that a negation would result in the progress of the 
management actions realizing a Clear Water (Partial) future outcome. This is because there would 
be an increased amount of pollutants from the intensification of agricultural practices, which 
would inflow into the lake waters of Te Waihora.  
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Figure 7.9: Potential surprise map for ECOPY gains after 25 years (r = 5%) of implementing 
the various feasible management actions under an Intensive Agriculture future outcome. 
 
Figure 7.10 depicts the PV cost per ECOPY lost versus potential surprise after 25 years of 
implementing the various management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem under the 
Intensive Agriculture future outcome. In this case, it is observed that in spite of the management 
actions implemented, that the Algal Bloom future outcome resulting in ECOPY losses is 
considered to have few obstacles for its occurrence. This reflects the imagined abduction, that 
with an increased nutrient load within the lake waters, that the Te Waihora lake ecosystem 
could reach a saturation point where algal blooms occur, despite other environmental factors 
(e.g. wind) tending to prevent such an outcome from occurring.  
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Figure 7.10: Potential surprise map for ECOPY losses after 25 years (r = 5%) of implementing 
the various feasible management actions under an Intensive Agriculture future outcome.  
 
Figure 7.11 depicts the PV cost per ECOPY gained versus potential surprise after 25 years of 
implementing the various management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem, but where 
the Canterbury bioregion has changed towards the Dry Climate future outcome. It is shown that 
while the potential surprise values have lowered, indicating less surprise of a Clear Water 
(Partial) future outcome occurring, the lowering of the potential surprise is only marginal. This 
is despite the fact that there would be less water and nutrients inflowing into the lake. This 
result, however, can be supported by previous findings, where, while increased nutrient input 
can result in the immediate eutrophic effects of algal blooms, a decreased nutrient input may not 
result in a clear water state and the reversal of eutrophication in shallow lakes (Scheffer et al., 
1993). Indeed, the recycling of nutrients within the lake can be so large, that often even large 
reductions in nutrient loading cannot reverse the effects of eutrophication and its turbid water 
state (Mäler, 2000). In fact, system state reversal is further complicated, as while turbidity, in 
part, prevents algal blooms from occurring through light limitation, this problem of light 
availability also prevents the re-colonization of submerged macrophytic plants (Gerbeaux, 1989; 
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1993). Thus, in general, it is believed that only very strong nutrient reduction over very long 
periods of time can ensure that a shallow lake ecosystem will transition from a turbid water 
state to a clear water state (Scheffer et al., 1993; Van Nes et al., 2002).   
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Figure 7.11: Potential surprise map for ECOPY gains after 25 years (r = 5%) of implementing 
the various feasible management actions under a Dry Climate future outcome. 
 
Figure 7.12 depicts the PV cost per ECOPY lost versus potential surprise after 25 years of 
implementing the various management actions on the Te Waihora lake ecosystem under the Dry 
Climate future outcome. It is shown that with less intensification of agricultural practices 
resulting in lower inflows of nutrients into the lake ecosystem, that when compared with the 
Intensive Agriculture future outcome that it is more surprising if the Algal Bloom future outcome 
did occur. Nevertheless, when compared with Figure 7.9 depicting the potential surprise of the 
Algal Bloom future outcome occurring within the next five years, it is evident that with the 
exception of the Controlled Opening Flow Outlet (CO) management action, that a significant 
ecosystem-wide algal bloom could conceivably occur in the next 25 years regardless of the 
management action implemented. 
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Figure 7.12: Potential surprise map for ECOPY losses after 25 years (r = 5%) of implementing 
the various feasible management actions under a Dry Climate future outcome.  
 
Sensitivity analysis of the discount rate used in the economic evaluation, found that the ranking 
in terms of the potential cost-effectiveness of the various management actions is robust. In fact, 
where a ten per cent discount rate was employed, no change in the ranking of the management 
actions was found. However, where a zero per cent discount rate was employed, re-ranking did 
occur between the management actions Higher Trigger Level Lake Opening (HT) and Artificial 
Retention Basin (RB), in that the management action Higher Trigger Level Lake Opening dominated 
the management action Artificial Retention Basin in the long-term (results not shown). Hence, 
given the robustness of the management actions to changes in the discount rate, a declining 
discount rate reflective of post-classical economic sentiments was not formally employed in this 
economic evaluation (Section 4.1.1). Of note, no sensitivity analysis of the costs or utilities was 
performed because such an undertaking was considered a diversion from demonstrating a post-
classical economic evaluation. However, for greater insight into the opportunities for evaluating 
and managing ecosystems, such sensitivity analyses may prove illuminating. 
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The potential surprise maps for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system are portrayed in 
Appendix 7.4a-f. It was found that after five years of implementing the various management 
actions that significant improvements in the ECOPY gains and ECOPY losses could be found 
when compared with the management action Status Quo DOC Monitoring (SQ). However, these 
improvements over a 25 year period were far less noticeable, except to some extent with the 
management action Wetland Education and Ecological Restoration (WE), indicating the short-term 
‘fix’ of these feasible management actions. It was also found that there was little difference 
between Intensive Agriculture and Dry Climate future outcomes on the economic evaluation, 
presumably indicating unlike the lake waters of Te Waihora, that the Western Bank Wetlands 
sub-system is not as sensitive to the state of the catchment area and Canterbury bioregion.  
 
7.4 Gambler Preference Mapping & Cost-Effective Management Actions  
The next stage of the economic evaluation is to compare and rank rival management actions 
more conclusively through the construction of gambler preference maps. The construction of 
gambler preference maps involves participants converting initial focus outcomes for each rival 
management action into standardized focus outcomes (Shackle, 1949; 1961). This conversion 
entails the adjustment of utility of the outcome, to reflect its utility at a zero potential surprise 
value (Earl, 1986). Importantly, in this work the standardization process of removing the 
potential surprise values of rival management actions is not about standardizing different focus 
outcomes from different management actions, but the same focus outcomes for different 
management actions. These standardized rival management actions can then be examined and 
ranked in a gambler preference map, without the problem of different potential surprise values 
for rival management actions. Indeed, by removing potential surprise, pairs of attention-
arresting gains and losses for each rival management action can be compared in the gambler 
preference map. Unlike utility-potential surprise pairings, it is these adjusted gain-loss pairings, 
which can be regarded as a measure of utility (Ford, 1987; Young, 2001).   
 
Despite their promise, the use of gambler preference maps has been controversial. Several 
economists, who are sympathetic to Shackle’s method, have considered the inclusion of gambler 
preference maps inappropriate (Earl, 1983; 1986; Ford, 1987; Young, 2001). This led these 
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economists to argue that gambler preference maps are redundant and should be abandoned 
from economic evaluations using potential surprise. But, by abandoning gambler preference 
mapping it is very difficult to see how potential surprise, as a method of economic evaluation, 
can be used to consider both gains and losses together so as appropriately to rank rival 
management actions and consider overall ‘expected value’ (Earl, 1986; 1995).  
 
Nevertheless, there are two arguments that appear to stand against the use of gambler 
preference mapping. One argument is that by standardizing focus outcomes, it would appear 
that uncertainty itself can be removed. Yet, given the pervasive presence of genuine uncertainty, 
it is unlikely that the standardized values will remove uncertainty (Ford, 1987; Young, 2001). In 
fact, by removing potential surprise it would appear to be contradictory with Shackle’s aim of 
avoiding evaluations that reduce its elements too readily to single values (Earl, 1983; 1986). 
However, a zero potential surprise value does not mean that uncertainty is ignored and 
‘certainty’ achieved. Rather, it only assumes that one cannot conceive of any obstacle that comes 
to mind to prevent that outcome from occurring. Thus, the standardization process attempts to 
consider the degree of this obstacle in terms of utility. This process of standardization is possible 
given that uncertainty and utility from the perspective of gains and losses are, as discussed 
previously, intimately connected in the mind through our emotions and implicit memory in 
accordance with the somatic marker hypothesis and the formation of a common currency 
(Section 4.1.1) (Rolls, 1999).   
 
A second argument for considering gambler preference mapping as redundant appears more 
significant than the first. This is because there may be double counting involved, as the 
ascendancy function and the gambler preference map both appear to be eliciting the ascendancy 
weights and uncertainty aversion of participants. Thus, some gambler preferences are likely to 
be already observed within the ascendancy function (Earl, 1983; 1986). However, in the 
simplification used here, only the ascendancy weights for the outcomes found with the status 
quo management actions were used to determine the focus gain and focus loss outcomes. 
Hence, the problem of double counting is considered to be somewhat reduced, as other rival 
management actions have yet to be considered and appropriately evaluated. Moreover, while 
 252
the problem of double counting has not been fully resolved in Shackle’s method, it is recognized 
that it gives an additional opportunity for participants to express their ascendancy weights and 
uncertainty aversion (Shackle, 1955; 1961). Thus, it remains on balance a useful method to 
adequately compare rival management actions. For this reason, unlike other applied variants of 
Shackle’s method (e.g. Earl, 1983; Young, 2001), gambler preference mapping was employed in 
this empirical case study. This is believed to be the first time gambler preference maps have 
been employed for the purposes of evaluating an ecosystem in order to determine cost-effective 
management actions.  
 
With the various PV cost per ECOPY gained (or lost)-potential surprise pairings for each 
management action at hand (Figures 7.7 to 7.12), eight participants from the Te Waihora and 
Western Bank Wetlands groups standardized each pairing to a PV cost per ECOPY gained (or 
lost) value. The standardization process involved the elicitation of ascendancy weights on an 
interval scale [0, 1]. This interval scale was employed because there was no single management 
action that dominated all other management actions in the constructed potential surprise maps. 
Once again, this interval scale represents the ascendancy that a particular PV cost per ECOPY 
gained (or lost)-potential surprise pairing arrests the attention in the minds of participants.  
 
Specifically, participants were told to scan the various PV cost per ECOPY gained (or lost)-
potential surprise pairings, as rival management actions, and give that management action that 
provides the greater ascendancy, an ascendancy weight of one. This ascendant management 
action had to be found on the potentially efficient frontier. With this ascendant or focussed 
management action determined, an ascendancy weight for all other management actions was 
also given relative to this ascendant management action. These ascendancy weights were then 
reflected on and revised where need be. With ascendancy weights finalized, the ascendant 
management action was then standardized by equating the PV costs per ECOPY gained (or lost)-
potential surprise to a value that reflects the presumed PV costs per ECOPY gained if this 
management action had a zero potential surprise value (Shackle, 1955). Once achieved, all the 
other management actions were standardized by dividing their elicited ascendancy weight by 
the standardized PV cost of the focussed management action. All standardized values were then 
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averaged amongst the participants. The standardized PV cost per ECOPY gained and lost curves 
were then plotted against each other for each management action, to form various gambler 
preference maps for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and Western Bank Wetlands sub-system at 
different temporal scales.  
 
Figure 7.13 depicts the gambler preference map on a logarithmic scale for the Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem after five years. The management actions Riparian Restoration Planting (RP) and Active 
Macrophyte Re-establishment (AR) are found to be dominant, and therefore lie on the potentially 
efficient frontier. It should be noted that there are several orders of magnitude between these 
potentially efficient management actions and the other management actions.  
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Figure 7.13: Gambler preference map for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem 
 after five years. Note that those management actions that are cost-effective are found at the 
bottom left of the diagram. 
 
Figure 7.14 depicts the gambler preference map on a logarithmic scale for the Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem after 25 years. In both the Intensive Agriculture future outcome and the Dry Climate 
future outcome, the management actions Riparian Restoration Planting (RP) and Active Macrophyte 
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Re-establishment (AR) are again dominant. This indicates that one of these two management 
actions is the most cost-effective management action proposed. This is a clear indication that 
either of these management actions which lie on the potentially efficient frontier ‘should’ be 
chosen for implementation. 
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Figure 7.14: Gambler preference map for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem after 25 years. Note 
that management actions in ‘black’ represent those under the Intensive Agriculture future 
outcome and management actions in ‘red’ represent those under the Dry Climate future 
outcome. 
 
The gambler preference maps for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system after five years and 25 
years are documented in Appendix 7.5a-b. It was found that the management actions Willow 
Removal (WR) and Riparian Restoration Planting (RP) both lie on the potentially efficient frontier 
after five years. However, after 25 years the gambler preference map indicated that the 
management action Willow Removal (WR) was dominant over other management actions in both 
the Intensive Agriculture future outcome and the Dry Climate future outcome. This indicates that 
Willow Removal (WR) is the most cost-effective management action proposed.  
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In recognizing those management actions that are considered cost-effective, it was then possible 
to compare those cost-effective actions for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem with those cost-
effective actions for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. This was achieved through 
dividing standardized PV costs per ECOPY gained (or lost) by the respective area of these 
systems examined. Figure 7.15 depicts the outcome of this analysis, where it is demonstrated that 
the cost-effective management actions implemented for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem are, by 
some orders of magnitude, less costly than management actions which target the Western Bank 
Wetlands sub-systems alone. This finding appears to indicate economies of scale. It also 
highlights that while this study did not undertake portfolio analysis, which is need for future 
work, it appears to indicate that efforts should focus on the management of the lake ecosystem 
rather than the Western Bank Wetland. However, it also indicates, that Riparian Restoration 
Planting (RP) could be a very useful management action to employ, as it was found to be cost-
effective for both the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. 
This finding, once again, highlights the importance of undertaking an economic evaluation on 
multiple scales.  
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Figure 7.15: Gambler preference map of the Te Waihora lake ecosystem and the Western Bank 
Wetlands sub-system when adjusted for area.  
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While Riparian Restoration Planting (RP) appeared to be a very useful management action to 
implement, the final choice of management action should be consensual and reflect that 
management action which ascends above others in that it arrests the attention of the group 
mind. This final choice, however, was not carried out for this economic evaluation. This was 
because of the political sensitivity surrounding the ecosystem management of Te Waihora, and 
the legitimacy of this economic evaluation for the purposes of actively promoting a particular 
management action. Nevertheless, prior to undertaking this final choice, participants should in 
accordance with an informed intuition monitor their feelings, and where negative feelings of 
doubt still proliferate, they should make known their concerns whether it is the methods used 
for analysis or information that has been elicited (Section 4.2.6). And indeed, some participants in 
a final group meeting for the Te Waihora group, in particular, questioned the high preferential 
weights for the Spiritual Values ecosystem service (Figure 7.2) and the relative poor performance 
of the Higher Trigger Level Lake Opening management action. Where doubt is observed that 
results in contradictory certitude, an argument structure can be formed allowing for debate and 
reasoned analysis using the ECHO model. This reiterates that the post-classical economic 
evaluation and abductive process of research are in fact intimately connected methodological 
approaches. Thus, only once doubt within the group has been sufficiently mitigated, within time 
constraints available, should a final and potentially rational choice for the appropriate 
management action be consensually facilitated. This highlights that the findings of the economic 
evaluation do not attempt to calculate or deduce the most cost-effective management action 
(Shackle, 1961). Rather, it ‘only’ attempts to aid and inform intuition, so that a cognitive and 
emotional consensus can be more easily facilitated towards.  
 
7.5 Comparative Research & Intuitions 
The results of this economic evaluation indicate that there are several management actions 
which appear more cost-effective than other management actions. These management actions 
include Riparian Restoration Planting, Active Macrophyte Re-establishment and Willow Removal. 
These management actions have not just (genuine) economic efficiency, but scientific support for 
their implementation. Indeed, in a series of recent scientific works, each of these management 
actions have been recommended for further investigation into improving the ecosystem health 
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of Te Waihora and its sub-systems (Grove & Pompeii, 2009; Hayward & Ward, 2009; Jellyman & 
Smith, 2009; Pauling & Arnold, 2009). In fact, while not an explicit economic evaluation per se, a 
recent participatory group process of Te Waihora (Hughey et al., 2009), recommended several 
management actions for trial or implementation including the cost-effective management 
actions established here. A simplified depiction of these recommended management actions 
developed from this group participatory process are shown in Table 7.6. 
   
Shorter-term Long-term 
Implement an ‘improved’ status quo 
lake opening 
Trial permanent (or controlled) opening flow 
outlet 
Implement riparian restoration 
planting 
Trial active macrophyte  
re-establishment 
 Implement willow removal 
Table 7.6: Realistic shorter-term and long-term recommendations for ecosystem management 
of the Te Waihora lake ecosystem (adapted from Hughey et al., 2009).  
 
In an earlier study, Gough and Ward (1996) applied a soft systems methodology that brought 
various participants together representing Ngāi Tahu, recreationalists, government agencies and 
farmers for a discourse-based evaluation of management actions for Te Waihora. Unlike this 
empirical case study here, where the objective function was defined by the various ecosystem 
services supplied in the form of the ECOPY index, their objective function focused only on water 
quality. While their results were preliminary, it was concluded at that time that the status quo 
lake opening management action remained a suitable management action in the short-term.  
 
Despite the recommendations from the recent study by Hughey et al. (2009) supporting the cost-
effective management actions found in this economic evaluation, the intuitive responses elicited 
of participants appear to be somewhat counter to these findings. When participants were asked 
to elicit intuitively as to which management action they considered appropriate to improve the 
ecosystem health of Te Waihora in a cost-effective manner, neither Riparian Restoration Planting 
nor Active Macrophyte Re-establishment were considered. Table 7.7 documents the intuitive 
responses of nine Te Waihora group participants, without this information to aid and inform 
their intuitions, as to the most cost-effective management action for Te Waihora.  
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Management action 5 years 25 years 
Status quo lake opening 4 0 
Controlled opening flow outlet 1 3 
Higher trigger level lake opening 3 4 
Permanent opening flow outlet 1 2 
Table 7.7: Intuitive responses as to the most cost-effective management action for improving 
the ecosystem health of Te Waihora. 
 
The results from Table 7.7 contrast with the results obtained in this economic evaluation. The 
intuitive responses given all indicate the importance of the lake opening, which from previous 
analysis was found to be the most significant conceptual variable. Hence, it is hypothesized that 
the differences between cost-effective management actions elicited from immediate intuitive 
responses and those obtained from this economic evaluation are because intuitive responses 
may result in familiar variables of knowledge dominating other considerations. This might 
indicate that beliefs are fixed around the promise of the opening of the lake being the panacea to 
the problems of Te Waihora, even though other management actions appear more cost-effective. 
This supports previous research that indicates the conservative and habitual nature of intuitive 
responses (Simon, 1987; Betsch, 2008). However, with the use of the abductive process of 
research and a post-classical economic evaluation, alternative propositions, which might 
otherwise be ignored, can be considered and found to be cost-effective. This highlights the 
potential of the abductive process of research and a post-classical economic evaluation for 
aiding and informing the expertise and intuitions of resource co-managers, while providing 
transparent evidence that a systematic evaluation approach has been performed allowing the 
potential to implement unconventional management actions.     
 
7.6 Conclusion  
In this chapter a practical and repeatable application of a genuine post-classical economic 
evaluation of the ‘degraded’ lake ecosystem of Te Waihora was successfully completed. Hence, a 
principal purpose of this thesis has been achieved. This was accomplished by integrating cost 
utility analysis through the constructed ECOPY index with the potential surprise method 
developed by the post-classical economist Shackle. This multiple scale economic evaluation used 
the knowledge and preferences of the participants themselves throughout the entire managerial 
process. This is important as it indicates the legitimacy of the findings. This legitimacy is 
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important, because it allows empowerment as cost-effective management actions and the 
knowledge of the ecosystem were determined by the resource co-managers themselves. This 
empowerment is what is believed to be necessary for management actions to be implemented 
successfully over the long-term (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Armitage et al., 2007).   
 
Without this direct interaction with the managerial process where intuitions are accounted for, 
then the likelihood of Māori and other resource users re-organizing and re-connecting with the 
lake that they have been ‘alienated’ from is doubtful (Section 6.2.5). But, with a re-connection 
with the lake ecosystem comes the opportunity to accumulate tacit knowledge and develop 
expertise. This can allow a greater understanding of ecological functions, where ecosystem 
services that satisfy various societal needs can be perceived. Hence, the ecosystem health of the 
lake can improve in accordance with the connective theory of value (Section 2.2.6). Moreover, the 
accumulation of tacit knowledge allows the possibility of an ecological rationality to be 
developed, so that in time resource co-managers can engineer the ecosystem appropriately 
according to constructive co-management. From this resource co-managers can fulfil their hope 
of transforming Te Waihora into a healthy ecosystem (e.g. Mahinga Kai Cultural Park), where 
many more resource users can ‘connect’ and ‘interact’ with the lake in a sustainable way.  
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Chapter 8: Conclusion  
 
It is no accident that the words for economics and ecology have the same Greek root, ‘eco’ 
meaning simply ‘house’. Ecology and economics are, at root, the same. 
 
Stuart Kauffman 
 
8.0 Introduction  
A principal purpose of this thesis was to perform an economic evaluation of an ecosystem. This 
was successfully accomplished. A post-classical economic evaluation, which incorporated cost 
utility analysis with Shacklean potential surprise, was applied to the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. 
The knowledge of ecosystem behaviour, which allowed the generation of some of the necessary 
ingredients for the economic evaluation, was derived by the abductive process of research. This 
economic evaluation allows resource co-managers to show that a systematic evaluation 
approach has been carried out. The transparent and accountable nature of the evaluation allows 
resource co-managers the ability to indicate that expenditure is cost-effective for improving 
ecosystem health. This will help ensure that investments in environmental projects are not 
undervalued and discriminated against relative to other societal objectives. Hence, with the 
potential of disinvestment eased, biodiversity loss can also be alleviated (Figure 8.1).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8.1: The foreseen consequences when a post-classical economic evaluation is used. 
Note these consequences overturn the discriminatory consequences depicted in Figure 1.1. 
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This chapter discusses the work developed in the preceding chapters. The next section 
summarizes the methodological problems overcome in order to perform a post-classical 
economic evaluation. While only a few economists consider environmental problems by 
comprehensively investigating methodology (Dasgupta, 2002), this approach was undertaken 
here. In investigating these methodological problems, the contributions to knowledge from 
Chapter 1 through to Chapter 5 are re-stated. Then, findings in the empirical application 
established in Chapters 6 and 7 are discussed. Finally, the research limitations and various 
opportunities for future research are indicated.  
 
8.1 Methodological Developments & Ecological Rationality 
The first problem recognized in Chapter 1 was that the benefits or outcome function of an 
economic evaluation of environmental resources are difficult to price. This is because markets 
for these resources are often missing. In order to avoid the problem of undervaluing the benefits 
supplied, cost utility analysis (as opposed to cost benefit analysis) was proposed as a suitable 
method. Cost utility analysis can capture benefits supplied through the formation of a utility 
index without the need for monetary measurement. Thus, the novel utility index, the ECOPY 
(Ecosystem Outcome Protection Year), was developed. In developing the ECOPY index, this 
work extended the previous use of cost utility analysis for evaluating environmental projects at 
the ecosystem level rather than the species level. 
 
In an effort to determine the status of ecosystems, the concept of ecosystem health was 
employed. Despite its popularity, ecosystem health has been previously defined in somewhat 
vague terms (O’Laughlin et al., 1994; Lancaster, 2000). Hence, the problem addressed in Chapter 2 
was to identify an operational definition of ecosystem health. In defining ecosystem health, the 
perspectives of population ecology and systems ecology were synthesized, whereby ecosystems 
as thermodynamic networks were conceptualized as complex systems with a scale-free network 
topology (Jordano et al., 2003). However, species within ecosystems also have the capacity to 
adapt their behaviour. Hence, ecosystems are best conceptualized as complex adaptive systems 
(Levin, 2003; 2005). It was reasoned that ecosystems as complex adaptive systems should 
maintain the tension between adaptation to prevailing ecological conditions and adaptability if 
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and when ecological conditions change. Consequently, there should not be a focus on ecosystem 
development through the maximization and preservation of ecological capital per se. Instead 
there should be a focus on the preservation of the integrity of the adaptive cycle (Holling, 1986; 
2001). In recognizing the significance of the adaptive cycle metaphor, it was argued that 
ecosystems have neither an ecologically best phase, nor an ecologically best system state. A 
value-free definition of ecosystem health using ecological attributes alone cannot be attained 
(Norton, 2005). Therefore, ecosystem health is in part an economic concept. Accordingly, this 
thesis established a novel definition of ecosystem health. Ecosystem health is a function of utility 
established through ecosystem services that satisfy various societal needs, subject to preserving 
the integrity of the adaptive cycle. Thus, the ECOPY index is defined by the aggregation of 
utility generated by ecosystem services in a system state, with preferential weights of those 
ecosystem services that satisfy the needs of society.  
 
With ecosystem health defined, an investigation was made to determine an appropriate 
approach for ecosystem management in order to direct ecosystems towards preferred system 
states. Chapter 3 was the first of three that discussed and synthesized the relationship between 
ecosystem management and the methodology of economic theory. There are two aspects 
required for the management of ecosystems; knowledge about system behaviour and choice of 
management action. But, what makes the undertaking of these aspects difficult is the presence of 
uncertainty. Despite uncertainty, the application of neoclassical economic theory claims to offer 
the hope of knowledge that is free of doubt and choice that is rational allowing the potential for 
optimal ecosystem management, where utility is maximized (McCloskey, 1983; Bromley, 2008). 
This claim was critiqued, as it was argued that the complex dynamics of ecosystems makes the 
ability to control and formally predict ecosystem behaviour in the long-term impossible. Hence, 
the optimal management of ecosystems is illusory (Folke et al. 2005; Pahl-Wostl, 2007).  
 
In Chapter 4 it was reasoned that despite the problem of complexity, the intuitive responses of 
experts, which are networked and built around stores of tacit knowledge can generate some 
kind of macro-regularity of ecosystem behaviour. Thus, the intuitive responses of experts were 
recognized as a means of overcoming the problem of complexity in ecosystem management. 
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However, intuition is rational only in specific ecological contexts. Accordingly, there is a need to 
use a diverse and representative group of experts, who together can represent in their mental 
models the complete macro-regularity of ecosystem behaviour. In acknowledging the 
importance of a group of experts, it was recognized that adaptive co-management with its 
emphasis on collaboration through group consensus, can be used to generate a shared common 
knowledge. However, despite the usefulness of adaptive co-management, it is limited because it 
has focussed its research attention on processes to bring about collaboration. There has been 
much less work on attempting to establish a methodology suitable for systematic learning and 
evaluation (Plummer & Armitage, 2007a). Hence, Chapter 4 developed a novel methodological 
approach based around an informed intuition, where several useful and psychologically 
appropriate methods were developed for allowing systematic learning and evaluation in a 
transparent manner. The transparency further informs intuition and allows adequate checks-
and-balances in order to provide accountability to the methodology. 
 
A problem which remains with adaptive co-management as developed thus far arises when an 
unexpected outcome comes to pass. In these cases, abduction, the logic of creative conjecture, is 
required to explain the surprising phenomenon. Moreover, it was reiterated in Chapter 5 that 
novel system states with no apparent historical analogue are commonplace through the impact 
of human economic activity (Vitousek et al., 1997; Lindenmayer et al., 2008). There is therefore 
often no obvious nexus between the past, the present and the future. Thus, there are two 
undeniable problems when evaluating and managing ecosystems, those of complexity and 
novelty. Accordingly, ecosystems as complex adaptive systems are non-ergodic and genuinely 
uncertain, whereby they will be forever problematic and full of surprises. A means of 
overcoming these problems and retaining the assumption of ergodicity and the legitimate use of 
a probability calculus is to consider only short-term horizons (Davidson, 1994; 1996). However, 
for ecosystem management there is a need to complete economic evaluations in the long-term. 
Therefore, given the pervasive presence of genuine uncertainty, resource co-managers must 
avoid habituation and ensure that their mental models remain flexible. In order to bring about 
the need for this adaptability, it was argued that resource co-managers should genuinely 
embrace abduction. By embracing abductive logic the mental models of resource co-managers 
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can be disrupted. This is significant, because a key task of scenario analysis is to alter the mental 
models of participants (Chermack, 2007). However, without systematizing abduction into the 
management of ecosystems it is taxing to envisage how scenario analysis can develop future 
outcomes that go beyond informal predictions developed from past knowledge. Hence, a novel 
methodological approach was proposed as the abductive process of research. This research 
process systematizes and integrates informed intuition and abduction, and is grounded in the 
non-probabilistic function of potential surprise (Shackle, 1972; 1979).  
 
The proposed abductive process of research is a significant contribution to the body of 
knowledge, as it establishes both a methodological basis for adaptive co-management and a 
post-classical economics. Indeed, this methodology recognizes the significance of expertise for 
research, not just as a low cost alternative approach, but as a rational and cost-effective approach 
for undertaking research where systems are complex and adaptive. It is through this research 
process that experts can gain knowledge of system behaviour and establish an ecological 
rationality. This ecological rationality can result, because this novel research process allows for 
systematic adaptive and adaptable learning in a continuous manner, so that knowledge can 
entail a methodological fit with the adaptive cycle. This depiction of an ecological rationality 
extends the definition provided by Gigerenzer and Selten (2001), where they recognized the 
importance of an adaptive rationality, but not a rationality for adapting to change.  
 
It is with this ecological rationality that it is possible to avoid any contradiction between our 
conceptualizations of ecosystems and the ways we evaluate and manage them. This is critical, as 
the cyberneticist Bateson recognized that our “own survival depends on understanding that not 
only are we coupled to our own conceptualization of ecosystems and ecological order, but also 
to embodiments of our own ways of thinking about them and acting on them” (Harries-Jones, 
1995; p. 8). Any misalignment between our conceptualizations of ecosystems and our 
methodology for evaluating and managing ecosystems will not only adversely affect the health 
of ecosystems, but also our own health. Thus, it is proposed that any differences between the 
methodology of economic theory and ecological theory can be expected to be a contributing 
causal factor for the ongoing loss of biodiversity, and in turn for the loss of ecosystem services or 
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degradation of ecosystem health. This conclusion has been supported recently, where Lant et al. 
(2008; p. 971) argue that:  
“The diminishment of ecosystem services is the result of a complex ‘social trap’. The trap and 
how we envision escaping it proceed in no small means from our conceptualization of 
ecosystems and their place in our society.” 
 
The plausibility of any methodology is that it adequately engages and attempts to mirror the 
processes of ‘reality’. So a methodology that is used to evaluate and manage ecosystems, that 
does not resemble our conceptualization of ecosystems as complex adaptive systems, is not best 
practice. Hence, it is proposed that it is neither simply (detached) human economic activity, nor 
the inability to value environmental projects appropriately, that are the sole causal factors for 
biodiversity loss. Rather, such losses are likely also to be the result of an incoherent relationship 
between the way we conceptualize, evaluate and manage ecosystems. Thus, it is reasonable to 
contend that the loss of biodiversity and the degradation of ecosystem health are useful 
‘indicators’ that our present methodologies that are applied do not adequately engage with an 
ecological reality. It has been argued that the abductive process of research can invoke an 
ecological rationality where the mental models of resource co-managers resemble complex 
adaptive systems. This allows a methodological fit between our conceptualization of ecosystems 
and our management of them. This is necessary as “the essential qualities of any complex 
adaptive system can really only be effectively captured by another complex adaptive system” 
(Bradbury, 2002; p. 63).  
 
It is this understanding that the forester-philosopher Leopold (1949; p. 129) meant, when he 
stated that we need to ‘think like a mountain’, as “only the mountain has lived long enough to 
listen objectively to the howl of the wolf.” It is with the proposed abductive process of research 
that resource co-managers, with their intimate knowledge, can begin to ‘think’ like an 
ecosystem, which is necessary for the long-term sustainability of ecosystems. For this reason, the 
proposed abductive process of research is cautiously put forward as the elusive science of 
sustainability, as it allows the minds of resource co-managers and scientific methodology more 
generally to be modelled as a complex adaptive system. Accordingly, through employing this 
novel methodology for ecosystem management, it is conceived that biodiversity loss and the 
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degradation of ecosystem health can be mitigated, while allowing institutions the capacity to 
adapt to change. From this it is possible that genuine economic efficiencies can be maintained in 
the face of genuine uncertainties. 
 
8.2 Empirical Application & Findings 
In Chapters 6 and 7, an original empirical case study of the ‘degraded’ Te Waihora lake 
ecosystem was performed to rigorously trial the proposed abductive process of research and the 
devised post-classical economic evaluation. Specifically, in Chapter 6 the proposed abductive 
process of research was practically applied using a multiple scale perspective. From this 
research process, participants constructed fuzzy cognitive maps, which were formed into a 
group map indicating a shared common knowledge. From this knowledge, macro-level theories 
were constructed to explain the behaviour of the various examined systems. In constructing 
theories from the analysis of the group maps, this work methodologically built on and extended 
the previous work of Özesmi (1999). Where multiple theories were constructed, theory 
plausibility by the inference of the best explanation was analysed using the ECHO (Explanatory 
Coherence by Harmony Optimization) model. This was the first time the ECHO model has been 
used for investigations into ecosystem management.  
  
With theories constructed, participants developed plausible future outcomes using scenario 
analysis and elicited potential surprise values representing the disbelief in the occurrence of 
these outcomes. The potential surprises allowed the generation of plausible ex-ante-futuro 
hypotheses through abductive exercises, which is a novel method for generating hypotheses to 
explain the surprise of the future outcome occurring. Not only are these hypotheses a novel 
development, but they were shown to disrupt some of the theories and fuzzy cognitive maps 
constructed by participants. Hence, the proposed abductive process of research, which 
systematically incorporates abductive logic, has the potential to disrupt the mental models of 
participants. The disruption of mental models is a key task of scenario analysis. Accordingly, the 
proposed abductive process of research appears an important contribution to this analytical 
method. The disruption of mental models also indicates that the methodology proposed can 
 267
bring about mental model flexibility necessary for an ecological rationality, given that 
ecosystems are forever problematic and full of surprises.  
 
In Chapter 7, a novel and practical application of a post-classical economic evaluation was 
performed to decipher the choice of management actions that could improve the lake health of 
Te Waihora. This economic evaluation used some of the necessary ingredients derived by the 
abductive process of research. Specifically, the economic evaluation integrated cost utility 
analysis through the ECOPY index with the complete two-stage potential surprise method 
developed by the economist Shackle (1949; 1961). Hence, this was a genuine post-classical 
economic evaluation, which was able to overcome the various problems of evaluating and 
managing ecosystems.  
 
This economic evaluation was novel, as it extended the previous work of Cullen et al. (1999; 
2001) by comprehensively investigating cost utility analysis at the ecosystem level. Furthermore, 
this economic evaluation built on the previous potential surprise work undertaken by Young 
(2001) by integrating cost utility analysis with the potential surprise method developed by 
Shackle (1972). The economic evaluation also employed in a novel way the analytical hierarchy 
process, a multi-criteria analytical method, for the development of the ECOPY index in order to 
comprehensively weight all recognized ecosystem services.   
 
The findings of the economic evaluation indicated various cost-effective management actions 
that could be implemented to improve the ecosystem health of Te Waihora. These cost-effective 
management actions included Riparian Restoration Planting and Active Macrophyte Re-
establishment. The results of the post-classical economic evaluation were compared with recent 
recommendations established in the group participatory work undertaken by Hughey et al. 
(2009). Their recommendations support the cost-effective management found in this economic 
evaluation. The results from this economic evaluation were also compared with the intuitive 
responses of participants. This indicated that the post-classical economic evaluation provided 
insights for the cost-effective management of the Te Waihora lake ecosystem that might 
otherwise have been ignored by participants. These comparisons highlight the potential of the 
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methodology developed for aiding and informing the expertise and intuitions of resource co-
managers. Accordingly, the abductive process of research and a post-classical economic 
evaluation provide a rational and legitimate means of developing the knowledge of ecosystem 
behaviour and determining cost-effective management actions.  
 
In conclusion, the proposed abductive process of research and the post-classical economic 
evaluation have been developed in an effort to overcome the problems found with evaluating 
and managing ecosystems. It has been shown through an empirical case study that they provide 
a coherent methodology that can lead to important insights for the cost-effective management of 
ecosystems. Therefore, while this methodological approach is a first step, it is worth pursuing 
and requires further investigation.  
 
8.3 Research Limitations & Future Research Opportunities  
In the remainder of this chapter, various research limitations are discussed and opportunities for 
future research are indicated. In particular, three important aspects need further investigation. 
First, the relationship between abduction and potential surprise needs exploring. This 
exploration may allow a better understanding of the complex logic that has been theoretically 
argued to occur when abductive logic is systematically applied. One specific area between 
abduction and potential surprise that should also be explored is the likelihood of whether the 
plausibility of a hypothesis generated from a potential surprise influences the weighted 
possibility of the future outcome that generated a potential surprise.  
 
The second aspect for further investigation, given that this work is a first step in the 
development of this methodological approach, is the need for more empirical case studies to be 
carried out with other ecosystems and even other complex adaptive systems (e.g. socio-economic 
systems). In particular, there needs to be a greater number of iterations undertaken with the 
proposed abductive process of research. It is through this praxis of continual evaluation that the 
endogenous nature of the proposed abductive process of research can be appropriately 
examined and tested. Success would be evident through the mental models of participants being 
disrupted in an ongoing manner. This would be evident through altered fuzzy cognitive maps, 
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and the continuous generation of a diverse set of plausible future outcomes and the 
determination of the resilience of macro-level theories that explain ecosystem behaviour. It is 
with this endogeneity that the scientific imagination of participants can be appropriately used, 
because their disrupted mental models would allow future outcomes to be generated with no 
apparent historical analogue.   
 
The third aspect is the need to compare the deductive process of research, which underpins 
neoclassical economic theory, with that of the proposed abductive process of research. 
Specifically, this future research would compare the results of a post-classical economic 
evaluation with that of a neoclassical economic evaluation, where cost benefit analysis would be 
employed and probability values would be derived from the deductive process of research. Such 
a comparison, made from an ecological and economic perspective, would further clarify the 
advantages of each of these methodologies. This is necessary, as while the novel methodological 
approach developed here has been argued to be theoretically more appropriate for the 
sustainable management of ecosystems, this has yet to be empirically ‘proven’.  
 
While the use of citizen’s juries was not employed in this thesis, it is also recognized that such a 
method could also be employed for comparisons with the expert methodological approach 
developed here. In undertaking this comparison the advantages of expertise can be further 
explored for the purposes of improving public choice. The results of this comparison could also 
further elucidate where citizen’s juries can complement this novel methodological approach 
developed here. One can envisage that citizen’s juries would be a useful method for the partial 
selection of experts as resource co-managers. This could be an important innovation, as it 
presumably would provide improved legitimacy to the selection process of experts from that 
undertaken here, which relied exclusively upon informal discussions of the interviewing analyst 
to determine the ‘representative’ group of experts. While the appropriate experts were found, as 
acknowledged by the participants themselves, it is recognized that this selection process could 
also be both more transparent and systematic. The use of citizen’s juries could also complement 
the methodological approach developed, as it could be used as a ‘scientific court’. Specifically, 
this would entail a group of citizens appraising the transparency and accountability of the 
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research process and economic evaluation performed by the resource co-managers. This 
innovation would once again provide further legitimacy to the choice of management actions 
implemented.  
 
In this study, a difficulty was that several participants indicated that they were uncomfortable 
with a subjective methodology that examined ecosystems through the ‘lens’ of mental models. 
While they actively participated in this work, some contended that they were more comfortable 
with ‘objective’ inferences from analytical methods using quantitative data alone. Significantly, 
this resistance to subjective methodological approaches has also been encountered in previous 
work (Arnell et al., 2005). However, several participants who appeared initially sceptical of the 
approach indicated afterwards that it was very informative.  
 
Nevertheless, to avoid these potential problems, one option is to inform participants of some of 
the different forms of analysis developed prior to interviewing. While this approach was 
undertaken in this empirical case study, it is believed that more effort is needed to allow 
participants to become comfortable with unorthodox methodologies. An alternative option is 
simply to avoid participants unsympathetic to subjective methodologies. However, this may 
bias the approach to only a certain type of participant, possibly those more comfortable with 
subjective judgements. Certainly, in this work it was found that participants with vast local 
knowledge (e.g. farmers, recreationalists, Ngāi Tahu, Waihora Ellesmere Trust members) 
appeared particularly enthusiastic about the methodology applied. This is important, as a 
critical problem for adaptive co-management is ensuring the active participation of resource co-
managers with local knowledge (Carlsson & Berkes, 2005; Plummer & Armitage, 2007a).  
 
Face-to-face group evaluations performed either led to group consensus or the resolution of 
potential contradictions with dialogue and the formation of argument structures using the 
ECHO model. The relative ease of consensus may indicate a positive commitment amongst 
participants to find consensus. However, given the history of problems associated with the 
ecosystem management of Te Waihora, and the multiplicity of agencies that govern the lake, it is 
unlikely that such consensus can always be found so readily.  
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Previous research indicates that group consensus is not always a useful method for collective 
evaluations. This is because of participants too easily compromising their position to find 
consensus where short time frames have been allocated (Henrich & Gil-White, 2006). This is 
potentially a limitation of this work, because while the process does not require participants to 
have considerable analytical know-how, it does require them to participate through a number of 
methods. For this reason, there could potentially be benefits to continue to simplify the 
evaluation process, so as to limit the time taken. However, simplifications must be considered 
carefully to ascertain the trade-offs of more time and effort. For example, the simplification of 
not eliciting ex-ante-futuro hypotheses for the potential surprise of alternative management 
actions provided less information about why these management actions could and could not be 
effectual. Moreover, while efforts may wish to simplify the evaluation process, it may be 
beneficial to extend the time taken between each method employed. This is because more time 
between methods would increase the likelihood of problems being ‘incubated’ in the back of the 
mind, allowing greater creativity to flourish through a ‘defocused attention’ (Section 4.2.7) 
(Wallas, 1926). Accordingly, future research could explore the tradeoffs between simplification 
to decrease the time taken and extending the time taken to improve the quality of the research. 
 
There are also innovations that could yet improve face-to-face group consensus and 
collaboration. This includes further investigation of the ECHO model. The use of this model 
provided insights for the determination of the plausibility of promoted theories. However, it 
was not employed to its fullest capabilities. This was indicated in the fact that many networked 
arguments constructed were relatively simple. However, where more complex arguments are 
formed, then it is foreseen, that this method would become even more useful for systematizing 
the cognitive workings of the mind towards coherent reasoning.  
 
Further related future work could include systematizing the cognitive level of the mind, but also 
the emotional level as well. One such example for future research is the development of 
systematizing the use of emotions in group evaluations. This research is already partly 
underway with the research developments of the psychologist Thagard (2008). For example, this 
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researcher has developed the artificial neural network model HOTCO3, an acronym for ‘hot 
coherence’, which attempts to aid group consensus at an emotional level through facilitating 
participants towards consensual emotional responses when undertaking group evaluations.  
 
In relation to the cognitive level, the use of fuzzy cognitive maps to transcribe the mental models 
of participants was used, but the method is still in its infancy. This approach received much 
interest by some participants, especially when fuzzy cognitive maps were grouped to form a 
shared common knowledge. However, this method was also found to have limitations and 
needs further critical evaluation (Section 6.2.4). While previous research has indicated various 
problems with fuzzy cognitive mapping, including issues of scale and scope (e.g. Fairweather et 
al., 2006), the work performed here indicated an additional problem. This problem is that 
dynamic analysis through artificial neural network simulations results in them regularly settling 
down onto a fixed set of values (i.e. point attractor). While this does not prevent the emergence 
of useful theory, it is expected that richer theories can be constructed where dynamic analysis 
converges towards non-fixed activation outputs. Accordingly, future research perhaps should 
investigate opportunities to bring about more complex activation outputs, rather than the 
present trend that has focused on bringing about point attractors to analytical results for ease of 
interpretation (e.g. Hobbs et al., 2002; Özesmi & Özesmi, 2003).   
 
In this study, scenario analysis was employed to establish plausible future outcomes for the 
systems examined. It was shown how abduction could disrupt the mental models of resource 
co-managers. However, further work in applying abduction with scenario analysis is required 
including the influence of abduction on the range of future outcomes generated. Other work that 
could be investigated involves the use of alternative ‘futures’ methods. One method that 
appears particularly suited where constructive co-management is attempted is backcasting. 
Specifically, backcasting is concerned with how preferable future outcomes are created. 
Backcasting develops preferable future outcomes, and then works backwards from this future 
endpoint to the present to determine suitable management actions that can bring about these 
preferred outcomes (Hojer & Mattsson, 2000). In working backwards, from the future to the 
present, it would appear that backcasting could be neatly integrated with the potential surprise 
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method and the generation of ex-ante-futuro hypotheses. Hence, future research could trial the 
use of backcasting as a complement or alternative to scenario analysis.  
 
The rest of this section focuses on the limitations of the economic evaluation in Chapter 7 and the 
potential for future work in relation to this area. One limitation of the economic evaluation was 
the problem of investigating future outcomes. By there very nature future outcomes are 
uncertain. For this reason, there is likely to be much uncertainty over the preferential weights 
and utility scores that make up the ECOPY index of future outcomes. While, it is true, that these 
values can be reflected on and altered to limit feelings of doubt over the value elicited, this may 
not be always possible within the time available. One method that could be incorporated in 
future work to ease this problem is incorporating fuzzy numbers to the costs, utility scores, 
preferential weights and potential surprise values elicited. This is because fuzzy numbers can 
depict the imprecision or confidence of these values elicited (Kosko, 1992). For example, instead 
of a precise potential surprise of 0.1, a fuzzy potential surprise value might be given as 
‘approximately 0.1’, which could be quantitatively described by a suitable membership function.  
 
Another limitation of the economic evaluation is the realization that the analytical hierarchy 
process employed can result in rank reversal with the addition of an ecosystem service to the list 
of ecosystem services evaluated (Forman & Gass, 2001). Hence, the analytical hierarchy process 
would appear incompatible and contradictory with the modelling of ecosystems (and 
bioregions) as open systems. However, this problem of rank reversal is not likely to be 
detrimental to the method. This is because while preferences are assumed to change, it is 
nevertheless a reasonable assumption that the various ecosystem services supplied remain fixed 
and given (Capistrano et al., 2006). One reason for this is that it is plausible to assume that 
bioregions from where preferences in this study derive are closed systems (Nijkamp, 1999). 
However, with increased scientific research, an ecological movement that is gaining expertise 
through a re-connection with ecosystems, and greater environmental change occurring, it is also 
plausible that the list of ecosystem services will expand (or change) considerably.  
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A related concern to rank reversal found with the analytical hierarchy process is that its ratio 
mathematics assumes that all ecosystem services can be preferentially traded-off between one 
another. However, it is reasonable to consider the case where there are strict preferences for 
particular ecosystem services so that they are non-compensatory (Earl, 1986). For example, the 
ecosystem service Food, which includes mahinga kai, might be preferentially ranked above all 
other ecosystem services for Māori, regardless of the quantities of other ecosystem services 
offered in compensation. This idea of non-compensation and strict preference has been related 
to societal needs, which is relevant to this work (Drakopoulos, 1994). This is because the idea 
reflects that human agents may have a hierarchy or minimum standard of needs to be satisfied 
before compensation between needs can be considered (Menger, 1950; Spash, 2000). Hence, 
future research efforts should investigate alternative multi-criteria analytical methods to the 
analytical hierarchy process to seek interesting synergies for mitigating this problem of non-
compensation (and for that matter rank reversal). One such multi-criteria analytical method that 
could be considered is the method of outranking (e.g. ELECTRE) which appeals to a partal 
comparability axiom. Specifically, with outranking methods, preferences between ecosystem 
services can be modelled by four binary relations: incomparability, strict preference, large 
preference and indifference (Munda, 1995; Ananda & Herath, 2009). 
 
While the construction of the ECOPY index is a novel contribution, there may be limitations in 
using a strict additive function for the aggregation of ecosystem services (Equation 7.2). For 
example, an additive function assumes the independence of ecosystem services. However, 
ecosystem services, which are generated from the “complex interactions between biotic and 
abiotic components of an ecosystem” (De Groot et al., 2002; p. 394), are likely to be better 
indicated by more complicated formulations of the ECOPY index given the interdependence of 
ecosystem services (Sala et al., 2000; Capistrano et al., 2006). These formulations, which could be 
considered in future work, include the use of functions devised from network analysis.    
 
The above issue of appropriately aggregating ecosystem services into an index also relates to the 
problem of double counting. This is an important issue when attempting to aggregate ecosystem 
services into an index, as double counting provides an imprecise measure of accounts. Despite 
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the possibility of double counting, few researchers recognize this problem. Indeed, in a recent 
study, Fisher et al. (2009) found that only one in 34 studies mentioned double counting problems 
when analysing ecosystem services. In order, to resolve the problem of double counting there 
needs to be further research in appropriately aggregating ecosystem services into an index and 
in devising a standardized classification of various ecosystem services supplied by ecosystems 
beyond that defined by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment project (Capistrano et al., 2006). 
Significantly, one issue with the classification devised by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment is 
that it appears overly generic and some proclaimed ecosystem services (e.g. various supporting 
services) may be better described as ecological functions (Kremen, 2005; Boyd & Banzhaf, 2007; 
Egoh et al., 2007). However, a new classification and list of ecosystem services remains to be 
completed, and appears to be no easy undertaking.   
 
But, if a new classification can be established to standardize the list of ecosystem services, then it 
would allow these services and cost utility analysis through the ECOPY index to be more easily 
adopted into broader policy evaluations for appraising bioregional accounts. This would have 
significant repercussions, because it would allow a connective theory of value between human 
agents and ecosystems to be established across an entire bioregion. This would allow a better 
reflection of value to be gained from the strictly anthropocentric approaches that consider only a 
monetary measurement for assessing bioregional accounts. Furthermore, if ecosystem services 
were used to evaluate ecosystems within a bioregion, this would allow for portfolio analysis to 
be incorporated with the post-classical economic evaluation developed. Employing portfolio 
analysis, which considers the economic evaluation of a diverse range of ecosystems 
simultaneously, would enable managers to further mitigate the boom-and-bust cycles of utility 
that are experienced with the growth and collapse of ecosystems (Costanza et al., 2000). 
Significantly, it should be noted that the use of portfolio analysis can retain the simplication of 
Shackle’s potential surprise method developed in this thesis. However, each ecosystem would 
have their own specific focus outcomes determined from the status quo management actions.    
 
Finally, with discussion moving to Shackle’s potential surprise method, it is recognized that the 
application of the gambler preference map remains controverisal (Section 7.4). Several 
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economists have stated that these maps should be discarded from Shackle’s potential surprise 
method (e.g. Earl, 1986; Young, 2001). They argue that gambler preference mapping results in 
issues of double counting and the inappropriate removal of potential surprise values. Both of 
these limitations remain unresolved though its impacts can be partially mitigated with the 
simplification used in this thesis. However, from the economic evaluation performed, it was 
evident that useful information can be obtained from gambler preference maps, which can be 
used to aid and inform expert intuition. Nonetheless, despite these efforts made to simplify 
Shackle’s method through using focus outcomes determined from status quo management 
actions and background policies, participants still indicated that the complete method was 
somewhat complicated for practical purposes. For this reason coupled with previous criticisms, 
it is suggested that much further research is required to develop Shackle’s highly under-utilized 
potential surprise method. One simplification that has been developed is a satisficing version of 
the potential surprise method developed by Earl (1983; 1986). This approach considers the 
aspiration levels for gains and losses of participants and in so doing allows the use of both the 
ascendancy function and the gambler preference map to be avoided. However, given the 
potential of expert intuition to go beyond the satisficing behaviour of bounded rationality, other 
developments should also be considered, which retain aspects of Shackle’s original method.   
 
In summary, there remain limitations with some of the methods used. Also, many of the 
methods implemented can be expected to be of only contextual relevance and contingent value. 
They are not the only methods suitable for representing the proposed abductive process of 
research to complete a post-classical economic evaluation. Indeed, as research develops, 
especially at the psychological and neurological levels through functional magnetic resonance 
imaging, it is likely that greater understanding will become available to design methods more 
conducive to the modus operandi of the complex adaptive systems approach undertaken here. 
That said, appropriate methods would have to fit various criteria. Such criteria would include 
that the methods are compatible and coherent with the workings of the (expert) mind as a 
complex neuro-psychological system, yet not be impractical or too costly to use when 
undertaking intuitive and participatory research. After all, the economy of research matters... 
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Appendices 
 
 
Appendix 6.1: Descriptions of the sub-systems designated to constitute Te Waihora (adapted 
from Taylor, 1996; Department of Conservation & Ngai Tahu, 2005). 
Sub-system Sub-system description  
Open Water The Open Water sub-system represents the main body of brackish water, which 
at present is highly turbid and dominated by phytoplankton. 
Coastal Side 
of Kaitorete 
Spit 
The Coastal side of Kaitorete Spit sub-system represents the coastal margin of 
the beach barrier and is predominantly made of sand dunes, which in some 
areas of the coastline are administered and managed by DOC (i.e. Department of 
Conservation).  
Lake Side of 
Kaitorete 
Spit 
The Lake side of Kaitorete Spit sub-system represents the lake margin of the 
beach barrier and is a wetland area of low salinity native vegetation consisting 
predominantly of marsh ribbonwood and sea rush.  
Kaituna 
Lagoon  
The Kaituna Lagoon sub-system is recognized to only be distinct from the Open 
Water sub-system when lake levels are low. Indeed, even under low lake levels 
the sub-system remains in permanent shallow water. However, there are various 
mudflats, sand spits and a few small islands that can be found in this sub-
system. It is in these areas that raupo and rushes inhabit the lagoon.  
Greenpark 
Sands  
The Greenpark Sands sub-system represents three wetlands areas, that being 
Greenpark Sands, Yarr’s Flat and the Selwyn wetlands. The Greenpark Sands 
and Yarr’s Flat are extensive wetlands that extend over 13 kilometres across the 
share of the lake from the Halswell River to the LII River. Specifically, the Sands 
contain numerous types of wetland vegetation. This is because the sub-system 
contains habitats suitable for freshwater and saline-tolerant species. Native 
shrub, marsh ribbonwood, and sea rush are the predominant vegetation that is 
found in the upper zone of this wetland. However, in the lower zones or sand 
flats many halophytic plant species can be found. The Selwyn wetland extends 
from the Irwell River to the west bank of the LII River and contains native 
freshwater vegetation including raupo and sedge.   
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
The Western Bank wetlands sub-system contains four neighbouring wetland 
areas; Harts Creek, Irwell, Lakeside and Taumutu Commonage, all located on 
the west side of Te Waihora. Harts Creek is dominated by willow species and 
native vegetation that lies in the understorey of the willow canopy. Further 
towards the lake edge extensive raupo beds fringe the lake, and survive in the 
seemingly saline conditions because of the flow of freshwater from the Creek. 
The Irwell wetland is a long narrow strip of wetland that stretches from Harts 
Creek to the Irwell River and contains mostly native freshwater vegetation. 
Lakeside and Taumutu Commonage located adjacent and south of Harts Creek 
is an area dominated by saltmarsh, and a few some localized freshwater 
swamps.  
Surrounding 
Agricultural 
Land 
Agricultural lease land of relatively low productivity surrounds the lake 
ecosystem. For the most part, this surrounding agricultural land is used for 
grazing sheep stock.  
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Appendix 6.2a: An historical account depicting the system states as qualitative narratives 
constructed for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. 
System state Historical qualitative narrative  
Interfan 
Depression 
Before 8000 years ago, Te Waihora was part of an interfan depression on the 
Canterbury Plains or Ngā Pākihi Whakatekateka o Waitaha. 
Bay Between 5000 and 8000 years ago, sea levels rose and the interfan depression 
became submerged creating a bay ecosystem. The interfan depression between 
the Rakaia fan and Banks Peninsula was flooded by the sea.  
Estuary Approximately 4000 years ago coastline erosion and sediment drift from 
southern rivers, transported sediment across the face of the bay, forming a beach 
barrier (i.e. Kaitorete Spit). Thus, the bay had transformed into an estuary. This 
estuary was transformed through the migration of the Waimakariri River. 
Natural 
Clear Water 
 
Around 3000 years ago, the steadily growing beach barrier made a landfall on 
Banks Peninsula and ‘closed’ the estuary ecosystem from the sea, thus forming a 
lake or coastal lagoon. Naturally-caused breaches of the beach barrier meant that 
the system was partially estuarine and freshwater in nature. When Māori settled 
near the lake, it was found to be in a clear water state with considerable 
submerged marcophytic plants (i.e. Ruppia) forming dense weedbeds. However, 
the clear nature of lake may have only been around its perimeter, as it is likely 
that a large area in the open water would have been prone to high turbidity as a 
result of prevailing winds. Significantly, the lake system at this time was nearly 
twice the size it is today. Besides harvesting its resources for mahinga kai, which 
were abundant, Māori also reportedly opened the lake intermittently to reduce 
the lake level, so as to avoid the inundation of lakeshore pa sites.   
Agricultural
Managed 
Clear Water 
 
Since the late 1800s the coast of most of Kaitorete Spit has been stable, which has 
seen the growth of a substantial dune belt along the coastline. The European 
settlement of Canterbury during the late 1800s saw agricultural development 
occur, whereby large parts of the wetlands surrounding Te Waihora were 
drained, reducing markedly lake size to approximately its present day area. In 
addition to draining the lake, Europeans introduced exotic plants, fish and birds 
to the lake. The lake was regularly opened by the Selwyn County Council and 
Lake Ellesmere Drainage Board to reduce lake levels so as to avoid flooding onto 
neighbouring pastoral land. This increase in lake openings increased the salinity 
of the lake water. In 1947 the North Canterbury Catchment Board became 
responsible for lake level management and instituted a management regime that 
required the lake to be opened when its height reached 1.05m asl in summer and 
1.13m asl in winter. Significantly, it was noted during the 1940s that the 
weedbeds were disappearing. However, by the 1950s the weedbeds recovered. 
Turbid 
Water 
 
Prior to the 1960s, the lake margin still maintained an acceptable water clarity 
and had wide stands of weedbed or aquatic plants. However, with the ongoing 
agricultural practices in Canterbury, the lake’s water quality and ecological 
resilience declined rapidly because of the runoff from agricultural pollutants. 
Hence, with the environmental shock of the Wahine storm event in 1968, many 
of the weedbeds were lost leaving the lake turbid with markedly lower water 
clarity and dominated by phytoplankton. To mitigate these ongoing and 
detrimental ecological effects, the National Water Conservation Order 1990 was 
imposed so as to protect remaining wildlife habitats and shift lake level 
management attention from agricultural interests to ecological concerns.  
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Appendix 6.2b: An historical account depicting the system states as qualitative narratives 
constructed for the Canterbury bioregion. 
System state Historical qualitative narrative  
Forested  Some 10,000 years ago the Canterbury bioregion was covered predominantly in 
a mixed forest vegetation of tree species such as totara, rimu, matai and native 
beech. Climatic variation, however, caused some local dry areas and forest 
deterioration, whereby some areas were replaced by tussock grasslands.  
Open 
Tussock 
Grassland  
 
The arrival of the Waitaha Moa-hunters during the Archaic Māori period around 
700 years ago saw the first introduced species of the Polynesian dog and rat. 
With settlement over a span of 500 years the Moa-hunters had hunted to 
extinction the Moa and burnt extensive tracts of the forested landscape of the 
Canterbury Plains. In so doing the landscape of Canterbury was irrevocably 
changed to tussock grassland. With few forested areas left, catastrophic soil 
erosion denuded the foothills and rivers further spread across the Canterbury 
Plains burying any trace of the once extensive tracts of forest. However, the 
Canterbury Plains were not an endless sea of tussock; land along the coastline 
remained as swampy wetlands. Despite the loss of forest, there was still an 
abundance of food, which attracted stronger Māori tribes from the north in what 
has been described as the Classic Māori period. First, the Ngati Mamoe tribe 
descended on the Waitaha Moa-hunters and then several generations later, the 
Ngāi Tahu tribe became the dominant tribe in the region. Warring at this time 
had become endemic. Indeed, Ngāi Tahu had a civil war, which in part resulted 
in only 500 Māori remaining in Canterbury at the time of European arrival.  
Pastoral 
Farming 
System State: 
(Mid 1800s 
to late 
1800s) 
 
The arrival of the French in 1838 raised the attention of the British to the 
Canterbury region. Thus, whilst the French claimed sovereignty, their efforts for 
colonization were mitigated by the British declaring complete sovereignty of 
New Zealand with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840. British efforts 
for colonization of Canterbury were undertaken by the Canterbury Association 
led by Edward Gibbon Wakefield. Wakefield attempted to replicate the existing 
institutional and class structure of English society in Canterbury by designing a 
compact and conservative Anglican agricultural community with all the 
amenities of a civilized society. In an effort to ensure that an agricultural 
community was established, Wakefield insisted that purchasers of land in 
Canterbury demonstrated they were of good character, were not of the lowest 
economic classes and had affiliations to the Church of England. In establishing 
this agricultural community in Canterbury, many of the surrounding wetlands 
along the coast, which held much importance to Ngāi Tahu were drained 
without compensation. In order to further re-create an English character to 
Canterbury, British birds, fish and game animals were introduced. However, 
despite the vision of a stable agricultural community in Christchurch, the rate of 
settlement did not increase sufficiently as was hoped. It was realized that there 
were neither the markets nor the labour supply to support such a community. 
Nevertheless, pastoral farming through wool exports had proven to be 
profitable in other colonies, and thus despite being against Wakefield’s wishes 
was seen as the only viable means to sustain the region. Thus, pastoral farming 
leases were established in Canterbury, and soon provided much economic 
growth, despite the tussock grasslands not being particularly palatable for sheep 
grazing.   
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System State Historical Qualitative Narrative  
Agricultural 
Farming 
System State: 
(Late 1800s 
to mid 
1900s) 
 
Despite the successes of pastoral farming by the 1880s much of the tussock 
grasslands on the Canterbury Plains had been ploughed, fenced and 
shelterbelted from the prevailing winds. Hence, the vast expanse of tussock 
grasslands were over time transformed into a ploughed patchwork of paddocks 
dominated with introduced British grasses and crops, such as wheat. This 
transition from pastoral to agricultural farming was driven largely by economic 
forces as stock numbers were near their limits imposed by the poor quality of 
the grazing pasture. Thus, profitability could only be maintained with the 
intensification of land use. With the change toward agricultural practices in 
farming, Canterbury became a prosperous region, and while the World Wars, 
the Spanish influenza epidemic and the Depression provided major setbacks, 
Canterbury remained resilient albeit largely homogeneous in its institutional 
and economic structure.  
Globally-
Attuned 
System State: 
(Mid 1900s 
to the 
present day) 
 
 
By the 1960s the post-war reverence and conservatism towards the Church and 
class structure dissipated in Canterbury. While the landowning rural 
community still commanded much political influence they were no longer the 
wealthiest group in Canterbury, as urbanized Christchurch developed a 
growing manufacturing sector. Antagonism arose between rural and urban 
communities because of subsidies and supplementary minimum prices given to 
farmers. Despite these subsidies farmers fell on hard times with the move of 
Great Britain to the European Economic Community, thus, curtailing 
Canterbury’s largest export market. Thus, by the 1970s an economic recession 
developed and the steady rate of growth and prosperity in the region came to a 
halt. In an effort to remove regulations in the economy which was crippling it 
from adjusting to a more globalized economy, the Labour Government of the 
1980s brought about free market reforms causing major structural changes to the 
economy and its institutions. With these changes, farmers in order to survive, 
diversified and further intensified their operations. This saw a trend away from 
traditional mixed sheep and crop farming to horticulture, forestry and irrigated 
agriculture including dairying and specialist cropping. With these different 
practices new environmental risks presented themselves beyond the 
environmental difficulties associated with the many introduced species, which 
were now considered societal pests as they hindered both the sustainability of 
farming and efforts to conserve native species. These concerns provided the 
impetus towards the Resource Management Act 1991, which brought about the 
need for the sustainable management of environmental resources. Air pollution 
also became a significant environmental concern in urban areas. With a more 
globally-attuned economy the institutional structure of the region became more 
heterogeneous with increasing numbers of Asian migrants. 
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Appendix 6.3a: Activation output of the Te Waihora group map indicating map resilience 
when significant conceptual variables deactivated. 
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Appendix 6.3b: Activation output of the Te Waihora group map indicating map resilience 
when significant connections removed. 
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Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.3c: Activation output of the Canterbury group map indicating map resilience 
when significant conceptual variables deactivated.  
. Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.3d: Activation output of the Canterbury group map indicating map resilience 
when significant connections removed. 
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Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.3e: Activation output of the Western Bank Wetlands group map indicating map 
resilience when significant conceptual variables deactivated.  
Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.3f: Activation output of the Western Bank Wetlands group map indicating map 
resilience when significant connections removed.  
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Appendix 6.4a: Trends of various qualitative and quantitative data over the past 5 years for 
analysing the various sub-systems of Te Waihora examined.  
Sub-system 
 
 
 
 
Qualitative and quantitative data  C
oa
st
al
 s
id
e 
of
 
K
ai
to
re
te
 S
p
it
 
G
re
en
p
ar
k 
Sa
nd
s 
K
ai
tu
na
 L
ag
oo
n 
L
ak
e 
si
d
e 
of
 
K
ai
to
re
te
 S
p
it
 
O
p
en
 W
at
er
 
Su
rr
ou
nd
in
g 
A
gr
ic
u
lt
u
ra
l 
L
an
d
 
W
es
te
rn
 B
an
k 
W
et
la
nd
s 
Areas of botanical value        ∨ 
Availability of mahinga kai   ∨ ∨  ∨   
Base flow       ∨   
Chlorophyll a biomass      −   
Commercial fisheries catch       −   
Desirable habitats for weeds     −  ∧ ∧ 
Exotic grasslands   ∧  −  ∧  
Flood events       ∨   
Freshwater wetland habitat    ∧    ∧ 
Habitat availability for mahinga kai   ∨ ∨  ∨   
Light transmission       ∨   
Marsh ribbonwood    ∧ −    
Native freshwater wetland    −    ∨ 
Nitrogen concentration       ∨   
Recreation – Cycling    ∧   ∧  
Recreation – Fishing   ∨   −  ∨ 
Recreation – Hunting   ∨ ∨     
Recreation – Picnicking   ∨ ∨    ∨ 
Salinity concentration       ∨   
Saltmarsh habitat   − ∨ −   ∨ 
Sea level rise   ∧       
Selwyn River flow (e.g. Coes Ford)   ∨    ∨  
Soluble phosphorus concentration       ∧   
Suspended solids concentration       −   
Three square sedgewood    ∧     
Wildlife habitat availability  − − ∨ −   ∨ 
Wildlife species diversity   − ∧ − −   − 
Willow numbers        ∧ 
Here ∧ represents an increase in indicator value;  
∨ represents a decrease in indicator value; 
− represents a stable indicator value;  
represents a surprising trend or pattern observed.  
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Appendix 6.4b: Supporting evidence, plausibility and reliability values for the various 
abducted hypotheses determined for unexpected events in the sub-systems of Te Waihora. 
Note that the plausibility (or believability) scale ranges from 1 (low) to 9 (high) and reliability 
scale ranges from 1 (low) to 3 (high). 
Sub-system  Hypothesis 
or evidence 
Arguments  
P
la
u
si
bi
lit
y 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
Greenpark 
Sands 
Hypothesis Recreation constraints limited 8 --- 
Hypothesis Recreational activities will never change  6 --- 
Evidence Limited policing of recreation 7 3 
Evidence Self-serving behaviour of agents 6 1 
Kaituna 
Lagoon 
Hypothesis Personal observations  are incorrect 7 --- 
Hypothesis Empirical indicator data collected is inaccurate 4 --- 
Evidence Empirical indicator data has been incorrect in the 
past 
6 1 
Evidence Personal observations are biased 7 2 
Lake side of 
Kaitorete 
Spit 
Hypothesis Coarse sand substrate promotes stability  7 --- 
Hypothesis Lack of level pressure due to climatic conditions 7 --- 
Evidence Particle size determines robustness of substrate 8 3 
Evidence Changing sea levels 6 2 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Hypothesis Sound riparian management? 4 --- 
Hypothesis Poor wetland understanding 8 --- 
Evidence Inappropriate native tree species planted for a 
wetland 
7 3 
Evidence Native tree species buffer & stabilize waterways 6 2 
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Appendix 6.5: Complete list of conceptual variables of the various systems investigated. Note 
conceptual variables placed between brackets (…) represent actual abductions; conceptual 
variables placed between curly brackets {…} represent virtual abductions. 
System  Conceptual variables (in alphabetical order) 
Te Waihora Catchment Land Use, Climate Change, Coastal-Lake Interactions, Erosion & 
Sedimentation, Harvesting, Inflow Quality, Inflow Quantity, Lake 
Infrastructure, Lake Margin Management, Lake Margin Private Ownership, 
Lake Opening, Lake Place Attachment, Loss of Recreation Culture, Native 
Habitat Loss, Ngāi Tahu Values, Nutrient Runoff, Production-Conservation 
Balance, Recreation Access, Salinity, Unaesthetic Lake, Unsuitable Recreation 
Environment, Utilitarian Lake Perception, Water Extraction, Weedbed Loss.  
Canterbury Agricultural Labour Saving, Agricultural Technology, Availability of Imported 
Goods, Changing Trade Connections, {Cheap Travel}, Climate Change, 
Commodity Prices, Community Attitudes, Dairying Profitability, Economy 
Deregulation, Environmental Degradation, Farmer Entrepreneurship, Food 
Demand, {Food Surplus Mass Migration}, Government Policy, {Increasing 
Environmental Awareness}, Land Prices, Laws & Institutions, Lifestyle & 
Cultural Consumption, Political Correctness, Public Preferences, Regional 
Resources, Regional Supply, Resource Exploitation, {Social Capital Collapse}, 
Tourism, Transport Infrastructure, Urban Population, Water Availability.  
Coastal side 
of Kaitorete 
Spit 
Deposition, Ecological Restoration, Erosion, Exotic Plantings, Frost Free, New 
Soil Substrate, Long Shore Drift, Recreation, Salt Water Intrusion, Sand Removal, 
Sand/Gravel Balance, Sea Level Rise, Stock Grazing, Weed Invasion, Wind 
Greenpark 
Sands 
Evaporation, Freshwater Inflows, Lake Level Fluctuations, Lake Opening, 
(Limited Recreational Constraints), Recreation, Salinity, Sediment Size, Stock 
Grazing, Weedbed Loss, Weeds, Wind  
Kaituna 
Lagoon 
Canada Geese Impacts, Freshwater Inflows, High Nutrient Load, Lagoon 
Shallowness, Lake Level Fluctuations, Lake Opening, Reclamation, (Recreation), 
Sedimentation, Stock Grazing  
Lake side of 
Kaitorete 
Spit 
Erosion, Lake Level Fluctuations, Lake Opening, Salinity, (Stable) Coarse 
Substrate, Stock Grazing, Weeds, Windlash 
Open Water Lake Level Fluctuations, Lake Opening, Nutrient Runoff, Recreation, Sea Level 
Rise, Waterfowl, Water Quality, Weedbed Loss, Waterfowl  
Surrounding 
Agricultural 
Land 
Drainage, Drought on Sand Soil, Farming Type, Fertilizer Application, Fire, 
Frontier Development, Lake Opening, Land Use Intensification, Nutrient 
Runoff, Poor Boundary Protection, Poor Waste Management, Salt Spray, 
Sedimentation, Stock Grazing 
Western 
Bank 
Wetlands 
Canada Geese Impacts, Commercial Fishing, Erosion, Freshwater Inflows, High 
Soil Fertility, Lake Level Fluctuations, Lake Openings, Land Use Intensification, 
Limited Remnant Valuing, Poor Vegetation Management, (Poor Wetland 
Understanding), Stock Grazing, Variable Salinity, Willow Invasion 
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Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.6a: Normalized simulated activation output of the Coastal side of Kaitorete Spit 
group map.  
Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.6b: Normalized simulated activation output of the Greenpark Sands group map.  
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Conceptual Variables
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Appendix 6.6c: Normalized simulated activation output for the Kaituna Lagoon group map. 
Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.6d: Normalized simulated activation output for the  
Lake side of Kaitorete Spit group map. 
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Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.6e: Normalized simulated activation output for the  
Open Water group map. 
Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.6f: Normalized simulated activation output for the  
Surrounding Agricultural Land group map. 
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Appendix 6.7a: The futuristic qualitative narratives for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem future 
outcomes. 
Future 
outcome 
Futuristic qualitative narrative 
Agricultural 
Reclamation 
Te Waihora is a lake ecosystem, which has progressively been drained and converted 
to agricultural land. The biodiversity of the lake and all of the lake margin wetland 
habitats have been decimated, as the highly polluted, but considerably smaller 
remaining lake waters are stock-banked. The catchment tributaries, such as the 
Selwyn river, are also stock-banked to protect the inundation of farm land in case of 
flooding events.    
Algal Bloom Te Waihora is a lake ecosystem with regular algal blooms occurring through the lake. 
Few fish live in the lake waters, as oxygen levels in the lake are very low. The lake 
margin wetland habitats are low in biodiversity, with only non-native weedy species 
prevailing in these areas.    
Clear Water 
(Full) 
Te Waihora is a lake ecosystem with submerged macrophytic plants throughout the 
lake. The extensive weedbeds appear to trap sediment so that the water column of 
the lake has a high water clarity and piscivorous fish (e.g. eels, trout) predominate. 
The lake margin wetland habitats have a high biodiversity with many native flora 
and fauna species.  
Clear Water 
(Partial)  
Te Waihora is a lake ecosystem with submerged macrophytic plants around the 
perimeter of the lake. The main body of the lake is highly turbid where 
phytoplankton and planktivorous/benthivorous fish predominate, though few algal 
blooms occur. However, where the weedbeds are present the lake has a high water 
clarity and piscivorous fish predominate. The lake margin wetland habitats have a 
high biodiversity with many native flora and fauna species.   
Turbid 
Water  
Te Waihora is a lake ecosystem dominated by phytoplankton and 
planktivorous/benthivorous fish within its highly turbid lake waters, though few 
algal blooms occur. The lake margin wetland habitats have a high biodiversity, 
though many non-native weedy species predominate in these areas.    
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Appendix 6.7b: The futuristic qualitative narratives for the Canterbury bioregion future 
outcomes. 
Future 
outcome  
Futuristic qualitative narrative  
Dry Climate Canterbury is a bioregion with only a few remaining profitable farms in the dry 
prevailing climatic conditions. Attitudes about the environment are varied. However, 
many in the urban areas have become very concerned about the state of the 
environment, especially waterways and rivers, and have put considerable pressure 
on local governments to conserve all remaining water supplies and natural systems, 
preventing amongst other things farmland irrigation and the viability of intensive 
agricultural practices. The viability of intensive practices is further precluded 
through the introduction of government regulation and taxes to ensure that the 
limited supply of water remains unpolluted and efficiently utilized in the region.   
Intensive 
Agriculture 
Canterbury is a bioregion dominated by a large and intensively-managed 
agricultural sector focused on fast-growing food, fuel and fibre commodities, which 
is corporate administered, export-focused and attempts to maximize the profitability 
of its land use given energy and water constraints. Nevertheless, whilst the regional 
environment is highly productive, it is also homogeneous in land cover and 
conflicting attitudes towards the environment exist between the rural and urban 
communities, as it is evident that the waterways and rivers throughout Canterbury 
are becoming ever more polluted. 
Lifestyle Canterbury is a bioregion with many smaller farm holdings whose general emphasis 
is for the purpose of lifestyle consumption rather than profit alone. As a result, whilst 
the region is economically self-sustaining through a myriad of networked townships, 
it is not as a whole intensively managed nor especially commodity oriented. 
However, given that preferences for land use are partially at the ‘whim’ of the land 
owner the regional environment is heterogeneous in land cover and adapted to 
localized differences each with their own distinct environmental attitudes.    
Slums Canterbury is a bioregion where abject poverty is prevalent throughout the region, 
whereby there is a large discrepancy between the rich, often rural land-owning class 
and the poor, who live predominantly in urban slums or squat in abandoned areas.  
This divide between the rich and the poor proliferates with much social, economic 
and institutional unrest in the region. As a result, environmental concerns are not 
considered particularly important, and little money is available to support 
conservation endeavours.  
Suburban 
Sprawl 
Canterbury is a bioregion with a large ageing, immigrant and urban-dwelling 
population, whereby much of the coastal region has expanded into suburban and 
satellite ‘sprawl’ with these areas dominated by information technology industries. 
As such, large-scale agriculture is practiced in the regional interior as a means to 
support the urban population. Hence, attitudes towards the environment are heavily 
influenced by the many heterogeneous urban communities, who have some concerns 
about the state of the environment.   
Tourism Canterbury is a bioregion where only in the most arable areas is agricultural land use 
still remain economically viable. Nevertheless, despite the unprofitable nature of 
agriculture, enterprise has emerged in the tourism sector, especially amongst the 
remaining natural environments. Restoration efforts are prevalent to improve 
aesthetic appeal. Environmental attitudes are driven by the perceptions of overseas 
travellers rather than the regional population.  
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Appendix 6.7c: The futuristic qualitative narratives for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system 
future outcomes. 
Future 
Outcome 
Futuristic qualitative narrative 
Agriculture The Western Bank is a wetland sub-system where agricultural exotic grass species are 
abundant. Agricultural practices occur where possible right up to the lake edge. Few 
native wetland species (e.g. raupo) are present with non-native weedy species 
prevalent in the few areas that are unsuitable for farming.   
Native 
Freshwater 
Wetland  
The Western Bank is a wetland sub-system where numerous native wetland species 
(e.g. raupo) are prevalent, while non-native weedy species are only found in a few 
pocket locations. The complexity and biodiversity of the wetland is high with many 
native fauna species inhabiting the area.  
Native/ 
Weedy 
Freshwater 
Wetland 
The Western Bank is a wetland sub-system where both non-native weedy species and 
native species predominate. The complexity and biodiversity of the wetland is quite 
high, though willows spread throughout the area.  
Saltmarsh The Western Bank is a wetland sub-system of high salinity, where native and non-
native saltmarsh species predominate. There are few freshwater species in this area, 
except in a few localized pockets where ground springs are found.   
Willow-
dominated 
Swampland 
The Western Bank is a wetland sub-system where willows predominate throughout 
the area. The wetland is fairly simple and the biodiversity is low, with only a few 
non-native weedy species existing underneath the willow canopy.   
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Appendix 6.8a: Supporting evidence, plausibility, believability and reliability values for the 
various abducted hypotheses determined for future outcomes with potential surprise values 
between zero and one in the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. 
Future 
Outcome 
Hypothesis 
or evidence 
Arguments  
P
la
u
si
bi
lit
y/
 
B
el
ie
va
bi
lit
y 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
Clear 
Water  
(Partial) 
Hypothesis Less intensification of catchment land use  5 --- 
Evidence Movement toward sustainable agricultural practices  5 2 
Hypothesis  Decreased catchment water abstraction  7 --- 
Evidence  Increased resource controls on water 7 2 
Hypothesis Lag period between nutrient load and state 
transition shorter than expected 
3 --- 
Evidence Limited scientific knowledge of Te Waihora  7 2 
Hypothesis  Biophysical drivers change altering clarity and 
switching behavior 
3 --- 
Evidence  Ecosystems are complex and poorly understood 8 3 
Algal  
Bloom 
Hypothesis Hot summer with little wind (i.e. calm conditions) 8 --- 
Evidence Climatic conditions are variable and changing  9 2 
Hypothesis  Saturation levels of nutrients reached  9 --- 
Evidence  Lake is hyper-eutrophic 9 3 
Hypothesis Incremental nutrient load exceeds prescribed 
environmental limits 
5 --- 
Evidence Increased intensification in agricultural practice 9 3 
Hypothesis Less sediment in water column leading to increased 
light penetration  
5 --- 
Evidence Limitation to light prevents algal blooms  8 2 
Hypothesis  Increased catchment water abstraction  7 --- 
Evidence  Scheme for irrigation to be brought to much of 
Canterbury Plains 
6 2 
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Appendix 6.8b: Supporting evidence, plausibility, believability and reliability values for the 
various abducted hypotheses determined for future outcomes with potential surprise values 
between zero and one in the Canterbury bioregion.  
Future 
outcome 
Hypothesis 
or evidence 
Arguments  
P
la
u
si
bi
lit
y/
 
B
el
ie
va
bi
lit
y 
 
R
el
ia
bi
lit
y 
Dry Hypothesis Irrigation disallowed in Canterbury  7 --- 
Climate Evidence Resource control increasing 8 3 
 Hypothesis Poor understanding of suitable dry climate farming 5 --- 
 Evidence Farmers unable to be profitable in arid climates  6 2 
Intensive Hypothesis New Zealand government becomes a dictatorship 9 --- 
Agriculture Evidence Historical evidence of enforced stability 7 3 
 Hypothesis Environmental concerns proven to be unfounded 2 --- 
 Evidence No evident large-scale environmental collapse 
despite doomsayers 
7 2 
Lifestyle Hypothesis Experts persuade public of local living benefits 7 --- 
 Evidence Return to local living seems a popular concept  6 2 
 Hypothesis Strong green government elected 8 --- 
 Evidence Green ideologies becoming more mainstream 2 1 
 Hypothesis Agriculture is proven to be unsustainable  5 --- 
 Evidence Increasing environmental concerns about 
agriculture (e.g. GM, pesticides) 
6 2 
Slums Hypothesis Loss of social capital & institutions  5 --- 
 Evidence Happened in countries in South America & Africa 9 3 
 Hypothesis Collapse of capitalism/world market 9 --- 
 Evidence Many socio-economics indicators 8 2 
Suburban Hypothesis Mass migration from Bangladesh or parts of Europe 8 --- 
Sprawl Evidence Low lying countries will be flooded 7 3 
 Hypothesis Re-colonization of New Zealand 5 --- 
 Evidence Colonization has occurred before  4 3 
 Hypothesis  Agriculture export led, where surplus food results 
in migration  
6 --- 
 Evidence  New Zealand population not large enough to use 
agricultural produce 
4 3 
Tourism  Hypothesis Oil prices drop to record low levels or cheap 
alternative energy developed 
7 --- 
 Evidence Peak oil overstated and alternative energy available 6 2 
 Hypothesis  Increase in tourism demand through surplus capital 7 --- 
 Evidence  People spend disposable income on tourism 8 2 
 Hypothesis Colonization of New Zealand  5 --- 
 Evidence Colonization has historically occurred before 4 3 
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Appendix 6.9a: Te Waihora group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Saturated Nutrients. 
Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.9b: Canterbury group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Irrigation Prohibited. 
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Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.9c: Canterbury group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Environmental Awareness. 
Conceptual Variables
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Appendix 6.9d: Canterbury group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Dictatorship. 
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Conceptual Variables 
Da
iry
in
g P
ro
fit
ab
ili
ty
Ag
ric
ul
tu
ra
l T
ec
hn
ol
og
y
W
at
er
 A
va
ila
bi
lit
y
Co
m
m
od
ity
 P
ric
es
So
cia
l C
ap
ita
l C
oll
ap
se
Fo
od
 D
em
an
d
En
vi
ro
nm
en
ta
l D
eg
ra
da
tio
n
Ur
ba
n 
Po
pu
lat
io
n 
Cl
im
at
e C
ha
ng
e
To
ur
ism
Su
pp
ly
Re
gi
on
al 
Re
so
ur
ce
s
La
nd
 P
ric
es
Li
fe
sty
le 
& 
Cu
ltu
ra
l C
on
su
m
pt
io
n
La
w
s &
 In
sti
tu
tio
ns
C
en
tr
al
it
y
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
Before virtual abduction 
After virtual abduction 
 
Appendix 6.9e: Canterbury group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Social Capital Collapse. 
Conceptual Variables
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Appendix 6.9f: Canterbury group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Mass Migration. 
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Conceptual Variables 
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Appendix 6.9g: Canterbury group map with the ex-ante-futuro hypothesis Cheap Travel. 
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Appendix 7.1: Average utility scores of ecosystem services for future outcomes of systems examined. 
 
 
System  Te Waihora Canterbury Western Bank 
Wetlands 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ecosystem services  
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s
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W
i
l
l
o
w
-
D
o
m
i
n
a
t
e
d
 
S
w
a
m
p
l
a
n
d
 
Climate Regulation  -0.8 -0.1 0.2    0 .1 -0.2 -0.2 -0.2 -0.5 -0.8 0.8 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.3 
Disease Regulation  -0.3 -0.9 0.5 0.5 0.0 -0.2 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.3 -0.2 
Water Regulation  -0.4 -0.5 1.0 1.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 -0.3 
Water & Air Purification  -0.9 -0.5 1.0 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 0.5 -0.2 -0.3 0.2 -0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 
Biological & Erosion Control -0.7 -0.5 0.5 0.4 -0.3 0.0 0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.5 0.3 -0.2 -0.5 
Food 0.9 -0.5 1.0 1.0 -0.8 1.0 -0.3 -0.5 -0.2 -1.0 1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.7 
Fuel  1.0 -0.5 0.1 0.1 -0.2 0.8 0.0 -0.3 0.0 -0.5 0.2 0.0 -0.2 0.0 
Freshwater -0.2 -0.6 1.0 0.9 -0.8 0.0 0.5 -0.8 -0.2 0.5 -0.3 0.0 -0.7 0.0 
Biological Products 1.0 -0.4 0.5 0.5 -0.3 0.8 0.0 -0.5 0.0 -0.3 0.0 0.0 0.2 -0.2 
Nutrient Cycling 0.0 0.0 0.6 0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.2 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Pollination 0.2 -0.5 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 -0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Soil Formation  -0.5 0.0 0.6 0.5 -0.2 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 0.0 -0.3 
Primary Production  0.5 0.0 0.7 0.5 -0.7 1.0 -0.2 -0.3 -0.2 -0.3 -0.5 0.0 0.0 -0.2 
Aesthetic Values -0.8 -0.1  1.0 0.9 -0.3 -0.2 0.8 -0.8 -0.2 1.0 -1.0 0.0 -0.2 -0.2 
Educational Values -0.6 -0.2 1.0 1.0 -0.3 0.0 0.5 -0.8 0.7 1.0 -0.8 0.8 0.5 -0.5 
Spiritual Values -1.0 -0.9 1.0 0.9 -0.2 -0.5 0.5 -0.7 0.2 1.0 -1.0 1.0 -0.2 -0.7 
Recreational Values -0.5 -0.5 0.7 1.0 -0.5 0.0 0.5 -0.8 0.3 1.0 -1.0 0.2 0.0 -0.8 
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Appendix 7.2a: Feasibility of the proposed management actions for the Te Waihora lake ecosystem. 
Note F represents a feasible management action and I represents an infeasible management action. 
Proposed 
management 
action  
Management action description 
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
s
u
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
 F
e
a
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
Status Quo 
Lake Opening 
The status quo lake opening is guided by the NWCO (i.e. National Water Conservation 
Order) 1990, which is implemented to shift emphasis away from agricultural 
requirements to wider ecological concerns, including the protection of significant 
ecological habitats. However, whilst the NWCO is presently implemented, to date the 
actual trigger levels for artificially opening the lake (i.e. 1.05 and 1.13 m asl), remain as 
those stipulated by the North Canterbury Catchment Board (NCCB) during the 1940s, 
where levels were determined with the protection of productive agricultural lands 
being in mind. Nevertheless, the NWCO does allow for higher lake levels and the 
application of resource consents for both additional artificial openings and closures 
within certain times of the year in recognition of the ecological processes and habitats of 
the lake ecosystem. However, these additional stipulations have yet to be implemented, 
presumably because of budgetary constraints.  
0.0  F 
Active 
Macrophyte 
Re-establishment  
The active re-establishment of submerged macrophytes by planting 300 ha around lake 
margins and tributaries is foreseen to stabilize sediments in the lake. However, to 
prevent disturbance during germination, exclosure cages would be readily used.   
0.2  F 
Artificial 
Retention Basin  
Artificial retention basins are designed to hold a portion of storm water runoff for a 
certain length of time so as to allow pollutant removal through vegetative filtration, 
settling and biological uptake. Generally, retention basins are created to be partly an 
artificial open water lake and a wetland. The land requirement for the construction of 
an artificial retention basin upstream is typically large, and would be approximately 
three percent of Te Waihora’s water volume or 300 ha at 4 m deep. Given the size of the 
retention system required, there would be considerable habitat benefits for wildlife. 
0.6  F 
Controlled 
Opening Flow 
Outlet 
The construction of a controlled opening flow outlet would allow the height and 
variability of the lake level to be varied and controlled, so that the lake can be 
sensitively managed for both conservation and production purposes.  
0.7  F 
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Proposed 
management 
action  
 
 
Management action description 
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
s
u
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
 F
e
a
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
Copper 
Treatment 
Copper, if added to the lake may act as a contact non-selective herbicide. Specifically, 
the active ingredient with copper treatment is the copper ion, and its mode of action is 
to inhibit photosynthesis, thus, acting as an algaecide. However, the non-selective 
characteristic of copper means it will also affect non-target flora and fauna.  
0.9  I 
Fish Bio- 
manipulation  
Fish biomanipulation is where the biomass of fish stocks, especially those that feed at 
the bottom of the lake bed are temporarily enclosed or removed, so as to mitigate 
turbidity and the re-suspension of sediment from fish disturbance.  
0.7  F 
Flocculation  The addition of a suitable flocculant such as alum (i.e. aluminium sulphate) to the lake 
water surface, may allow the aggregation of the nutrient particles and sediment forming 
a hydroxide precipitate, to which phosphorus is readily absorbed. Hence, in theory, 
with phosphorus precipitated, these nutrients are removed from the water column.  
0.9  I 
Floodwater 
Diversion  
The diversion of floodwaters away from Te Waihora requires the building of a stop-
banked channel that diverts Selwyn River flood flows into the Rakaia River. The 
diversion of floodwaters from the lake may be reasonable if the associated nutrient load 
is particularly undesirable and the loss of the hydrologic load will not have undue 
negative environmental impacts. However, mean lake level and lake level fluctuations 
would decline with diversion.  
1.0  I 
Freshwater 
Supplementation  
The supplementation of freshwater that is free from pollutants and sediment could be 
achieved by diverting freshwater from the Rakaia catchment by way of a canal. It is 
reasoned that by supplementing freshwater into the lake a dilution and flushing effect 
would occur. Naturally, in implementing this regime, lake levels would increase.   
0.9  I 
Higher Trigger 
Level 
Lake Opening  
The higher lake trigger level opening stipulates that a trigger level for the lake opening 
should be raised to approximately 1.5 m asl. A higher trigger level for the lake opening 
regime leads to fewer lake openings and an easier engineering process for 
implementation than the status quo trigger levels. However, lake level fluctuations will 
be reduced, and adjacent farm land will be heavily inundated with lake water given the 
greater water surface area of the lake inevitable with a trigger level at 1.5 m asl  
0.8  F 
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Proposed 
management 
action  
 
 
Management action description 
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
s
u
r
p
r
i
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e
 
 F
e
a
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
No Lake 
Opening 
No lake opening entails that no artificial openings are made, so that gravel movement 
would close off the lake from the sea for long time periods. This would increase both 
mean water depth and size of the lake dramatically, inundating at least 30,000 ha of 
farm land with lake water.   
1.0  I 
Permanent 
Opening Flow 
Outlet 
The construction of a permanent opening flow outlet at the lake opening would result 
in a low trigger level (i.e. 0.3m asl), which would substantially reduce both mean lake 
level and water surface area. 
1.0  I 
Reclamation  The reclamation of land requires the construction of drainage ditches (0.5 m asl) and 
stop banking to prevent the inundation of lake water on to adjacent farmland. 
Reclamation would substantially reduce water surface area and mean lake levels, but 
increase the frequency of lake level fluctuations. Importantly, reclamation is counter to 
the NWCO, the Resource Management Act 1991 and the Te Waihora Joint Management 
Plan 2005, as it would reduce lake margin habitat. 
0.9  I 
Riparian 
Restoration 
Planting 
The utilization of riparian restoration planting of the lake margin and banks of 
inflowing tributaries would provide some capacity to assimilating pollutants and 
preventing nutrient runoff. Specifically, riparian and restoration planting entails 
weeding, then fencing wetland, stream and tributary boundaries to prevent stock 
grazing and finally planting native vegetation in degraded areas creating 5 m wide 
buffer zones, which provide the added benefit of improved habitat for wildlife. 
0.1  F 
Sediment 
Dredging 
Sediment dredging is the physical removal of lake-bottom contaminated sediments and 
is often employed to deal with excessive deposition of eroded matter through processes 
of sedimentation. It is believed that dredging may decline turbidity by reduced re-
suspension of unconsolidated sediments and stop the ongoing aggradation of shallow 
lakes. Sediment dredging also requires a suitable disposal area for the contaminated 
sediment.  
0.9  I 
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Appendix 7.2b: Feasibility of the proposed management actions for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system. 
Proposed 
management 
action 
Management action description 
P
o
t
e
n
t
i
a
l
 
s
u
r
p
r
i
s
e
 
 F
e
a
s
i
b
i
l
i
t
y
 
Status Quo 
DOC 
Monitoring 
In accordance with the Te Waihora Joint Management Plan 2005, DOC at present 
regularly monitors the dynamic vegetation patterns of the Western Bank Wetlands.  
0.0 F 
DOC Land 
Purchase of 
Private Wetlands 
The procurement of private wetlands areas amongst the Western Bank Wetlands would 
provide the capacity for DOC to protect the boundaries and condition of wetland areas 
from stock grazing. In addition, to this land purchase, some pest control is proposed.   
0.5 F 
Higher Trigger 
Level Lake 
Opening 
See Appendix 7.2a 1.0 I 
Riparian 
Restoration 
Planting 
See Appendix 7.2a  0.0 F 
Wetland 
Education & 
Ecological 
Restoration 
Wetland education would be instrumented, where local community groups are 
educated into the importance of wetland ecology and restoration. DOC and local 
community groups then ecologically restore wetland areas that are perceived to be 
degraded by planting native species suitable for wetlands.  
0.0 F 
Willow Removal  Willow removal by bulldozer would prevent the ongoing invasion of willows within 
this wetland area, which presently is decreasing native vegetation habitat.   
0.1 F 
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Appendix 7.3a: Cost structures for the feasible management actions of the Te Waihora lake ecosystem.  
Note that where the lake opening has not been explicitly managed for,  
other management actions include the status quo lake opening cost structures.  
Feasible 
management 
action 
Cost structures 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
 
 
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
(
$
0
0
0
s
)
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
(
$
0
0
0
s
)
 
Status Quo 
Lake Opening 
Lake opening performed once or twice per year equating to an annual cost of $153,000 
(see Reid & Holmes, 1996). 
--- $164 
Active 
Macrophyte 
Re-establishment 
The cost of planting macrophytes and building protective exclosures for them from 
wave action is estimated to be $15,000 per ha (Gerbeaux, 1993; Bayside City Council, 
2001).  
$4530 $164 
Artificial 
Retention Basin 
The construction of an artificial retention basin would cost approximately $28,000 per 
ha. This includes the development of a wetland, which would reduce annual 
maintenance costs to a negligible amount. 300 ha of land would also have to be 
procured (see Coveney et al., 2002; Hill, 2007; pers. comm.).  
$10,110 $265 
Controlled 
Opening Flow 
Outlet 
Construction costs of a permanent opening flow outlet have been determined, but not 
for a controlled outlet, which would be more expensive. However, approximate 
construction costs of $15,000,000 and $1,500,000 for annual maintenance costs have been 
suggested (Morris and Wilson Consulting Engineers, 1980; Palmer, 2007; pers. comm.).  
$15,000 $1500 
Higher Trigger 
Level 
Lake Opening 
Lake opening performed once per year equating to an annual cost of $116,000. 2900 ha 
of land procured at $15,000 per ha as a result of farm land inundation (see Reid & 
Holmes, 1996; Hill, 2007; pers. comm.). 
$12,650 $140 
Fish Bio- 
Manipulation 
The cost of enclosing fish species on average is approximately $500 per ha. However, 
fish biomanipulation costs vary substantially as they depend on the labour cost for 
removing planktivores or the stocking cost of added piscivores (Hosper et al., 1992; 
Cooke et al., 1993; Hein, 2006).  
$1671 $164 
Riparian 
Restoration 
Planting 
Planting costs are $51,000 per km with a 5 m buffer each side of tributaries at 24 km in 
length, as well as on one side of lake margins at 66 km in length (River Ecosystem 
Group, 2003).  
$2622 $164 
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Appendix 7.3b: Cost structures for the feasible management actions of the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system.  
Note that all management actions account for DOC monitoring in their costing.  
Feasible 
management 
action 
Cost structures 
I
n
i
t
i
a
l
 
 
 
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
(
$
0
0
0
s
)
 
A
n
n
u
a
l
 
c
o
s
t
s
 
(
$
0
0
0
s
)
 
Status Quo 
DOC 
Monitoring 
The cost of DOC monitoring is $45 per hour and involves up to 120 hours per year, 
which involves field monitoring and reporting (Cowan & Pugsley, 1995; Palmer, 2007; 
pers. comm.). 
--- $8 
DOC Land 
Purchase of 
Private Wetlands  
600 ha of land procured at $15,000 per ha for the purposes of concerting private farm 
land into conservation estate (Hill, 2007; pers. comm.). Pest control costs $30 per ha for 
bait and labour (Coleman et al., 2007). 
$9000 $10 
Riparian 
Restoration 
Planting 
Planting costs are $51,000 per km with a 5 m buffer each side of tributaries at 9 km in 
length, as well as on one side of lake margins at 13 km in length (River Ecosystem 
Group, 2003). 
$791 $12 
Wetland 
Education & 
Ecological 
Restoration 
A widespread wetland education programme, which includes school trips to the 
wetland would cost $5,000 per year (Shanks, 2007; pers comm.; Newman, 2007; pers. 
comm.). The ecological restoration of the wetlands involving one-off weeding and 
planting of suitable native species would cost $65,000 per ha of a total 100 ha of 
degraded wetland area (National Research Council, 1992).  
$6500 $16 
Willow Removal  Willow removal by bulldozer would cost $9300 per km and would cover approximately 
100 km of land. In addition, every year there would checks on willow re-growth, which 
is an additional 2% on costs (Burston et al., 1997).  
$930 $27 
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Appendix 7.4a: Potential surprise map for ECOPY gains after five years (r = 5%) of 
implementing the various feasible management actions on the Western Bank Wetlands sub-
system.  
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Appendix 7.4b: Potential surprise map for ECOPY losses after five years (r = 5%) of 
implementing the various feasible management actions on the Western Bank Wetlands sub-
system.  
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Appendix 7.4c: Potential surprise map for ECOPY gains after 25 years (r = 5%) of 
implementing the various feasible management actions under an Intensive Agriculture future 
outcome.  
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Appendix 7.4d: Potential surprise map for ECOPY losses after 25 years (r = 5%) of 
implementing the various feasible management actions under an Intensive Agriculture future 
outcome.  
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Appendix 7.4e: Potential surprise map for ECOPY gains after 25 years (r = 5%) of 
implementing the various feasible management actions under a Dry Climate future outcome.  
 
PV Cost (NZ$ million) per ECOPY lost
0 50 100 150 200
P
ot
en
ti
al
 S
u
rp
ri
se
 V
al
u
e 
0.0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1.0
SQ
WR
WERP
LP
Potentially efficient frontier
Unsurprised
Utterly
Astonished
 
Appendix 7.4f: Potential surprise map for ECOPY losses after 25 years (r = 5%) of 
implementing the various feasible management actions under a Dry Climate future outcome.  
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Appendix 7.5a: Gambler preference map for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system after five 
years. 
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Appendix 7.5b: Gambler preference map for the Western Bank Wetlands sub-system after 25 
years. Note that management actions in ‘black’ represent those under the Intensive Agriculture 
future outcome and management actions in ‘red’ represent those under the Dry Climate 
future outcome.  
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Glossary 
 
 
Abduction (Section 5.0): A mode of logic developed by the logician Peirce (1931-1958) for the purposes of 
creative conjecture so as to explain an unexpected outcome.  
Abductive process of research (Section 5.2.4): A novel research process that incorporates the methodology 
of an informed intuition with the systematic application of abductive logic.  
Abductive exercises (Section 5.2.3): A method where the future outcome generated by one participant 
results in a (potential) surprise for another participant, so that a novel hypothesis can be generated to 
explain the surprise.   
Adaptive cycle (Section 2.2.4): A metaphor developed by the ecologist Holling (1986; 2001), which depicts 
the continuous process of an ecosystem having the capacity to grow and adapt along a succession 
pathway, while also having the capacity to re-organize and adapt to change. 
Adaptive co-management (Section 4.2): An approach to ecosystem management that emphasizes the need 
for collaboration, so as to establish a shared common knowledge amongst participants, while attempting 
to retain adaptive learning that is systematic.  
Analytical hierarchy process (Section 4.2.9): A multi-criteria analytical method developed by Saaty (1980) 
that uses ratio mathematics and pairwise comparisons within a hierarchical networked structure.  
Complex adaptive system (Section 2.2.3): A networked system that results in emergent macroscopic global 
behaviour from the microscopic local interactions of agents, while recognizing that agents can also adapt 
their own behaviour.   
Computational irreducibility (Section 3.2.4): A term developed by Wolfram (2002) to describe the result of 
modelling a complex system that does not settle down, as a result of the endogenous nature of complex 
dynamics. 
Connective theory of value (Section 2.2.6): A concept that recognizes that utility is experienced when 
human agents are connected with the external system (Foster, 2006).  
Constructive co-management (Section 5.2.5): A novel approach to ecosystem management that 
incorporates the principles of adaptive co-management, while recognizing the potential actively to 
construct ecosystems through locally appropriate ecological engineering.  
Cost utility analysis (Section 1.1): A method of economic evaluation that puts the benefits or outcome 
function of analysis in a utility index rather than a monetary measurement.  
Demi-macro-regularity (Section 5.2): A representation of a macro-regularity of system behaviour that is 
only a limited causal tendency in time and space.  
Ecosystem health (Section 1.3): A concept derived to determine the status of ecosystems.  
ECHO (Section 4.2.6): Explanatory Coherence by Harmony Optimization model is a computational 
algorithm underpinned by the theory of explanatory coherence, which provides support for determining 
the coherence in arguments (Thagard, 1992).  
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ECHO-adjusted plausibility values (Section 4.2.6): A plausibility value elicited by a participant that has 
been adjusted by simulating the argument in the ECHO model, which adjusts plausibility values given 
according to their coherence through attaching to these values positive excitatory weights or negative 
inhibitory weights.   
ECO (Section 2.2.6): A utility index representing Ecosystem Outcome, which is determined by aggregating 
preferential weights of ecosystem services with utility scores of ecosystem services for a particular system 
state.  
ECOPY (Section 2.2.6): A novel utility index representing Ecosystem Outcome Protection Years, which is 
determined by discounting the ECO index.  
Ex-ante-futuro hypothesis (Section 5.2.3): A novel explanatory hypothesis generated by abductive logic 
from the potential surprise of a future outcome occurring.  
Ex-post-facto hypothesis (Section 5.1): A novel explanatory hypothesis generated by abductive logic from 
an actual unexpected outcome occurring.   
Fuzzy cognitive mapping (Section 4.2.4): A method that depicts the conceived mental models of experts, 
which can then be analysed using artificial neural network simulations.  
Genuine uncertainty (Section 5.2): A type of uncertainty that recognizes the impossibility of defining the 
complete set of outcomes for a course of action.  
Inference to the best explanation (Section 4.2.6): A method of theory selection based on selecting plausible 
theories according to their explanatory goodness.  
Informed intuition (Section 4.2.2): A methodological approach that incorporates intuition, conscious 
deliberation and various analytical methods for the purpose of aiding and informing intuitive responses.  
Neural network (Section 4.1): A representation of the mind where a network is formed between concepts 
and causal connections between concepts.  
Non-ergodicity (Section 5.2): A term used to explain when future outcomes are not epistemologically 
reflected in the past.  
Panarchy (Section 2.2.4): A nested set or hierarchy of adaptive cycles operating at different spatio-temporal 
scales (Holling, 2001).   
Potential surprise (Section 5.2.2): A non-probabilistic concept developed by the economist Shackle (1949; 
1961) to represent the surprise that would be felt if a particular future outcome did occur.  
Promoted (espoused) theory (Section 4.1.3): A term developed by Argyris (1985) to represent the set of 
explicit theories that human agents think they believe in.  
Resource co-manager (Section 4.2): A participant that is involved throughout the managerial process of 
adaptive co-management.   
Scale-free network (Section 2.2.1): A network architecture or topology of a complex system that follows a 
power law distribution, where it is generated by self-organizing processes determined by preference and 
network growth (Barabási, 2003).   
Theories-in-use (Section 4.1.2): A term developed by Argyris (1985) to represent the set of implicit and 
explicit theories that are actually used and believed in by human agents.  
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Only the mountain has lived long enough to listen objectively to the howl of the wolf 
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